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Ethnoconfessional Nationalism in the Balkans: 
Analysis, Manifestations and Managements 
 
Gordon N. Bardos 
 
 
For at least the past two hundred years, ethnoconfessional nationalism has been the most 
powerful ideology and force shaping political and social developments in southeastern Europe. 
This dissertation argues that Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is such an important element 
in southeastern Europe because it is a collective, chronic and non-economic phenomenon which 
transcends other political ideologies, generations, or socio-economic classes. As such, 
conventional Marxist-based approaches to understanding the phenomenon of nationalism, and 
their intellectual descendants such as the more materially-based forms of social constructivism 
and instrumentalism, consistently fail to both understand and predict its appeal and success in 
southeastern Europe. The dissertation concludes by arguing that there are severe limitations to 
the extent to which outsiders can manage the outcome of ethnoconfessional conflicts; hence, in 
terms of policy prescriptions, the analysis provided in this dissertation argues for a cautious and 
modest understanding of the extent to which intervention by the international community can 
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The Problem and a Proposed Explanation 
 
The state makes the nation. 
Josef Pilsudski 
 
Nations are created and abolished by God, and not by ministers or dictators.  
Only what springs up from the people can be long-lasting. 
Vladko Maček 
 
The attempt, through the use of state power, to create in the shortest possible time a Yugoslav 
nationalism that would suffocate Serbian and Croatian nationalism—did not succeed. 
Slobodan Jovanović 
 
We have up until now tried everything possible to maintain Yugoslavia: 
 first it was a unitary state, then it became a federation, and now we are moving towards a 
confederation. If even that does not succeed,  
then it only remains for us to admit that the Comintern 
 was right when it claimed that Yugoslavia was an artificial creation,  




I. The Problem of Ethnoconfessional Nationalism 
     The dominant force in Balkan politics and society for the past 200 years has been 
ethnoconfessional nationalism.
1
 Some one hundred years ago, it led to the breakup of the 
Habsburg and Ottoman empires, and sparked the beginning of the First World War. In the 1990s, 
it has led to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the wars accompanying its breakup. 
For the past two decades, trying to control its often violent manifestations has been a major focus 
of international attention. Former U.S. president Bill Clinton called the war in Bosnia “the most 
                                                        
1 Precisely which countries belong to “the Balkans” is controversial among scholars, with some now preferring the 
term “southeastern Europe.” Traditionally, “the Balkans” have referred to Europe south and east of the Drava and 
Danube rivers, hence including all of present-day Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey west of the 





frustrating and complex foreign policy issue in the world today,”2 and Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher famously called the Bosnian war “a problem from hell.”3 In terms of the resources 
devoted trying to ameliorate, control, and contain Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism, Bosnia 
& Herzegovina has received more financial assistance per capita than was allocated to any 
country in Europe under the Marshall Plan,
4
 and as of 2006, NATO countries had devoted 25 
times more troops and 50 times more money to Kosovo per capita than to their efforts in 
Afghanistan.
5
 Yet despite these considerable expenditures of time, treasure, and effort, a blue-
ribbon international panel in 2004 noted that the state- and nation-building efforts in the Balkans 
remained as close to failure as they were to success.
6





                                                        
2 As cited by Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 6. 
3 Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher made these remarks during a visit to Capitol Hill on 18 May 1993, 
as reported by National Public Radio’s All Things Considered, 18 May 1993.  
4 Mehmet Ugur, “Regional Public Goods or Philanthropy? A Critical Assessment of the EU-Balkans Economic 




5 Iain King and Whit Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2006), 21. 
6 Guiliano Amato, et. al. The Balkans in Europe’s Future (Sofia: International Commission on the Balkans, 2005).  
7 For a selection of recent articles describing the continuing instability in southeastern Europe despite almost two 
decades of intensive international engagement, see Paddy Ashdown and Richard Holbrooke, “A Bosnian 
Powderkeg.” The Guardian, 22 October 2008, available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/oct/22/ashdown-holbrooke-bosnia-balkan-dayton; Morton 
Abramowitz and Daniel Serwer, “Balkan Troubles,” The Wall Street Journal Europe, 6 January 2009, available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123119981293655561.html ; Christopher S. Chivvis, “Back to the Brink in Bosnia?” 
Survival 52 (February-March 2010), 97-110; and Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western, “The Death of Dayton,” 




     This presents a puzzle for both a considerable body of academic theory and for international 
policy towards the Balkans, as well as other areas of the world confronting similar problems: 
namely, why is ethnoconfessional nationalism such a powerful political and social force, despite 
the considerable efforts made in trying to control it?  
 
II. The Argument in Brief 
    The answer to this puzzle lies in the fact that the ontological assumptions of the two dominant 
theoretical approaches (among both scholars and policymakers) attempting to explain and 
manage ethnoconfessional nationalism—constructivist and rationalist/instrumentalist theories 
based on the primacy of politics, on the role of elites or institutions in “constructing” ethnic 
identities and inciting interethnic violence, on the ultimate fluidity and malleability of individual 
identities, and/or the economic and material bases of nationalism—are fundamentally flawed. 
Thus, where constructivist and rationalist explanations stress the role of elites and institutions, 
this dissertation will argue that the problem is mass-based, insofar as numerous Balkan cases 
reveal that it is identities that shape institutions as opposed to the standard political science 
explanation that institutions determine identities; instead of the stress on political elites, I point to 
the widespread “naturally occurring diversity”8 obvious in ethnoconfessional nationalist 
movements, and where constructivist and rationalist explanations stress the importance of 
economic interests over ethnoconfessional identities and loyalties, I argue that in many Balkan 
                                                        
8 The phrase “naturally occurring diversity” is used by filmmaker Ken Burns to describe the large number of 
Americans from many different social categories—men and women, African-American, Native American, Hispanic, 
and Caucasian, republicans and democrats, etc., who all contributed to the creation of the U.S. National Park system. 
The “naturally occurring diversity” of people involved in Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalist efforts will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter II; here, however, it bears noting that on the basis of the many books and articles 
discussing the phenomenon in the 1990s, the following groups have been involved: thugs, criminals, journalists, 
historians, priests, émigrés, politicians, musicians, soldiers, secret agents, terrorists, artists, and painters. Several 




cases identities have more frequently determined interests, and that human motivations other 
than material gain have demonstrably proven more important in determining the course and 
outcome of political conflict.  
 
     This dissertation argues that the particular strength of ethnoconfessional nationalism in the 
Balkans is based on the overlap of two independent variables. The first is psychological and 
social—the universal human tendency to identify with particular groups, most importantly with 
an ethnic group or nation. The second independent variable is historical and structural—the 
impact the Ottoman millet system has had on Balkan political culture. The overlap of these two 
variables explains both why ethnoconfessional nationalism has been such a persistent feature of 
Balkan history, and its specific characteristics and manifestations. The dissertation will then 
propose an alternative way of understanding the phenomenon and argue that ethnoconfessional 
nationalism in the Balkans has three main characteristics—it is collective, chronic, and non-
economic. Understood in this way, the dissertation will then go on to show why various 
constructivist nation- and state-building projects in southeastern Europe over the past 150 years 
have repeatedly failed, and propose a set of policymaking options for dealing with 
ethnoconfessional nationalism consistent with the understanding of the phenomenon provided 
herein.   
 
     The standard storyline of constructivist and rationalist/instrumentalist theories of nationalism 
and identity-formation holds that individual identities are fluid, malleable, and endogenous to 
politics, that elites manipulate these identities in ways that enhance their own power (or, 




state), and that to a significant degree nationalism and the ethnic-identity formation process can 
be explained by group competition for resources and the interest-maximizing benefits of 




     Yet a considerable amount of evidence suggests serious problems with each of these 
explanations. First, identities are actually not as fluid and malleable as constructivists and 
rationalists suggest.
10
 Even in Western Europe and the US, for instance, a substantial majority of 
individuals maintains the religious affiliations they inherited from their families,
11
 and several 
generations of families maintain their distinct ethnic or religious heritages.
12
 Identities, 
moreover, become good predictors of political loyalties. Thus, since 1945 between 60-90 percent 
of Jewish-Americans have consistently voted Democratic,
13
 as has been true of African-
Americans as well.   
                                                        
9 For a representative sampling of the literature arguing these points, see  Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: 
Theory and Comparison (London: Sage Publications, 1991); Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: 
Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Russell Hardin, One 
for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Michael Hechter, Containing 
Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian-
Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); and, with respect to the 
former Yugoslavia itself, V.P. Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War: Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2004). 
10 As Keith Darden notes, “the empirical basis upon which [the theoretical position regarding the fluidity of identity] 
rests is precarious, particularly with regard to national identities. The national identity of individuals on a given 
territory—their perceived bonds to a broader community which they believe to enjoy a natural right to self-rule 
(sovereignty)—is remarkably and universally stable over time, and national loyalties have proven to be quite durable 
. . . Empirically, national identity seems remarkably fixed . . . Under a variety of very adverse conditions, national 
loyalties have proven remarkably durable..” See Darden, “The Causes and Consequences of Enduring National 
Loyalties,” draft manuscript, Chapter 1, 4-6. 
11 U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Affiliation, Diverse and Dynamic (Washington, DC: Pew Forum, 
2008). 
12 See Alberto Bisin and Verdier Thierry, “’Beyond the Melting Pot’: Cultural Transmission, Marriage, and the 
Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (August 2000), 955-988. 
13 See Steven Windmueller, “Are American Jews Becoming Republican? Insights Into Jewish Political Behavior,” 
Jerusalem Viewpoints no. 509 (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 15 December 2003). In the November 2006 





     In southeastern Europe, what L. S. Stavrianos has called “the preservation of ethnic groups”14 
has been even more pronounced; thus, the Balkan experience suggests that for a significant 
majority of people—i.e., anywhere from two-thirds to ninety percent—ethnoconfessional 
identities are fixed, unidimensional, and exogenous to politics. In this view, culture and society 
play much more independent and important roles in determining identities. Thus, the role of 
political elites in the identity formation process is significantly less important than constructivist 
and rationalist theories maintain. This is why it is more accurate to say that in the Balkans the 




     In contrast to constructivist and rationalist theories of nationalism and ethnic-identity 
formation arguing that ethnic groups are the social engineering products of interest-maximizing 
elites that result in “imagined communities,”16 I argue that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a 
mass-based, and, consequently, much more complex phenomenon. In this view, 
ethnoconfessional nationalism is a phenomenon so widespread and pervasive that it is best 
understood as what William H. Sewell has termed an “ideological formation” which is 
“anonymous, collective, and transpersonal.”17  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Richard Baehr, “The Exit Polls and the Jewish Vote,” The American Thinker, 15 November 2006, available at: 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2006/11/the_exit_polls_and_the_jewish.html   
14 L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 13. 
15 As argued by Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 204. 
16 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 
Verso, 1983). 
17 See Sewell, “Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case,” The Journal of Modern History 
57 (March 1985), 60-61. Along similar lines, Motyl has argued that it is perfectly logically possible for “national 





     As a collective phenomenon, I demonstrate that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a sentiment 
or emotion that consistently draws the support of two-thirds to ninety percent of a specific ethnic 
group or nation, and that one’s ethnoconfessional background determines (or at least 
significantly influences) an individual’s beliefs and behavior on a wide range of issues: voting 
preferences, choice of marriage partner, settlement patterns, etc. Furthermore, ethnoconfessional 
nationalism is a phenomenon that unites ideologically-dissimilar individuals from across the 
political spectrum horizontally and vertically as well, thereby undermining the usually posited 
dichotomy of elites and masses, or between classes.  
 
     The Balkan experience also suggests that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a chronic 
phenomenon, insofar as it has been a more or less constant feature of Balkan and/or East Central 
European politics. As Daniel Chirot has pointed out, a striking feature of East Central Europe’s 
20
th
 century history is the fact that almost all of the competing nationalist problems have either 
persisted, or have ultimately been resolved through the use of violence. This claim is consistent 
with other studies of civil conflict that have found them exceedingly difficult to resolve through 
negotiations.
18
 In this sense, they can be categorized as “never-ending” conflicts, i.e. civil 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
consequences.” See Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possiblities (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 76; and Pierre Bourdieu has claimed that ethnic sentiments “are able to 
pass from practice to practice without going through discourse or consciousness.” See Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory 
of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 87, as cited by Jack David Eller and Reed M. 
Coughlan, Reed M. “The Poverty of Primordialism: the Demystification of Ethnic Attachments,” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 16 (April 1993), 200. Coughlan and Reed, however, negatively describe this as a “superorganic” 
understanding of the nature of identity and ethnicity. 
18 Daniel Chirot “Herder’s Multicultural Theory of Nationalism and Its Consequences.” East European Politics and 
Societies 10 (Winter 1996), 1-15. On similar cases in other parts of the world, see Roy Licklider, “The 
Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” American Political Science Review 89 
(September 1995), 681-690; William I Zartman, “Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again,” in David A. Lake and 
Donald Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton, 




conflicts in which the parties attach roughly equal importance to political dominance.
19
 In the 
Balkans, a comparison of historical case studies related to Bosnia, Kosovo, or the former 
Yugoslavia more generally with contemporary news stories bears this point out, as the same 
issues and problems these areas were dealing with in the 19
th
 century regarding the division of 
power between ethnic groups, control over territory, and the appropriate forms of state 
organization remain acute problems today.
20
 There is, moreover, a demonstrable historical 
continuity (examined in Chapter III) to efforts by Albanians, Croats, Serbs and others to create 
their own “greater” national states. Importantly, even during politically quieter times these goals 
or tendencies have not been eliminated; instead, such relative calm was more the result of what 
Timur Kuran has called “preference falsification under conditions of oppression,”21 or what 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
negotiation, Florian Bieber has shown that of fourteen international interventions in the Balkans between 1991-
2002, half have resulted in failure. See Bieber, “Institutionalizing Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia: Domestic vs. 
Internationally Driven Processes of Institutional (Re-) Design,” The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2 (January 
2003), 3-16. 
19 Dmitriy Gershenson and Herschel I. Grossman, “Civil Conflict: Ended or Never Ending?” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 44 (December 2000), 805-822. Similarly, Albert Hirschman has argued that disputes over national or 
religious identities frequently become “either/or” conflicts, or “non-divisible” conflicts. (This is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter III, section 3.) See Hirschman, “Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Economy,” 
Political Theory 22, 203-18.   
20  On Bosnia & Herzegovina, for instance, see Robin Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism: The Habsburg ‘Civilizing 
Mission’ in Bosnia, 1878-1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), and Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: 
Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); on Kosovo, see 
Dušan T. Bataković, The Kosovo Chronicles (Belgrade: Plato, 1992); Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New 
York: New York University Press, 1998); and Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); 
on the former Yugoslavia, see Steven L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1983); Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948-1974. (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1977); Paul L. Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1968); and Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold 
War (op. cit.). 
21 Timur Kuran, “Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989.” World 




Hudson Meadwell has called a “strategic expression of preferences,”22 then to ethnoconfessional 
nationalism’s total disappearance.23  
 
    Understanding ethnoconfessional nationalism as a chronic phenomenon sometimes hidden by 
preference falsification or strategic expressions of preference thus explains what de Figueredo 
and Weingast have described as one of the fundamental puzzles of the ethnification of politics, 
namely, how to explain the often sudden eruption of ethnic violence, especially after long 
periods of apparent peace.
24
   
 
    By non-economic, I argue that ethnoconfessional nationalism is based on “non-rational” roots: 
emotional, psychological, or sentimental loyalties and attachments to one’s ethnoconfessional 
group,
25
 rather than on calculations interest-maximizing individuals make regarding their 
personal economic welfare.
26
 Many rationalist and instrumentalist explanations for nationalism, 
for instance, reveal what Joseph Rothschild once called the “intellectually facile and politically 
                                                        
22 Hudson Meadwell, “A Rational Choice Approach to Political Regionalism,” Comparative Politics 23 (July 1991), 
402. 
23 For similar points, see also Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and 
Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 32; and Joseph Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A 
Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 7-8. 
24 Rui J. P. de Figueredo Jr. and Barry Weingast, “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic 
Conflict,” in Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds., Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), 262-63. 
25 See, for instance, Ivo Banac, The Yugoslav National Question: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1983), 25; John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
Second Edition, 1993), 401; Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994), 204; Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of 
Asian and African Peoples (Boston, Ma.: Beacon Press, 1960), 102; Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures 
(New York: Basic Books, 1973), 259-60; Anthony Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 12 
(July 1989), 363. 




unsound” belief that “ethnicity can be compartmentalized and prevented from contaminating 
those ‘essential’ areas of modern economic and political life that require ‘rational’ universalistic 
behavior and values.”27 Thus, while many constructivist and rationalist explanations for 
nationalism start from the Marxist premise that existence determines consciousness, they fail to 
account for the possibility that an individual’s identity can just as easily determine her economic 
interests.
28
 Moreover, the excessive economic determinism of many rationalist and materialist 
explanations for ethnoconfessional nationalism often deny the possibility (indeed, reality) that 
individuals can be motivated by different things to different extents. Ashutosh Varshney, for 
instances, argues that individuals exhibit both “value rationality” in which behavior is based on 
conscious ethical, aesthetic or religious beliefs which operate regardless of whether there is a 
prospect for the success of such behavior (and can “consciously embrace great personal 
sacrifices”), and “instrumental rationality” which, according to Varshney, “entails a strict cost-
                                                        
27 See Rothschild, Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 25-26. 
Evidence for Rothschild’s claim can be found in a recent study from Germany, for instance, which showed that 
cultural preferences are the most powerful predictor of migration patterns within the country. See Falck, Heblich, 
Lameli, and Südekum, “Dialects, Cultural Identity, and Economic Exchange,” (Berlin: Institute for the Study of 
Labor, Discussion Paper no. 4743), February 2010. As the authors note (pp. 3-4), “cultural differences at the 
regional level are persistent over time and have long-lasting causal effects on economic behavior, such as migration 
decisions.” These findings mirror similar demographic movements in the former Yugoslavia; this will be analyzed 
in more detail in Chapter IV.  
28 See, for instance, George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, “Economics and Identity.” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115 (August 2000), 715-753. Moses Shayo similarly notes that “people do not simply vote their 
economic self-interest; they also vote their identity.” See Shayo, “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to 
Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution,” American Political Science Review 103 (May 2009), 148. In 
a similar vein, Samuel Huntington has argued that “People do not live by reason alone. They cannot calculate and 
act rationally in pursuit of their self-interest until they define their self. Interest politics presupposes identity. In 
times of rapid social change established identities dissolve, the self must be redefined, and new identities created. 
For people facing the need to determine Who am I? Where do I belong? religion provides compelling answers, and 
religious groups provide small social communities to replace those lost through urbanization.” Huntington, The 




benefit calculus with respect to goals, necessitating the abandonment or adjustment of goals if 
the costs of realizing them are too high.”29 
 
     This, in turn, explains the second of the fundamental puzzles related to the ethnification of 
politics, i.e., why individuals and groups engage in violent conflict when cooperation has greater 
economic payoffs.
30
 Understood as a non-economic phenomenon, ethnoconfessional nationalism 
is about more than group struggles for economic resources. The claim will be demonstrated 
through analysis of numerous historical and contemporary political issues in which the respective 
actors clearly choose non-economically rational courses of action.  
 
    The argument that ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans is a collective and chronic 
phenomenon has an important implication for political science insofar as it supports the view that 
for the purposes of most political analysis ethnic groups can indeed be considered unitary 
political actors, even across generations. Chapter’s IV and V support this claim by providing 
evidence of both the mass-based nature of the nation- and state building projects in southeastern 
Europe over the past two-hundred years, and the continuity of political goals the various ethnic 
groups have had in the region. Chapter VI will then summarize this analysis by suggesting what 
                                                        
29 Ashutosh Varshney, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality,” www.apsanet.org (March 2003), Vol. 1/No. 
1, 85-99. Along similar lines, Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod argue that “sacred values,” i.e., concern for the 
welfare of one’s family and country, or commitment to one’s religion, to honor, or to justice, can drive behavior in 
ways that disassociated from their ultimate prospects for success, and are often considered to be absolute and 
inviolable. See Scott Atran and Robert Axelrod, “Reframing Sacred Values,” Negotiation Journal (July 2008), 221-
246.  
30 de Figueredo and Weingast, 1999: 262-63; see also David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, The International 
Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 10-11; 
and Monica Duffy Toft, The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory 




the practical, policy-making implications are of such an understanding of ethnoconfessional 
nationalism.  
 
III. Defining Ethnoconfessional Nationalism 
     Defining terms such as “nations” and “nationalism” has been a difficult proposition.31 With 
regard to the term nationalism itself, Ernest Gellner provided the most commonly cited 
definition, according to which nationalism is the political principle which holds that political and 
cultural units should be congruent.
32
 John Breuilly has provided another widely accepted 
definition, according to which nationalism is a specifically political phenomenon.
33
 Both Gellner 
and Breuilly are modernists, in that they both consider nationalism a post-1789 phenomenon. 
 
     The primary problem with such definitions is that the dividing line they draw between similar 
activities and beliefs that existed before that date rests on a questionable historical assumption: 
that people living prior to 1789 had no preferences as to whether they would be governed by 
their own kind as opposed to an alien people speaking an alien tongue, and possessing an alien 
                                                        
31 As Hugh Seton-Watson once noted, “I am driven to the conclusion that no ‘scientific definition’ of the nation can 
be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists.” See Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the 
Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), 5. Similarly, Charles Tilly 
claimed that the “nation” is “one of the most puzzling and tendentious items in the political lexicon.” Tilly, The 
Formation of National States in Western Europe, 6. The concept of “identity” is similarly problematic; for instance, 
Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper have found at least five different uses of the term in the scholarly literature. 
See Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity’,” Theory and Society 29 (February 2000), 1-47. See also Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations 
and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001), 399. Such semantic debates extend beyond 
the social sciences; legal scholars, for instance, have had similar difficulties in agreeing on what constitutes a 
“minority.” See, for instance, Joseph Marko, “Processes of Ethnic Mobilization in the Former Yugoslav Republics 
Reconsidered,” Southeastern Europe 34 (2010), 3. 
32 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1. 
33 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago, Il: University of Chicago Press, 1993, 2nd Edition), 1.Thus, 
according to Breuilly, “To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or modernization is to neglect the 




religion and culture. Yet the historical record suggests quite the opposite, namely, that nationalist 





     Second, both Gellner’s and Breuilly’s definitions are too restrictive insofar as they limit 
nationalism to political phenomena, ignoring the fact that social or economic activism can have 
essentially the same goal or consequences as political nationalism, or that the latter constitutes a 
logical progression from the former. In fact, nationalists’ demands can quickly change as 
circumstances permit. As Will Kymlicka notes,  
there seems to be no natural stopping-point to the demands for increasing self-
government. If limited autonomy is granted to nationalist leaders, this may simply 
fuel the ambitions of nationalist leaders, who may be satisfied with nothing short 




     Thus, movements for greater cultural, educational, or economic rights can rapidly become 
fully-fledged independence movements if external conditions allow. Obviously, in periods in 
which great empires were the structural norm in the international system it would have been 
difficult for people to struggle for smaller, ethnically homogenous, self-governing entities. Yet 
                                                        
34 This issue will be discussed in more detail in Chapter II, but here one example should suffice to prove the point. 
In The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides attributes the following speech to Pericles, 
This land of ours, in which the same people have never ceased to dwell in an unbroken line of 
successive generations, they by their valor transmitted to our times a free state . . . We live under a 
form of government which does not emulate the institutions of our neighbors; on the contrary, we 
are ourselves a model which some follow rather than the imitators of other peoples . . . We have 
provided for the spirit many relaxations from toil, we have games and sacrifices regularly 
throughout the year and homes fitted out with good taste and elegance . . . 
Thucydides here clearly provides an unambiguous list of all the elements that modernists suggest is a way of 
thinking that emerged only after 1789: namely, that there is a defined group of people with their own identity, based 
on their own specific ancestry, living continuously on a specific territory, with their own form of government, and 
with their own developed cultural practices and rituals. See The Peloponnesian War, Book II, xxxvi. 
35 Will Kymlicka, “Social Unity in a Liberal State,” Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996), 122, as cited by 




struggles on behalf of greater cultural, educational, or economic rights can be understood as 
nationalist efforts veiled by strategic expressions of preference that quickly change and become 
more explicitly political as circumstances warranted. Efforts such as these on behalf of concepts 
like “Poland,” “Germany,” “Italy,” “Croatia” or “Serbia” made nationalist thought and action on 
behalf of such entities exist long before the entities themselves did.  
 
     A few Balkan examples—one religious, one social and political, one educational, and one 
economic—illustrate this point. First the religious example: in the late 12th—early 13th century, 
Sava Nemanjić (popularly known as Saint Sava), the founder of the independent Serbian 
Orthodox Church and son of Stefan Nemanja, the founder of the medieval Serbian Nemanjić 
dynasty, began reforming the Orthodox Church’s structure in territories inhabited by Serbs, 
replacing Greek hierarchs with local Serbs, and ordering that captions under frescoes in churches 
and monasteries be in Cyrillic rather than in Greek.
36
 With the Latin crusader’s capture of 
Constantinople in 1204, however, and the subsequent weakening of Byzantine power in the 
Balkans, Sava saw an opportunity to gain even more independence for the Serbian church. His 
efforts culminated in 1219 when he successfully petitioned the Byzantine emperor and the 
Patriarch of Constantinople to grant autocephaly to the Serbian church. The fact that Sava’s 
brother Stefan proclaimed himself the first-crowned king of the Serbs should not be seen as a 
coincidence.  
 




 centuries (i.e., at least 100 years 
before explanations such as those of Gellner and Breuilly would admit), Serbs in the Habsburg 
                                                        




Monarchy were petitioning Emperor Joseph I for a wide range of canonical, political, cultural, 
military, and economic rights as a corporate group, albeit their demands fell short of calls for 
outright independence and fully recognized the lands on which they lived as part of the Habsburg 
Empire and Joseph I as their rightful sovereign.
37
 A century later, as Peter Sugar points out, “The 
first of the successful revolutions, the Serbian of 1804, shows quite clearly how the demands of 
the inhabitants of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire escalated rapidly from efficient 
government, to home rule, and finally to the conviction that only independence would satisfy 
their minimal demands for security of life and property.”38 
 
    As a third example, educational initiatives can often similarly serve as nationalist actions. In 
2000, the Albanian education minister, Ethem Ruka, called for the development of an Albanian-
language grade-school primer that would be used in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and 
Montenegro. According to Ruka, “The unified Albanian-language book would be a cornerstone 
for national unification.”39   
 
                                                        
37 Rajko Veselinović, “Narodnocrkvena i privilegijska pitanja Srba u Habsburškoj monarhiji 1699-1716 godine.” 
Istorija Srpskog Naroda, Vol. IV-1, 39-50. Denying that such efforts were “nationalistic” is in some ways a logical 
corollary to the common European belief in earlier centuries that the peoples of southeastern Europe had no desire to 
rule themselves; as J.A.R. Marriott once noted regarding the attitudes of European statesmen during 17th-19th 
centuries, “That the submerged nationalities of the Balkan peninsula would ever again be in a position to exercise 
any decisive influence upon the destinies of the lands they still peopled was an idea too remote from actualities to 
engage even the passing attention of diplomacy.”  See Marriott, The Eastern Question: A Study in European 
Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1917), 5-6. 
38 Peter Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, ), 
208.  
39 See “Pan-Albanianism: How Big a Threat to Balkan Stability?” (Tirana/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 
2005), 6-29. Similarly, one of the grand old men of Balkan politics, former Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov, 
told the present author in 2003 that the first time it crossed his mind that Yugoslavia would ultimately disintegrate 
came in 1967 when Croatian scholars repudiated the 1954 Novi Sad agreement which had supported the view that 




     And finally, a more recent example from the economic realm: in 1999, then-Montenegrin 
president Milo Djukanović’s government abandoned the Yugoslav dinar and adopt the deutsche 
mark (and subsequently the euro in 2002). Although ostensibly intended to promote economic 
stability in Montenegro (and thus, not qualifying as a nationalist initiative according to Breuilly’s 
and Gellner’s definitions), the political consequences of establishing such economic 
independence from Belgrade were obvious and were fulfilled with Montenegro’s declaration of 
independence in 2006.  
 
     In each of these cases, to claim that these activities were not “nationalist” until the latter, 
explicitly political stages of the process ignores the fact that ethnic groups adopt a wide variety 
of tactics, strategies and goals over time to further their ambitions, given their international 




      For these reasons, I propose a different definition—ethnoconfessional nationalism is a 
sentiment in which a distinct group of people, recognizing themselves as such, strives to 
accumulate as much political, religious, military, economic, cultural, or educational self-
government as possible. Use of the term “ethnoconfessional” is meant to emphasize the fact that, 





                                                        
40 These issues will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter II. 
41 See Milorad Ekmečić, Radovi iz istorije Bosne i Hercegovine XIX veka (Belgrade 1997), 9-11. It is important to 
note, however, that use of the term “ethnoconfessional” is not meant to imply that conflict in southeastern Europe is 
based on differences of theology or a clash of teleological worldviews. Rather, it reinforces the importance that the 
region’s faiths (Catholicism, Islam, and Orthodoxy) and their respective institutions have had on the secular 




     There are several advantages to this definition. First, it does not limit nationalism to a specific 
period in history, and it does not make the ontological assumption that there has been some great 
discontinuity in human aspirations before and after 1789 (for which in any case there is no 
empirical evidence). Activities by an ethnic group or a segment thereof in the Middle Ages to 
garner more ability to run its own affairs can be admitted to be just as “nationalist” as such 




 centuries.  
 
     Second, instead of being surprised by the “explosion” of nationalist movements around the 
world after 1789, this definition anticipates them; thus, this “explosion” is fully compatible with 
the ontological assumptions provided above by explicitly recognizing that, ceteris paribus, 
distinctive human collectivities prefer to run their own affairs, and generally always have, not 
just after 1789. It is also compatible with the understanding that an ethnic group can adopt a wide 
variety of strategies and tactics geared towards achieving a greater ability to determine its own 
affairs. If we recognize that ethnic group struggles to gain greater self-determination have been a 
long-term historical phenomenon, and that ethnic groups’ strategies and tactics to gain such 
increased self-determination change along with historical circumstances, then Yugoslavia’s 
breakup in the 1990s is considerably more foreseeable. Moreover, it also increases the predictive 
capacity of our theoretical understandings of such problems. Just because Slovenes were not 
openly calling for an independent state in the early 1960s during the Slovenian road-building 
crisis, for instance, does not mean that this was not a nationalist initiative, or that the Croatian 





     Moreover, the narrower definition of nationalism, i.e., conscious political action towards 
gaining a state, somewhat arbitrarily suggests that individuals such as Dobrica Čosić, Franjo 
Tudjman, or Alija Izetbegović only became nationalists in 1991 or 1992.42 Common sense, of 
course, suggests something else, and it is important to note that many actors in these dramas see 
their actions, or understand history, in terms of the broader definition of nationalism provided 
above.  
 
     There are several logical implications to this definition. First, understanding 
ethnoconfessional nationalism as a phenomenon manifested in one form or another as far back as 
the Middle Ages, if not earlier, suggests that it is a belief or attitude shared by numerous 
generations of a particular group. This supports the claim that it is a chronic phenomenon. 
Second, the above definition allows for individuals from across the political spectrum to share 
nationalist ideals, regardless of whether they are loyal imperial subjects, clericalists, fascists, 
communists, or liberal democrats. It also allows for nationalism to be considered an ideal that 
can be shared by both elites and the general population. Thus, it can be considered a collective 
phenomenon. Third, the fact that nationalism is a sentiment shared by individuals from across the 
political spectrum and across generational divides suggests that there is something inherent in the 
idea that transcends ordinary political or materialistic ideologies; or, put another way, that it is a 
non-economic phenomenon. Each of these claims, however, rest on the assumption that we can 
treat ethnic groups as unitary actors possessing a common will, a thesis that will be tested at 
various points throughout the dissertation.  
                                                        
42 As early as the 1960s, for instance, Tudjman had already become convinced that an historic “Croat-Serb 
compromise” would include some division of Bosnia & Herzegovina along the lines of the Cvetković-Maček 
sporazum of 1939, and that Croatia’s “natural borders” followed the line of the Vrbas and Neretva rivers. See Darko 
Hudelist, Tudjman: Biografija (Zagreb: Profil International, 2004), 467, 686. In 1969, for instance, Tudjman hosted 




IV. The Psychological and Social Roots of Ethnoconfessional Nationalism 
 
     The most dominant socio-political feature of the modern era is the power and ubiquity of 
nationalism. Anthony Smith, for instance, has claimed that nations are “indispensable” in the 
modern world, and that “nothing so clearly marks out the modern era and defines our attitudes 
and sentiments as national consciousness and nationalist ideology . . . The modern world has 
become inconceivable and unintelligible without nations and nationalism.”43 For Benedict 
Anderson, “nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.”44 
To Anthony Marx, nationalism “is the central organizing political principle of modern times,”45 
while for Liah Greenfeld, “nationality is the constitutive principle of modernity.”46 For Ernest 
Gellner, nationalism (defined as the belief that political and national units should be congruent) 
is a “necessity” given modern productive techniques and the organization of society they 
imply.
47
 For István Deák, “the creation of nation-states has been so much a part of modern 
European history as to allow us to call it inevitable.”48 Tom Nairn, arguing from a Marxist 
perspective, has claimed that nationalism is “an inescapable phenomenon of modern history.”49 
Hans Kohn claimed that the twentieth century represented “the first period in history in which 
                                                        
43 Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” op. cit., 340-341. Emphasis added. 
44 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 3. 
45 Anthony Marx, Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
viii. 
46 Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1992), 491. 
47 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 40. 
48 Istvan Deak, “A Somewhat Pessimistic View of Charles Ingrao’s ‘Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central 
Europe’,” Nationalities Papers 27 (June 1999), 320. Emphasis added. 




the whole of mankind has accepted one and the same political attitude, that of nationalism.”50 
For Miroslav Hroch, once the national movement gained mass support “the process of nation-
forming acquired an irreversible character.”51 For A.J.P. Taylor “The conflict between a super-
national dynastic state and the national principle had to be fought to the finish; and so, too, had 
the conflict between the master and subject nations . . . The national principle, once launched, 
had to work itself out to its conclusion.
52
 And with specific reference to the Balkans, Sumantra 
Bose has argued that “historical context and institutional precedent combine to make national-
collective identities an inescapable feature of the political landscape.”53 
 
     Even the academic study of the modern era cannot escape nationalism’s omnipresence. To 
paraphrase Mark Von Hagen, the geopolitical reality of nationalism has come to be reflected 
even in the intellectual structures that contemporary academia has built up to organize our 
thinking about the phenomenon. Thus, constructivism itself is an argument for “the inevitability 
of ethnicity in modern societies,” and scholars pay comparatively little attention to stateless 
                                                        
50 Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History  (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1955), 89, as cited by 
Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, 12. 
51 Hroch, “Real and Constructed: The Nature of the Nation,” in John Hall, ed., The State of the Nation: Ernest 
Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), as cited by Snyder, From 
Voting to Violence, 35. Emphasis added. 
52 A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy: 1809-1918 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948). Emphasis added. 
53 Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 93. Emphasis added. Along similar lines, when R. W. Seton-Watson attempted to write a 
history of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, he bemoaned the fact that “the vital question of Nationality met me at 
every turn and clamoured for a solution.” (As cited by Mark Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and 




ethnic groups or nations; as Geoff Eley notes, “the faculty of attained statehood is an 
indispensable condition for historiographical legitimacy.”54 
 
     The empirical evidence regarding the process of state formation over the past two hundred 
years fully supports the above observations. This process has especially picked up pace in recent 
years, as the 1990s saw the single greatest burst of new-state creation since decolonization in the 
1960s.
55
 As Niall Ferguson points out,  
. . . one of the great paradoxes of our time is that the economic integration of the 
world has coincided with its political disintegration. Excluding sub-Saharan 
Africa, there were 64 independent countries in the world in 1871. Forty-three 
years later, on the eve of World War I, imperialism had reduced the number to 59. 
But since World War II, there have been sustained increases. In 1946, there were 




     Viewed in this historical and comparative context, three points bear stressing. First, what has 
been happening in the Balkans over the past two hundred years is fully consistent with European 
and world history, and is not the result of some specifically Balkan tendency toward 
disintegration and violence.
57
 Seen in this light, the nation-building process in southeastern 
                                                        
54 See, respectively, Joane Nagel, “Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture,” 
Social Problems 41 (February 1994), 168, emphasis added; and Geoff Eley, “Remapping the Nation: War, 
Revolutionary Upheaval and State Formation in Eastern Europe, 1914-1923,” in Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard 
Aster, eds., Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian 
Studies, 1988), 222, as cited by Dušan J. Djordjevich, “Clio amid the Ruins,” in Norman N. Naimark and Holly 
Case, eds., Yugoslavia and its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s (Stanford, Ca: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 15. Emphasis added. 
55 According to Philip G. Roeder; see Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of 
Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 6. 
56 See Ferguson, “2011,” in The New York Times Magazine, 2 December 2001, 76-79. 
57 As John Allcock has noted, “It is only possible to understand the South Slav lands by paying attention to the 
context within which they are situated. The trajectory of their development needs to be explained in relation to wider 
processes, involving neighboring states, the Mediterranean region, the continent of Europe as a whole and indeed the 
world. See Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) 13, 20. The importance 
of looking at Balkan history in a comparative way is a crucial point. Much of southeastern Europe’s development 
has followed a common pattern, making it both difficult and artificial to isolate specific countries, nations, or ethnic 




Europe should thus be understood as simply a later manifestation of something that has been 
happening throughout Europe itself over the past few hundred years. As Gale Stokes notes,    
Remapping state boundaries onto ethnic lines is one of the major threads of post-
French Revolutionary European history. The process began with the unifications 
of Italy and Germany, ran through the creation of new states at the end of World 
War I, and had its most catastrophic outcomes at the end of World War II with the 
Holocaust and the expulsion of the Germans from Eastern Europe . . . the wars of 
Yugoslav succession are not some aberrant Balkan phenomenon; they are the last 





     Along similar lines, Rogers Brubaker notes that “Everywhere, political space has been 
reconfigured along putatively national lines.”59 
 
     The second point is more theoretical. Given the ubiquity of nationalism, it is difficult to 
sustain the view that it is some accidental aberration in human affairs caused by small elite 
groups or “evil leaders.” If nationalism is indeed “inevitable,” “inescapable,” and 
“indispensable,” then this suggests that nationalist ideologies and nationalist struggles would 
have emerged and erupted regardless of which leaders or elites were in power.  This conclusion, 
in turn, suggests two things. First, that the phenomenon is more a product of structure than of 
human agency or contingency. The second is the need to shift the analytical emphasis from the 
individual level to that of the collective.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
development the new national regimes tended to follow the same general pattern and to face similar difficulties.” 
Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 298. 
58 Gale Stokes, "The Unpalatable Paradox," Nationalities Papers 27 (June 1999), 327-329. 
59 See Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: 




     The universality of nationalism suggests that the human condition itself should be taken as an 
independent variable in understanding its power and ubiquity in politics and society. Put a 
different way, part of the explanation for the dominance of ethnoconfessional nationalism in the 
Balkans comes from the universal psychological and social roots of human behavior.
60
 Common 
to human development in all societies is that the process of identity formation begins in early 
childhood as the infant begins to distinguish between itself and others, and then between others 
(parents, siblings, neighbors, etc.) considered part of the in-group, and others considered part of 
the out-group.
61
 The powerful role that one’s family background has on forming individual 
political opinions is clear; thus, for instance, one recent study found that at least fifty percent of 
an individual’s political ideology seems to result from inherited genetic traits rather than the 
environmental context in which one is situated; thus, “correlations of social and political 
attitudes among people with greater or lesser shared genotypes suggest that behaviors are often 
shaped by forces of which the actors themselves are not consciously aware,” and consequently 
“To the extent that political ideologies are inherited and not learned, they become more difficult 
to manipulate.”62 
 
     As the child grows towards adulthood and the socialization process proceeds, the relevant in-
group expands to include aggregations in which the individual’s most immediate in-groups 
                                                        
60 The following discussion of social psychological theories of identity-formation, unless otherwise noted, is based 
on Daniel Druckman, “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective,” Mershon 
International Studies Review 38 (April 1994), 43-68. 
61 Joseph Rudolph, for instance, has suggested that the strength of ethnic identities and loyalties lies in “the 
elemental fact that for most people, socialization in ethnic identity predates the more structured socialization 
processes encountered in schools and later life.” See Rudolf, Politics and Ethnicity, 209.  
62 See John R. Alford, Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing, “Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?” 




(family, neighborhood, school, workplace) are embedded. Most commonly, as Donald Horowitz 
notes, the largest such in-group with which the individual identifies, or the terminal group for 
attracting an individual’s affective loyalties, becomes the ethnic group or nation.63  
 
     Categorization, as takes place when the individual divides the world between in-groups and 
out-groups, is a key (and universal) part of every individual’s psychological and intellectual 
development. As Brubaker et. al. note regarding the central importance categorization plays in 
human thinking and behavior,   
Categories are utterly central to seeing and thinking, but they are equally central 
to talking and acting. . . Categories structure and order the world for us. We use 
categories to parse the flow of experience into discriminable and interpretable 
objects, attributes, and events. Categories permit—indeed, entail—massive 
cognitive, social, and political simplification. . . . They allow us to see different 
things—and treat different cases—as the same. They focus our attention and 
channel our limited energies, leaving us—individuals and organizations alike—
free to disattend to “irrelevant” stimuli. They thereby make the natural and social 
worlds intelligible, interpretable, communicable, and transformable . . . Thus 
categories underlie not only seeing and thinking but the most basic forms of doing 
as well, including both everyday action and more complex, institutionalized forms 
of “doing.”64  
 
     Such universal tendencies to categorize ethnic, racial, and national groups has led some 
scholars to suggest that the tendency may in fact be “grounded in the human cognitive 
apparatus.”65  
 
     Individuals’ identify with groups for a variety of reasons, both affective and instrumental, 
whether out of a sense of sentimentality towards their in-group, a desire to help the in-group, 
                                                        
63 See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1985), 57. 
64 See Rogers Brubaker, Mara Loveman, and Peter Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Cognition,” Theory and Society 33 
(February 2004),” 38. 




because it gives them a sense of identity, or because such group identities provide instrumental 
means for the individual to attain certain material or status/prestige goals. Whatever the reason(s) 
however, this tendency is so common that one scholar has suggested that “group (not national) 
identification is a primordial condition.”66  
 
     Another common human tendency is the development of in-group bias, which has been called 
“endemic” to the human species. Thus, one tends to favor one’s in-group and to discriminate 
against, or have negative views, of out-groups. There are varying ways in which individuals can 
perceive outgroups, however, ranging from the more prejudicial or hostile to the more neutral or 
even favorable; furthermore, such views are not stable but can vary depending upon context and 
situation. Such in-group biases, in turn, generate loyalties which  
differentiate whom in their environment it is appropriate to support and whom to 
avoid. And such loyalties can foster a consensus among members that becomes 
self-fulfilling and difficult to change. The stronger the loyalty, the more likely 
members of a group are to hold similar views and endorse similar strategies. They 
approach the world in lockstep, perceiving and defining others in the world 
similarly. There is little, if any, chance for discrepant information to filter through 




      Importantly, even rationalists accept many of these presuppositions; in rationalist terms, for 
instance, such in-group biases and the group loyalties and collective self-consciousness they 
generate helps resolve many collective action problems because it increases cohesion within the 
                                                        
66 Stern, “Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?” Political Psychology 16 (June 1995), 225. Stern goes on to 
note that “This strong claim is based on two considerations. The first is that human groups are primordial: Small 
bands were the main units of social organization until about 12,000 years ago, when they were supplemented by 
larger units such as city, ethnic group and state. The second is that individuals have probably always identified 
strongly with primary social groups. People tend to imitate and learn selectively from fellow group members and to 
form emotional attachments to members, the group, and its symbols . . . In sum, natural selection seems to have 
favored the evolution of behavioral and emotional predispositions to maintain primary social groups, even at some 
cost to the individual.” Stern, “Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?”, 226-227 




in-group. Identification with a specific group thus generates a tendency to follow the prescribed 
behavior of that group.
68
 This in turn improves the group’s performance in competition with 
other groups; hence, “There is a reinforcing effect of loyalty and cohesion—groups whose 
members are loyal perform better, leading the group to become more cohesive and the members 
more loyal.”69 
 
     Perceived cultural differences with outgroups, conversely, generate mistrust and less intensive 
relationships. For instance, a recent study of attitudes among business managers in Europe has 
shown that individuals trust their fellow countrymen more than foreigners, and that factors such 
as geographical distance, degree of commonality between languages, the commonality between 
legal traditions, religious traditions, and the history of conflict between different countries all 
significantly influence levels of trust European business managers exhibit in other Europeans; 
moreover, attributing higher levels of trust to culturally-similar groups occurs across economic 
income levels. Thus, as Guiso et. al. note, “cultural effects are not limited to unsophisticated 
consumers, but are also present among sophisticated professionals such as mutual fund 
managers.”70  
 
     There are important social and political implications to the above discussion. On a macro 
level, political entities whose citizens exhibit higher degrees of in-group loyalty and 
                                                        
68 Shayo, “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy,” op. cit., 148.  
69 Druckman, “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty,” 56. 
70 See Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, “Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics (August 2009), 1098. With respect to the impact of religious commonality, for instance, 
Guiso et. al. show that in a pair of countries in which 90% of the inhabitants are of the same religion, the level of 




identification should function more efficiently and successfully than those that do not. Thus, 





 and Linz and Stepan
73
 have generally concurred that multiethnic or multicultural 
states are weaker than more ethnically or culturally homogenous ones.
74
 As Banerjee, 
Somanathan, and Iyer argue, 
One of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy is the notion that social 
divisions undermine economic progress, not just in extremis, as in the case of 
civil war, but also in more normal times. The idea is that even in a market 
economy there are numerous transactions that rely on the cooperation of others: 
trade often requires trust, providing public goods needs collective action and the 
rule of law is only possible if everyone accepts the rights of others. Homogenous 
societies, it is suggested, have an advantage because there may be more contact 
across the population, which builds understanding, trust and empathy and shared 
interests. This makes it more likely that they will all be on the same side. If true, 
this hypothesis has a number of important implications. Among these is an 
                                                        
71 In discussing the prerequisites for a successful democratic transition, for instance, Dankwort Rustow noted one 
single background condition: “national unity.” Thus, “the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have 
no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.” See Rustow, “Transitions to 
Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” in Lisa Anderson, ed., Transitions to Democracy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999), 26. 
72 For an extended discussion of the effects of ethnic heterogeneity on democratic systems, see Dahl, Polyarchy: 
Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), chp. 7. 
73 As Linz and Stepan note, “Under what empirical conditions are the logics of state policies aimed at nation-
building and the logics of state policies aimed at crafting democracy congruent? Conflicts between these different 
policies are reduced when empirically almost all the residents of the state identify with one subjective idea of the 
nation, and that nation is virtually contiguous with the state. These conditions are met only if there is no significant 
irredenta outside the state’s boundaries, if there is only one nation existing (or awakened) in the state, and if there is 
low cultural diversity within the state. Virtually only in these circumstances can leaders of the government 
simultaneously pursue democratization policies and nation-state policies. Such congruity between the polity and the 
demos would facilitate the creation of a democratic nation-state. This congruence empirically eliminates most 
stateness problems and thus should be considered supportive conditions for democratic consolidation.” See Juan J. 
Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America 
and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 25. 
74 See, for instance, See Zachary Elkins and John Sides, “Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?” 
American Political Science Review 101 (November 2007), 693-708. As the nineteenth century liberal John Stuart 
Mill argued, “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities . . . especially if 
they read and speak different languages . . . The boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those 
of nationalities.” See Mill, Considerations on Representative Government. That this has been a problem with 
establishing stable democratic polities in the Balkans has long been recognized; thus, with reference to the Balkans 
specifically, Joseph S. Roucek noted in the 1940s that the Balkans’ “scores of tongues, dialects and religions” 
resulted in the region suffering from a “handicap of heterogeneity.” See Roucek, Balkan Politics: International 




argument for a high degree of sensitivity to distributional issues since the 
memory, real or imagined, of having been exploited can create a divide that will 




     In this view, ethnically homogeneous groups or areas have more efficient communication 
networks, or better sanctioning mechanisms against individuals who do not contribute to 
collective efforts. In Uganda, for instance, Habyarimana, et.al., have found that ethnically 
homogeneous neighborhoods in Kampala are better at providing public goods than ethnically 
heterogeneous ones because in the former more homogeneous ethnic groups “possess both norms 
and networks that facilitate the sanctioning of community members who fail to contribute to 
collective endeavors.”76 
 
     Evidence from Eastern Europe supports similar conclusions. Vachudová and Snyder have 
argued that in six eastern European states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania and Slovakia) the most important determinant of their developmental paths have been 
what they term “ethnic nationalism.” According to the authors, the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland are examples of states that have not exhibited high levels of ethnic nationalism; Bulgaria, 
Romania and Slovakia have.
77
 The latter, of course, have significantly higher numbers of ethnic 
                                                        
75 Abhijt Banerjee, Rohimi Somanathan and Lakshmi Iyer, “History, Social Divisions and Public Goods in Rural 
India,” Journal of the European Economic Association 3 (April-May 2005), 639-647. 
76 See James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Why Does Ethnic 
Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?” American Political Science Review 101 (November 2007), 721-22. 
Another recent cross-national study of fifty-one countries showed that ethnic minorities are ten times less likely to 
identify with the state than ethnic majorities. Importantly, grievances over the level of autonomy a group enjoys 
were shown to matter more than other political, cultural or economic grievances. See Elkins and Sides, “Can 
Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?” op. cit. For a useful review of the links between ethnic heterogeneity 
and democracy, see Benjamin Reilly, “Democracy, Ethnic Fragmentation, and Internal Conflict: Confused Theories, 
Faulty Data, and the ‘Crucial Case’ of Papua New Guinea,” International Security 25 (Winter 2000/2001), 162-166. 
77 See Vachudová and Snyder, “Are Transitions Transitory? Two Types of Political Change in Eastern Europe Since 
1989,” East European Politics and Societies 11 (Winter 1997), 1-35. It is also important to note the potential danger 
ethnic cleavages pose even in what are generally considered (although perhaps erroneously) Balkan success stories. 




minorities, while the former more monoethnic states have been the postcommunist success 
stories.  
 
     In fact, throughout post-1989 East Central Europe, the more ethnically homogenous states 
have been more successful in adopting the political, legal, and economic reforms required for 
European Union accession than the more ethnically heterogeneous ones. For instance, in the 
twelve countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, the “state-nation’s” percentage of the 
population is 82.5%. By way of comparison, Table 1 points out the comparative percentages for 
three Balkan states that are considered to be far behind in their efforts to adopt the political and 








                                                                                                                                                                                  
democracy Bulgaria has bridged the gaps between its ethnic groups on the basis of new democratic values and 
beliefs in human rights are deluding themselves. What has happened over these years is the opposite; the ethnic 
groups are further apart than ever.” See Albena Shkodrova, “Ethnic Groups in Bulgaria Are More Apart Than Many 
Believe,” BIRN Balkan Insight, 17 July 2007, available at: http://www.birn.eu.com/en/93/10/3622/?ILStart=20 
Similarly, Bernd Rechl has noted that the notion of a unique “Bulgarian ethnic model” that has supposedly 
transcended the ethnic problems typical of other parts of East Central Europe suffers from several problems: “the 
continued, but poorly acknowledged, existence of racism, discrimination and socio-economic exclusion; the almost 
complete absence of positive minority rights; and the electoral support of nationalist parties . . . for many years, even 
the existence of minorities was not acknowledged in the state. . . The right to free ethnic self-expression has been 
denied to Pomaks and Macedonians . . . post-communist Bulgaria has adopted constitutional and legal provisions 
aimed at preventing the political participation of minorities.” See Rechel, “The ‘Bulgarian Ethnic Model’—Reality 









Bosnia & Herzegovina           48            
Macedonia            64 
Montenegro            43       
New EU member average          82.5 
 
     Table 1 reveals the fundamental empirical problems facing many of the Balkan states. Nation-
building and democratization are, as Linz and Stepan have pointed out, conceptually different 
enterprises, and democratization is significantly complicated when a state has a large ethnic 
irredenta outside its borders, when a state has high levels of cultural diversity within its border, 
or when a state has more than one large “awakened” ethnic group.  
 
     The difficulties that ethnic irredenta, awakened ethnic groups, and high levels of cultural 
diversity pose are of course most clearly in evidence in the continuing instability facing 
southeastern Europe’s remaining multiethnic states. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, for instance, 
public opinion polls over the past several years have consistently shown that sizeable majorities 
of Serbs in the Republika Srpska (RS) would support making the RS either independent or a part 
of Serbia. Much the same could be said for Bosnian Croats and their views towards Croatia. 
Macedonia in 2001 was on the verge of all out civil war when Albanian insurgents organized an 
                                                        
78 All figures according to The World Factbook, available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html. Note: Macedonia’s “state-nation” percentage is probably declining due to differences in 
demographic growth rates between the Albanian and Macedonian segments of the population. Some estimates have 
suggested that Albanians could become a numerical majority in Macedonia by 2025. The above measures of ethnic 
homogeneity are admittedly rather crude. For instance, some might argue that Macedonia is actually more ethnically 
divided than Bosnia & Herzegovina despite the fact that the state-nation makes up a greater percentage of the overall 
population because in Macedonia the distance between the state’s two main ethnic groups (Macedonians and 
Albanians) is both religious and linguistic, whereas in Bosnia & Herzegovina, although the three main ethnic groups 
(Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) are of course divided by religion, they at least share what is essentially the same 
language. For a detailed discussion of the problems of measuring ethnic fractionalization, see James D. Fearon, 




insurrection to demand greater rights. In October 2007, the leader of the largest ethnic Albanian 
party in Macedonia, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), Ali Ahmeti again raised the 
possibility of an Albanian insurrection in Macedonia unless the government did more to satisfy 
Albanian demands in the country. Recent public opinion polls conducted in Macedonia show that 
these two communities are drifting further apart—for instance, by large margins, people on both 
sides of the ethnic divide say that they do not support mixed marriages, or Albanian and 




    In Montenegro, on one end of the political and ethnic spectrum, that state’s Serb population 
(some 35%) rejects the country’s new constitution, while on the other side of the ethnic 
spectrum, the September 2006 arrest of a dozen ethnic Albanians (several of whom were on the 
government payroll) for planning a terrorist action raises serious questions about the ultimate 
                                                        
79 See, for instance, Tim Judah, “’Greater Albania’ Gains Support,” IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No. 341, 7 June 
2002. As a report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance published in 2001 noted in the case 
of Macedonia, 
. . . each of the main ethnic communities tends to live in a relatively homogeneous world of its 
own. Even where members of different ethnic groups live and even work alongside each other, 
they often have limited contact in daily life. Although interaction is increasing, particularly among 
young people and the educated and professional segments of society, many members of the 
various groups still tend to go to different restaurants, different cafes, different stores and even 
different schools. The organizations and associations of civil society too, are in large part divided 
along ethnic lines, as are the political parties . . . Public debate takes place within each community 
rather than between communities, each receiving information about events within the community, 
the country and the region from media in its own language, produced by members of its own 
ethnic group. 
Source: “Second Report on “The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (Strasbourg: European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance, 3 April 2001), 15. See also information on ethnic segregation in the Macedonian 
school system in Ljubica Grozdanovska, “Macedonia: Class Struggle,” Transitions Online, 1 October 2007, 
available at: 
http://www.tol.cz/look/TOL/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=4&NrIssue=237&NrSection=1&NrArticle=1
9030. The ethnic divide between the Albanian and Macedonian populations is not a new development. Field 
research and public opinion surveys conducted by the sociologist Ilija Josifovski in the 1960s and 1970s returned 
similar results. See Josifovski, Ilija. Општествените промени на село македоското, албанското, и турското 
населеније на село во Полог (Скопје: Институт за Социолошки и Политичко-правни Истраживања при 




loyalty of another 7 percent of that country’s population.80 Importantly, neither Albanian nor 
Serb political parties in Montenegro supported passage of the country’s new constitution in 
October 2007.   
 
     In the case of Serbia, Kosovo’s decades-long effort to break its ties with Belgrade culminated 
in February 2008 with its declaration of independence. Importantly, ethnic Albanians in the 
Preševo Valley (a region in Serbia proper directly adjacent to Kosovo) either support Kosovo’s 
claims to independence and/or demand unification with Kosovo as well. In Kosovo itself, the 
Kosovo Serb population north of the Ibar River (estimated to number some 40,000) is playing an 
analogous role vis-a-vis the Kosovo Albanian government in Priština. 
 
    As the above examples show, consistent with the political science literature that stresses the 
problems ethnic, religious, and cultural heterogeneity within states often cause, these Balkan 
examples reveal the problems and inefficiencies southeastern Europe’s remaining multiethnic 
states face. Political uncertainty makes enacting reforms and attracting foreign investment 
considerably more difficult, and the longer or more “chronic” they appear to be, the more they 
become essentially structural problems in these states and societies. Thus, multiethnic states face 





                                                        
80 For a discussion of ethnic politics in Montenegro, see Miša Djurković, “Montenegro: Headed for New 
Divisions?” (Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, Conflict Studies Research Centre 07/11, March 2007).   
81 As Gidon Gottlieb argues, “Homogenous national entities may be more likely to evolve into peaceable 
democracies than states rent by harsh linguistic and cultural antagonisms.”See Gottlieb, “Nations Without States,” 




V. The Millet System as an Independent Variable Effecting Ethnoconfessional Nationalism 
in the Balkans 
 
     The previous section argued that the group identities and loyalties fostered by the identity –
formation process and in-group bias is a universal feature of the human condition. It also pointed 
out the difficulties and disadvantages states possessing higher levels of ethnoconfessional 
heterogeneity have in maintaining the loyalty of their populations.  
 
    In southeastern Europe, what has compounded the above difficulties, and given its specifically 
ethnoconfessional character, is a second independent variable: the structural influence the 
Ottoman millet system has had on Balkan political culture. If “the Balkans are the Ottoman 
legacy” as Maria Todorova has argued, then the institutions, traditions and practices of this 




     The Ottoman millet system was a form of indirect rule and corporate self-government by 
ethnoconfessional groups first established in 1454 by Sultan Mehmet II upon the fall of 
Constantinople. The millet system has been described as “basically a minority home-rule policy 
based on religious affiliation,” the roots of which can be found in Ottoman rule in Sasanid Iran, 
and even in some of Justinian’s edicts concerning Jews in the Byzantine Empire.83 The millet 
system’s equation of religion with ethnicity (the term millet itself has been translated by one 
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Turkish author as “church-nation”84) has had significant influence on every subsequent political 
system in the Balkans; as John Allcock has noted “this element of Ottoman social organization 
has had profound significance for the subsequent development of the relationship between 
ethnicity and political culture in the Balkans.”85  
 
     The Habsburgs adopted many features of the millet system when Serbs began to settle the 
Habsburg regions bordering the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 17
th
 century, and this form of 
ethnoconfessional self-governance was again adopted and modified by the South Slavs’ national 
movements in the 19
th
 century. Throughout the past two hundred years, attempts to overcome the 
ethnoconfessional segmentation of Balkan society the millet system institutionalized—whether 
in the form of Ottomanism, bošnjaštvo, or Yugoslavism—have repeatedly come to naught. 
Indeed, it has been argued that even international treaties in the early twentieth century and 
current constitutional arrangements in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia are reformulations 
of various aspects of the millet system.
86
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Travellers (London: Saqi, 2004), 179. 
85 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 148. Robin Okey notes that when the Habsburg Empire occupied Bosnia & 
Herzegovina in 1878, “In many ways, the monarchy continued the Ottoman millet system of treating Bosnians as 
religious rather than national groups, to be governed through reshaped religious hierarchies.” See Okey, Taming 
Balkan Nationalism: The Habsburg’s ‘Civilizing Mission’ in Bosnia, 1878-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007), viii. Subsequently, the nascent Serbian state in the early 1800s would itself adopt many of these features; 
thus, “the Serbian idea of a modern state was imported from the Vojvodina with the same conflation of corporate 
and national rights that predominated over individual rights in the Habsburg or Ottoman lands.” See Lampe, 
Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 2nd Edition), 
47. 
86 On how the millet system influenced international treaties regarding the treatment of minorities in early twentieth-
century Europe, see Stephanos Katsikas, “Millets in Nation-States: The Case of Greek and Bulgarian Muslims, 
1912-13,” Nationalities Papers 37 (March 2009), 177-201. On elements of the millet system in Macedonia’s Ohrid 
Accords, see Zhidas Daskalovski, “Language and Identity: The Ohrid Framework Agreement and Liberal Notions of 
Citizenship and Nationality in Macedonia.” Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 1 (2002). 





     The most prominent feature of the millet system was the power it delegated to the Ottoman 
Empire’s various religious organizations to administer their respective flocks. Under Islamic 
conceptions of the state, religion and law were closely intertwined; thus, “religion, law, and 
administrative structure and, therefore, correct behavior and salvation were closely tied 
together.”87 Thus, under the millet system, 
non-Muslim subjects of the Porte were provided with an autonomous self-
government under their respective religious leaders, the term conveying both 
nationality and religion in the Ottoman scheme of things. The non-Muslim millets 
(Orthodox, Jewish, Armenian) were subject to their own native regulations and 
not to the Şeriat (Islamic Law).  Their dealings with the Ottoman state were 
conducted through their respective community leaders. As ethnarchs of the Serbs, 
the patriarchs of Peć thus had not only all the prerogatives of their spiritual station 
but also the authority that belonged to medieval Serbian kings. In transactions 
with the Porte, they were the sole representatives of the Orthodox faithful under 
their jurisdiction, and these were by no means all Serbs. The Patriarchate also 
acquired a significant amount of judicial power within the Orthodox community, 
and it was largely due to the influence of the church that consciousness of Serbian 
state and national traditions not only survived but was even extended to 
communities where they had never before existed. In short, the Ottoman 
overlordship had the paradoxical effect of investing the Serbs with a great 
instrument of national expansion.”88  
 
     Given such a system, for most inhabitants of the Balkan peninsula their main contact with 
governmental authority did not come in the form of interaction with Muslim/Ottoman officials, 
but with communal leaders of their own religious group or their own ecclesiastical authorities, 
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who were responsible for collecting taxes and the distribution of state land.
89
 In 1557, for 
instance, the restored Serbian Patriarchate of Peć undertook “as far as was possible under foreign 
rule, the functions of the former Serbian government. The church had its own law courts and 
administrative system; it conducted foreign policy and eventually even provided military 
leadership. In essence the Serbian church became the Serbian state.”90 
 
     Under this style of rule, multiconfessional and multiethnic areas of the Balkans became 
“segmented societies” in which “Serbs, Croats, and Muslims each could live their lives wholly 
within the framework of their own Serb, Croat, or Muslim institutions.”91 Indicative of the 
degree of ethnoconfessional segregation in Bosnia in the nineteenth century is an examination of 
how rural villages were divided along such lines; when the Habsburg occupation began, there 
were 1,412 “Orthodox villages” in Bosnia, 793 “Muslim,” and 437 “Catholic.”92 The Ottoman 
system also created an ethnic division of labor, whereby, as one traveler at the turn of the 
twentieth century noted, in Macedonia “Turk meant government official, Greek merchant, 
Bulgar peasant, and Wallachian shepard.”93 
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     Apart from the imposition of a “millet mentality” on the peoples of southeastern Europe, the 
nature of Ottoman/Muslim rule in the Balkans also created severe social divisions between 
Muslims and non-Muslims. Cathie Carmichael, for instance, has called the Ottoman millet 
system a form of religious apartheid.
94
 Despite formal prescriptions about how non-Muslim 
“people of the book” should be treated, in practice, under the millet system non-Muslims were 
clearly second-class citizens: non-Muslims had to wear clothes of inferior quality and more 
modest colors than those of Muslims; they had to allow Muslims a seat if the latter needed one; 
upon meeting on the street, Christians had to put their backs to the wall to allow Muslims to 
pass; they were not allowed to ride horses; their houses could not be larger than those of Muslim 
neighbors; their churches could not exceed a certain height; their liturgical ceremonies had to be 
conducted in quiet, without bells or holiday processions; and in any legal dispute conducted in an 
Islamic judicial institution between a Muslim and non-Muslim, only Muslim testimony was 
considered valid because non-Muslims had no status as legal subjects in Islamic courts. 




     Ottoman rule also severely retarded the social and intellectual development of the vast 
majority of Balkan Christians. Ottoman elites had little interest in fostering the education of their 
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Christian subjects (and, in any case, education was the responsibility of the millets themselves) 
so given their lack of access to income-producing occupations it was very difficult for most 
Christians to obtain even a rudimentary education.
96
 All told, in the Ottoman system 
there was a definite sense that the Christian raya owed deference and submission 
to their Muslim superiors, not just because they were of higher social rank, but 
also because they were Muslim. And perhaps the most important privilege was 
not one contained in the kanun-i-raya; it was the principle that Christians could 
not bring law-suits against Muslims, and that their testimony could not be used 
against a Muslim in court. This was a serious form of legal discrimination, and 
must have been most keenly felt when the Christians and Muslims concerned 
were in fact social equals—townsmen and villagers.97 
 
     The political culture fostered by the millet system ultimately proved unable to transform itself 
enough to provide forms of citizenship based on territorial rather than cultural ties. In the 1830s, 
the Tanzimat reforms, a last-gasp Ottoman effort at modernization and reform, included an effort 
to create a civic, Ottoman identity for all of the ethnoconfessional groups in the empire, but this 
belated attempt “was a utopian experiment doomed at the outset,”98 for the millet mentality was 
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too deeply entrenched by this point. As Kemal Karpat notes, the Balkan states emerging from the 
Ottoman empire in the nineteenth century  
. . . attached themselves to territorial bonds of secular citizenship and historical 
memories while their group identity, internal cohesion and social-political values 
as a nation were determined by their long experience in the millet system. 
Nationality, in the sense of ethnic-national identity, drew its essence from the 
religious-communal experience in the millet, while citizenship—a secular 
concept—was determined by territory. In effect, the political, social and cultural 
crises which have buffeted the national states of the Balkans and the Middle East 
since their emergence can be attributed in large measure to the incompatibility of 





     Paradoxically, then, attempts to adopt or impose Western forms of identity and constitutional 
rights on the Balkan peoples only exacerbated their ethnoconfessional divisions. Economic 
modernization had similarly paradoxical effects; as Mazower argued, modernity sharpened 
religious boundaries and gave them new political meaning.
100
 Some scholars have gone even 
further and suggested that economic change and urbanization even fostered different lifestyles 
amongst the Balkan peoples; thus, for instance, Çaglar Keyder claims that “not only religious 
practice, but also schools and community organization, patterns of consumption and levels of 
Westernization, material culture and lifestyles increasingly diverged.”101  
     
     From a theoretical standpoint, and especially with regard to materialist and rationalist 
explanations for identity-formation, it is important to note that economic modernization and the 
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overall breakdown of the millet system did not mean that new identities were being created; 
rather, old identities were again coming to the fore. Thus,   
What emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not the 
disintegration of the Orthodox millet opening the door to new foci of loyalty. 
What emerged were old differences and antagonisms that could not be expressed 
openly so long as the millet leadership was protected by the power of a strong 




     Thus, the result of several centuries of Ottoman rule was the entrenchment of un-malleable, 
un-fluid ethnoconfessional identities on the peoples of southeastern Europe. In Bosnia 
specifically, during the Ottoman period “to a great degree the basis for a common political 
identity among the Bosnian population was destroyed.”103 The unavoidable reality of physical, 
spatial proximity, of course, meant that the separate ethnoconfessional groups in the Balkans 
would come into contact, and even, to a limited extent, share each other’s religious and cultural 
practices,
104
 but by and large they lived in separate institutional and psychological worlds. As 
Maria Todorova has concluded, “Not only was there no feeling of belonging to a common 
society but the population felt it belonged to disparate (religious, social, or other) groups that 
would not converge.”105  
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“Ottoman-Islamic repressive religious tolerance, in truth, tolerated a pluralistic society, but at the same time 
manipulated specific groups in their mutual conflicts and prevented a true spiritual communication. The 
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century, “The parting of the ways between Christian and Muslim was clear at the beginning of the century, and the 
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     Moreover, while by the nineteenth century the concepts of liberty and equality were spreading 
to the Ottoman Empire, instead of following the western European pattern in which such 
demands were made on behalf of the individual, in the Ottoman lands they were made on behalf 
of ethnoconfessional groups.
106





centuries, the millet system’s most important features, especially those provisions giving 
ethnoconfessional groups large degrees of self-governance, would henceforth become an 
unavoidable expectation and demand of the various ethnoconfessional groups in the Balkans, 
reproduced and transplanted across time and into different political regimes. 
 
VI. Religion and Balkan Ethnoconfessional Nationalism 
     Paradoxically, while the peoples of the former Yugoslavia were not known for being 
particularly devout during the socialist period, religion has nevertheless been the most powerful 
marker of differentiation between groups in the Balkans. Nations in southeastern Europe, as 
Milorad Ekmečić has argued, were formed on the basis of religion, not language, and this has 
had important implications for the character and manifestations of ethnoconfessional nationalism 
in the region. As Adrian Hastings has argued, the more influential religion has been in the 
“construction” of a nation, the more influence it is likely to have over every expression of its 
specific nationalism.
107
 Moreover, the fact that these are in many ways “church-nations” 
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intensifies the already strong ties between religion and nationalism that many scholars have 
noted. Thus, nationalism is not simply a “cognitive doctrine” of religion,” but, as Elie Kedourie 
notes, it is “a method of spiritual mobilization, of eliciting, activating, and canalizing dormant 
political energies.”108 In this sense, religion can serve as a force multiplier for nationalist 
movements, “inspiring greater zeal and sacrifice from the masses.”109 Some scholars, such as 
Eric Hobsbawm, have argued that religion becomes an especially important component of 
nationalism the moment it allegedly spread from intellectuals and activists to the masses,
110
 and 
Hans Kohn similarly noted that religious revivals tend to foreshadow nationalist upsurges. 
Explaining ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans thus requires an analysis of how 
religion has become such an important factor in the region.  
 
     In examining how religion affects politics, Weber described the need to look for the “practical 
impulses for action which are founded in the psychological and pragmatic contexts of 
religion.”111 Similarly, David Laitin has noted that if religion is defined as “an original doctrine 
[which not only] announces the faith, but also provides guidance for living a moral life consistent 
                                                        
108 As cited by Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 102. 
109 See Walter A. McDougall’s “Introduction” to a special edition on religion and politics in Orbis 42 (Spring 1998), 
162. 
110 As Hobsbawm notes, “The links between religion and national consciousness can be very close . . . In fact, the 
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activists’ movement . . . Religion is an ancient and well-tried method of establishing communion through common 
practice and a sort of brotherhood between people who otherwise have nothing much in common.” See Hobsbawm, 
Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
67. 
111 See Weber, “The Social Psychology of the World Religions,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, H.H. 




with the religious conceptualization” it is “intuitively obvious” that this has consequences for the 




     The task thus becomes analyzing what Laitin calls “the transference of values from the 
religious sphere to the political sphere,”113 and understanding how religion (or, put more broadly, 
political culture) “constrains preferences and how preferences affect culture . . . the critical factor 
underlying preference stability is the social and psychological constraints that act upon it.”114 For 
religion to be a useful tool in understanding political phenomenon, however, “it must be able to 
explain why and when people choose a particular course of action over others and the likelihood 
that these choices will be widely shared.”115 Clifford Geertz made an attempt in this direction 
when he described how “sacred symbols” impact daily life:  
sacred symbols function to synthesize a people’s ethos—the tone, character, and 
quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood—and their world 
view—the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most 
comprehensive ideas of order. In religious belief and practice a group’s ethos is 
rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life 
ideally adapted to the actual state of affairs the world view describes, while the 
world view is rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as an image of 
an actual state of affairs peculiarly well-arranged to accommodate such a way of 
life. . . . The notion that religion tunes human actions to an envisaged cosmic 
order and projects images of cosmic order onto the plane of human experience is 
hardly novel. But it is hardly investigated either, so that we have very little idea of 
how, in empirical terms, this particular miracle is accomplished. We just know 
that it is done, annually, weekly, daily, for some people almost hourly; and we 
have an enormous ethnographic literature to demonstrate it. But the theoretical 
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account of the sort we can provide for lineage segmentation, political succession, 
labor exchange, or the socialization of the child, does not exist.”116 
 
     Geertz’s claim that we have a relatively poor understanding of how religion tunes human 
action parallels other descriptions which see it as a subconscious or subliminal phenomenon.
117
 
While this brings to mind Anthony Smith’s “irreducible ethnopsychological element[s] in 
nations and nationalism” that seemingly have a subconscious or non-rational aspect to them, it 
still begs the question of how these non-rational beliefs get translated into concrete political 
action. For this reason, an analysis of the roles religious organizations play in Balkan society 
reveals how and why religion has become such an important factor in ethnoconfessional identity 
                                                        
116 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973),  89-90. It bears noting here that 
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Yugoslavia is because during the communist period local scholars showed little interest in the topic. As John 
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time since the Enlightenment.” See McDougall, “Introduction,” Orbis 42 (Spring 1998), 159 (special edition 
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the world’s people’s their voice, and they want to talk about God.” Foreign Policy (July/August 2006), 39. 
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cathedral strikes the hour with weighty confidence: 2am. More than a minute passes (to be exact, seventy-five 
seconds—I counted) and only then with a rather weaker, but piercing sound does the Orthodox church announce the 
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in southeastern Europe. Here we can point to two distinct roles religious organizations play: 1) 
church and mosque as cultural guardian and moral conscience of the group; and 2) church and 
mosque as political ally and legitimator of ethnoconfessional nationalist movements. 
 
a. Church and Mosque as Cultural Guardian and Moral Conscience 
    Perhaps the most important role religious organizations in the Balkans have played has been in 
maintaining or perpetuating the existence of ethnoconfessional groups themselves. Both the 
Croatian Catholic and Serbian Orthodox churches, for instance, frequently claim that they played 
the leading and decisive role in the survival of their respective flocks during centuries of foreign 
occupation. In Croatia, the Roman Catholic Church promoted the view that throughout Croatian 
history it played a determining role in developing and maintaining the Croatian nation through its 
role in schooling, art, culture, and various forms of charity.
118
 For the Orthodox populations of 
southeastern Europe in general, the Orthodox Church “kept the Christian community almost 
unchanged in an ideological sense until the age of national movements,” and in the routines of 
everyday life the average Balkan Christian, “was surrounded by Christian symbols, by crosses 
and icons, and not by reminders of Ottoman domination.”119 As Vjekoslav Perica has noted with 
regard to this aspect of the role of religious institutions:  
Ethnic churches are designed as instruments for the survival of ethnic 
communities . . . They are authoritarian-minded and centralized organizations 
capable of organizing resistance against an outside threat and maintaining stability 
inside the community. The upper section of clerical hierarchies exercise a 
hegemony in ecclesiastical affairs (at the expense of the lower clergy and lay 
members). Ethnoclericalism is thus both an ecclesiastical concept and political 
ideology. It champions a strong homogeneous church in a strong homogenous 
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state, with both institutions working together as guardians of the ethnic 
community. Ethnic churches depend on the nation state as much as the nation 
depends on them. Needless to say, ethnoclericalism as an ideology holds that the 
ethnic community would perish without its own church and state. Thanks to its 




    As noted here, religious institutions play an important role in Balkan society simply by virtue 
of having a coherent, hierarchical institutional structure, recognized rules of procedure, their own 
organizational networks, forms of public media, etc. Moreover, as inherently conservative 
organizations, they instinctively maintain and perpetuate the traditions and beliefs of their 
respective peoples through the centuries, making them often appear to be the authentic ethnic or 
national institution. Thus, the persisting popularity of religious rituals in the life-cycle, such as 
infant baptism, marriage, funerals, the slava celebration among Serbs, etc. are not only rituals to 
mark important milestones in life, but also ways to affirm an individual’s and a family’s 
ethnoconfessional identity.
121
 As Tone Bringa notes in her study of Bosnian Muslims, the 
celebration of Ramadan “serves as a vehicle for the expression of a distinctive Muslim nacija 
identity vis-à-vis other non-Muslim Bosnians.”122 
 
     The often all-encompassing nature of religious proscriptions means that in the Balkans 
religious faith and practice has influenced what people eat and drink, how they dress, the style of 
architecture they choose to build their houses and places of worship, their choice of marriage 
partners, the yearly rhythms of their celebrations and holidays, the rituals by which they are 
brought into the world and how they depart from it, and on and on. Thus, in Balkan Islam, for 
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instance, “the teachings and daily practice of the faith, and the associated customs, serve to 
create a consolidated sense of community; these customs and the distinctive way of life that goes 
with them separate Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbors even where faith has been 
eroded.”123 
 
     In recent years, religious institutions have played this role by acting as cultural arbiters—
proferring public judgement on what is “acceptable” for a member of an ethnic group to wear, to 
eat, to watch on television, etc. The leader of Bosnia’s Islamic Community, reis-ul-ulema 
Mustafa ef. Cerić, for example, has been noted for his frequent attacks on public programming 
on Sarajevo’s television stations, such as his complaints during the 1998 holiday season of 
“excessive Christian content” on state television, while more radical Muslim leaders, such as the 
imam of the King Fahd mosque in Sarajevo, Nezim Halilović, has often warned worshippers to 
reject the “alien and hostile influence of the West.”124 Cerić has also discouraged Bosniacs from 
entering into close personal relations with members of other ethnoconfessional groups, going so 
far as to claim that interethnic marriages “are just another form of genocide against the Bosnian 
people.”125 
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     A corollary to understanding the role of churches and mosques as a given ethnic group’s 
cultural guardian is their role as the “moral conscience” of the group. Balkan religious 
organizations see themselves, and are seen by their peoples, as the ultimate “guardians” of the 
nation’s identity, values, and freedom. As a high-ranking official in the Serbian Orthodox 
Church has noted, “the mission of the Serbian Orthodox Church is to be the conscience of its 
people” and to make moral pronouncements. As this official noted, “When discussing our 
Church and her public pronouncements, she does not do this with some political plan, but as the 
bearer of the moral conscience of society. For years, the Church in our society was not allowed 
to represent her people and to express the ethical dimensions of Saint Sava-hood before her 
people.”126 
 
b. Church and Mosque as Political Ally and Legitimator 
     Because of their traditional values, religious institutions are frequently natural allies of 
conservative, right-of-center political movements. On a whole host of issues, such as abortion, 
pornography, businesses operating on religious holidays, gay marriage, etc., conservative 
political parties frequently find natural allies among religious institutions. Thus, it is no surprise 
that as the communist system in the former Yugoslavia disintegrated in the 1980s, the right-of-
center national movements that developed during this time received substantial support from 
Catholic, Islamic, and Orthodox religious organizations throughout the country. The Bosnian 
intellectual Ivan Lovrenović has claimed that the 1980s witnessed the “de-secularization” of 
                                                        










      Most prominently, this de-secularization of society has taken the form of religious leaders 
and religious ceremonies again becoming prominent features of social and political life in the 
former Yugoslav republics. Religious leaders are frequently featured at political functions, and 
for politicians the presence of a religious leader by their side is now considered de rigeur. At 
ceremonies marking the opening of a new facility for the Sarajevo water works in September 
1997 attended by several leading Stranka za Demokratske Akcije (Party for Democratic Action, 
or SDA) officials, a sheep was ritually slaughtered in traditional Islamic fashion.
128
 At the 
inauguration of the RS National Assembly in October 1996, members were called on to swear an 
oath of allegiance on a bible and kiss a cross held by an Orthodox prelate, a ritual obviously 
unacceptable to Bosniac and Croat representatives. Religion classes are now mandatory for all 
grade school students in the RS. Similarly, in many Bosniac-populated areas of BiH, 
organizations from Islamic countries provide funds to rebuild schools, but under the proviso that 
these schools offer classes in Islamic religious doctrine and in the Arabic language. Croats in 
Sarajevo have attacked the increasing use of religious greetings, such as the traditional Muslim 
greeting “Selam aleikum” in public institutions.129 Further evidence of the return of religion to 
social life is the literal building boom occurring in the construction of mosques and churches, 
much of which is government supported. Throughout the Balkans, state-owned TV stations have 
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pushed religious programs to the forefront, especially those dealing with the close ties between 
the church and the ethnconfessional group, and airwaves are now regularly filled with programs 
on the historical/national importance of a famous mosque, monastery, or religious figure.  
 
      As the failures of the communist system began to be openly discussed in the late 1980s, 
people’s faith in religious institutions increased. On Vidovdan130 1990, one of the most important 
Serb politicians at the time in the former Yugoslavia, Dr. Jovan Rašković, the founder of the 
Croatian branch of the Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serb Democratic Party, or SDS), said in a 
speech in Kosovo that  
The Serbs were dormant for nearly 50 years. We forgot our name, our faith, our 
roots. Now, the time for awakening has come. What the Serbs must do first, is to 
pay tribute to our Serbian Orthodox Church . . . Our Orthodox Church is our 
mother . . . She was a weeping and lonely mother deserted by her children. We 
must return to its altar, because the Serbian Church is our mother. The Serbian 
nation was born at the holy altar of our Serbian Orthodox Church in the year 1219 




     Similarly, Radovan Karadzić would note in 1990 that “The Serbian Orthodox Church is not 
merely a religious organization, it is a cultural institution and part of national leadership; the 
Church is highly important for all Serbs, and it is irrelevant whether one believes in God or 
not.”132 
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Kosovo in 1389; the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, and Stalin’s excommunication 
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     Increasing the importance of religious organizations in secular politics is the fact that 
religious organizations possess a well-established organizational structure, encompassing cadres, 
properties, and propaganda resources. Thus, the ability of religious organizations to bring people 
together and send a message to large numbers of people is obvious. In the case of the Bosnian 
HDZ, for instance, 
. . . the Bosnian branch of the HDZ was organized and prepared for the 1990 
elections through the parish system of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Bosnian Catholic bishops and most of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian 
clergy . . . made possible the electoral victory of the HDZ, even though it was 
obvious that this party’s goal was the dismemberment of the republic.133 
   
     Importantly, the Islamic Organization in Bosnia and the Serbian Orthodox Church in Bosnia 
played similar roles for the SDA and the SDS; thus, “the ulema took part in the foundation of the 
SDA and carried out most of the logistics for the election campaign. Among forty founding 
members of the SDA, eight were former ‘Young Muslims’ and some two dozen included 
prominent imams from the Sarajevo theological school and the Zagreb mosque, the mufti of 
Mostar, and officials of the Community’s Sarajevo headquarters.” During the election campaign, 
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134 Ibid. Here it is also important to note, however, that religious leaders have also played positive roles in promoting 
reconciliation as well. As Brank Peuraca has noted, “Clerics may lead by example. Such a simple act as an Orthodox 
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with Serbian returnees were greatly reassured and encouraged by the arrival of a Catholic priest. Another reported 
that in one town in central Bosnia, Croats were reluctant to join Bosniaks in activities sponsored by an NGO. When 
a Catholic priest newly assigned to the town encouraged participation, however, Croat youth became much more 
comfortable joining. When that priest was transferred, Croat attendance dropped once more. That example again 
demonstrates clerics’ great influence: when they fail to undertake interfaith reconciliation, their followers may be 
that much less apt to do so.” See Peuraca, “Can Faith-Based NGOs Advance Interfaith Reconciliation? The Case of 




     Throughout the postcommunist period, there has been an increasing tendency to blur the lines 
between the state, the ethnic group, and religion. The extent to which church and state have 
become intermingled can be seen in the fact that Alija Izetbegović personally appointed the 
current head of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1993, and the SDA makes 
most of the important personnel decisions within the Islamic Community.
135
 Many religious 
figures, for their part, have eagerly become participants in politics, sometimes openly supporting 
individual political leaders and/or parties. During the September 1996 elections campaign, for 
instance, the Orthodox bishop of Banja Luka openly called on Serbs to vote for the SDS. Bosniac 
Muslim clerics have in similar fashion called on Bosniacs to vote for the SDA. In a different 
vein, religious organizations in the region have sometimes come under criticism for not standing 
up to what are perceived to be various nationalistic policies; thus, for instance, one Bosnian 
intellectual attacked the Catholic Church hierarchy in BiH for not speaking out forcefully against 




     As the above discussion reveals, religious institutions in the Balkans have played important 
roles in their societies by virtue of their role in forming identities, in providing the institutional 
and mobilizational resources they have to contribute to specific political platforms, and also 
because of the much more difficult to quantify emotional and psychological influence they have 
on their respective flocks. Yet what also emerges from this analysis is that, as stated at the 
beginning of this section, to claim that nationalism in the Balkans is ethnoconfessional is not to 
suggest that it has anything to do with theology; rather, it is about the political importance and 
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symbolic power that religious institutions and traditions can assume in any society over the 
course of centuries.  
 
VII. Structure of the Dissertation and Academic and Policymaking Implications  
 
     Chapter II will examine and debate two specific categories of constructivist and 
rationalist/instrumentalist explanations 1) theories that focus on the often pernicious motivations 
and goals of individuals and/or specific groups of leaders, and the advantages they have to gain 
by playing the “nationalist card” to gain or keep power, and; 2) economic-based theories 
stressing that nationalism is a result of group struggles for control of resources.  
 
     Chapter III examines in depth and provides empirical evidence for the claim that Balkan 
ethnoconfessional nationalism is a collective, chronic, and non-economic phenomenon. It will 
also discuss how such an understanding of ethnonconfessional nationalism in the Balkans 
contributes to ongoing debates between primordialists, perennialists, instrumentalists and 
constructivists regarding identity-formation and nation-building.  
 
     Chapter IV provides an historical and empirical analysis of the segmentation of Balkan 
society along ethnoconfessional lines, and further amplifies the argument that ethnoconfessional 
nationalism is a collective, chronic, and non-economic phenomenon. An important part of this 
chapter is devoted to addressing the issue of whether ethnic groups can be considered unitary 
political actors. Many constructivists argue against such a view.
137
 Other scholars, however have 
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argued that for the purpose of most political analysis it is permissible to treat ethnic groups as 
unitary political actors,
138
 or, as one scholar has argued that in the Yugoslav case, can 
ethnoconfessional group interests really be considered “de facto monolithic.”139 
Methodologically, several scholars have noted that given the right precautions, it is possible to 
assign preferences to groups or collectivities.
140
 The historical and empirical evidence presented 
in Chapter IV will show that the preponderance of available evidence does in fact suggest that 
according to a wide array of political and social behaviors the different Balkan ethnoconfessional 
groups can be considered unitary political actors.  
 
     The evidence provided in Chapter IV is supplemented by information provided in the 
Appendix, which is an analysis of approximately thirty elections, referenda and public opinion 
polls conducted in southeastern Europe over the past century,  in each of which distinct 
differences and preferences can be seen based on ethnoconfessional identity. While the evidence 
provided in the Appendix is not meant to be exhaustive, it should be considered representative of 
actual attitudes and preferences in southeastern Europe. Both the historical and empirical 
evidence, and the information provided in the Appendix is intended to support the thesis that for 
the historically delimited period analyzed, ethnoconfessional nationalism should be considered a 
collective phenomenon.   
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     Chapter V will provide a series of micro case-studies analyzing and comparing several state- 
and nation-building efforts in the Balkan over the past two centuries. First it will look at 
constructivist failures: Bošnjaštvo, King Alexander’s “Yugoslav integralism,” and Titoist 
Yugoslavism. Each of these efforts failed, but what is noteworthy from a social science 
standpoint is that they failed against competing identity projects (e.g., Croatian, Macedonian, and 
Serbian) over which they had immeasurable advantages in terms of state power and material 
resources. Understanding and explaining why some identity projects lacking conventional levers 
of conventional power succeeded while others failed is of considerable importance for 
constructivist theory,
141
 and will support the argument that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a 
non-economic phenomenon.  
 
     In conclusion, Chapter VI will discuss the implications such an analysis of ethnoconfessional 
nationalism has for the study of nationalism, for our understanding of the identity-formation 
process, and for practical policymaking, all of which will be discussed and tested in Chapter VI.  
 
     With respect to the academic study of nationalism, one of the arguments consistently made in 
the dissertation—that identities are far less fluid and malleable then is commonly assumed—has 
an important implication for political science, insofar as it contributes to the debate as to whether 
or not it is appropriate to consider ethnic groups or nations unitary political actors or not. The 
evidence presented in this dissertation will argue that while ethnic groups are not homogenous, 
                                                        
141 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International 




undifferentiated wholes, for the purposes of most political analysis and political strategy, ethnic 
groups and/or nations do represent decisive political majorities. 
 
     Another major claim of this dissertation—contra rationalist and materialist explanations for 
nationalism—will be that economic and material factors do not have a major influence on 
ethnoconfessional nationalism. In southeastern Europe, non-tangible and non-quantifiable factors 
more related to psychology and emotions are thus seen as the most important elements in 
understanding the phenomenon.  
 
     These findings have important implications for policymaking. Most importantly, they suggest 
that certain types of institutional design are more appropriate for ethnoconfessionally-segmented 
societies than others. Specifically, consociational-federal systems (which assume that individuals 
and communities have more fixed identities) are the most appropriate forms of governmental 
organization for the multiethnic political entities in southeastern Europe, for two reasons. First, 
as the Balkan experience has repeatedly shown, unitary, highly-centralized political systems can 
only be imposed using considerable amounts of coercion, which would be difficult to sustain for 
longer periods. Second, in states and societies in which an individual’s ethnoconfessional 
identity is the primary social and political referent, ordinary democratic majoritarian politics 
characterized by “one person, one vote” in which there are numerous cross-cutting interests and 
cleavages are generally unfeasible because of ethnic bloc voting, and may in fact exacerbate 
communal tensions rather than mitigate them.
142
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     A second implication for policymaking of this understanding of ethnoconfessional 
nationalism has to do with its collective nature. If, as argued here, ethnoconfessional nationalism 
is a mass phenomenon, then managing it entails far more than replacing (or removing) 
uncooperative elites or developing new institutional designs. Many rationalist proposals for 
managing ethnic relations
143
 which stress the value of ethnic minority affirmative action 
programs, providing more freedom for various forms of personal identification, etc., were all 
tried and failed in the former Yugoslavia, and the experience with such efforts in post-1995 
Bosnia and Kosovo have also been disappointing. This suggests that strategies commonly used to 
combat ethnoconfessional nationalism, such as holding democratic elections or indicting leaders 
deemed to be inciting ethnic conflict, will have little bearing on the problem.  
 
     Third, the finding that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a non-economic phenomenon that 
does not exhibit a unilinear relationship to economic forces suggests that economic or financial 
instruments will not have a significant effect in managing it. The experiences of the former 
Yugoslavia, or contemporary Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo, suggest that it is extremely 
difficult to “buy off” ethnoconfessional groups using financial or economic incentives. This in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 30 (October 1997), 607-
630; Markus M. L. Crepaz, “Consensus Versus Majoritarian Democracy: Political Institutions and Their Impact on 
Macroeconomic Performance and Industrial Disputes.” Comparative Political Studies 29 (February 1996), 4-26; 
Hechter, Containing Nationalism; Hanna Lerner, “Constitution-Writing in Deeply Divided Societies: The 
Incrementalist Approach,” Nations and Nationalism 16 (2010), 68-88; Sherrill Stroschein, “What Belgium Can 
Teach Bosnia: The Uses of Autonomy in ‘Divided House’ States.” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in 
Europe 3 (2003), 1-30. 
143 See, for instance, those provided by Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” op. cit., Timur Kuran, 
“Ethnic Dissimulation and its International Diffusion,” in David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, The International 
Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 35-60; 
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” 
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turn suggests that the emphasis in state-building efforts and post-conflict situations should be 
geared more towards providing military and political security for various groups than towards 
using economic levers to create unitary, integrated political entities.  
 
     Fourth, and as a result of all of the above, this dissertation will demonstrate that nation-
building is an inherently more complex process than both constructivists in the academic world 
and policymakers in the so-called “real world” normally assume. This in turn supports a 
considerable body of academic literature arguing that there are significant limits to what 
outsiders can accomplish (in terms of developing stable political arrangements for deeply-
divided states) around the world, and, hence, that a more cautious and conservative approach to 
international intervention in ethnoconfessional conflicts is both more appropriate, and perhaps 
even more beneficial in the long-run.
144
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     “The basic logical process of science,” according to Arthur Stinchombe, “is the elimination of 
alternative theories (both those we know and those we do not) by investigating as many of the 
empirical consequences of each theory as is practical, always testing for the greatest possible 
variety in the implications tested.”1 This chapter will examine three general categories of theories 
proposed to explain Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism: elite-based, modernist and economic- 
or materialist-based theories, and examine the strengths and limitations of each.  These three 
categories are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily contradictory; in fact, they share a 
number of similarities. Each, however, has a distinctive emphasis, which makes it useful to 
analyze each of them independently.  
 
     Important insights can be gained from comparing various theoretical approaches and 
examining their strengths and weaknesses as explanatory models. With respect to the three main 
theories used to explain the presence or absence of nationalism in the Balkans in the 19
th
 century 
(primordialism, nationalism as a Western import, and nationalism as a structural feature or a 
phenomenon related to modernization), Chirot and Barkey note that each should be recognized 
as having some scholarly validity.
2
 Yet some theories inevitably have more explanatory power 
than others, and, as a result, contribute more towards understanding ethnoconfessional 
nationalism than others do. By examining the empirical and logical consequences of elite-based, 
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modernist and economic- or materialist-based theories, this chapter will reveal each theory’s 
strengths and weaknesses, and sharpen the analytical focus of the alternative explanation of 
ethnoconfessional nationalism proposed in the next chapter.   
 
 
II. Elite-based theories 
 
     Perhaps the most prominent theory attempting to explain Balkan nationalism in recent years 
has been the belief that “evil leaders” or otherwise malevolent elites were the independent causal 
variable determining the disintegration and violence which afflicted the former Yugoslavia in its 
final days. An analogous academic school of thought argues that such politicians intentionally 
provoke conflict to create or foster new identities amongst certain segments of the population. In 
this view, variables such as history, culture, religion, or a more genuinely felt sense of 
nationalism among the general population assume secondary or tertiary importance as 
explanatory variables.  
 
    Elite-based theories have been popular with many diplomats, journalists, and Western 
scholars. Richard Holbrooke, for instance, has claimed that "Yugoslavia's tragedy was not 
foreordained. It was the product of bad, even criminal, political leaders who encouraged ethnic 
confrontation for personal, political, and financial gain."
3
 Along similar lines, Warren 
Zimmerman has noted that "Yugoslavia's death and the violence that followed resulted from the 
conscious actions of nationalist leaders who coopted, intimidated, circumvented, or eliminated 
                                                        
3 Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 23-24. This has been a consistent theme of 
Holbrooke’s approach to the region. On another occasion, Holbrooke claimed that “The forces of darkness—
separatists, racists, war criminals, and crooks—are still there, continuing their efforts to keep the people in the dark 
ages.” The New York Times, 14 September 1999, as quoted by Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, 




all opposition to their demagogic designs. Yugoslavia was destroyed from the top down."
4
 
Similar explanations are provided for earlier instances of interethnic conflict in the region. Thus, 
with reference to the early nineteenth century Serbian uprisings against Ottoman rule, Snyder has 
argued that “it would be wrong to view Serbia’s war for autonomy from the Ottoman Empire in 
the early nineteenth century as an outpouring of ancient popular nationalist sentiment . . . this 
struggle was more a commercial enterprise by a multiethnic cabal of pig-traders than a war of 
national liberation.”5 Along similar lines, Gagnon also argues that earlier instances of ethnic 
conflict in the Balkans—and the way in which they shaped identities—were the deliberate 
consequence of elite struggles for power and dominance; thus,  
. . . the dynamics of the wars of the 1990s in many ways are a replay of earlier 
conflicts that are often cited as “proof” of the existence of ancient ethnic hatreds 
and the overwhelming power of ethnic identity. Yet looking at it from a social 
constructivist perspective, what becomes clear is that in those cases too the goals 
and strategies of elites were of vital importance in determining outcomes. Existing 
identities, and the meanings of those identities, were in these cases obstacles to 
elite goals rather than the means by which elites achieved their goals. In response, 
elites fomented and provoked conflict in ethnic terms in order to change the 
meanings of ethnic identities and the nature of ethnic groupness, that is, the nature 
of the relationships among people who identify in common ethnic terms. Violence 
was thus used to force a change in how people identified and what it meant to 
identify in particular ways . . . . elites, because of their control over resources 
(including economic, military, political, and informational), are able to use 
violence to try to create a particular notion of groupness that did not exist before; 
that is, the violence seeks to change what it means to identify as Serb or Croat and 
to impose an equivalence between ethnic identity and political position—in other 




                                                        
4 Warren Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe (New York: Times Books, 1993), vii. The view that a few 
individuals were responsible for the former Yugoslavia’s disintegration and subsequent wars has also been provided 
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Mladićevim kalendarima?” Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 16 January 2002. 
5 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 35.  




      This understanding of interethnic conflict derives from a version of social constructivist 
thinking about the role of political and cultural elites in the emergence and development of 
nationalism. Social constructivism, according to Fearon and Laitin, implies that “social 
categories, their membership rules, content, and valuation are the products of human action and 
speech, and that as a result they can and do change over time.” According to this view, political, 
intellectual and social elites develop various nation-building or “identity projects,”usually based 
on rational choice calculations as to what constitutes a personally advantageous outcome or 
position, be it power, prestige, or material or financial gain.
7
 The potential of elites to succeed 
with such identity projects, in turn, is predicated upon the fact that individuals have multiple, 
fluid, and malleable identities, which elites can manipulate. Thus, according to David Laitin,  
All societies—perhaps especially today—have cultural entrepreneurs who offer 
new identity categories (racial, sexual, regional), hoping to find “buyers.” If their 
product sells, these entrepreneurs become leaders of newly formed ethnic, 
cultural, religious, or other forms of identity groups . . . Construction and choice, 




    Two issues are worth examining at length here. The first is how powerful elites are in this 
process. The second concerns the fluidity and malleability of individual identities, and, 
ultimately, the extent to which individuals believe that all of their identities are equally salient.  
 
     The power of elites: For many constructivists, voluntaristic political intervention is at least a 
necessary condition for the emergence of nations and ethnic groups; as Eley and Suny note, 
                                                        
7 As James Fearon and David Laitin note, “If individuals are viewed as agents who construct ethnic identities, then 
constructivist explanations for ethnic violence tend to merge with rationalist, strategic analyses, particularly those 
that emphasize elite manipulation of mass publics but also those that see violence stemming from ethnic interactions 
‘on the ground’. . .  In this approach, the insights of a ‘constructivist’ approach merge with, or become hard to 
distinguish from, a rationalist or strategic choice approach.” See Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social 
Construction of Ethnic Identity,” International Organization 54 (Autumn 2000), 846-48, 853. 




“coherent political action is required to transform a segmented and disunited population into a 
coherent nationality.”9 Similarly, in his critique of the constructivist argument Alexander Motyl 
notes that “Constructivism . . . must argue that national identity can arise only if elites, as the 
active imaginers, inventors, and constructors . . . consciously take preexisting building blocks 
and transform them into national identity.”10 The degree to which the masses can be manipulated 
is apparent from an argument proposed by Nicholas Miller:    
. . . in southeastern Europe, the idea of the nation was brought to the masses by 
intellectuals who had the opportunity to pick and choose which elements of a 
collective personality they wished to emphasize. Only then was this personality 
communicated to the populace, which was becoming literate as it imbibed the 
nation-building educational efforts of newly formed state elites. Thus this person 
whom we know as a Serb today might very well have become something else: a 
Croat, a Bulgarian, a Yugoslav, depending on the relative merits of the cultural 





      In the arguments of both Laitin and Miller, the emphasis is clearly on the role of elites. 
“Cultural entrepreneurs” “pick and choose” what “product” they want to sell to the masses.12 
Nevertheless, it is also clear from these accounts that the “masses” are not entirely passive; thus, 
Laitin admits that “cultural entrepreneurs” have to find “buyers” for their “product,” who 
presumably have some ability to pick and choose among the various “products” on the market. 
                                                        
9 Eley and Suny, “Introduction,” 7-8. 
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University Press, 1999), 71. Emphasis in the original. 
11 Miller, Between Nation and State, 25. Michael Hechter makes the same argument in more abstract terms, claiming 
that nation-builders must overcome relatively micro-ecological differences in cultures “by promulgating an arbitrary 
set of culturally distinctive practices and beliefs, including some sanctioned story of the nation, as a standard to be 
adopted throughout the territory. Although this task is ultimately educational, it can proceed, in the absence of 
formal schools, on the basis of oral tradition or written texts. It only succeeds, however, to the degree that the target 
population is dependent on nation-builders, and that these nation-builders have the capacity to monitor and sanction 
their dependants.” See Hechter, Containing Nationalism, 24. 
12 The most extreme example of the constructivist argument that I have found is proposed by Nelson Kasfir, who 
argues that one person alone can create an ethnic group; thus, Kasfir claims that “an ethnic group may be carefully 
constructed by an upwardly mobile entrepreneur looking for a political base.” See Kasfir, “Explaining Ethnic 




For Miller, this process is determined to some extent by the relative merits of elite arguments. 
This view of elite manipulation, however, provides what Fearon and Laitin call “a major puzzle,” 
namely, the problem of explaining “how elites can convince their followers to adopt false beliefs 
and take actions that the followers would not want to take if they understood what the leaders 
were up to . . . why do [the masses] pay extravagant costs to fulfill elite power interests?”13  
 
      How do elites achieve their goal of imposing their chosen “identity project” on the masses? 
Fearon and Laitin argue that elites are able to exploit the constitutional and political leadership 
roles they have to influence conflict-prone situations to their advantage, or that the masses give 
them the benefit of the doubt in conflict situations because they assume that political elites have 
access to more or better information about the intentions of “others,” or simply because in crisis 
situations people feel that they do not have the luxury of searching for new leadership.”14  
 
     Often, elite control of the mass media or the educational system is considered key to such 
power and influence; thus, in this view “the emotions of an inert mass are waiting to be aroused 
and channeled by elites as part of an exercise in social engineering,”15 With respect to the 
Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the role of journalists and the media has been extensively analyzed, 
and many politicians, journalists and scholars have made strong claims about the media’s ability 
                                                        
13 Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 853, 868. In their analysis of Paul 
Brass’ account of communal violence in India, Fearon and Laitin admit that even Brass “seems aware that it is odd 
that he should find the politicians’ machinations transparent while the Indian public is duped.” 
14 Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 855. 




to influence (or inflame) public opinion.
16
 A prominent Bosnian intellectual, Zlatko Dizdarević, 
for instance, has claimed that former Bosniac president Alija Izetbegović manipulated popular 
opinion to gain power, in the full knowledge that such policies would lead to war. According to 
Dizdarević,  
. . . nations, especially in this region [but referring specifically to the Bosniacs], 
without any strong democratic tradition can be molded like dough if the molder is 
smart, lucid and knows how to do that. I do not want to say that [Izetbegović] 
took them into the war, but I want to say that he accepted the concept for which 




     The Serbian writer and politician Vuk Drašković has likewise pointed to the power of 
politicians or government-controlled media to mold peoples’ attitudes. Speaking with reference 
to Serbs in the 1990s, Drašković once claimed that  
The tragedy of this people is in the fact that, like a drunk, it goes for the 
propaganda of those who are in power, not thinking about the suffering of their 
children, their families, their nation and state; rather, they think through the 





     A sustained analysis of elite-led arguments, however, fails on at least eleven counts. First, and 
perhaps most importantly, the contemporaneous breakups of the USSR and Czechoslovakia (and 
perhaps even Belgium in the future) suggests that the problems confronting multiethnic 
federations are structural or systemic rather than the result of machinations by individual 
leaders.
19
 Along somewhat similar lines, Barry R. Posen has argued that technological and 
                                                        
16 See, for instance, Kemal Kurspahić, Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2003), and Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and 
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18 See the interview with Vuk Drašković in NIN (Belgrade), 13 March 2003. 
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geographical facts of the former Yugoslavia’s disintegration created a set of incentives (if not 
imperatives) that greatly increased the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict.
20
 Other scholars have 
gone further, arguing that the violent disintegration of multiethnic states in East-Central Europe 
was “predestined” or “over-determined.”21 Such views obviously reduce the role of individual 
leaders or elites in these processes, and suggest that a more powerful or convincing explanation 
for the phenomenon should be found at the systemic or structural level. 
 
     Second, elite-led theories of nationalism and ethnic-identity formation exaggerate the 
importance of the political world, while underplaying the autonomy and importance of social and 
cultural developments.
22
 An example of the autonomous action social and cultural forces can 
have from state control was seen in the former Yugoslavia in the late 1960s, when, during the 
“Croatian Spring” it was Croatian cultural figures, student groups, and the Roman Catholic 
Church that led the movement, not party or government officials.
23
 The early stages of the Serb 
protest movement in Kosovo in the 1980s similarly appeared devoid of conventional elites.
24
 Yet 
another example can be found in the 19
th
 century during the Herzegovinian rebellion, when a 
                                                        
20 See Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and 
International Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 103-124. 
21 See, respectively, Ernest Gellner, Nationalism (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 54; and Petersen, 
Understanding Ethnic Violence, 230. 
22 Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” American Historical Review 102 
(December 1997), 1394-95. 
23 Ivan Perić, Suvremeni hrvatski nacionalizam (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1984), 24. Along these lines, as Jasna 
Dragović-Soso points out, the first common Yugoslav institution to disintegrate in the 1980s was the Yugoslav 
Writers Union. See Dragović-Soso, “Why Did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations,” 
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24 See, for instance, Nebojša Vladisavljević, “Grass Roots Groups, Milošević or Dissident Intellectuals? A 
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Serb peasant uprising adopted substantially different goals from those intended by both the 
Belgrade government and by local Serbian urban and commercial elites in Bosnian cities.
25
 
Related to this problem is the fact that elite-led theories often assume that political leaders 
operate in a strategic vacuum in which their actions are always self-initiated, and are not 
influenced by events beyond their control. One scholar, for instance, has claimed that violence 
was avoided in Macedonia after the breakup of Yugoslavia because politicians “sought calm 
accommodation.”26 In reality, violence did break out in Macedonia (precisely at the time the 
article in question was published). In part, this was due to the fact that Macedonia shared the 
same structural-demographic problems other Yugoslav republics faced (i.e., areas in which 
territorial and ethnic/cultural boundaries were not congruent), but also because of exogenous 
shocks such as the breakdown of governmental authority in Albania in 1997 and the spillover 
effects of the Kosovo War in 1999. In either case, theories which over-emphasize the role of 
elites underestimate the dangers inherent in specific structural situations, and therefore weaken 
their own predictive capacity.   
 
     Thus, by subjugating society and culture to the political world, elite-led theories of 
nationalism grant the former little autonomous power in relation to the latter. As Alon Confino 
notes when discussing the topic of “national memory,”   
                                                        
25 Milorad Ekmečić, Radovi iz Istorije Bosne i Hercegovine XIX Veka (Belgrade: Bigz, 1997), 25-46. As Ekmečić 
points out, the goals of both the Belgrade government and the Bosnian Serb urban commercial elites during the 
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agrarian reform. This was unacceptable to the peasant insurrectionists, however, who demanded both unification 
with Serbia and agrarian reform. 




By sanctifying the political while underplaying the social, and by sacrificing the 
cultural to the political, we transform memory into a ‘natural’ corollary of 
political development and interests . . . Furthermore, one unfortunate side effect of 
treating memory as a symptom of politics is the lack of explorations of power in 
areas that are not politically evident . . . We miss a whole world of human 
activities that cannot be immediately recognized (and categorized) as political, 





      Confino’s observation about the autonomy of the social and the cultural brings back into 
focus an important fact: the various Yugoslav republics in the 1990s were not totalitarian entities 
in which political elites were all-powerful; other broad sectors of Yugoslav society had their own 
perspectives, goals and interests which should be considered independently of political elites. 
What is interesting in the Yugoslav case of the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, is the extent 
to which what Jasna Dragović-Soso has termed “national homogenization” occurred; that is, the 
adoption of the same nationalist perspective by political, intellectual, cultural, and religious 
elites, along with the general population as a whole.
28
 This issue will be explored in greater detail 
in Chapter IV, but here it is sufficient to stress the inaccuracy of the claim that the various 
nationalist political elites in the Yugoslav republics “imposed” a particular perspective on their 
respective societies. Rather, it is more correct to say that in a period of “national 
homogenization” different segments of society coming from considerably different ideological 
perspectives reached the same conclusions about the problems affecting their respective 
ethnoconfessional group, and, sometimes more problematically, the means needed to resolve 
these problems. 
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     Third, cruder forms of the elite-led argument imply that “the masses” are "passive dupes, 
vehicles or objects of manipulative designs" instead of "active participants" and "political 
subjects in their own right,"
29
 or suffer from a cynical “post-modern shiftlessness,” with no 
notion of solidarity until one is given to them by a state.
30
 Or, put a slightly differently way, it 
exemplifies “a belief in the power of authority to overawe unsophisticated folk,”31 despite the 




     Similarly, the ability of elites and/or governments to manipulate public opinion using print or 
electronic media is usually overstated. Studies of stock market investors, for instance, have found 
that individual behavior is more typically influenced or generated by interpersonal 
communication than by information an individual may obtain from print media, television, or 
radio.
33
 Evidence from the Balkans suggests that in the 1990s most people were able to 
                                                        
29 See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 72. As Brubaker goes on to note, among the Serbs of the Krajina 
region in the 1980s, “representations of wartime atrocities . . . were not imports. They were locally rooted, sustained 
within family and village circles, and transmitted to the postwar generations.” Similarly, Anthony Smith argues that 
in such theories the masses “are passive, acted upon, and usually manipulated by elites for political ends, but their 
cultures and social networks, even where they have a measure of autonomy, have no political relevance,” and that 
according to such views, the majority of the population does not possess indigenous traditions and beliefs for which 
they are willing to sacrifice, fight, and die. See Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 127-128. 
30 Keith Brown, The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), 128-29; see also Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
31 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 70. 
32 Thus, Donald Horowitz has argued that “the assumption that elite machinations and deception bring the masses 
along—requires a leap of faith, and a far-reaching one at that. What it suggests is that non-elites are suffering from a 
case of ‘false consciousness,’ for they are serving interests other than their own . . .  Such an explanation presumes 
that enormous masses of people in country after country do not have a sound conception of what concerns them. 
This is a presumption difficult to square with mounting evidence that non-elites in Asia and Africa are far from 
ignorant about politics.” See Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 104-105. 




distinguish between legitimate sources of information and outright propaganda. Thus, despite the 
propaganda campaigns conducted throughout the late 1980s—early 1990s, the views of most 
individuals seem to have remained more or less constant over time. In Croatia, for instance, 
“what is most striking . . . throughout this entire period is the degree to which the basic value 
orientations and priorities of the population remained remarkably consistent over time, despite 
the war and the propaganda of the HDZ.”34 Similarly, in Serbia media consumers “refused to 
swallow every lie whole;” in one poll conducted in 1992, for example, only 8 percent of 
respondents said that state television kept them well-informed, while 43 percent said that the 
independent media did.
35
 Another longitudinal study of public opinion in Croatia across two 
decades (from roughly the mid-1980s to 2004) found that “macro-political deterioration did not 
translate into increased intolerance on the personal level,”36 again revealing the autonomy of 
individual attitudes vis-à-vis the intentions of state-sponsored propaganda campaigns. Such a 
conclusion was also found in a recent study of how individuals in postwar Bosnia develop 
                                                        
34 Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War, 176. 
35 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 217-218. On the responses of individuals (especially ethnic Serbs) in Croatia to 
developments in that republic, it is also worth considering what they did know was happening, despite or in addition 
to what was being spread in the media: 1) that genocide did occur in the “Independent State of Croatia” from 1941-
44, and many Croatian Serbs were either survivors of or the descendants of victims of the genocide; 2) that 
Tudjman’s HDZ was resurrecting many historic symbols of Croatian statehood that had been appropriated by the 
Ustaša regime, which, rightly or wrongly, was interpreted by Serbs as signifying a rehabilitation of the NDH; 3) that 
upon coming to power, the HDZ did begin removing large numbers of Serbs from prominent positions throughout 
Croatia; 4) and, finally, that Tudjman had on a number of occasions made highly provocative and/or racist 
statements with regards to Serbs and other ethnic groups; for instance, on one occasion saying “Thank God my wife 
is neither a Serb nor a Jew.” Regardless of the extent to which Tudjman was or was not personally intolerant of 
other groups (a number of individuals who knew Tudjman personally have told the present writer that he had no 
personal antipathies towards Serbs), such statements and actions obviously inflamed tensions in what was already a 
difficult situation, making the “authenticity” of the Serb reaction in Croatia more believable. On these issues, see 
Bette Denitch, “Dismembering Yugoslavia: Nationalist Ideologies and the Symbolic Revival of Genocide.” 
American Ethnologist 21 (May 1994), 367-390.  
36 See Sekulić, Duško, Massey, Garth, and Hodson, Randy, “Ethnic Intolerance and Ethnic Conflict in the 









     Such evidence suggests that ordinary citizens are more sophisticated in their reasoning than 
elite-based theories admit. In the “marketplace of ideas” many different ideologies, political 
platforms, positions, etc., are competing, again raising the issue of reception and begging the 
question of why the nationalist argument so often wins the day. As Ernest Gellner notes,  
There is something bizarre in the suggestion that a force so widespread and 
pervasive, a flame that springs up so strongly and spontaneously in so many 
disconnected places, and which needs so very little fanning to become a 
devouring forest blaze, should spring from nothing more than some extremely 
abstruse lucubrations of philosophers. For better or worse, our ideas seldom have 
quite such power. In an age of cheap paper, print, and widespread literacy and 
easy communication, any number of ideologies are spawned and compete for our 
favor; and they are often formulated and propagated by men with greater literary 
and propagandistic gifts than those which nature chose to bestow on the prophets 
of nationalism. Yet these other forms of nonsense have never had a remotely 




     Fourth, elite-focused theories of nationalism and ethnic conflict do not explain why—
especially in a region of transient regimes—some states have been able to impose their identities 
                                                        
37 See Paula M. Pickering, Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground Floor (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2007). 
38 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 125-26. Along similar lines, Anthony Smith argues that “The passion that the 
nation could evoke, especially in time of danger, the sacrifices it could command from ‘the poor and unlettered’ as 
well as the middle classes, cannot be convincingly explained by the propaganda of politicians and intellectuals, or 
the ritual and pageantry of mass ceremonies—unless, that is, the public was already attuned to both propaganda and 
ceremonial. It is hard to believe that most people would willingly lay down their lives for an artifact or be duped by 
propaganda and ritual over a long period, unless that ritual and propaganda expressed and amplified pre-existing 
popular sentiments which saw the ethnic nation as the family and locality writ large.” See Smith, Nationalism and 
Modernism, 131. Similarly, Keith Darden has argued that “It is likely that the nationalism of newspapers and 
literature reflects rather than drives the creation of the ‘nationalist’ public, and that the ‘market’ for such content is 
driven by demand rather than supply.” See Darden, “The Causes and Consequences of Enduring National 
Loyalties,” draft manuscript, Chapter 1, 16. To take but one example of the weakness of this argument--in February 
2000 NATO peacekeepers shut down what was called a Croat nationalist TV station in Mostar. Nine months later, 





on individuals, while others have not.
39
 A resident of Kosovo or Serbia born in the 1930s had by 
2010 lived in six different internationally recognized countries. Thus, when several competing 
political programs or identity-projects are on offer at any given moment, this then begs the 
question of why some succeed while others fail, or, put another way, the question of reception. 
As Alon Confino notes,  
. . . the crucial issue . . . is not how a past is represented but why it was received 
or rejected. For every society sets up images of the past. Yet to make a difference 
in a society, it is not enough for a certain past to be selected. It must steer 
emotions, motivate people to act, be received; in short, it must become a socio-
cultural mode of action. Why is it that some pasts triumph while others fail? Why 
do people prefer one image of the past over another? . . . the crucial issue is not 





     Confino’s question regarding why “some pasts triumph while others fail” and why some 
images of the past are accepted while others are rejected is a crucial point. The historical 
experience of the Balkans over the past 150-200 years has been one in which political 
“solutions” prove fairly temporary; throughout this period, political regimes have come and gone 
with considerable regularity. This begs the question of which one formed an individual’s 
identity, and why it was successful where others failed. As Keith Brown points out, a weakness 
of elite-based or state-sponsored theories of identity-formation is that 
. . . in a region of transient regimes, what is emphasized about the inhabitants is 
their supposed willingness to adopt another national affiliation quickly. In parallel 
fashion, the new state is presumed to be ready and able to accept them as tabulae 
                                                        
39 Brown, The Past in Question, op. cit., 128-29. While perhaps an extreme example of how transient regimes in the 
region can be, a Bosnian scholar has pointed out that he and his two brothers were born in the same house in the 
same town only five years apart—yet each was born in a different state. See Ivan Cvitković, Hrvatski identitet u 
Bosni i Hercegovini: Hrvati između nacionalnog i građanskog (Zagreb: Synopsis, 2006), 296. The first brother was 
born in 1940 in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The second brother was born during World War II in the “Independent 
State of Croatia.” The third brother was born in 1945 in Tito’s communist federation. 
40 See Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” American Historical Review 102 
(December 1997), 1390, 1392. Jonathan Fox argues that the “reception” problem elites’ face is much lower if a 
particular community already has a strong sense of ethnic identity as usually defined by primordialists. See Fox, 




rasae and to inscribe national identity on them anew. Such a view at best credits 
the population with cynicism, a sort of post-modern shiftlessness; at worst, 
perceived from the stance of the nation-state, it presumes they have no notion of 
solidarity until given to them by a state (for, in this logic, only states make 
nations) and thereby makes them into ciphers. What one might term 
“experienced” history drops out of sight as the rhythm of every aspect of life is 
taken to be determined by the continuities or disjunctures in ‘top-down’ history.41 
 
      Thus, in a region of transient regimes, the popular reception of particular images of the 
past—why certain images are internalized while others are not—suggests that elites and political 
orders are not as omnipotent in imposing their identity projects on their respective populations as 
many constructivist or instrumentalist theories would suggest. Thus, instead of stressing the role 
of elites in imposing identities on any given population, a more appropriate way of 
understanding Balkan societies is to recognize that large segments of the population are 
relatively autonomous in the formation of their identities, attitudes, and worldviews. 
 
     Fifth, elite-led theories of nationalism and identity formation suggest that there is an essential 
dichotomy between the goals and ambitions of elites, and those of the masses, a viewpoint 
frequently expressed by international policymakers working in the former Yugoslavia.
42
  
                                                        
41 Brown, The Past in Question, 128-129. Brown goes on to note an alternative understanding of these problems: 
“people’s constructions of their social reality may escape the categories and plans of the centralizing state, and that 
the life of a small community may serve as a locus of continuity far more effectively than the often more fleeting 
existence that a territorially bound polity may enjoy. This approach is one in which the anthropological imagination 
is invoked in a consideration of what have variously been called the micropractices, cultural codes or habitus of a 
society, which form continuities in individual and group life less visible in the national frame.” Brown, The Past in 
Question, 129. 
42 Along with the popularity of this thesis with social constructivists, it has also been popular with international 
officials in the Balkans. For instance, the former international High Representative in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Paddy 
Ashdown, claimed that there was a large difference between the ambitions and desires of the people of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, and the desires and dreams of people in power and in politics—a rather far-reaching statement for 
someone who did not speak the language of Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, and who had never won an election in the 
country he governed with almost limitless authority. See “Ja sam visoki predstavnik, nisam Bog,” Dani (Sarajevo), 
28 June 2002. Ashdown, however, is only the latest in a long line of international bureaucrats appointed to the 
Balkans with such views. Robin Okey, for instance, notes that during Benjamin Kállay’s administration of Bosnia, a 
prominent view of problems in the province was that “a minority of ‘radicals’ or ‘malcontents’ were 





    There are several problems with this mode of thinking. The first is that it underestimates the 
willingness of lower classes to identify with the history and traditions of upper classes from their 
own cultural/religious communities.
43
 Or, put another way, it assumes that there is an essential 
dichotomy between the goals, ambitions, and interests of elites, and the goals, interests and 
ambitions of “the masses,” which, arguably, is probably not the case during a period of “national 
homogenization.” But it also assumes that “the masses” do not understand what is in their true 
interests, while the observer does, or that outside observers can determine the true interests and 
motivations of a given actor, even if the actor in question claims otherwise.
44
 As John Breuilly 
argues,  
To argue that a particular class is manipulated implies that there is an objective 
class interest which is independent of the perceived interest of members of that 
class. This objective interest can be identified by the observer . . . [yet] one never 
encounters completely irrational action or the complete realization of particular 
class interests. A number of classes can benefit to a greater or lesser degree from a 




     Substituting “classes” for “ethnic groups” or “nations” leads to the same conclusion. 
Consequently, instead of blaming an upsurge in nationalism in the former Yugoslavia in the 
1980s and 1990s on “small groups of conservatives and extremists,” a more plausible argument 
would suggest that both leaders and led were absorbed by the logic of national homogenization 
                                                        
43 On these issues, see Aleksa Djilas, The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 16. Theodor Hanf has made a similar point, noting “Even the 
economically deprived members [of a group defined in terms of a cultural marker] are better off identifying with the 
privileged members of their community than with people in a similar economic situation from other communities.” 
See Hanf, “The Sacred Marker: Religion, Communalism and Nationalism,” Social Compass 41 (1994), 13. 
44 Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 11. 
45 See Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2nd Edition, 1993), 410-411. 
This has been a problem for liberal thinkers since the Enlightenment. As Aleksa Djilas has noted, the Enlightenment 
underestimated the propensity of the lower social classes to identify with the ruling class and to see its history as 
their own. The peasantry simply was not ahistorical to the degree that the Enlightenment and, especially, the 




and ethnic solidarity during a period of systemic breakdown. Elites can be just as frequently in 
the grip of nationalist passions as the masses, and often just as prepared for self-sacrifice; thus, 
“Nationalism did not erase class differences or antagonisms, but it certainly could override them 
in moments of external danger, and temporarily unify the classes to achieve common goals.”46  
 
     Sixth, regarding the elites in the former Yugoslavia themselves, the degree to which their 
decisions to “become nationalists” were the result of interest-maximizing rationality is 
questionable. Many of the protagonists in the most recent Balkan conflicts became nationalists 




                                                        
46 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 128. On the issue of the instrumental rationality of elites in the former 
Yugoslavias, Dejan Jović cautions that much analysis along these lines is an example of what Quentin Skinner has 
described as the myth of prolepsis: the problem of searching for a causal explanation tying together intentions, 
actions, and consequences, in such a way that a specific result is the consequence of a specific intention. Jović 
himself argues that it was not the intention of any of the elite groups in the former Yugoslavia to destroy the 
country. According to Jović, a careful analysis of the public statements and actions of the various leaders in the 
former Yugoslavia suggests that many of them were in fact genuinely surprised by the outcome. Jović, 
Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla, 93. 
47 While Slobodan Milošević is often held up as an example of a politician who cynically adopted nationalist 
policies to further his personal political ambitions, an analysis of the lives and careers of many of the other 
protagonists in Yugoslavia’s breakup reveals that they had become nationalists long before such orientations could 
have been considered rational political moves. Many of them, moreover, abandoned successful careers to embrace 
what would be considered nationalist positions. Franjo Tudjman, for instance, enjoyed a very successful career in 
communist Yugoslavia, becoming a general in Tito’s Yugoslav People’s Army, holding the prestigious position of 
president of Belgrade’s Partizan soccer club (although Red Star fans might argue that no honorable individual would 
be associated with Partizan), and being named the director of an historical research institute in Zagreb. Despite these 
career successes, his views became increasingly nationalistic, even at a time at which such views were 
counterproductive personally. In 1946, forty-four years before he first ran for elected office, Alija Izetbegović was 
arrested and imprisoned for anti-communist activities and involvement in an anti-state Muslim organization. Haris 
Silajdzić came from a family of prominent Islamic clerics, studied Arab languages and Islamic studies in Libya, and 
obtained a Ph.D. at the University of Priština. His doctoral thesis was on Albanian nationalism. Stipe Mesić started 
out his public career as a communist party member, received a law degree, but in the 1970s became a supporter of 
the “Croatian Spring” movement, because of which he was eventually tried and imprisoned. Vojislav Šešelj’s career 
started off with considerable promise, as he became the youngest person ever to earn a Ph.D. in Yugoslavia, yet his 
nationalist views earned him a jail sentence in 1984. Vuk Drašković was a communist party member and had a 
successful career in Yugoslav journalism, but after embarking on a new career as a fiction writer focusing on the 
Serb historical experience in the 20th century, his novels moved him in the direction of becoming a dissident. 
Dobroslav Paraga, the founder of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), early in his life became an anti-communist 
dissident known for his strongly Croatian nationalist views. Dobrica Ćosić, perhaps the most prominent 20th century 





     Seventh, elite-led theories have difficulties explaining why so many leaders from across the 
political spectrum, i.e., not just “nationalists” adopt nationalist positions. Over the past 150 
years, for instance, the banner of Croatian nationalism has been waved by people from across the 
ideological spectrum, from Ante Starčević and the Croatian Party of Right, to peasant radicals 
such as Stjepan Radić, fascists such as Ante Pavelić, clericalists such as Alojzije Stepinac, 
communists such as Vladimir Bakarić, communists-turned nationalists such as Franjo Tudjman, 
and social democrats such as Dražen Budiša. That such different political personalities across 
time and from such different ideological perspectives all adopted nationalist positions suggests 




     Eighth, in the estimations of many of these leaders themselves, they were following public 
opinion more than they were leading it, which in effect reverses the causal direction of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(as exemplified by the fact that in 1961 he accompanied Tito on a 72-day state visit to eight African countries, 
traveling aboard Tito’s presidential yacht). Yet in 1968, unhappy with what he perceived to be anti-Serbian biases in 
government policy, he broke with Tito and the LCY and became a well-known dissident. As these examples show, 
the lives and careers of all of these men suggest that what was motivating them was neither financial gain nor the 
adoption of a practical, rational road to power, but ideals and beliefs for which many paid a considerable price. 
48 Sabrina Ramet put the issue in somewhat similar terms when she noted that “regardless of what the particular 
interests of Croatian peasants, merchants, sailors, priests, and intellectuals may have been, they united to support the 
same program in the conviction that their principal foe was one and the same (Serbian hegemonism).” Ramet, 
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 7. This can also be seen in the fact that, as the case of the former 
Yugoslavia demonstrated, political dissidents were much more willing to collaborate with political opponents of 
their own nationality than with like-minded individuals of a different nationality. Reviewing the history of state-
opposition relations in the Titoist period, Vladimir Gligorov noted that, “Opposition groups are more ready to 
cooperate with the Communists of their own nationality than with the opposition of some other nationality.” See 
Gligorov, “The Discovery of Liberalism in Yugoslavia,” East European Politics and Societies 5 (Winter 1991), 15. 
Along similar lines, Dejan Jović has noted that “Although ideological differences between them were great, between 
elites and counter-elites there was not a great difference with respect to the national question and the protection of 
“national interests.” See Jović, Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla, 424. Such cross-ideological cooperation on 
national issues was also evident in Macedonia during World War II, when Macedonia’s communist leadership 
supported the Bulgarian occupation authorities’ efforts, despite the fact that Bulgaria was an ally in Germany’s war 
against the Soviet Union. As Keith Brown notes, “’National’ rejection of Yugoslav rule had been affirmed as more 
important than any communist opposition to the old Yugoslav elites or to fascism more generally.” See Keith 




process. As Zoran Djindjić, one of the principal leaders of the anti-Milošević opposition in the 
1990s, noted at the time “if we want to build a popular movement, we must use nationalism to do 
it. Our primary goal is to reform the economy and push Yugoslavia into Western Europe, but we 
cannot rally popular support around an economic program. This is why we are building our 
movement on Serbian nationalism.”49 Alija Izetbegović noted the same problem facing Bosnian 
politicians when he observed, “If you call for an open forum on democracy, a hundred 
intellectuals show up. If the forum is about nationalism, you will get 10 thousand people from all 
walks of life on the streets.”50 Earlier historical examples provide similar cases in point. In the 
1870s, Serbian leaders such as the Serbian king at the time, Milan Obrenović, were opposed to 
an aggressive foreign policy vis-à-vis the Ottoman empire; however, “elections had returned a 
majority that favored military action . . . [and despite Milan’s reluctance] The combination of 
Serbian public pressure and public enthusiasm was too strong for Milan.”51 In the latter half of 
the 19
th
 century, rejecting the tradition that local intellectuals should draw their inspiration from 
Vienna or Paris, Croatia’s most important and influential politician of the late 19th-early 20th 
century, Stjepan Radić, would note, “we must seek our political ideas, a political directive, in the 
people. From these national ideas let us conceive our national ideals.”52  
                                                        
49 As cited by Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 219-22. 
50 Cited by Carsten Wieland, “Izetbegovic und Jinnah-die selektive Vereinnahung zweier ‘Muslim-Fuhrer’.” 
Sudosteuropa Mitteilungen (1999/Nr. 4), 351. When Izetbegović had to choose between staying in a smaller, 
modified Yugoslavia, or opting for independence for Bosnia, he chose the latter, noting “That is not a situation we 
created. That is a situation created by the disintegration of Yugoslavia. No matter who was in charge, he would find 
himself in completely the same situation . . . “As quoted by Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 77.  
Emphasis added. Saçir Filandra, a leading Bosniac intellectual, confirmed Izetbegović’s dilemma, and the 
constraints placed upon him by public opinion when he noted ". . . there was no other choice except state 
independence for Bosnia. If [Izetbegovic] at that time had made a mistake, we as a people would have chosen that 
course; because that is simply the logic of historical events and nothing else could have been chosen at the time." 
See the interview with Filandra in Dani (Sarajevo), 8 December 1997, 34. Emphasis added. 
51 Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 354-55. 





     Ninth, elite-led theories of nationalism and ethnic conflict imply that a change in elites should 
help resolve nationalist/ethnic problems, or that, when so inclined, elites should be able to “whip 
down” ethnic frenzies and even “un-create nations.”53 In post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina, for 
instance, this has been an implicit belief of international strategy, as seen by the authorities 
granted to the internationally-appointed High Representative to remove uncooperative elites 
from power. Yet the intractability of many nationalist/ethnic conflicts in the Balkan reveals that 
their resolution is seldom achieved by changing elites. Evidence for this claim can be found in 
the fact that so many current conflicts in the region—such as the Kosovo question (especially 
since 1981), the Greek-Macedonian name dispute issue, and various aspects of the Bosnian 
problem—have outlasted several generations of elites.54 
 
     Tenth, in many instances of ethnic conflict, violence can spring up spontaneously, or, put a 
different way, it is not clear who the leaders of such conflicts are.
55
 Roger Petersen, for instance, 
                                                        
53 See Alexander J. Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires, 91. 
54 In the Kosovo case, evidence of this can be found in the fact that since 1981, several different sets of leadership in 
Belgrade (i.e., post-Tito Yugoslav federal authorities, Milošević, Koštunica, Djindjić, Tadić) have proven unable to 
develop a satisfactory solution to the problem. Similarly, in the case of the Greek-Macedonian name dispute issue, 
several changes of elites in both Athens and Skopje have been unable to resolve the problem since 1991. Likewise, 
in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country is dealing with the same sets of constitutional and political questions 
it has confronted since 1990-1991, despite several changes of leadership and a 43-month war. For instance, Bosniac-
Croat disputes, such as re-unifying the divided city of Mostar, or resolving the status of the Adriatic ports of Neum 
and Ploće, have been on the table since the 1990s, despite the fact that there have been numerous changes in 
leadership in Zagreb (e.g., from Tudjman, to Ivica Račan, to Ivo Sanader and Stipe Mesić, and to the current tandem 
of Ivo Josipović and Jadranka Kosor). 
55 For various examples of this, see Dejan Jović, Jugoslavija-država koja je odumrla (Belgrade: Samizdat B92, 
2003), 326; Roger D. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence, op. cit., 5, 36, 251. As Petersen goes on to note, 
"One senses that the portrayal of events as elite led is well intentioned. It reduces the responsibility of the mass of 
perpetrators by placing blame on a few evil leaders. Good intentions have little to do with social science, however." 
On the superfluity of elites in the instigation of ethnic conflict, Joseph Rudolf notes that this has been true in many 
cases in advanced western democracies as well; for instance, in the Los Angeles riots associated with the Rodney 
King affair, and the 2005 riots between Roma and Muslims in southern French cities in 2005. See Rudolph, Politics 




claims that in many cases of ethnic violence in 20
th
 century East Central Europe, leadership has 
often been "superfluous . . . in several instances of ethnic violence in Eastern Europe, it is 
difficult to identify leaders." In the specific case of the former Yugoslavia, Dejan Jović has 
similarly argued that the image of leaders manipulating masses is too simplistic. According to 
Jović, there were in fact three independent sets of actors involved in the various events leading 
up to Yugoslavia’s disintegration—elites, critical intelligentsia, and dissatisfied segments of the 
population. According to Jović, in the relations between these three groups, “one cannot 
determine exactly who was the initiator and who was the follower in these relations: those two 
roles frequently changed.”56 This has been evident in several cases in the former Yugoslavia, 




     Eleventh, many elite-led theories of nationalism assume that leaders operate in an historical 
and political vacuum. For instance, one account of the Croat-Serb conflict of the 1990s suggests 
that it was a result of  
. . . the policy of the small groups of conservatives and extremists on both sides 
who were seeking to impose their own political preferences on populations who 
had very different values and preferences . . . violence and threats were necessary 




     What is debatable here is not whether “small groups of conservatives and extremists” can 
initiate violence. The ability of elites (especially those in a centralized communist hierarchy) to 
                                                        
56 See Jović, Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla, 326. 
57 Amongst both Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, for instance, problems in the province were put on the political 
agenda by a number of non-state actors such as the Serbian Orthodox Church or the Kosovo Albanian students’ 
movement, not by official political elites. Jasna Dragović-Soso claims the same could be said for the Slovenian 
youth and social movements of the 1980s. See Dragović-Soso, “Why Did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of 
Contending Explanations,” 22. 




initiate violence is relatively uncontroversial. Moreover, in key moments of rapid change, the 
power of political leaders often assumes even greater importance.
59
 Yet in the above passage the 
claims about elite power are more far-reaching. They assume that leaders are essentially 
operating in an historical and political vacuum, as a result of which they are able to impose, 
through the use of violence, their vision of ethnic identity on otherwise reluctant populations, and 
are able to “ethnicize” a society which otherwise could have split along different lines. Each of 
these claims should be examined in some detail.  
 
     First, the assumption that political leaders act in an historical or political vacuum free of 
constraints imposed upon them by the past, or by the expectations of their own populations, is 
difficult to sustain; as Woodward points out, the stress on evil leaders “ignores the conditions 
that make such leaders possible and popular and therefore also ignores the policies necessary to 
end their rule.”60 It also discounts point eight above—the possibility that the causal direction in 
the process might be the opposite of what elite-led theories of ethnic conflict argue: that the 
masses are pushing elites along a certain course. Addressing both of these issues, Roger Petersen 
notes that 
                                                        
59 As Susan Woodward has noted in the case of the former Yugoslavia, “The enormous real difficulties of managing 
this triple transition—to multiparty democracy, market economies, and independent statehood—require a rare 
combination of leadership skills. The fact that its timing was set by political developments elsewhere reduced 
substantially the probability that the available leaders would have what was necessary. At the same time, the 
collapse of established political procedures and the political instability placed a premium on individual leadership. 
Politicians who rode the nationalist tide to power had to shift roles rapidly with little preparation. They moved 
almost overnight from Communist party sinecures or from the political isolation of individual dissent (including 
prison) to positions that required organizational talents and statesmanship, to build party organizations and to keep 
the newly independent state from further breakdown of civil order and war. The disadvantage of their region in the 
strategic balance of power is thus compounded by the inexperience of their leaders, which increases the probability 
of costly and even tragic tactical mistakes.” See Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 352. On this point, see also Valerie 
Bunce, Subversive Institutions, 36. 




 . . . history matters. Such a statement may seem banal, but many, if not most, 
political science treatments of the Yugoslav violence stress recent elite 
manipulations or the situational dynamics of Fear and the security dilemma. . . . If 
history is important, then it will serve as a constraint on the strategies of elites. 
Elite attempts at manipulation will fail if they do not resonate with historical 
experience. The elite versus mass question, is, in most cases, a matter of degree. 
Certainly, charismatic leaders can organize and motivate populations with their 
ideas; of course, elites can use the control of the media to distort information and 
manipulate numbers of people. But there is no reason to assume that elites always 
constrain and manipulate masses rather than the other way around. Many times it 




     Sumantra Bose has expressed this idea in a somewhat different way, by evoking the metaphor 
of the “boiling cauldron” of ethnic conflict, which, he notes, “was stirred by elites until it boiled 
over—however, this implies the existence of a cauldron, or at least ingredients thereof, that could 
be stirred in this manner. Elites can provoke and precipitate violent conflict, but they cannot 
invent or fabricate such conflicts out of thin air.”62 
 
     Twelfth, the definition of “elites” used in many constructivist and rationalist accounts is 
somewhat fuzzy. If all of the individuals and groups engaging in nationalist activities and 
constructing ethnic identities are in fact a part of these processes, then the overall segment of the 
population involved in such activities becomes quite large. For instance, Fearon and Laitin argue 
that an important part in the identity construction process is played by thugs and ordinary 
criminals.
63




 writers, historians, and 
                                                        
61 Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence, 251. 
62 Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 249. 
63 “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” op. cit.; for similar arguments, see Mueller, “The 
Banality of Ethnic War,” op. cit.  
64 Again, see Kurspahić, Prime Time Crime, op. cit., and Thompson, Forging War, op. cit.  
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 the bards of the gusla and other musicians,
68
 secret agents and terrorists,
69
 
and artists and painters.
70
 If to this list we add the architects who design places of worship and 
family homes in ethnoconfessionally distinctive ways, the chefs who cook specific “national” 
cuisines, and the seamstresses and artisans who craft folk arts in similarly distinctive “national” 
ways, the “elites” who produce and reproduce ethnic identity becomes rather large.71 As these 
examples show, rather than understanding nationalism as a project promoted by interest-
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ratovi u njoj (Beograd: Krug, 2001). 
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(Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2007).   
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their perpetuation of national dress, customs, and folk songs, who had preserved a Croatian national culture 
throughout history. See Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 
52. The broader point here, however, is supported by recent critiques of the elite bias in many constructivist 
accounts of identity-formation. As Brubaker et. al. have noted, there is a tendency in such research to “focus on 
conspicuously visible constructions, such as those of political entrepreneurs, high-level bureaucrats, or public 
intellectuals, to the neglect of the less visible (but no less “constructive”) activities of common people in their 
everyday lives.” See Brubaker et. al., “Ethnicity as Cognition,” 52. Even explicitly constructivist scholars urge 
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maximizing elites, nationalism in southeastern Europe is in fact better understood as the product 
of a “naturally occurring diversity” comprising large segments of a given population.72   
 
     Thirteenth and finally, if nationalism is an “inevitable,” “inescapable,” and “indispensable” 
“necessity” of the modern era,73 then this again suggests that nationalist ideologies and 
nationalist struggles would have emerged and erupted regardless of which leaders or elites were 
in power. All of these factors suggest that nationalism and the process of ethnic-identity 
formation is more a product of structure and of the human condition than merely one of human 
agency or contingency, and, correspondingly, that in trying to understand and explain 
ethnoconfessional nationalism the level-of-analysis needs to be shifted from the individual to the 
collective or the structural. 
  
        Given the aforementioned weaknesses of elite-led explanations for nationalism, it becomes 
clear that a more complex and sophisticated understanding is needed. Eley and Suny, for 
instance, note the multicausal complexity of nationalism and identity-formation when they claim 
that “nationality is best conceived as a complex, uneven, and unpredictable process, forged from 
an interaction of cultural coalescence and specific political intervention.”74 Similarly, Fearon and 
Laitin show that constructivism provides three different approaches by which identities are 
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constructed: through broad structural forces (i.e., economic modernization or technological 
progress), through “discursive formations or symbolic or cultural systems that have their own 
logic or agency”, or though individual human agency, although they also note that the 
constructivist literature is weak when it comes to describing “the specific process by which 
identities are produced and reproduced in action and speech.”75  Joanne Nagel provides a 
similarly complex argument, claiming that,   
Boundaries, identities, and cultures are negotiated, defined, and produced through 
social interaction inside and outside ethnic communities . . . the origin, content, 
and form of ethnicity reflect the creative choices of individuals and groups as they 
define themselves and others in ethnic ways. Through the actions and 
designations of ethnic groups, their antagonists, political authorities, and 
economic interest groups, ethnic boundaries are erected dividing some 
populations and unifying others . . . Ethnicity is the product of actions undertaken 
by ethnic groups as they shape and reshape their self-definition and culture; 
however, ethnicity is also constructed by external social, economic, and political 
processes and actors as they shape and reshape ethnic categories and definitions . . 




     It should be noted, however, that the price paid for this more sophisticated understanding of 
the nationalism (albeit one that makes it more realistic) is conceptual and theoretical simplicity. 
The arguments by Eley, Suny, and Nagel have moved away from the more simplistic arguments 
about human agency to more complex arguments that involve both human agency and structural 
factors. Thus, ethnic identity formation becomes a product of both individual and group actions 
                                                        
75 See Fearon and Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” 850-51. They also note (855-
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(i.e., human agency) and more anonymous processes and actors (structures). Lake and Rothchild, 
for instance, claim that “Analytically, ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs are as much a 
product as a producer of ethnic fears and are dependent for their ‘success’ upon the underlying 
strategic dilemmas [facing individual ethnic groups].”77  At this point, the entire image of 
“construction” begins to give a somewhat false impression of the process, as Motyl notes, “To 
point out that nations are humanly constructed may therefore be true . . . but it is as true as the 
larger statement that all nonmolecular, nonatomic reality is constructed . . .”78 
 
     Given all of the above considerations, both identity-formation and the nation-building process 
in general are clearly very complex, multi-dimensional processes in which it is extremely 
difficult to trace the causal origins or direction of the process. As one group of authors recently 
noted, 
Often designated as elite-led and mass-led ethnic mobilization . . . there is actually 
an interactive process that goes on between political leaders, intellectuals, 
journalists, and other opinion makers and the public, a process that defies a one-
directional characterization of mobilization, including the intensification of ethnic 
hostility. Political entrepreneurs and opinion leaders are limited in how far the 
definition of an ethnic other can be construed as a threat to personal and public 
safety, and even the degree of ambiguity they can introduce in order to generate 




      At this point, we can conclude the discussion of elite-led theories of identity-formation by 
noting the following: First, elite-based theories which stress the role of instruments of state 
power to impose identities on individuals overestimate the role of the state and the ability of 
media to form identities or attitudes, while at the same time underestimating the intelligence of 
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the average individual, or the autonomy of social and cultural actors from political ones. This 
makes it difficult to view the process of identity formation, or nation-building, as a 
unidirectional, top-down process. As insights from the constructivist literature suggest, identity 
formation is the result of a complex process involving both specific human agency and more 
anonymous structural processes.  
 
III. Modernism and Balkan Nationalism 
     Elite-based theories of identity formation and nation-building are related to what Anthony 
Smith calls the modernist theory of nationalism. The modernist argument runs along the 
following lines: nationalism as a political ideology (in the Gellnerian sense that cultural and 
political units should be congruent) emerged in Western Europe about the time of the French 
Revolution, subsequently spread to Eastern Europe, and then throughout the world. Prior to that 
time, the vast majority of the world’s population had little or no sense of ethnic identity or 
nationality, and was largely indifferent to who governed it. With specific reference to Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans, nationalism as an ideology was imported from the West and only 
become a serious political force sometime in the mid-19
th
 century (with specific respect to 
Serbia, Gale Stokes puts it sometime after 1840
80
). At this point in time, nationally conscious 
elites began spreading the nationalist gospel and “inventing” national myths and traditions. 
Within the space of a few decades, intellectuals and other “ethnic entrepreneurs” managed to 
implant or impose their vision of what these people’s identity should be on them; Hobsbawm, for 
instance, argues that “the popular masses—workers, servants, peasants” were the last to be 
                                                        




affected by “national consciousness”81 through state institutions such as the school system 
(largely a nineteenth century innovation), the military and the government bureaucracy. 
Technological innovations such as the invention of printing accelerated this process. This vision 
of national identity then became so powerful that great masses of people were not merely willing 
to kill each other for the sake of such “imagined communities,” but to die for them as well.  
 
     There are several problems with this argument. The first concerns the historical origins of the 
birth and emergence of nations. Nationalism as an idea (again, in the Gellnerian sense) was not 
an invention of 19
th
 century nationally-conscious elites. The roots of what is called “modern” 
nationalist thought can be traced well back into history. In Genesis (Chapter 10), the sons of 
Noah have “their families, their languages, their lands, and their nations,” clearly combining 
elements crucial to the nationalist idea—a distinct people, on a distinct land, with their own 
distinct mode of communication, forming a distinct collectivity. As Adrian Hastings notes,  
The Bible . . . presented in Israel itself a developed model of what it means to be a 
nation—a unity of people, language, religion, territory, and government. Perhaps 
it was an all too terrifyingly monolithic ideal, productive ever after of all sorts of 
dangerous fantasies, but it was there, an all too obvious exemplar for Bible 





     Ancient Greece provides an even more explicit example of the existence of nationalist 
thought and practice. In The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides, for example, attributes the 
following speech to Pericles, 
This land of ours, in which the same people have never ceased to dwell in an 
unbroken line of successive generations, they by their valor transmitted to our 
times a free state . . . We live under a form of government which does not emulate 
                                                        
81 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, 12. 




the institutions of our neighbors; on the contrary, we are ourselves a model which 
some follow rather than the imitators of other peoples . . . We have provided for 
the spirit many relaxations from toil, we have games and sacrifices regularly 




     Thucydides here provides an even clearer expression of nationalist thought—a common 
people, living continuously on a specific territory, with their own form of government, and with 
their own developed cultural practices and rituals. Thus, the human tendency to favor and take 
pride in one’s own ways—what social psychologists today call in-group favoritism—existed 
amongst the ancients as well; as Herodotus wrote several hundred years before the common era, 
“everyone believes his own native customs, and the religion he was brought up in, to be the best; 
and that being so, it is unlikely that anyone but a madman would mock at such things.”84 Since 
Herodotus’ times, psychological studies have repeatedly shown that the loyalties which produce 
in-group favoritism are common to all human collectivities and groupings.
85
 This in-group 
favoritism is also apparent in the preference of people to be ruled by their own kind, another 
thing that is not an exclusively modern phenomenon. In the early sixteenth century, for instance, 
the Frenchman Claude Seyssel claimed that “All nations and reasonable men prefer to be 
governed by men of their own country and nation—who know their habits, laws and customs and 
share the same language and lifestyle as them, rather than by strangers.”86  
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     These issues raise the question of the extent to which individuals and groups prior to 1789 
thought, or could think, in terms of ethnic loyalties and nation-states. A common debate in 
studies of Bosnia & Herzegovina, for instance, is the extent to which Christians in Bosnia (i.e., 
Catholics and Orthodox) had any sense of being Croats or Serbs, respectively, prior to the 19
th
 
century. Not surprisingly, Bosniac historiography (and Western accounts derivative of it) tends 
to discount such a possibility.
87
 Similarly, in the case of Serbia, Gale Stokes cites the eighteenth 
century Serbian historian Pavle Julinac as expressing the hope “that the Almighty might be 
pleased to deliver all the Serbs from the barbarian yoke . . . and give them such gracious masters 
as the Austrian rulers.” Stokes suggests that Julinac “would have been shocked at any suggestion 
that Serbia should be an independent country.”88 Yet another explanation for Julinac’s 
expression might simply have been that given the current balance of forces in southeastern 
Europe, and the fact that the Serbs had little chance of defeating either the Habsburgs or the 
Ottomans in the effort to create an independent polity, it would be better to simply accept 
Habsburg suzerainty. In the case of Macedonia, for instance, although all of the Macedonian 




 centuries had  
. . . sought the establishment of a Macedonian state—a “free Macedonia” 
(slobodna Makedonija)—statehood did not necessarily or always denote total 
independence. Many Macedonian spokesmen, conscious of the relative weakness 
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of Macedonian nationalism and the comparative combined strength of its 
opposition, assumed a more pragmatic stance. They sought a place for a free or 
autonomous Macedonian state in a larger unit or supranational association: a 
Balkan federation, a Balkan socialist federation, a reorganized Ottoman empire, in 
the period before 1912; and a Balkan communist federation, a South Slav 




       Rossos’ observations on the different tactics Macedonian movements of various ideological 
or political stripes adopted support the view that ethnic groups adopt a variety of strategies and 
tactics depending upon the strategic situation they confront. As Joseph Rothschild has noted, 
ethnic groups may  
for prudential reasons . . . adopt a low profile or, indeed, on occasion even leave 
the overt political arena for an interval. This is not tantamount to depoliticizing or 
demobilizing the group—any more than an individual’s decision not to engage his 
ethnic identity in every social encounter is tantamount to his assimilation or 
“passing” out of the group. Quite the contrary. A group decision to withdraw from 
the political arena as a corporate combatant may be a sophisticated political 
strategy in the interest of group survival and/or consolidation. It may also embed a 
long-term intention, reculer pour mieux sauter. In any event, it illustrates that 
ethnic groups (like ethnic individuals) have a variegated and flexible repertoire of 
political options—more flexible, ironically, than states have.90 
 
     Moreover, the hope to be granted “such gracious masters as the Austrian rulers” does not 
necessarily imply a rejection of the desire for one’s own state or kingdom; as Daniel Chirot has 
noted, “The extent to which various local populations and their lords were or were not loyal to 
the great empires, and for how long, is . . . a matter of considerable historical contention.”91 
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Another question worth asking is why local elites might have been, rhetorically at least, loyal to 
the sultan, such as was the case at the beginning of the First Serbian Uprising in 1804. Sugar, for 
instance, claims that local power holders in the Ottoman empire “understood the need for a 
‘legal’ power basis and knew who could provide it.”92 Understood in these terms, one should not 
overestimate the degree to which either rhetorical expressions of loyalty or specific expressions 
of goals might reflect either actual loyalties or ultimate intentions. 
 
     Moreover, the argument that people in the Balkans were indifferent with regard to both who 
ruled them and to the polity in which they lived is at odds with much of what we know about the 
myths and traditions nurtured by the various Balkan populations throughout the later Middle 
Ages and the early modern period. Mazower, for instance, notes that the Christian peasantry of 
the Balkans “carefully preserved folk songs and ancestral legends about the rebirth of a Christian 
empire. Predictions, laments and prophecies had circulated among them ever since the fall of 
Constantinople that fateful Tuesday in 1453.”93 In the Western Balkans, the Orthodox Christian 
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peasantry was obviously lamenting the loss of the medieval Nemanjić dynasty, which was a 
distinctly Serbian dynasty, not an a-national or anonymous Christian empire. Evidence of this 
can be found in the fact that as early as the eighteenth century (if not sooner), the various Slavic 
peoples of the Ottoman empire did not feel that they belonged to one “nation” as the millet 
system categorized them, creating serious problems both for their Ottoman rulers and for the 
Ecumenical patriarch himself.
94
 Throughout the Ottoman period, popular loyalty to “national” 
churches, typical of the Eastern Orthodox tradition whereby each national group had its own 
church, represented, according to Peter Sugar, “a continuation of previous loyalties,” not the 
creation of new ones.
95
 Stavrianos has a similar view, arguing that during Ottoman rule “the 
several Balkan ethnic groups were able to retain their identity and to emerge finally as 
independent peoples with essentially unimpaired national cultures.”96 Thus, Hobsbawm is 
probably more correct on this issue when he notes  
There is no reason to deny proto-national feelings to pre-nineteenth century Serbs, 
not because they were Orthodox as against neighboring Catholics and Muslims—
this would not have distinguished them from Bulgars—but because the memory 
of an old kingdom defeated by the Turks was preserved in song and heroic story, 
and, perhaps more to the point, in the daily liturgy of the Serbian church which 
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     In Croatia, the Serb population was already exhibiting signs of national consciousness at the 
turn of the seventeenth century, a full one hundred years before most modernists would admit the 
phenomenon existed.
98
 Some historians have also found evidence of the existence of national, or 
even nationalist, consciousness in the Balkans prior to the French Revolution in the activities of 
the ubiquitous Balkan outlaws or bandits, variously known as hajduks, klephts, uskoks, or 
morlaks, who emerged as soon as the Ottomans conquered the Balkans, but whose activities 
really became prominent after 1630. According to Bistra Cvetkova, the hajduks represented both 
a permanent resistance movement to the Ottomans, an expression of the national conscience of 





     Another problem with the modernist argument is that it specifically limits nationalism or 
nationalist activity to political demands. As Roman Szporluk has argued, however, other forms 
of nationalism (and other types of nationalists) such as cultural nationalists, existed in Eastern 
Europe long before political nationalists, which is what made it possible for a cultural Germany 
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99 Bistra Cvetkova, Hajdutstvoto v Bulgarskite zemi prez 15/18 vek (Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1971), as summarized 
by Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman Rule, 242-43. Nevertheless, Sugar himself cautions that we should 
avoid reading too much in to the hajduk tradition; as he notes, “Although today hajduks are considered national 
heroes and forerunners of the successful revolutionaries of the nineteenth century, attribution of modern nationalistic 
feelings and motivations to them appears unjustified, as does speaking of a resistance movement in the sense in 
which this expression is used to describe nineteenth and twentieth century phenomenon. True enough, folk songs 
and tales of considerably earlier origin also treat them as champions of the downtrodden, the Christian masses 
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separated them from the Turks—became clearer and clearer. It would be reading present-day concepts into the past, 




or a cultural Poland to exist long before these units became political realities.
100
 For these 
reasons, the modernist argument about nationalism seems unsustainable, and it is safer to 
conclude, as Banac suggests, that “Both national consciousness and national movements existed 
long before nationalism.”101  
 
     In contrast to the modernist view of nationalism as a post-1789 phenomenon, many historians 
and political scientists argue that the origins of nations and nationalism can be traced at least to 
the medieval period;
102
 moreover, if, as Lewis Namier has claimed, “religion is a sixteenth 
century word for nationalism,” then many of the confessional conflicts that raged across Europe 
in the 17
th
 century could be considered precursors of what would later be defined as ethno-
national conflicts. For Miroslav Hroch, for instance, “the modern nation is not the product of 
‘nationalism,’ but the consequence of long-term social processes in the transition from feudal to 
capitalist society.”103 Alexander Motyl explicitly argues that  
no grounds exist for arguing that national identity formation could not have taken 
place before, say, 1789. The ancient Israelites, whose national belief system 
provided them with a distinct place in time and space, were as much of a nation as 
most contemporary nations. The Romans, especially during the republic, appear 
to have fit the definitional requirements as well. So too did the Byzantine Greeks, 
whose myths provided them with origins and whose distaste for “barbarians” 
testified to their refined sense of “the other.”104 
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     In the Balkans as well, examples of what modernists consider to be nationalist thinking and 
behavior were apparent in the Balkans long before 1789. Already in the 13
th
 century, for 
instance, the founder of the autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church, Saint Sava, decreed that 
the writing on frescoes in Serbian monasteries should be in Cyrillic, not in Greek, and that Serbs 
should replace Greeks as hierarchs in the Serbian church and as the abbots of important 
monasteries.
 105
 Russian culture in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, according to Dmitri 
Obolensky, was already exhibiting signs of “overt nationalism,” and many Russians at this time 
were distinguishing between religion and ethnicity. Patriarch Nikon, for instance, claimed that “I 
am a Russian, but my faith and my religion are Greek,” clearly revealing his recognition that 
national background, culture, and religion could come from separate places, or even that an 




     Leaving aside the theoretical and semantic debate about when nationalism might have arisen, 
however, there is another serious difficulty with the modernist position, insofar as we simply 
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     By way of contrast, the Bosniac scholar Ahmed S. Aličić argues that it was Bosniacs who in fact had a sense of 
national consciousness in the first half of the nineteenth century, and that the Christian populations of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina had no real sense of national identity at the time. See Aličić, Pokret za Autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 
1832. Godine (Sarajevo: Orientalni Institut, 1996), 366-371. 




cannot claim to know with any certainty how the vast majority of people felt in the pre-modern 
era, or what they considered to be the main lines of cleavage in their societies. Noel Malcolm, for 
instance, has argued in the case of 19
th
 century Bosnia that “The main basis of hostility was not 
ethnic or religious but economic: the resentment felt by the members of a mainly (but not 
exclusively) Christian peasantry towards their Muslim landowners.”107 But Malcolm’s thesis is 
questionable. Since ethnoconfessional and economic-class identities overlapped in nineteenth-
century Bosnia it is “difficult to separate peasant-agrarian from national goals” in any 
meaningful way.
108
 Moreover, since the overwhelming majority of the population in the Balkans 
(and, indeed, throughout the world at this time) was illiterate and left no written record of its 
thoughts and feelings, we simply do not know how most people felt about such issues;
109
 as 
Barbara Jelavich has argued, “It is impossible to judge the extent to which the people in any 
Balkan area held deeply nationalistic convictions—that is, in the sense of believing that the 
nation-state was the natural moral and political division of mankind that should command the 
first allegiance of the citizen.”110 Similarly, Eric Hobsbawm has argued that it is simply 
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impossible to know the “sentiments of the illiterate who formed the overwhelming majority of 
the world’s population before the twentieth century.”111 
 
    In sum, there is no a priori reason why individuals in the Balkans could not feel a sense of 
national identity prior to 1789. From what social psychology tells us about human behavior, in-
group biases and loyalties are common to all human collectivities, and there is no reason to 
believe that such thoughts, emotions, and motivations did not exist more than two hundred years 
ago. As numerous historical examples show us, individuals have long placed a value on the 
essential elements that compose what modernists call nationalism—the belief that a distinct 
cultural group should be self-governing. This belief should not be considered either a recent 
phenomenon, or the result of self-interested elite action.    
 
 
IV. Rationalist and Economic Explanations 




      In “A Letter from 1920,” the protagonist of Bosnian Nobel Laureate Ivo Andrić’s classic 
short story, Max Levenfeld, wrote: “I’m afraid that in these [Bosnian urban] circles, under the 
cover of all these contemporary maxims, old instincts and Cain-like plans may only be 
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slumbering, and will live on until the foundations of material and spiritual life in Bosnia are 
altogether changed.”113 
 
     Andrić’s belief that Bosnia would not change until the foundations of material and spiritual 
life change is a crucial point, for it touches upon one of the most fundamental issues in the study 
of historical and social development. As Ernest Gellner has asked, what should be considered 
“the units or sub-units in terms of which the structural transformation of human society are to be 
characterized?” Gellner himself proposed that the principal candidates to play the role of the 
“dramatis personae of history” are classes and nations.114 Thus, albeit in different ways, both 
Andrić and Gellner are pointing to a fundamental ontological distinction in how social reality is 
to be viewed and understood. An emphasis on “material life” and “classes” suggests that 
economics and the quest for material or financial gain are what drive human history, whereas a 
belief in the importance of  “imagined communities,” or of other intangibles such as the power of 
ideas, or the importance of spiritual life (or religion more generally) suggests a quite different 
driving force.   
 
    A second important category of explanations of the identity formation process and of 
nationalism itself focuses on their rational, economic, material, and physical causes, such as 
economic deprivation or the advantages of nationalist policies to interest-maximizing elites. Part 
of the popularity of such theories is due to the preferences (and prejudices) of the social sciences, 
which generally view quantitative analysis as more scientific and rigorous than qualitative 
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analysis or historical narratives, and therefore prefer research designs stressing the former rather 
than the latter. Since nationalism and/or the strength of an individual’s religious or ethnic 
identity are difficult to measure using quantitative methodologies, however, it was perhaps 
almost inevitable that many social scientists would begin to view nationalism or religious 
movements as epiphenomena of economic realities or changes in material conditions which are 
more quantifiable than variables stressing culture or history. Quantitative analysis does not 
readily lend itself to the “invisible boundaries” and “invisible barriers” between Balkan 




     Such approaches, however, have led to several important failures in social and political 
analysis in recent decades, perhaps most notably, the failure of modernization theory to predict 
the upsurge in both nationalism and religious activism over the past three decades. 
Modernization theory, for several decades one of the dominant paradigms of western intellectual 
thought regarding individual ethnic and religious identity, rested on the assumption that 
industrialization, urbanization, and education would weaken “non-rational” ethnic and religious 
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identities, and that individuals would increasingly adopt more “rational” identities based on 
economic class, professional specialization, or the territorial unit within which one lived.  
 
    Events over the past several decades (e.g., the Iranian revolution, the Roman Catholic 
Church’s role in precipitating the fall of communism in Poland, and the rise of the religious right 
in the United States) have cast doubt on many of modernization theory’s assumptions. Thus, 
instead of modernization weakening the religious affiliations most individuals hold, “the period 
in which economic and political modernization has been most intense—the last 30 to 40 years—
has witnessed a jump in religious vitality around the world . . . God is winning in global politics. 
And modernization, democratization, and globalization have only made him stronger.”116 
Modernization theory (and those who believed in it, such as the members of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia) also failed to realize that nationalist tendencies could overpower the 
forces of modernity. With specific regard to Yugoslavia, for instance,  
. . . the postwar Titoist regime set out to establish a new social, political, and 
economic order that would engender individual characteristics and value systems 
conducive to the evolution of an integrated socialist community . . . In effect, the 
Yugoslavs have approached the community-building problem by coupling 
modernization logic with Marxist principles to predict the evolution of a more 
mobilized, modernized, and universalistic citizenry; in short, a citizenry better 




     These failures of both modernization theorists and Yugoslav communists were at least in part 
due to the fact that they failed to anticipate that material and economic progress, rather than 
reducing or alleviating ethnic conflict and competition, could have the opposite effect. Thus, as 
Walker Connor has noted,  
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the substantial body of data which is available supports the proposition that 
material increases in what [Karl] Deutsch termed social mobilization and 
communication tend to increase cultural awareness and to exacerbate ethnic 
conflict . . . improvements in the quality and quantity of communication and 
transportation media progressively curtail the cultural isolation in which an ethnic 
group could formerly cloak its cultural chasteness from the perverting influences 
of other cultures within the same state. The reaction to such curtailment is very 




      Modernization theory also proved weak in several other respects. First, it could not predict 
which ethnic group would adopt a nationalist position. Kosovo Albanians, for instance, enjoyed 
much higher levels of economic prosperity and political freedom than their ethnic kin in 
neighboring Albania for much of the postwar period; nevertheless, the majority of Kosovo 
Albanians remained hostile to the Yugoslav state and favorably disposed to Albania. Similarly, 
both the most economically advanced Yugoslav republic (Slovenia) and the most economically 





     Second, modernization theory also proved weak in predicting the timing of nationalist 
movements: for instance, it could not explain why the former Yugoslavia experienced its most 
serious ethnic tensions just as the country was enjoying its most impressive spurt of post-WWII 
economic growth. The Croatian national movement of the late 1960s-early 1970s, for instance, 
followed upon a decade in which Croatia experienced rapid economic growth,
120
 yet it was 
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precisely during this most economically successful decade of Yugoslavia’s existence (the 1960s) 
that the country experienced the most political and social turmoil: the Croatian Spring, 
demonstrations and riots in Belgrade and Kosovo, the Ranković affair, etc.121 In fact, during the 
Croatian Spring, even communists—whom one would suspect of adhering to the view that class 
distinctions were more important than national distinctions—would claim, as did the then leader 
of the League of Communists of Croatia, Miko Tripalo, that “national and class interests were 
the same as nation and class had become identical.”122  
 
     Two of the phenomenon described above—the Kosovo Albanians’ unwillingness to identify 
with the Yugoslav state, despite their relatively advantageous economic position within it as 
compared to the Albanians in Albania proper, and the outbreak of nationalist dissatisfaction even 
during periods of economic growth—also show that conventional rational choice analyses of 
how and why individuals identify with certain national groups or nationalist projects has 
significant limitations. As Paul Stern notes, rational choice theory “predicts that when a 
multinational state has a growing economy . . . identification with the nominal nationality should 
strengthen at the expense of the national minority or other group identifications, and people 
should become more willing to sacrifice for the state . . . [but] no evidence [exists] that minority 
groups trade in their identities for those of the majority when times are good.”123 As Stern goes 
on to note, 
People resist changing their national identities, even when they can expect to 
benefit. Rational choice theory fails to explain people’s unwillingness to adopt the 
favored identities of a conquering power. Consider recent events in the former 
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Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Despite benefits made available to those who 
identified with dominant national groups, people passed on their ancestral 
identities as Ruthenians, Ossetians, Azeris, and the like for generations with little 
hope of collective gain. In some cases, such as those of Turks in Bulgaria or 
Hungarians in Romania, people held on to their identities in the face of active or 
acute discrimination. Ethnic groups and their languages and customs do become 
extinct as a function of conquest, migration, modernization, dispersion, and 





     The problem with modernization theory, and more generally the various economic and 
rationalist theories offered to explain identity formation and ethnic conflict and competition, is 
that such views of the origins of individual identity and nationalism rely on a unidimensional 
understanding of human nature. “Human agents,” as George and Bennett note, “are reflective—
that is, they contemplate, anticipate, and can work to change their social and material 
environments and they have long-term intentions as well as immediate desires and wants.”125 
Thus, rationalist and economic explanations for identity-formation and nationalism give 
insufficient recognition to the fact that human behavior is often motivated by many issues 
besides financial or material gain, such as a belief in reciprocity, altruism, fairness, justice, a 
sense of group,
126
 on non-egoistic based commitments,
127
 or on the dignity and self-respect 
Ashutosh Varshney claims form the microfoundations of the “nationalism of resistance” 
dominated groups practice to preserve their cultural identity and resist the dominant group’s 
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 In a cross-national study of 15 small societies around the world, for instance, the 
self-interest model of human behavior failed in all of the cases, while group-level differences 
appeared to explain a substantial portion of variation across societies.
129
 Other examples showing 
that individuals are often motivated by more than economic or material inducements are evident 
as well. Anti-communist, nationalist dissidents in the Soviet Union clearly showed little regard 
for material or financial advantage.
130
 And in times of war, nationalist appeals often succeed 
most with that segment of the population that stands the most to lose—young men going off to 
war.
131
 In the Yugoslav case specifically, Burg and Berbaum found that a sense of “Yugoslav 





     A substantial body of empirical evidence from comparative studies of nationalist movements 
around the world supports the view that the correlation between economics and ethnic 
nationalism is tenuous. In his study of ethnic conflict in Africa and Asia, for instance, Donald 
Horowitz found that “what emerges quite clearly is the willingness of ethnic groups to sacrifice 
economic interest for the sake of other kinds of gain.”133 Walker Connor reached similar 
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conclusions, noting that “economic factors are likely to come in a poor second when competing 
with the emotionalism of ethnic nationalism.”134 In the former USSR, for instance, Ghia Nodia 
argued that in the various Soviet republics, national independence and sovereignty were ends in 
themselves, not means towards a more economically beneficial future: “Leaders from 
independence-minded republics were asked what they hoped to gain economically from 
independence, while the would-be nations themselves saw sovereignty as an end in itself rather 
than as a mere means to prosperity.”135 In the Yugoslav case, it is difficult to believe that a desire 
for economic gain was driving many of the group demands for sovereignty and/or independence; 
as Rodney Hall notes “One might argue that Slovenia was sufficiently economically better off 
than its former Yugoslav partners to rationally seek separation from Yugoslavia, but could a 
Bosnian Serb republic governed from Pale be economically viable?”136 Similarly, Stuart J. 
Kaufman has observed that  
. . . if the root of Yugoslavia’s problem was economic, no one could have 
considered that a rational solution was a war that would sever economic ties 
between different parts of the country, provoke international economic sanctions 
against some areas while other areas were bombed to rubble, promote massive 
looting, and destroy the rule of law that made normal economic life possible. If 
different regions could not agree on an economic policy, they could have 
amicably split, as the Czech Republic and Slovakia did. All would have been 
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     While Kaufman fails to appreciate the many differences between the Yugoslav and 
Czechoslovak cases, he does make an important point when noting that political leaders who 
were thinking in economically rational terms would not have adopted the policies that they did. 
 
     Given these considerations, the economic reductionism of many explanations for identity-
formation and nationalism becomes, as Walker Connor once noted, “an unwarranted 
exaggeration of the influence of materialism upon human affairs”138 which does not correlate 
with most experience we have of nationalism in the real world. The theoretical result has been to 
mistake the outward manifestation of nationalism for its essence; thus, according to Connor, 
“The tendency to stress economic forces can be viewed as one manifestation of a broader 
tendency to mistake the overt characteristics of a nation for its essence,” resulting in a tendency 
to “perceive ethnic restlessness in terms of a group’s choice of battlefields, that is, in terms of 
economic statistics or an aspect of culture such as language.”139 Connor also faults the a-
historicity of many scholars here; as he notes, reducing nationalism to economics is a result of “a 
general disregard for historical perspective. If . . . one credits the rise of nationalism within a 
particular ethnic community solely to economic discrimination (the theory of economic 
deprivation), then there is little need to search history for antecedents or for the germination and 
development of an abstract notion of a kindred people.”140 
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      Michael Hechter and Kanchan Chandra both provide prominent recent examples from this 
category of explanations. Hechter argues that national identities are essentially the result of 
functional or class differences; or, as he puts it, “the establishment and maintenance of a cultural 
division of labor is decisive for the salience of national identity.”141 Such a cultural division of 
labor, according to Hechter, can emerge in three ways: through conquest, as a by-product of 
institutional arrangements, or through immigration. Applying Hechter’s analysis to the Balkans, 
all three ways of establishing a cultural division of labor are in place: the Ottoman military 




 centuries, the institutional arrangements of the millet 
system, and the immigration of Anatolian Turks, janissaries, and others from Istanbul to the 
Balkans, all of which combined produced the cultural division of labor that Hechter describes—
the vast majority of Balkan Christians were peasants who worked the land, while Muslims made 
up the landowning class and filled the ranks of government and military officialdom. In essence, 
Hechter has provided a Marxist argument for the establishment and maintenance of national 
identities, insofar as the existence of individuals within a cultural division of labor determines 
their (ethnic) consciousness.  
 
     Hechter’s thesis has been criticized on several grounds: that it ignores the fact that a cultural 
division of labor does not affect all members of a given ethnic group equally; that it ignores the 
difference between choice and constraint; and that it ignores temporal issues, i.e., why ethnicity 
                                                        




seems to be a salient issue at some times and not at others.
142
 But perhaps the most serious 
problem facing Hechter’s explanation is that ethnoconfessional identities existed in the Balkans 
before the Ottoman conquest, before the imposition of the millet system, or the subsequent 
creation of a cultural division of labor in the region. As Stanford Shaw described the problem 
facing the Ottomans after their conquest of southeastern Europe,  
The Ottomans did not invent [the millet system], but, rather, were forced to accept 
and preserve it by the peculiar social conditions of the area which they came to 
rule . . . In a sense, the Ottomans were, indeed, going against the trend of Balkan 
history, at least by choosing to make religion the primary basis of their 
institutionalized communal system. But what other choice did they have? The 
previous Balkan states had decayed. This was the main reason for the rapid 
successes of the Ottoman army. Members of the Balkan ruling classes who still 
survived could hardly be trusted to administer their former principalities and 
states as autonomous vassals under Ottoman suzerainty, as the failure of several 
experiments in this direction clearly showed even before 1453. The only other 
bases of local self-organization which could have been relied on for the 
organization of the heterogeneous social structure which the Ottomans were 
codifying were the religious and economic. And in accepting these, the Ottomans 
were doing no more than relying on the experience and practice of Muslim lands 
from which they came, where religion and those expert in its laws were given a 




     As the above passage argues, the Ottomans did not create the categories of Muslims and 
Christians; consequently, Hechter’s argument that a cultural division of labor is decisive for the 
salience of national identities cannot explain the emergence and salience of the identities of the 
various Balkan peoples before the Ottomans had imposed such a cultural division of labor on the 
inhabitants of the region. In other words, the Ottoman millet system did not create Bulgars, 
Croats, Greeks, and Serbs; on the contrary, the existence of these peoples and their religious and 
cultural traditions compelled the Ottomans to adapt their system of rule to the demographic 
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realities they confronted upon conquering southeastern Europe. In essence, identities formed 
institutions, and not vice versa.  
 
     Hechter’s argument has many parallels in the literature on Balkan nationalism—one version 
of the argument, for instance, claims that in the 19
th
 century the Serbian Orthodox and Roman 
Catholic churches turned Bosnian Christian peasants into Serbs and Croats, respectively, or, 
more recently, that the institutions created by Dayton prevent citizens from becoming 
“Bosnians.” Yet deeper historical analysis reveals a quite different dynamic at work—rather than 
institutions forming the identities of these individuals and peoples, it is the institutions that have 
to reconcile themselves to the cleavages and popular pressures within Balkan societies, and the 
aspirations for self-government each of the Balkan ethnoconfessional groups have had. Thus, the 
millet system as an institution had to reconcile itself to the already-existing cleavages it 
confronted in southeastern Europe, and Dayton’s architects had to reconcile themselves to the 
reality that Bosnia’s Croats and Serbs each demanded large measures of self-government. The 
same is true in Macedonia, where, according to Robert Hislope, 
The cleavage lines that separate the ethnic groups are firm and deep. 
Consequently, those cleavages structure the political system, shaping the modes 
of political organization (viz., the monopolization of all political expression by 




     A further problem with Hechter’s argument about group boundaries flowing from 
“institutions of control” rather than pre-established social identities is the fact that it cannot 
explain why certain “institutions of control” are able to impose a set of identities on a defined 
population while others are not. As noted previously, there have been numerous attempts to 
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create new identities for individuals and populations in southeastern Europe (e.g., Ottomanism, 
Bošnjaštvo, the “integral Yugoslavism” of the interwar kingdom, post-WWII communist 
attempts to foster “brotherhood and unity,” etc.). Yet despite significant financial, logistical and 
material advantages, each of these efforts failed, begging the question of why some identity 
projects succeed and take root while others fail.  (These issues will be explored in more detail in 
Chapter V.)  
 
    With regard to the relationship between institutions and ethnic identity, Kanchan Chandra has 
argued that  
. . . fixity is not an intrinsic quality of ethnic identities but a product of the 
institutional context in which ethnic groups are politicized. Some institutional 
contexts impose an artificial fixity on ethnic identities, while others allow their 
inherent fluidity to flourish. Consequently, some institutional contexts produce 




     Here again, however, a sustained historical analysis of the evolution of institutions in the 
former Yugoslavia reveals the weaknesses of Chandra’s thesis. Chandra claims that the 1974 
Yugoslav constitution privileged “nations” (her quotation marks) “at the expense of other 
potentially crosscutting identities,” yet this begs the question of why the 1974 constitution was 
designed and written in such a way.
146
 As noted above, the history of previous efforts to deal 
with Yugoslavia’s national question, which included several new institutional designs intended 
to promote more broad-based loyalties and identifications (discussed in more detail in Chapter 
V) repeatedly failed, ultimately because popular resistance to such integration proved too strong.  
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     A related line of rationalist explanations also sees economic considerations as being at the 
heart of ethnic competition and conflict. Lake and Rothchild, for instance, argue that 
Competition for resources typically lies at the heart of ethnic conflict. Property 
rights, jobs, scholarships, educational admissions, language rights, government 
contracts, and development allocations all confer benefits on individuals and 
groups. All such resources are scarce and, thus, objects of competition and 
occasionally struggle between individuals and, when organized, groups.
147
   
 
     According to this perspective, violent ethnic conflict most frequently erupts as a consequence 
of state weakness and failure, when the state can no longer adequately divide resources among 
various groups, and information failures, problems of credible commitments, and security 
dilemmas between ethnic groups take hold. These problems are then exploited by political 
entrepreneurs and ethnic activists, who manipulate the general population’s non-rational myths 
and emotions to fan social and political tensions. 
 
      The problem with such explanations is that they reduce nationalism and ethnic conflict to the 
problem of fulfilling an economic plan, and do not recognize that Balkan ethnoconfessional 
nationalism is often about fulfilling a dream.
148
 Rationalist arguments suggest that sufficient 
GDP growth should prevent ethnic conflict in multiethnic societies. Yet the experience of the 
former Yugoslavia does not bear this out, as Allcock and Jović noted above when they showed 
that post-1945 Yugoslavia experienced its greatest ethnic tensions at the same time it was 
experiencing its greatest economic growth. Lake and Rothchild’s argument also does not stand 
up if one accepts the above arguments by Connor, Horowitz, Fukuyama, and others that 
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148 The late Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, for instance, was fond of saying that by gaining independence in 
1991, Croats had fulfilled “a thousand-year-old dream.” See Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War 




nationalist sentiment is fundamentally about emotions, sentiments, and the desire for human 
dignity rather than economic matters. Support for this thesis can be seen in a recent study by 
Moses Shayo, in which he shows that “in almost all modern democracies, poorer individuals are 
more likely to be nationalistic . . . In almost every country, lower income is associated with more 
national identification.”149  
                                                        
149 See Shayo, “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class and 
Redistribution,” op. cit., 148, 168. With respect to Lake and Rothchild, moreover, many other aspects of their 
argument are debatable; for instance, the claim that information failures were responsible for the outbreak of violent 
ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Here again, deeper investigation reveals that this was not the case. First, 
the consequences of the increasing nationalization of Yugoslav politics were clear to almost anyone who knew 
Yugoslav history and politics. As Tito himself told Pamela Harriman in 1979, “After me, there will be chaos” 
(Quoted by Woodward, Socialist Unemployment, 345). In the mid-1980s, when the then Yugoslav prime minister 
Branko Mikulić was asked why the League of Communists would not allow a multi-party system, Mikulić claimed 
If we allow [a] multiparty system in this country, all . . . the people would get would be several 
new ethnic and religious parties without any specific political or economic agenda and issues 
except hatred for one another and their leaders’ cries for partitions and secessions. We would have 
another Lebanon in this country, and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia will never let it 
happen. (Quoted by Perica, Balkan Idols, 95). 
     Second, many of the protagonists in the Yugoslav conflict, such as Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegović, had 
well-established historical records of their views, so there was nothing either surprising or unknown about their 
political positions and aims. At least since the 1970s, both Tudjman and Izetbegović had been arguing (albeit 
indirectly to some extent) that their republics or peoples should be independent, and Tudjman had also suggested in 
his writings that Bosnia-Herzegovina historically belonged to Croatia. Similarly, Milošević had been relatively 
forthright in his position that if Yugoslavia disintegrated, Serbia would demand changes to republican borders.  
     Third, by mid-1990 at the latest it had become clear to many people that violence was extremely likely, if not 
inevitable. A secret CIA report leaked at this time on the situation in Yugoslavia, for instance, said that the country 
was likely to breakup violently within eighteen months. The present author can relate a personal story to this effect: 
in the summer of 1990, United Press International (UPI) decided to re-open its Belgrade bureau. The new bureau 
chief, Jonathan Landay, was a reporter who had been working in India for the past five years. Within one week of 
his arrival in Yugoslavia, Landay said “this place is going to blow up.” Moreover, during this period, both Yugoslav 
counter-intelligence and the intelligence services of the various republics were well aware of the plans the various 
sides were making, their secret efforts to obtain weapons, etc., as the Špegelj affair in Croatia makes clear.  
     Fourth, there were numerous negotiations and discussions among the different leaders and other officials about 
the country’s fate, both secret and public. Throughout this period, what was evident was not that the different sides 
did not know enough about the other’s positions and intentions, it was that these positions and intentions were 
diametrically opposed to each other, and none of the sides were willing to compromise. Moreover, despite the fact 
that different peoples and republics were at war with each other, a remarkable fact was the willingness of the 
different republican leaders to continue to cut deals with each other. The last American ambassador to Yugoslavia, 
Warren Zimmerman, relates a frustrating meeting with Tudjman, where Tudjman announces that he is going to 
make a separate deal with Milošević. When Zimmerman asked Tudjman how he could do such a thing, Tudjman 
replied, “Because I can trust Milošević.” See Zimmerman, Origins of a Catastrophe, 183. In total, then, the 





     Moving away from the above-mentioned unidimensional understandings of human behavior 
based on material and economic calculations allows us to understand the importance individuals, 
groups, and societies attach to many actions and forms of behavior that seem counter-productive 
or non-rational from the economic standpoint. This, in turn, allows “national identification . . . 
[to become] so powerful as to overcome considerations of self-interest and win a contest of 
altruisms with primary social groups in the name of an ‘imagined community’.”150 Evolutionary 
biologists, for instance, have noted that in virtually all human societies, human beings engage in 
a variety of religious rituals that seemly costly and inefficient—rituals such as circumcision, 
various forms of genital mutilation, scarification, or the expensive initiation ceremonies and rites 
of passage found in almost all societies. As Richard Sosis asks, 
How can we begin to understand such behavior? If human beings are rational 
creatures, then why do we spend so much time, energy and resources on acts that 
can be so painful or, at the very least, uncomfortable? Archeologists tell us that 
our species has engaged in ritual behavior for at least 100,000 years, and every 
known culture practices some form of religion. It even survives covertly in those 
cultures where governments have attempted to eliminate spiritual practice. And, 
despite the unparalleled triumph of scientific rationalism in the 20
th
 century, 
religion continued to flourish . . . Why do religious beliefs, practices and 
institutions continue to be an essential component of human and social life? . . . If 
our species is designed to optimize the rate at which we extract energy from the 
environment, why would we engage in religious behavior that seems so 
counterproductive? Indeed, some religious practices, such as ritual sacrifices, are 
a conspicuous display of wasted resources. Anthropologists can explain why 
foragers regularly share their food with others in the group, but why would 
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     All of these things suggest that “individuals act out of . . . social motives that deviate from the 
assumptions of rational choice theory.”152 As constructivists point out, for instance, 
internationally accepted norms cannot always be reduced to the interests of the powerful; as 
Finnemore and Sikkink note, “Human rights norms, the preference of the weak, have been 
shown to triumph over strong actors and strong states; environmental norms prevail over 
powerful corporate business preferences;” moreover, economic and materialist explanations of 
interest-maximizing behavior cannot explain why people fight for the rights of people living far 
away from them, or to protect whales and dolphins.
153
 Fukuyama has argued that neither 
materialism nor economism can fully explain many aspects of human (and, consequently, 
political) behavior; for Fukuyama, it is neither industrial development nor capitalist economics 
that “gets us to the gates of the Promised Land of liberal democracy” but “a totally noneconomic 
drive, the struggle for recognition,” i.e., the struggle for human dignity.154  
 
     Considerable evidence supports the thesis that non-economic impulses and incentives drive a 
significant amount of individual political behavior. In a cross-country survey of examining 
Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland, for instance, Arend Lijphart found religious 
affiliation to be the most powerful determinant of party choice, followed by linguistic affiliation, 
with class ties being only a distant third.
155
 Lijphart’s findings on the importance of non-material 
or non-economic characteristics of a person’s identity are consistent with similar studies from the 
                                                        
152 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 140.  
153 Finnemore and Sikkink, “Taking Stock,” 396, 403. 
154 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992), 134-35, as cited by Nodia, 
“Nationalism and Democracy,” 15. 
155 See Lijphart, “Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting: The ‘Crucial Experiment’ of Comparing Belgium, 




Balkans. For instance, one group of researchers found that after cross-tabulating responses from 
individuals polled in public opinion surveys by education, age, income, and socio-economic 
status, the only variable that was statistically significant was ethnicity; as they note, “ethnicity in 
BiH dominates all the usual socio-demographic cleavages that one sees in modern societies.”156 
Similarly, a recent report commissioned by the U.N. Development Program asking Bosnian 
citizens how much they trusted their government noted that  
In institutional trust, religion plays a major role . . . Interesting is the absence of 
life satisfaction, economic measures and age. In other words, economic 
considerations do not impact on the way respondents perceive the State 





     In Serbia, a study comparing survey data from 1989 and 2003 tracing the rise of nationalist 
sentiment in Serbia, Mladen Lazić found no correlation between socioeconomic status and 
                                                        
156 See Gearóid Ó Tuathail, (Gerald Toal), John O’Loughlin, and Dino Djipa, “Bosnia-Herzegovina Ten Years after 
Dayton: Constitutional Change and Public Opinion,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 47 (January-February 
2006), 72. Numerous other public opinion researchers have come to similar conclusions. A March 2007 study by the 
Washington-based National Democratic Institute, for instance, found that “the defining division in Montenegro 
continues to be one’s ethnic identification, which has been the case since NDI began to conduct opinion research in 
Montenegro since 2001.”  See “National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Montenegro Key Findings 
Baseline Poll—February 2007 (March 9, 2007),” available at: 
http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2128_mn_focusgroups_030907.pdf (accessed on 2 July 2007). In Bosnia, a 
recent report by the UNDP found that religion (which in Bosnia-Herzegovina of course is equated with ethnicity) is 
the major determinant in levels of trust one expresses for state institutions at the national level. Interesting, other 
variables such as life satisfaction, economic measures, or age were not seen to be important factors. See “Silent 
Majority” 16-17. An earlier report on Bosnian public opinion completed in 1996 noted that “The country is divided 
by three distinct visions. If there is some evidence of common ground, we could not find it . . . Outside of Central 
Bosnia [the population of which was overwhelmingly Bosniac in 1996] any serious discussion of a unified and 
multi-ethnic state has ceased. Indeed, the subject appeared beyond debate . . . Although some participants 
entertained the idea that perhaps after ’10 years or so’ of separation, some joint political arrangements might be 
possible, consensus for separation was absolute in all of these groups . . .  The Serb participants were unwilling to 
consider any party that did not affirm a separate Serb future. Voters are willing to consider opposition parties, but 
not ones that are uncertain about their Serb identity. The Serb vote ‘can’t be divided,’ ‘can’t be split,’ as one of the 
participants concluded, ‘any party that wants to live with the other side is not good.’ Any party must promote ‘Serb 
interests.’ . . . The Bosnian Croats were simply unwilling to consider any party other than HDZ.” See Stanley B. 
Greenberg and Amy Phee, Political Change in Bosnia. (National Democratic Institute: September 1996).  Available 
at: http://www.greenbergresearch.com/articles/1627/1425_NDIBosnia_report.pdf. Accessed on 3 August 2007. The 
present author helped organize several of these sessions.  
157 See The Silent Majority Speaks: Snapshots of Today and Visions of the Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina 







 In Kosovo in the 1980s, less than 20% of Serb migrants from the province 
cited economic reasons as their motivation for leaving. Most claimed they were leaving due to 
harassment, persecution, and discrimination, and fear for the children.
159
 All of this evidence 
suggests, as one scholar has concluded, that “to put economic issues at the center of the analysis 
means to miss the primary point, namely, that ethnic movements are indeed ethnic and not 
economic.”160 
 
     Given these considerations, a proper understanding of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism 
needs to look to other sources to explain its origins and longevity. To understand the human 
motivations that inspire the passions, emotions, and sacrifices of nationalism requires analyzing 
its psychological or spiritual origins; as the founder of French Romantic literature, 
Chateaubriand, claimed “Men don’t allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow 
themselves to be killed for their passions.”161 In a more contemporary vein, Benedict Anderson 
updated this sentiment by noting that “in themselves, market-zones, ‘natural’-geographic or 
politico-administrative, do not create attachments. Who will willingly die for Comecon or the 
EEC?”162  
                                                        
158 The Lazić study was cited by Vladimir Matic, “Serbia at the Crossroads Again” (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute for Peace Special Report #128, November 2004), 17. 
159 Ruža Petrović and Marina Blagojević, Seobe Srba i Crnogoraca ca Kosova i iz Metohije: Rezultati ankete 
sprovedene 1985-1986 godine (Belgrade: Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umetnosti, 1989), 219-223. 
160 See Conversi, “Conceptualizing Nationalism: An introduction to Walker Connor’s work,” in Ethnonationalism in 
the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the study of nationalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 
6.   
161 As cited by Walker Connor, “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond,” 206. 
162 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 53. Hechter disagrees with the view that nations or ethnic groups are special 
in this regard, or that they can inspire more self-sacrifice than other forms of association; as he argues, “This seems 





     Of course, one cannot claim that national and/or ethnic interests will consistently prove more 
important in determining individual loyalties and behavior than rational or economic interests. 
As Theodor Hanf has noted, “Although it has been shown that economistic factors alone do not 
determine the behavior of individuals and groups, this does not imply that the reverse is true, 
namely that, in the final analysis, behavior is rooted in ‘cultural identity’, however that may be 
defined.”163 In reality, we have cases in which one wins out, and other cases in which the other 
does. Human behavior does change; thus, sometimes economic interests may influence how one 
chooses to identify more than ethnic or cultural interests, and at other times other affiliations may 
influence the determination of one’s economic interests.164 
 
     Ultimately, establishing the dominance of either economic/material interests or 
psychological/spiritual values in the creation of ethnic identities and loyalties is difficult. 
Recognizing this fact, Rogers M. Smith notes that, “though the relationship of political identities 
to human interests is complex, there is good reason to think that it is reciprocal—that just as 
economic interests influence our affiliations, so those affiliations shape our sense of our 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
for nations because they encompass collective rather than individual interests, but this does not distinguish them 
from other kinds of groups.” Hechter, Containing Nationalism, 189. 
163 See Hanf, “Religion, Communalism and Nationalism,” 10.  
164 An example of this can be seen in early 20th century Bosnia, when Bosniac elites at the time were more intent in 
defending their economic interests than their national interests. Thus, the origins of the 1911 coalition between 
Bosniacs and Croats lie in a trade made by Bosniac elites, in which they agreed to support a Croatian proposal that 
the official language be called “Croatian” or “Serbian” and that the official alphabet be recognized as either Latin or 
Cyrillic. In return, the Croats agreed to support the Bosniac position on land reform issues. According to Saçir 
Filandra, “The questions of language and the way in which kmets were bought out are large political questions. By 
placing the emphasis on land, and not on the language question, the Bosniac leadership behaved pragmatically and 
politically. In such a way they satisfied economic and landholding interests, but lost the battle on the political, 
linguistic plain, which was much more important for the people’s spiritual and national development.” See Filandra, 




economic interests.”165 Yet another way to think about the complex, multidimensional, and 
interactive nature of the influence of material factors on human consciousness is by considering 
the constructivist insight that the relationship between agents and structures is mutually 
constitutive; thus, “structures are social as well as material, and . . . agents and structures are 
mutually constitutive. In other words, social and material environments both socialize and 
constrain individuals and enable them to take actions intelligible to others, including actions that 
intentionally change social norms and material circumstances.”166 Nevertheless, it is clear that a 
purely material or economic understanding of nationalism fails to appreciate the emotional and 
spiritual components of the phenomenon. As Anthony Smith notes, the  
irreducible ethnopsychological element in nations and nationalism means that 
rational explanations for these phenomenon always miss the point. Economic or 
political explanations in terms of state power and institutions, or individualistic 
rational choice theories of the strategic manipulations of the intelligentsia, must 
by their very nature fail to ‘reflect the emotional depth of national identity’, and 




     To summarize the discussion in this section: a significant body of evidence suggests that 
human behavior cannot be reduced solely to the pursuit of economic or material gain. Altruism, 
love, group loyalty, devotion to tradition and culture all play a role in fostering nationalist 
thought and sentiment. Consequently, a proper theoretical understanding of Balkan 
ethnoconfessional nationalism has to recognize the importance of both the psychological and 
                                                        
165 See Smith, “The politics of identities,” 51. Similarly, Walker Connor argues that “The conclusion that 
ethnonationalism appears to operate remarkably independent from the economic variable is not tantamount to 
denying a role to economic factors. The latter are vary apt to serve as catalytic agent, exacerbator, or choice of 
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166 George and Bennett, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” 129. 
167 Smith, “Nationalism and Modernism,” 162, internal quotes citing Walker Connor, Ethno-nationalism: The Quest 




spiritual aspects of the phenomenon. This has important consequences for policymaking as well, 
an issue that will be dealt with in Chapter VI.   
 
V. Conclusions 
     As the evidence presented in this chapter has shown, each of the categories of explanations 
for identity-formation and nationalism presented above—elite-based theories, modernist views of 
ethnicity and nationalism, and economic and materialistic explanations—make important 
contributions to our understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism. Elite-based theories remind 
us of the role politicians and government leaders play during unstable periods, and how, given 
their positions within a state hierarchy, they can determine whether violence will be used, and 
the levels of such violence. This is especially apparent when Yugoslav elite policies are 
compared to those adopted by Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and others during the breakup of the Soviet 
Union.  
 
     Nevertheless, there are limits to this argument. Overall, the evidence presented in this chapter 
suggests that the strengths of elite-based theories of identity formation and nationalism in general 
are overshadowed by their weaknesses, or at least by their failure to appreciate the complexity of 
these phenomena: the inability to explain why ‘the masses” so consistently respond to the calls 
of political elites promoting nationalist agendas, but not to the calls of political elites promoting 
agendas based on other forms of social identity or group solidarity; the failure to recognize the 
power of “the masses” or their role as active participants in this process, with their own interests, 
traditions, loyalties, and attachments, independent of those of the elites; the ability of “the 




do not. All of this suggests that Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is better understood as a 
phenomenon with deep resonance on behalf of the vast majority of any given population, rather 
than as an elite-project imposed on people from above.   
 
     The modernist argument, for its part, suffers from the fact that it rests on an unverifiable 
premise; i.e., that individuals who lived prior to the nineteenth century had little or no sense of 
ethnic or national identity, even though we have no written record of the thoughts, feelings, 
sentiments and loyalties of the vast mass of illiterate individuals who were alive prior to 1900. 
Meanwhile, the least objectionable claim of constructivism, that nations are human constructs, is 
ultimately somewhat banal. As Motyl notes, “this proposition is interesting only as a 
counterpoint to the preposterous claims of extreme primordialism . . . To point out that nations 
are humanly constructed may therefore be true . . . but it is as true as the larger statement that all 
non-molecular, non atomic reality is constructed, in other words, that culture is a reality and that 
nations are cultural artifacts.”168    
 
    Thus, neither the explanations focusing on human agency or structure can satisfactorily come 
to grips with what Andrew Janos has called the “same stubborn facts” of politics in East Central 
Europe over the past two-hundred years. Ultimately, elite-based, modernist, and materialist-
economic explanations cannot answer the question of why ethno-national problems have 
persisted in the region, why would-be nation- and state-builders always seem stymied by the 
national problem, and why solutions to this problem always seem to fall along ethnoconfessional 
lines. In the following chapter, I will provide an alternative theory of Balkan ethnoconfessional 
                                                        




nationalism which attempts to do so by focusing on the emotional, psychological, and spiritual 





Three Theses on Balkan Ethnoconfessional Nationalism 
 
I. Introduction 
    The ethnic homogenization of existing and new states has been an intrinsic part of European 
history for the past two centuries. What has been driving this process, however, is a matter of 
considerable debate. According to Gale Stokes, it has not been socio-economic change, as Ernest 
Gellner would argue, but something more metaphysical, or at least more intangible—an attempt 
to implement the ideas of the French Revolution. Thus, with specific reference to the European 
experience, Stokes has noted that 
Much of the political history of nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe can be 
read as a working out of a homogenizing style of autonomy within the state 
system, a redrawing of state borders onto ethnic lines. In 1850, most of Europe 
was governed by four great multiethnic empires—Russian, Austrian, Ottoman, 
and German (in the last case by the German confederation, the heir to the Holy 
Roman Empire). Today Europe consists of dozens of independent, self-governing 
entities, most of which are more or less ethnically homogenous . . . In this context, 
the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s are not an anomaly but rather a late phase of a 
deep transformation that is only tangentially related to industrialization or the 
development of capitalism but is fundamentally related to specific attempts to put 
into effect certain inspiring notions from the eighteenth century . . . social change 
and class relations were not the primary ingredients in the formulation of the 
principles and actualities of the nation-state. Nationalism is a specific way of 
trying to effectuate the ideas of popular sovereignty, equity, and freedom within 
an already existing state system. Separating out these ideological and structural 
determinants from the socioeconomic factors that also are part and parcel of 
European history after the French Revolution makes it possible to think clearly 




    Over the past several decades, the dominance of nationalism as an ideology has been 
accompanied by the resurgence of religion in public life. According to one specialist on religion 
and public life, “faith-based political action seems more influential in world affairs today than at 
                                                        




any time since the Enlightenment.”2 This proposition has been especially true in the former 
Yugoslavia; one Yugoslav specialist has noted that “the disintegration of the Yugoslav state has 
brought religion closer to the state than at any time in the past,”3 while the Bosnian intellectual 
Ivan Lovrenović has argued that since the fall of communism the postcommunist Yugoslav 
republics have experienced a de-secularization of society.
4
 Evidence of this can be seen in the 
fact that throughout the region the number of self-professed believers has been increasing since 
the 1980s, and religious organizations have consistently been regarded as the most trustworthy 
institutions in these societies.
5
 Over the past two decades, political leaders such as Alija 
                                                        
2 See Walter A. McDougall, “Introduction,” Orbis 42 (Spring 1998), 159 (special edition dedicated to Religion in 
World Affairs). The sociologist Peter  L. Berger has made a similar argument, claiming that “the assumption that we 
live in a secularized world is false: The world today . . . is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places 
more so.” Berger, “Secularism in Retreat,” The National Interest (Winter 1996/97), 3. A number of reasons have 
been put forth as to why religion has again become such an important factor in world and public affairs, among 
which the most prominent are: 1) that it simply never ceased to be an important factor in politics and society, but 
modernization and secularization theorists failed to see its continuing relevance; 2) societal modernization itself has 
left vast numbers of people seeking existential answers for many of the problems inherent in the human condition 
for which rational/scientific theories cannot provide satisfactory answers; and 3) the end of the Cold War has 
removed many of the systemic constraints on various types of conflict, including religious ones. Jonathan Fox 
provides a useful review of these issues, as well as a quantitative study on how religion impacts ethnic conflicts 
around the world; see Fox, “The Salience of Religious Issues in Ethnic Conflicts: A Large-N Study,” Nationalism & 
Ethnic Politics 3 (Autumn 1997), 1-19.  
3 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 300. Allcock goes on to claim that this development has had the effect of making 
religion a less effective component of civil society. For similar views, especially with respect to the role of the 
Orthodox Church in Serbia and Montenegro, see Mirko Blagojević, Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva 
(Belgrade: Filip Višnjić, 2005), 381-83. 
4 Lovrenović, Bosna, Kraj Stoljeca (Zagreb: Durieux, 1997). Much public opinion data from the former Yugoslavia, 
discussed below, supports the argument that religion has again assumed significant importance in social and political 
life.  
5 For instance, the number of declared believers in Croatia increased from 47 percent in 1989 to 76 percent in 1996. 
See Sekulić, Duško, Massey, Garth, and Hodson, Randy, “Ethnic Intolerance and Ethnic Conflict in the Dissolution 
of Yugoslavia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 29 (September 2006), 814. In Serbia, a public opinion poll released in 
July 2007 showed that the Serbian Orthodox Church was by far the most respected public institution in the country, 
with 62 percent of respondents claiming that they trusted the church, as opposed to 43 percent who declared trust in 
the army, 31 percent who declared trust in the police, 31 per cent in the president of the republic, 21 percent in the 
government, 23 percent in the judiciary, and 18 percent who declared trust in parliament. See “Rezultati istraživanje 
javnog mnenja, jun 2007,” available at www.cesid.org.yu. Similarly, a 2002 public opinion survey in Montenegro 
found the Serbian Orthodox Church to be the most trusted institutions in the republic. See Public Opinion in 




Izetbegović have come to power with explicitly religious, or pseudo-religious, agendas.6 
Religious organizations and hierarchs have also been very active in various forms of politics; for 
                                                        
6 In his most famous political manifesto, The Islamic Declaration, in 1970 Izetbegović had declared, 
There is no peace or co-existence between Islamic faith and non-Islamic social and political 
institutions . . . The Islamic rebirth cannot begin without a religious [one], but it cannot be 
successfully continued and completed without a political revolution  . . . [but] Accentuating the 
priority of a religious-moral renewal does not mean—nor can it be interpreted to mean—that the 
Islamic rebirth can be achieved without Islamic government. This position means simply that our 
path does not begin with the conquest of power, but with the conquest of people’s hearts, and that 
the Islamic rebirth is first of all a revolution in the realm of upbringing, and only after that in the 
realm of politics . . . Our means are personal example, the book, and the word. When will force be 
added to these means? The choice of this moment is always a concrete question and depends on a 
variety of factors. However, one general rule can be postulated: the Islamic movement can and 
may move to take power once it is morally and numerically strong enough, not only to destroy the 
existing non-Islamic government, but to build a new Islamic government. 
See Izetbegović, Islamska Deklaracija (Sarajevo: Bosna, 1990), pp. 22-43. Some observers claim that since 
Izetbegović does not explicitly mention Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Islamska Deklaracija it is merely a theoretical 
work. Thus, for instance, Ivo Banac believes that there is no basis “for suspicions about Izetbegovic that can be 
deduced from his position paper usually referred to as the Islamic Declaration.” See Banac, “Bosnian Muslim: From 
Religious Community to Socialist Nationhood and Post-Communist Statehood, 1918-1992,” in Mark Pinson, ed., 
The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Historical Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of 
Yugoslavia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 147. Similarly, Noel Malcolm claims that the 
Islamic Declaration “is not about Bosnia and does not even mention Bosnia.” See Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History 
(New York: New York University Press, 1994), 219. Robert Donia claims that the Islamic Declaration is “a quest to 
define a middle path between conservatives and modernizers in global Islam.” See Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 245. 
     Such views do not, however, hold up under serious examination. The fact that Izetbegović devotes a section in 
the tract (pp. 44-46) to Pakistan—a religiously “clean” country formed by its violent secession from a larger multi-
religious and multi-ethnic entity, and which Izetbegović called “our great hope”—had clear implications for 
Izetbegović’s views regarding multi-religious Yugoslavia. (I am thankful to Xavier Bougarel for impressing the 
importance of this point upon me.) This is in contrast to the very critical view Izetbegović exhibits in the Islamic 
Declaration towards reformers in the Muslim world such as Kemal Ataturk. As Vjekoslav Perica notes, “The 
[Islamic] Declaration designated Pakistan as a model country to be emulated by Muslim revolutionaries worldwide. 
The Pakistan parallel also revealed Izetbegović’s vision of Yugoslavia’s fate as analogous to that of India after 
1948.” See Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (New York: Oxford, 2002), 77. As 
Zlatko Dizdarević, a prominent Bosniac journalist who has followed Izetbegović’s career for years has noted,  
. . . there is an infinite amount of proof for the claim that in the case of Izetbegović we are talking 
about a consistent concept of life and politics which he has realized, from which he has not 
stepped back, and which he, in the end, has realized . . . today we are the victims of a consistent 
view of the world which has shown itself to be fundamentally conservative, anachronistic, and 
fundamentally unacceptable for modern politics and the modern way of life . . . when you today 
read that same text and know that behind it in these ten years has existed the possibility of 
realizing that platform with the support of something which is called the state, which are called 
institutions of that state, such as the army, the police, etc., that those things, which 10 or 30 years 
ago one could proclaim a citizen’s right to their own opinion, grows into something which has a 




instance, the Catholic archbishop of Zagreb has appealed to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to allow an indicted war criminal, General Ante Gotovina, to 
await trial in Croatia.
7
  
     
     Viewed in this historical and comparative context, what has been happening in the Balkans 
over the past two hundred years is thus fully consistent with European and world history, and is 
not the result of some specifically Balkan tendency toward disintegration and violence. As John 
Allcock has noted, “It is only possible to understand the South Slav lands by paying attention to 
the context within which they are situated. The trajectory of their development needs to be 
explained in relation to wider processes, involving neighboring states, the Mediterranean region, 
the continent of Europe as a whole and indeed the world.”8 Seen in this light, the nation-building 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
     (See the interview with Zlatko Dizdarević in Dani (Sarajevo), No. 124, October 1999) .For an 
interesting series of critiques of Izetbegović’s writings, see Dr. Jasna Samić’s series of articles in Dani 
(Sarajevo), No. 145, “Cari Arapskog Jezika,” 10 March 2000; and “Zašto postoji nesto a ne ništa?” Dani 
(Sarajevo), No. 146, 17 March 2000. International officials who had sustained dealings with Izetbegović 
frequently expressed doubts about his true beliefs; General Sir Michael Rose, the commander of 
UNPROFOR in 1994-95, for instance, noted that after a year in Bosnia “I came to believe that his talk of 
creating a multi-religious, multi-cultural state in Bosnia was a disguise for the extension of his own 
political power and the furtherance of Islam.” See Rose, Fighting for Peace (London: Harvill, 1998), 38. 
The most serious and sustained analysis of Izetbegović’s background and ties to Islamic movements in the 
Middle-East is provided by John R. Schindler, a former analyst at the National Security Agency and 
currently Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College; see Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-
Qa’ida and the Rise of Global Jihad (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2007).  
7 See “Catholic Church Calls for Hague to Transfer Croatian War Crimes Indictee,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Newsline, 13 August 2007. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/newsline/4-see.asp. 
8 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 13, 20. The importance of looking at Balkan history in a comparative way is a 
crucial point. Much of southeastern Europe’s historical evolution and development has followed a common pattern, 
making it both difficult and artificial to isolate the historical experiences of specific countries, nations, or ethnic 
groups. In the nineteenth century, for instance, as Barbara Jelavich points out, “In their internal development the 
new national regimes tended to follow the same general pattern and to face similar difficulties.” Jelavich, History of 
the Balkans, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 298. Here it should be noted that in addition to the necessity of 
looking at the international context of events in southeastern Europe, it is also important to understand the 
importance of how interactive Balkan ethnoconfessionalisms are; as Jasna Dragović-Soso notes, “accounts of the 
process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration have often neglected the interactive nature of the various particularist 
nationalisms or of the policies and decisions of the different federal, republic, and province leaderships.” See 




process in southeastern Europe should not be considered some atavistic Balkan anomaly; it is, 
instead, simply part and parcel of what has been going on around the world over the past two 
centuries.   
  
 
II. Ethnoconfessional Nationalism as a Collective Phenomenon 
     In a provocative essay entitled “Primordialism Lives!” Stephen Van Evera asked whether “we 
should take ethnic groups as fixed for the purposes of political analysis?”9 Writing before the 
advent of social constructivism, in The Idea of Nationalism, Hans Kohn argued in the 
affirmative, claiming that “In the age of nationalism, nations are the great corporate personalities 
of history.” Kohn did not believe that what he called the “character” of nations was determined 
biologically, or that it was fixed for all time, but he did believe that such a national character 
existed as the “product of social and intellectual development, of countless gradations of 
behavior and reaction.”10 
 
     Many contemporary scholars reject such views.
11
 Rogers Brubaker, for instance, has attacked 
an understanding of nationalism and nations that “presupposes the existence of nations, and 
expresses their strivings for autonomy and independence . . . conceived as collective individuals, 
                                                        
9 Steven Van Evera, “Primordialism Lives!” APSA-CP: Newsletter of the Comparative Politics Section of the 
American Political Science Association (Winter 2001), 20. 
10 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Collier, 1967), 329.  
11 An analogous debate in evolutionary biology similarly questions the extent to which human groups can function 
as single organisms. Here too, religion figures prominently in the debate, as scientists ask why religious groups seem 
to have had more success in surviving than non-religious groups. Among the reasons for why societies based on 
some form of religious feeling may have been more successful are the fact that they were “more cohesive, more 
likely to contain individuals willing to make sacrifices for the group and more adept at sharing resources and 




capable of coherent, purposeful action” as “sociologically naïve.”12 James D. Fearon has argued 
that “Anyone with primordialist leanings should be quickly disabused of them by undertaking to 
code ‘ethnic groups’ in many different countries . . . Constructivist or instrumentalist arguments 
about the contingent, fuzzy, and situational character of ethnicity seem amply supported.”13 
David Laitin claims that “it is misleading to assume that nations (or putative nations)” are unitary 
actors, and making such a mistake “can lead to policy recommendations that promote not ethnic 
peace, but violent conflict.”14 Similarly, V.P. Gagnon has questioned   
. . . the concepts of groupness and solidarity, that is, whether, even if people do 
identify as Croats, it is in any way meaningful to assume that all such people are 
ipso facto members of an ethnic group with identifiable interests and borders, or 
that they all share an identical sense of what such an identification as Croat means 
in their relationships with other Croats and non Croats . . . the social constructivist 
approach means not assuming the existence of “groups” as unitary actors with a 




      Skepticism regarding the reality of ethnic or national groups is at the heart of social 
constructivism, which emphasizes, according to Kanchan Chandra, two fundamental points: first, 
that individuals have multiple identities; and second, that these identities vary “depending upon 
some specified causal variable.”16 Yet often this skepticism seems somewhat semantic. Thus, 
David Laitin in the same paragraph argues that “The search for ‘real’ nations living with ‘real’ 
boundaries . . . is a chimera . . . [yet] it would be foolhardy for liberals to ignore the social reality 
                                                        
12 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14-15. In a subsequent essay, Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov suggested 
using a “cognitive perspective” to avoid what they termed “analytical groupism,” i.e., “treating ethnic groups as 
substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed.” See Brubaker, et. al., “Ethnicity as Cognition,” 
Theory and Society 33 (2004), 31-32. 
13 Fearon, “Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country,” Journal of Economic Growth 8 (June 2003), 197. 
14 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 331. 
15 Gagnon, The Myth of Ethnic War, 12, 188. 
16 Kanchan Chandra, “Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics,” APSA-CP: Newsletter of the 




of nations in search of that very same chimera.”17 Often such views are combined with a 
dismissal of the importance of either religion or ethnicity in public life; with specific reference to 
the Balkans, for instance, one author has written that in pre-1992 Bosnia “religion and ethnicity 
were not the most salient features of identity.”18 
      
     But in trying to understand the long-term, secular trend toward ever smaller and more 
ethnically-homogeneous nation-states both in the Balkans and throughout the rest of Europe, it is 
worth reconsidering whether the social-constructivist approach, with its stress on individual 
choice and the actions of specific elites, has the same explanatory power as an approach that 
places more emphasis on structure as opposed to either agency or contingency. Accounts 
describing the “indispensability,” “inescapability,” and “inevitability” of nationalism suggest that 
there is something more to the structural transformation of the world and the triumph of 
nationalism as an ideology than the voluntaristic intervention of nationalist elites. In place of an 
approach that dismisses the potential that ethnic groups or nations can indeed act as unitary 
actors, it is worth considering whether a holistic approach, which, according to Susan James, 
attempts to discern “the social regularities which control classes of people” 19 provides a more 
powerful explanatory model for understanding nationalism’s enduring strength. In purely 
methodological terms, Ira Katznelson has argued that “so long as one does not turn social 
                                                        
17 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 345. In what seems to be a similarly forced attempt to reject an acceptance of ethnic 
groups as objective entities, Brubaker et. al. argue for shifting analytical attention away from the notion of “groups” 
and thinking in terms of the subject act of “group-making” and “grouping.” Thus, “Race, ethnicity and nationality . . 
. are not things in the world, but perspectives on the world—not ontological but epistemological realities.” See 
Brubaker, et. al., “Ethnicity as Cognition,” 45. Emphasis in the original.  
18 See Cynthia Simmons, “A Multicultural, Multiethnic, and Multiconfessional Bosnia and Herzegovina: Myth and 
Reality.” Nationalities Papers 30 (December 2002), 631. 




categories into fictional collective actors, it is permissible to assign preferences to collectivities, 
but only with great care, with self-conscious provisionality, and with the recognition that, 
ultimately, all preferences are held by persons, not roles,”20 and Van Evera has explicitly argued 
in favor of treating ethnic groups or nations as political actors.  Similarly, as George and Bennett 
note “If all individuals behave the same in the same social structure, then the interesting causal 
and explanatory action is at the level of the social structure, even if it must operate through the 
perceptions and calculations of individuals.”21 
 
     To what extent can we speak of what Kohn calls “the will of nations” in the Balkans? Before 
explicitly addressing this question, it is worth noting the strong historical streak of collectivism 
that runs through Balkan political culture. The origins of this collectivism can be traced back to 
the Middle Ages; for instance, notions such as collective responsibility for crimes, and, 
consequently, collective punishment for the families of those committing crimes, were a notable 
feature of Balkan peasant communities extending back to Byzantine times, if not even earlier.
22
 
Embedding this sense of collective identity in the region’s political culture were pre-Ottoman 
institutions such as the zadruga (collective household) which in Ottoman times was the primary 
unit of taxation. As Leopold von Ranke noted in the case of Serbia, 
These family households, supplying all their own wants, and shut up each within 
itself—a state of things which was continued under the Turks, because the taxes 
were chiefly leveled upon the households—formed the basis of Servian 




                                                        
20 See Katznelson, “Periodization and Preferences: Reflections on Purposive Action in Comparative Historical 
Social Science,” 279. 
21 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 141-42. 
22 Mazower, The Balkans, 151. 
23





     Such collectivism had considerable implications for the region’s political culture; specifically, 
whether Balkan societies would stress group or individual rights. Again, to cite Allcock, “long-
standing forms of collectivism in the political culture of the region” resulted in “a general failure 
to develop a sense in practice (and often also in law) of individual rights and an institutionalized 
tendency to think in terms of collective rights, which subsume the person.”24 In Kosovo, for 
instance, Ger Duijzings has found  
a strong fixation on the family or lineage; distrust towards those who are not one’s 
kin; a strong pressure to protect the family’s integrity and to avenge infringements 
upon its reputation; a tendency to conceal information or to mislead and deceive 
others, which corresponds to an instrumental view of relations outside the family. 
In this type of atomized society, in which the struggle for survival dominates life 
and violent conflict is a recurring phenomenon, loyalties beyond one’s own 
family are highly unstable, changeable and fluid. . . It is clear that lack of social 





     Importantly, modernization made only limited inroads into southeastern Europe’s political 
culture; thus, “The persistence of the reliance upon kinship, clientship and locality in South Slav 
society is therefore interesting as an indication both of the failure to develop these kinds of 
relations of impersonal trust and of the continuing life of pre-modern attitudes.”26 
                                                        
24 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 434. 
25 Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, 6-7. Distrust towards outsiders is not of course a unique 
characteristic of Albanians in southeastern Europe; as Keith Brown notes in his study of the Macedonian town of 
Kruševo, “Secrecy, concealment of truth, and attention to maintaining a public face were all perceived as 
components of a well-lived life.” See Brown, The Past in Question, 228. 
26 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 366. Here it is worth noting that international policy toward the region 
(specifically, the economic sanctions regime enforced against the FRY in the 1990s) has often reinforced the very 
ties upon which collectivism and nationalism in general are based. Susan Woodward, for instance, notes that 
“Sanctions, by imposing economic hardship, were intended to create an angry public opinion that would turn against 
Milosevic and demand a change in policy toward Bosnia, or, if necessary, overthrow his rule altogether. But 
economic hardship had nurtured nationalist sentiments in the first place. Further economic hardship would require 
individuals to spend more time on daily survival and less on political action. It would reinforce the informal 
networks and social obligations that define ethnicity—family, cousins, godparents—or crime. The sanctions, instead 
of undermining the sitting regime, increased the power of the government and of Milosevic personally . . . “ See 





     The historical legacy of collectivism in the Balkans has resulted in a socio-political 
environment in which ethnoconfessional group identities, and, consequently, ethnoconfessional 
group interests, have become paramount for understanding contemporary Balkan politics and 
society. While individuals in southeastern Europe may, as constructivists would argue, possess 
multiple identities, the salience of the various identities varies, and in a significant majority of 
cases, each individual’s collective group identity is of paramount importance. In the Balkans, as 
will be demonstrated below, the cleavage that has clearly had the most resonance, the one to 
which people feel what Kohn called a “supreme loyalty,” is by and large the national one (or, to 
be more precise in the Balkan case, the ethnoconfessional one).  As Kohn argued, although 
people do have multiple identities,   
Within these pluralistic, and sometimes conflicting, kinds of group consciousness 
there is generally one which is recognized by man as the supreme and most 
important, to which therefore, in the case of conflict of group-loyalties, he owes 
supreme loyalty. He identifies himself with the group and its existence, frequently 
not only for the span of his life, but for the continuity of his existence beyond this 
span. The feeling of solidarity between the individual and the group may go, at 
certain times, as far as complete submergence of the individual in the group. The 
whole education of the members of the group is directed to a common mental 




     Thus, while we can concede the constructivist claim that individuals possess multiple 
identities, by far the most important of these is the national one. There are, of course, numerous 
ranges of opinion within each Balkan ethnoconfessional group, competitions for power within 
elites, etc.
28
 Nevertheless, within each ethnoconfessional group there is also something which 
                                                        
27 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Collier Books, 1944), 11-12. Walker Connor uses the term “primary 
allegiance” in place of “supreme loyalty.” See Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 35.  
28 For a useful analysis of political debates and struggles within Bosnian Serb politics, see Nina Casperson, 
“Contingent Nationalist Dominance: Intra-Serb Challenges to the Serb Democratic Party,” Nationalities Papers 34 




Alon Confino calls “symbolic common denominators” that have been internalized in the 
vernacular memories (as opposed to official, state-sponsored memories) of a given population. 
The interesting question, then, is how the nation-state came to be a vernacular memory, or “how 
did people internalize the nation and make it in a remarkably short time an everyday mental 
property—a memory as intimate and authentic as the local, ethnic and family past?”29 As 
Confino goes on to note,  
National memory, for example, is constituted by different, often opposing, 
memories that, in spite of their rivalries, construct common denominators that 
overcome on the symbolic level real social and political differences to create an 
imagined community . . . It is obviously important to avoid essentialism and to 
reject arguments that impose cultural homogeneity on a heterogeneous society . . . 
Differences are real. People are sometimes ready to die for their vision of the past, 
and nations sometimes break because of memory conflicts. But all this only begs 
the question: how, then, in spite of all these differences and difficulties, do nations 
hold together? . . . many a national memory succeeds to represent, for a broad 
section of the population, a common destiny that overcomes symbolically real 
social and political conflicts in order to give the illusion of a community of people 
who in fact have very different interests. People construct representations of the 




     Confino’s warning that we should not privilege the political over the social or cultural is 
useful when one reflects upon how broad-based many upsurges in nationalist activity in the 
former Yugoslavia were, in contrast to many elite-led explanations for nationalism in the former 
Yugoslavia. The movement known as the “Croatian Spring,” for instance, was not led by 
political or state officials, but by cultural organizations, student groups, the Roman Catholic 
Church, and even to a limited extent Croatian émigré groups, independently of Croatian 
                                                        
29 Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” 1402. 




communist party and Croatian republican state elites.
31
 The Serb movement in Kosovo in the 




    Accepting that society and culture possess an autonomous power independent of the state also 
begins to spread the network of “nationalists” into an ever-larger segment of the population. The 
Balkan experience, for instance, shows that a very wide range of people can be considered 
“nationalists”—from politicians, to clerics, writers, intellectuals, artists, musicians, journalists, 
military officers, even criminals turned nationalist warlords. Here we can continue asking how 
deep the social roots of ethnoconfessional nationalism are by positing the question of whether 
“nationalists” could be considered individuals who choose a marriage partner of their own ethnic 
background, people who decide on where to settle based on ethnic demographic patterns (both of 
these issues will be discussed in Chapter IV), or businesspeople who financially supported 
nationalist political parties representing 70-90 percent of the political spectrum in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, or Serbia?  
 
     Examined in these terms, and in the context of the earlier discussion of the universality, 
indispensability, inescapability, and inevitability of nationalism, the phenomenon of 
ethnoconfessional nationalism begins to appear much broader and massive than the emphasis on 
elites many narrower versions of social constructivism imply. Here it is useful to borrow William 
H. Sewell’s concept of “ideological formations” to explain how nationalism involves more than 
voluntaristic elite intervention. In critiquing Theda Skocpol’s structural explanation for the 
                                                        
31 On these issues, see Ivan Perić, Suvremeni hrvatski nacionalizam (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1984), 23-33. 




outbreak of social revolutions, Sewell suggests more weight be given to the importance of 
ideology, or what he calls “ideological formations.” Thus, he sees a need  
. . . to shift the emphasis from highly self-conscious, purposive individuals 
attempting to elaborate or enact “blueprints” for change” to relatively anonymous, 
collective, transpersonal ideologies that “undergo continuous reproduction and/or 
transformations as a result of the combined willful actions of more or less 
knowledgeable actors within the constraints and the possibilities supplied by 
preexisting systems. It is, consequently, not quite right to speak of ideological 
structures as “non-voluntary” or “non-voluntarist,” since both the reproduction 
and the transformation of these structures are carried out by a very large number 
of willful actors. Ideological structures are, however, anonymous. The whole of 
an ideological structure (with its inevitable contradictions and discontinuities) is 
never present in the consciousness of any single actor—not even a Robespierre, a 
Napoleon, a Lenin, or a Mao—but in the collectivity. An ideological structure is 
not some self-consistent “blueprint,” but the outcome of the often contradictory or 
antagonistic action of a large number of actors or groups of actors . . . [This is] a 
conception of ideology as an anonymous, collective, but transformable, structure . 
. . [which informs] the structure of institutions, the nature of social cooperation 




     The preceding discussion has important implications for our understanding of the Balkan 
political spectrum. Many scholars have noted nationalism’s ability to transcend political and/or 
ideological boundaries. Woodward, for instance, has argued that nationalism “[gathers] into its 
fold all forms of reaction—from those in genuine opposition, those politically excluded from the 
previous regime, to opportunists—regardless of their substantive policy positions.”34  One could 
go even further and claim that nationalism does more than gather “all forms of reaction” into its 
folds; nationalism gathers almost everyone into its folds. As Alexander Motyl puts it, nationalism 
“can coexist with a variety of other political doctrines and behaviors, including communism . . . 
All that nationalism innately opposes are doctrines that explicitly deny the existence of nations 
and the possibility of states. In the twentieth century, however, such doctrines have been 
                                                        
33 Sewell, “Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case,” The Journal of Modern History 57 
(March 1985), 60-61. 




virtually non-existent.”35 In other words, nationalism’s power is most strongly seen in the 
willingness of people from across the political spectrum and representing different class interests 
to adopt a common view or position about the desirability of ethnic or national self-governance. 
As Dejan Jović has argued,  
The strength of nationalism lies in its internal pluralism, and its ability to include 
liberal, socialist, conservative and other values and to tie and direct them toward 
one goal—the creation or the preservation of the nation-state. Nationalism is the 
doctrine of extraordinary conditions in which political space is limited and 
suspended. It makes its appearance in place of regular politics, as an alternative to 




     This point can be illustrated by providing two different ways of understanding the political 
spectrum in post-Yugoslav states. The first example, “Ideology Trumps Ethnicity,” suggests that 
individuals sharing common ideological positions but different ethnic backgrounds can 
overcome their ethnic differences and join forces for a common political purpose.
37
 The Balkan 







                                                        
35 Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires, 81. 
36 Jović, Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla, 45. 
37 Rogers M. Smith describes the phenomenon of “trumping” identities in the following way: “some identities define 
persons’ trumping allegiances in cases where the demands of those memberships conflict with ones advanced on 
behalf of other human associations, groups, or societies (whether those are ‘nation-states,’ different levels of 
government, religious bodies, racial or ethnic communities, corporate, worker, or other class organizations, or other 
groups) . . . political activities of various sorts play important roles in determining which become salient political 




Figure I.  
Constructivist/Instrumentalist Assumptions about the Balkan Political Spectrum 
Ideology Trumps Ethnicity 
 
 
     Thus, Croat moderate (a
1
) should be more willing to collaborate with Serb moderate (b) than 
with Croat extreme nationalist (a), or Serb moderate (b) should be more willing to collaborate 
with Croat moderate (a
1
) than with Serb extreme nationalist (b
1
). In other words, ideology trumps 
ethnicity.  
 
      Considerable historical evidence, however, shows that this understanding of the Balkan 
political spectrum is substantially off the mark. An alternative understanding of the Balkan 
political spectrum is to approach it from the belief that ethnicity trumps ideology. For the vast 
majority of people (roughly two-thirds to ninety percent), one’s ethnoconfessional identity 
determines their political positions vis-à-vis a host of issues, and trumps ideological similarities 
they may share with people from across the ethnoconfessional divide; to quote a turn-of-phrase 
coined by Keith Brown, national identity does indeed determine perspective.
38
 Consequently, the 
Balkan political spectrum in reality looks something like this:  
                                                        
38 See Brown, The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation (Princeton, NJ: Princetion 
University Press, 2003), 19. Keith Darden goes perhaps even further with this claim; thus, according to Darden “if 
one knows the national content of the initial schooling in a community, one knows the most basic political loyalties 
of that community. This gives one remarkable power to predict how that community will align even more than a 
century hence.” See Darden, “The Causes and Consequences of Enduring National Loyalties,” Draft Manuscript, 
Chapter 1, 11 (emphasis added). Another term that could be used to describe the impact of ethnoconfessional 






Ethnicity Trumps Ideology 
 
 
     According to this view, Croat moderate (a
1
) will find it much easier to collaborate with Croat 
extreme nationalist (a) than with Serb moderate (b), and vice versa. 
 
     The exceptions to this understanding are in many ways politically irrelevant.
39
 As Vladko 
Maček would note in interwar Yugoslavia, defectors from the national camp are like “branches 
of a tree” broken “in a heavy storm”—“once no longer attached to the tree that gave them life, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
social leaders in Bosnia in 1878; thus, “The various local actors in the 1878 Sarajevo revolution were leaders and 
members of religious communities, and their religious affiliations and loyalties governed much of their behavior.” 
See Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 57. 
39 In this category one could include individuals in Bosnia such as the Croat Ivo Komšić and the Serb Mirko 
Pejanović. There have also been occasional instances in history in which prečani Serbs disagreed with the view of 
Serbs from Serbia proper. Woodward notes that the “assertion . . . that Serbs outside of Serbia would always choose 
to vote their national identity as an ethnic people rather than their identity as a member of the territorial people of a 
republic . . . [is] an assumption that had no basis in historical experience, where Serbs from Croatia and Vojvodina, 
for example, were most often in conflict with Serbs from Serbia proper.” See Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 430-431, 
footnote 38. But examples such as these are by and large exceptions that prove the rule. In the case of the prečani 
Serbs, for instance, for a significant period of time between 1918 and 1934, they supported Belgrade’s centralizing 
policies in interwar Yugoslavia (as opposed to their Croatian counterparts). It was only when the leader of the 
prečani Serbs, Svetozar Pribičević, had a falling out with King Alexander that a clear break between Belgrade and 
the prečani Serbs appeared. Before the break, Pribičević had been considered “among the staunchest centralists.” 




they would dry up.”40 In fact, the Balkan experience of the past two centuries provides 
substantial evidence that ethnoconfessional identity has consistently trumped ideology—i.e., that 
individuals with different political programs or ideologies have found it much easier to unite 
around ethnic/national issues, whereas individuals with similar political ideologies but from 




The national factor was so strong that it dominated Balkan politics in the past and 
continues to do so in the present. The right, the center, and the left all exploited 
nationalism and fostered national issues. They differed in methods as well as in 
substance but, basically, followed the same national endeavors. Conservatives 
preached the establishment of a strong state as a prerequisite for the sake of 
national unification. The liberals related freedom at home to freedom abroad. 
Socialists preached the fusion of both revolutions, the national and the social, into 
one. The social democrats were not immune to nationalistic influences; in fact, 
Balkan social democracy, based on the revolutionary tradition, never understood 





      Similarly, during the interwar Yugoslav period, “ethnic differentiation subverts class 
consciousness across the board.”42 Such findings are consistent with the arguments noted above 
regarding nationalism’s compatibility with a variety of political ideologies of both the right and 
the left, even across time (an issue which will be discussed in the next section).  
 
    A few empirical examples help illustrate this point. In Macedonia, according to Andrew 
Rossos  
                                                        
40 As cited by Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 78. Importantly, this is a mistake occupiers and interventionists have 
repeatedly made in the Balkans. During the Habsburg period, for instance, as Robin Okey notes, Benjamin Kállay’s 
efforts to split “moderates” from more extreme elements within national groups came to naught, as “moderation . . . 
did not mean inclination to become ‘national renegades’ . . . “ See Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 139.  
41 Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati, The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1981), 232-33. 




A “Free Macedonia” became the central plank in the program of virtually all 
Macedonian patriotic, revolutionary, and national organizations and movements 
after the 1878 Congress of Berlin. This was true of the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) of the Ilinden period as well as the 
Makedonisti of the generation of K.P. Misirkov, the leading ideologist of 
Macedonian nationalism after the turn of the century. It was equally true of both 
the Macedonian right and left, which, in the much more difficult circumstances of 
post-Ottoman, post-partition, divided Macedonia called, at least until the end of 




    Just as tellingly, during World War II Macedonia’s communist leadership supported the 
Bulgarian occupation authorities’ efforts, despite the fact that Bulgaria was an ally in Germany’s 
war against the Soviet Union; as Keith Brown notes, “’National’ rejection of Yugoslav rule had 
been affirmed as more important than any communist opposition to the old Yugoslav elites or to 
fascism more generally.”44 In interwar Yugoslavia, while Serb opposition parties were 
dissatisfied with the royal dictatorship, they in the main did not object to the centralizing features 
of the government’s program.45 In Serbia in the 1980s, the plight of Kosovo Serbs became an 
issue that cut across ideological and political persuasions: “liberals,” “nationalists” and the “new 
left” all joined efforts to support their cause.46 In Slovenia in the early 1980s, efforts to introduce 
a “common-core curricula” throughout Yugoslavia “united critical intellectuals and the 
communist leadership” against the campaign.47 Reviewing the history of state-opposition 
relations in the Titoist period, Vladimir Gligorov noted that, “Opposition groups are more ready 
                                                        
43 Rossos, “Great Britain and Macedonian Statehood and Unification, 1940-1949,” East European Politics and 
Society 14 (December 1999), 121-122. Emphasis added.  
44 Brown, The Past in Question, 135. 
45 Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 126. 
46 Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 139. Moreover, in contrast to analyses that see Slobodan Milošević or 
Serbian political elites as those most responsible for the “re-emergence” of Serbian nationalism, Mirko Blagojević 
argues that it was “[Serbian] Orthodoxy . . . that became the most important, and one would say the key factor in 
constructing an awakened Serbian collective identity” at the beginning of the 1980s, i.e., several years before 
Milošević came to power. See Blagojević, Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva, 384. 




to cooperate with the Communists of their own nationality than with the opposition of some 
other nationality.”48 Along similar lines, Dejan Jović has noted that “Although ideological 
differences between them were great, between elites and counter-elites there was not a great 
difference with respect to the national question and the protection of “national interests.”49 Here 
it also bears noting that in the final days of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, governments of national 
unity were formed in most of the republics composed of parties from across the political 
spectrum. All of these facts stand in marked contrast to what constructivist and/or instrumentalist 
views of nationalism would predict. Moreover, as will be seen in Chapter VI, it also stands in 
contrast to how the international community has understood the problems of ethnoconfessional 
nationalism, and how it has attempted to deal with it. 
 
     A logical corollary to the ability of ethnoconfessional nationalism to unite people across the 
ideological spectrum is the fact that resolving the “national question” takes precedence over 
“normal” politics, such as the struggle for civil rights, or debates over economic policy. Gavrilo 
Princip, for instance, frequently repeated the view that he and his co-conspirators in Mlada 
Bosna (the organization behind the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand) would be 
socialists if it were not for the unfinished matter of the Serb national question.
50
 A decade later, 
Vladko Maček would similarly note that “The first and foremost question is the Croatian 
                                                        
48 Gligorov, “The Discovery of Liberalism in Yugoslavia,” East European Politics and Societies 5 (Winter 1991), 
15.  
49 Jović, Jugoslavija—država koja je odumrla, 424. Ivo Banac has made a similar point with respect to Serbian 
politics after Tito’s death, noting that Serbia’s communists “had more in common with the prewar Radical Party, the 
party of Serbian supremacy, than with Slovene or Croat communists.” As quoted by Jasna Dragović-Soso, “Why 
Did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations,” in Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-
Soso, eds., State Collapse in Southeastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration (West 
Lafayetter, IN.: Purdue University Press, 2008), 6. 
50 See Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 214. One of Princip’s friends in Mlada Bosna, Nedeljko Čabrinović (who 




question. The question of dictatorship, civil liberties, and political freedoms comes second, even 
if it is of the utmost importance.”51  
 
     Given these considerations, instead of understanding nationalism as an elite-construct, it is 
better viewed, as Benedict Anderson has suggested, as “a deep, horizontal comradeship . . . 
regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail.”52 This suggests that apart 
from nationalism being an ideology that transcends ideological differences, it is also an ideology 
that transcends class differences. During the Croatian Spring in the late 1960s, for instance, the 
then leader of the League of Communists of Croatia, Miko Tripalo, would claim that “national 
and class interests were the same as nation and class had become identical.”53 Along similar 
lines, Sabrina Ramet has argued that “regardless of what the particular interests of Croatian 
peasants, merchants, sailors, priests, and intellectuals may have been, they united to support the 
same program in the conviction that their principal foe was one and the same (Serbian 
hegemonism).”54 Such monolithic group interests explain why widely dissimilar parties, such as 
Vladko Maček’s Croatian Peasant’s Party and Ante Pavelić’s Ustaša movement, were able to 
collaborate with each other.
55
 In Macedonia during World War II, for instance, the British vice-
                                                        
51 As quoted by Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 89. 
52 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991), 7. This also explains the virulence and 
strength of nationalism, for as Benedict Anderson notes, “Ultimately, it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over 
the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited 
imaginings.” 
53 As cited by Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, 56. 
54 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 7. 
55 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 7-8. In Croatia prior to and during World War II, anti-
Serbianism was something most (albeit perhaps not all) Croatian political forces shared; according to Aleksa Djilas, 
“the simple, and, perhaps, terrible truth is that the essentials of the Ustašas’ ideology were not much outside the 
mainstream of Croatian nationalism, and very close to the special tradition of Starčević, Kvaternik and Frank.” 




consul in Skopje, a certain Mr. Thomas, would estimate that “90 percent of all Slav Macedonians 
are autonomists in one sense or another.”56 In interwar Bosnia, despite the fact that some 
segments of the Bosnian Muslim population were more Serb-oriented and some more Croat-
oriented, “all Bosniac political and cultural actors were united in the defense of Bosnian rights, 
proving that the defense of Bosnia’s rights were above and beyond national ‘determinations.’57 
In a more recent Bosnian example, Sulejman Tihić, the head of the Stranka Demokratske Akcije 
(SDA, the political party formed by the late Alija Izetbegović), noted that in discussions on 
constitutional changes the Serb delegation (which included people from across the political 
spectrum such as Mladen Ivanić, Milorad Dodik, and Dragan Kalinić) was “united, they only 
expressed themselves in different ways.”58 In Albania and amongst Albanians in general, one of 
                                                        
56 As cited by Rossos, “The Macedonian Question and Instability in the Balkans,” 154. 
57 See Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, 112. 
58 See the interview with Tihić in Dani (Sarajevo), 29 March 2002, 10. A Serb member of the Bosnian collective 
state presidency, Nebojša Radmanović, expressed the same view about his Bosniac interlocutors, claiming that 
“there was no great difference between Bosniac politicians” regardless of whether they were from the SDA, the 
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elections did little to encourage the return of Serbs to Croatia. As the former High Representative in BiH, Wolfgang 
Petritsch, noted in April 2002, “One of the worst sides of the events in Croatia is the passive behavior of the Račan 
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living in the Republic of Srpska, mainly occupying Bosniac and Croat houses, which means that the behavior of the 
Croatian government impedes the normalization in the Republic of Srpska and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole.” 
See Petritsch’s interview in Danas (Belgrade), 10 April 2002. Similarly, changes in government in both Sarajevo 
and Zagreb over the past several years have done little to change the fundamental problems affecting relations 
between Bosnia and Croatia, such as a resolution of the status of the port of Ploće, or the belief of Croatian officials 
that they have a “constitutional obligation” to protect the rights of Croats “in the diaspora.” Thus, despite the fact 
that both states in 2002 had governments led by social-democrats, little progress could be achieved in fundamental 
relations. See Zija Dizdarević, “Zagreb umjesto Sarajeva,” Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 17 February 2002.  Numerous 
similar examples can be found further back in history; for instance, even such bitter political enemies as Ivan 
Stambolić and Slobodan Milošević shared the same, or nearly the same, positions on most political issues facing 
Serbia and Serbs in the 1980s (e.g., the 1974 Constitution, the status of Kosovo, the position of Serbia in 
Yugoslavia, etc). See the interview by Slobodan Reljić with Slavoljub Djukić, “Ivan, Slobodan, i Ona,” NIN 
(Belgrade), 3 April 2003. Similarly, in Kosovo, the Albanians “are deeply divided on every conceivable political 
issue except one: all want independence [from Serbia] within Kosovo’s existing borders.” Serbia After Djindjic 
(Brussels/Belgrade: International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 141), 18 March 2003, 13. In interwar 
Yugoslavia, Stjepan Radić once expressed his view that all Serb politicians “are largely identical, especially with 
regard to Croatia . . . [it would be difficult to find] such a Serb statesman and Serb party, who will comprehend that 
there can be no honorable and just agreement with the Croats’ until there was a recognition of Croat political rights.” 




the few issues that politicians across the left-right divide agree upon is the issue of Kosovo; thus, 
“in a generally bitterly divided political arena, Kosovo is one of the few issues to cross the left-
right divide.”59 In Slovenia, although the political spectrum consists of the full range of left-of-
center socialist parties to right-of-center Christian Democratic parties, “virtually all parties which 
emerged post-1989 were in some sense ‘Slovene nationalists.’60  
 
     Another important aspect of the collective nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism, in 
addition to providing for Anderson’s “deep horizontal comradeship” is to recognize that it also 
provides a vertical comradeship as well, insofar as there are fewer differences between elites and 
masses than many elite-based arguments admit. While elites and individual leaders can of course 
be cynical and manipulative, they can also be “true believers” in the nationalist cause. As Donald 
Horowitz has pointed out,  
The tacit assumption [of instrumentalist or constructivist arguments] is usually 
that political entrepreneurs are cynical manipulators whose activities are governed 
by self-interest alone. But what if political entrepreneurs are themselves 
                                                        
59 See Frida Malaj, “In Politically Split Albania, Independence for Kosovo is one of the few issues that Cause No 
Controversy for Berisha,” Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Balkan Insight, 2 November 2006; for similar 
views, see Elez Biberaj, “The Current Political Situation in Kosova and the Changing Social Order,” The Harriman 
Review 9 (Summer 1996), 27. Albanian interest in Kosovo’s future status is not, of course, a new development, as 
will be discussed in more detail below. In discussing how Kosovo Albanian’s viewed various politicians in 
Belgrade, Janjić, et. al., note the following: “Panić openly supported an improvement of conditions for Kosovo 
Albanians and the reopening of schools and hospitals, claiming at the same time that Kosovo was part of 
Yugoslavia. Although he believed in respecting the Kosovo Albanians’ human rights, he expected them to 
participate in the political life of Yugoslavia and take part in upcoming elections. However, according to LDK, there 
was almost no difference between Panić and Milošević . . . Although one million Albanian votes could have toppled 
Milošević, Kosovo Albanian leaders freely admitted that they did not want him removed from power because his 
regime was creating a framework for the final success of the Albanian national project.“ See Janjić, Lalaj, and Pula, 
“Kosovo Under the Milošević Regime,” 288, 300. Note here that the issue dividing Albanians and Serbs was thus 
not improving the Albanian population’s human rights, material conditions, or overall quality of life—a set of 
policies rationalist approaches to ethnic conflict maintain could have defused the situation—the issue was a zero 
sum struggle to decide whether or not Kosovo would be independent. Had the Kosovo Albanian population been 
willing to participate in Yugoslavia’s political life during the 1990s, it has been estimated that they would have 
gained control of 24 out of 29 municipalities in Kosovo, twenty-four seats in the Serbian parliament (out of 250), 
and twelve seats in the federal Yugoslav parliament.  




primordialists? . . . There is no necessary contradiction between the pursuit of 
self-interest and the utilization of a primordial cognitive frame . . . If ethnicity is 
commonly experienced primordially, it is, at the very least, an important empirical 
question whether political entrepreneurs depart in significant ways from 
prevailing patterns of cognition . . . the blanket assertion that political 





      Walker Connor similarly suggests that the elite-mass dichotomy favored by constructivists 
and instrumentalists is overdone; according to Connor, “nationalism is a mass phenomenon, and 
the degree to which the leaders are true believers does not affect the reality.”62 
 
     It also bears noting that public pressure can compel leaders to adopt certain policies even 
against their own better judgement. When the Herzegovinian rebellion erupted in 1875, the 
Serbian monarch at the time, King Milan, was intent on keeping Serbia out of the conflict; 
nevertheless, popular pressure was too strong. Stavrianos points up the problems facing Milan in 
the following excerpt, in which he intersperses his own observations with those of the British 
consul in Belgrade at the time.  
“. . .  Whenever a decided advocate of Revolutionary War against Turkey was 
confronted by a doubtful candidate, the preference was given by the electors to 
the former one.” Milan fought hard to restrain his bellicose subjects. A coalition 
cabinet was formed, and when it showed signs of yielding to the popular clamor 
he summarily dismissed it. The succeeding ministry failed to stand more firmly. 
“I find very little difference amongst public men here, whether Radical or 
Conservative,” the British consul reported; “of whatever shade of opinion, all are 
equally imbued with the desire to see Servian aggrandizement accomplished . . . 
“63  
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     Other leaders in more recent times have confronted the same problem. Moreover, the power 
of such mass, collective sentiments usually increase during periods of state disintegration or 
collapse, when “the emotional power of ethnic attachments is typically increased by the unifying 
effects of what are perceived to be external threats.”64 As the former Yugoslavia was 
disintegrating in the early 1990s, one could rightly ask whether leaders were stirring up 
nationalist feeling, or whether they were only responding to what their respective constituencies 
wanted. In the case of Macedonia, Andrew Rossos has argued “the declaration of complete 
sovereignty and independence . . . was the only option acceptable to the Macedonian majority of 
the population, as well as to the overwhelming majority of the total population of the republic, 
including the Albanians of Macedonia.”65  
 
    The implication of all of these things—that ethnoconfessional nationalism trumps ideological 
differences, that it unites people from across the political spectrum, that it provides for both a 
deep horizontal comradeship and strong vertical linkages between leaders and led—is that a 
more powerful explanatory model for understanding the phenomenon of ethnoconfessional 
nationalism in the Balkans should place the explanatory emphasis on its collective, mass base. 
Instead of the state making the nation, in the former Yugoslavia, as Susan Woodward argues, the 
nation has been making the state.
66
  
                                                        
64 Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 56. 
65 See Rossos, “The Macedonian Question and Instability in the Balkans,” 156. Emphasis added. For further 
evidence along these lines, see Chapter II, pp. 52-53. 
66 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 204. Put a slightly different way, as Rodney Bruce Hall notes, “the state is just the 
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III. Ethnoconfessional Nationalism as a Chronic Phenomenon 
      A satisfactory explanation for ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans has to provide 
convincing evidence of the stability of preferences for such things as a “Greater Albania,” 
“Greater Croatia,” “Greater Serbia,” etc., and their enduring strength across many generations 
and over long periods of time. One explanation for the stability and enduring strength of such 
preferences can be found in the view of some theorists that the nationalist idea has an intrinsic 
quality that defies conventional understandings of time; Hans Kohn, for instance, attributed a 
metaphysical quality to nationalism, claiming that for the average individual, “the supreme 
loyalty” (i.e., loyalty to the nation) lasted “not only for the span of his life, but for the continuity 
of his existence beyond this span.”67 
 
     At a very abstract and theoretical level time can in fact be measured and understood in 
different ways, a problem which physicists, historians, and novelists have each articulated in 
their own ways.
 68
 Karl Mannheim, for instance, looked at the difference between Enlightenment 
                                                        
67 Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, 11-12. Along similar lines, Anthony Smith has said that nationalism “implies a 
deeper need transcending individuals, generations and classes, a need for collective immortality through posterity, 
that will relativize and diminish the oblivion and futility of death . . . For only in the chain of generations of those 
who share an historic and quasi-familial bond, can individuals hope to achieve a sense of immortality in eras of 
purely terrestrial horizons.” See Smith, “The Origins of Nations,” op. cit., 362. That nationalism has become such a 
powerful force in international affairs may to some extent result from the fact that other major philosophies or 
worldviews have simply ceded this metaphysical ground to it. As Benedict Anderson notes, for instance, “neither 
Marxism nor Liberalism is much concerned with death and immortality.” See Anderson, Imagined Communities, 10. 
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approaches to time, seen as a unilinear progression of events understood in quantitative terms, to 
the understanding of time influenced by German romanticism, which believed in the existence of 
“an interior time that cannot be measured but only experienced in purely qualitative terms.”69 In 
this view, the chronological overlap of generations within distinct human groups transfers 
knowledge and collective experiences through time.
70
 This transfer of knowledge and experience 
creates links between individuals and generations living in different eras and compresses the 
elapsed time between generations or historical events. Gavrilo Princip, for instance, was raised 
hearing tales of the 1875 Serb rebellion in Herzegovina, in 1914 he assassinated the Habsburg 
heir to the throne, and in August 1941 his nephew led an attack that destroyed a German armored 
column east of Sarajevo.
71
 Thus, while for outsiders with an “objective,” unilinear understanding 
of time, in the Balkans (or any other geographical area which has its own historical legacy) 
where people are often seen as consumed by “irrational historical grievances,” at least part of the 
explanation for such obsessions with history—victories, defeats, massacres, who settled which 
piece of land first, etc.—lies in the infinitely more direct and subjective impact such events have 
had on the local populations. As L.S. Stavrianos describes this understanding of time 
. . . the past—even the very distant past—and the present are side by side in the 
Balkans. Centuries chronologically remote from each other are really 
contemporary. Governments and peoples, particularly intellectuals, have based 
their attitudes and actions on what happened, or what they believed to have 
happened, several centuries ago. The reason is that during the almost five 
centuries of Turkish rule the Balkan peoples had no history. Time stood still for 
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70 There is debate amongst both psychologists and anthropologists over how the transmission of knowledge exactly 
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them. Consequently when they won their independence in the nineteenth century 





     The chronic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism is also apparent in the longevity of such 
conflicts. In the Balkans, such longevity is largely due to the unwillingness of ethnoconfessional 
groups to accept the political dominance of another ethnic group. Gershenson and Grossman, for 
instance, have examined the difference between civil conflicts that have “ended” and those that 
appear to be “never ending,” and have argued that the primary difference between the two lies in 
the attitude of one of the two parties to such a conflict. Civil conflicts that “end” are the result of 
situations in which one party to the conflict attaches less importance to political dominance than 
the other side. Civil conflicts that are “never ending,” according to Gershenson and Grossman, 
are those in which both sides attach roughly equal importance to political dominance.
73
 Thus, as 
Jasna Dragović-Soso points out, throughout the twentieth century there was never a satisfactory 
answer to the “Yugoslav national question”; as she noted, “the dilemma of satisfying desires for 
national statehood and of defining the principles governing the notion of self-determination, as 
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73 See Dmitriy Gershenson and Herschel I. Grossman, “Civil Conflict: Ended or Never Ending?” Journal of Conflict 




well as the issue of how to divide sovereignty and power within a single political entity were 
present in 1918, in 1945, and throughout Yugoslavia’s existence until 1991.”74 
 
     This difference between the “objective” way in which outsiders understand time and the 
“subjective” way in which the Balkan peninsula’s inhabitants view it leads to a problem Walker 
Connor once pointed out: while students of nationalism often ask the question “But why now?” 
when confronted by an upsurge in nationalist activity, the more appropriate question would be 
“Why not now?” Connor argues that the problem often stems from the fact that many scholars 
perceive ethnonationalist conflicts to be “historically rootless” and therefore generally find them 
unpredictable and/or unexpected. Connor partly attributes this in part to “a general disregard for 
historical perspective,” an over-emphasis on economism, and ultimately, a sense that “there is 
little need to search history for antecedents or for the germination and development of an abstract 
notion of a kindred people.”75 
 
     Yet as will be seen below, many different political systems attempted to use many different 
institutional mechanisms to mitigate or reduce nationalist ambitions in the territory comprising 
the former Yugoslavia. None of them succeeded in the long term, but many observers 
nevertheless tended to view relatively short historical periods in which there was an absence of 
outright conflict as proof that stable multiethnic and multiconfessional polities had been 
produced. Hence the “But why now?” question posed by numerous social scientists in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  
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     The problems associated with this mode of thinking in the former Yugoslavia were similar to 
a broader failure to foresee not just the hostilities and disintegration of Yugoslavia, but the rapid 
disintegration of the Soviet bloc itself in 1989. Timur Kuran has shown how quickly communism 
collapsed in Eastern Europe at this time: in May 1989, there was relative peace and order 
throughout the Eastern Bloc, while by the end of the year all of the communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe had fallen. At least part of the reason for the rapidity with which such 
momentous geopolitical changes could occur, and why they took academic observers by surprise, 
is that they did not recognize that Eastern Europe’s façade of order and stability was based on 
what Kuran termed “preference falsification” under conditions of oppression, whereby people’s 
public support for these regimes did not reflect their true attitudes and beliefs. As David Laitin 
notes, under such conditions of oppression “there can be long periods of quiet under conditions 
of profound enmity.”76 Joseph Rudolf puts the matter in a slightly different way when he notes 
“ethnic identity does not have to be persistently active to be politically significant.”77 
 
     Preference falsification reminds us that what appears to be a relatively stable equilibrium in 
multiethnic and multiconfessional states might not be quite so stable, especially given 
Klymicka’s observation stated above that “there seems to be no natural stopping-point to the 
demands for increasing self-government.”78 Klymicka’s argument was borne out in the Yugoslav 
case; as will be seen in Chapter IV, repeated rounds of de-centralization and governmental 
devolution in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s consistently led to even greater demands for de-
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centralization and devolution, ultimately culminating in proposals in 1990-91 that Yugoslavia 
become a confederation of independent states. If this reading of Yugoslavia’s post-1945 history 
is correct, then it proves the accuracy of Hudson Meadwell’s suggestion that the difference 
between calls for greater regionalization and outright independence might only be a result of a 
“strategic expression of preferences” in which “entrepreneurs take up regionalism or 
independence as circumstances warrant.”79 More recently, Erin K. Jenne has provided a related 
argument, claiming that ethnic minorities will tend to increase their demands from affirmative 
action policies to autonomy to outright secession depending upon their perceived bargaining 
power (frequently based on the degree of support they can obtain from outside powers).
80
 This 
argument is consistent with rational choice hypotheses suggesting that identification with a 
nominal state (i.e., not the nation-state to which the individual belongs) will be greater when a 
foreign power or military attack leads to calculations that the potential aggressor is a more 
serious threat than the regime in power.
81
 Given the right domestic and international strategic 
and political circumstances, demands for more regional autonomy can quickly escalate into 
demands for outright independence. As Anthony Smith notes, we should not  
distinguish too sharply between movements for outright secession and those which 
aim for more limited autonomy, whether a cultural autonomy or home rule. 
Secession movements have adopted a variety of strategies to suit their purposes and 
the prevailing political climate. In some cases, they have been content with control 
over their schools and courts and press . . . In other cases, they desire full internal 
control over their finances and political self-expression, but are content to remain 
within the framework of the wider 'nation-state' . . . In yet other cases, they opt for 
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separation, but if the political opposition proves insurmountable, are quite ready to 
accept an autonomist compromise. Since it is often genuinely difficult to be sure 
whether a given strategy represents a sincerely held belief or is only a tactic (and 
this may vary within the overall 'movement'), it seems wiser not to make too sharp a 




     An example of this can be seen in the case of Macedonia. According to Andrew Rossos, at the 
turn of the twentieth century Macedonian nationalists kept their options open regarding their 
ultimate political goals. Thus, 
Although they all sought the establishment of a Macedonian state—a “free 
Macedonia,” to use the most frequently employed term—statehood did not 
necessarily or always denote total independence. Many Macedonian spokesmen, 
conscious of the relative weakness of Macedonian nationalism and the comparative 
combined strength of its opposition, assumed a more pragmatic stance. They sought 
a place for a free or autonomous Macedonian state in a larger unit or supranational 
association: a Balkan federation, a Balkan socialist federation, a reorganized 
Ottoman Empire in the period before 1912, and a Balkan communist federation, a 





      Further support for the claim that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a chronic phenomenon is 
seen in the fact that there are seldom “solutions” to such problems; they are long-term structural 
problems built into the very nature of group structure and competition, and as such can be 
managed with greater or lesser degrees of success, but rarely eliminated altogether. Lake and 
Rothchild, for instance, note that they  
see no permanent solutions [to ethnic conflicts], only “temporary fixes.” In the 
end, ethnic groups are left without reliable safety nets. There is no form of 
insurance sufficient to protect against the dilemmas that produce collective fears 
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     Other studies have found that the age of a state (i.e., the length of the states existence) does 
not appear to be a factor in promoting pride and attachment to a state, at least amongst minority 
groups.
85
 All of these facts suggest that ethnoconfessionally divided societies in southeastern 
Europe are inherently brittle, and that, as Ivan Šiber has noted, although the intensity of social 
traumas and violence such as World War II will wax and wane over time, they will continue to 
have an impact on future generations—sometimes more, and sometimes less, depending on the 
degree of stability or crisis a society is undergoing at any particular moment in time.
86
 This 
supports the argument made by Van Evera that multiethnic societies become exceptionally 
threatened when states become weak, thereby reducing their ability to provide security 




    As the following micro-case studies of four efforts to create “greater” states in southeastern 
Europe will show, ethnoconfessional conflicts in the Balkans can accurately fall under the 
category of “never ending.” This makes it possible to support the claim that Balkan 
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Microcase Study I: “Greater Albania” 
     For the past 150 years, efforts to unite the Albanian populations of the southern and western 
Balkans have been a persistent feature of Balkan politics. The Balkan Wars of the 1990s have 
given this feature new momentum. As Christopher Hill, a former US ambassador to both Albania 
and Macedonia noted in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict in 1999, “We spent the 1990’s 
worrying about Greater Serbia. That’s finished. We are going to spend time well into the next 
century worrying about a Greater Albania.”88 
 
     The “League of Prizren” held in 1878, was an early manifestation of this effort. Those 
gathered at the Prizren meeting claimed large parts of modern-day Albania, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia for a future Albanian state that would be formed out of bits and pieces of the 
disintegrating Ottoman Empire. At the London Conference of Ambassadors in December 1912, 
Albanian activists called for the towns of Peć, Djakovica, Prizren, Mitrovica, Priština, Skopje 
and Monastir to be part of a new, compact, Albanian political unit,
89
 but their hopes were dashed 
when Serbia was granted control over these areas after the First and Second Balkan Wars in 
1912-1913. All of these towns were subsequently incorporated into the newly formed Kingdom 
of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in 1918. Kosovo political exiles, meanwhile, at this time formed a 
“Committee for the Defense of Kosovo,” the goal of which was to advocate for the creation of an 
independent Kosovo and the unification of all “Albanian lands” in the Balkans.”90 Unwilling to 
accept their incorporation into the new state, the Albanian population in Kosovo responded with 
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a large-scale uprising (the Kaçak rebellion), which kept parts of Kosovo in a state of “permanent 
revolt” in the early 1920s.91  
 
 
Territories claimed for “Greater Albania,” including all of Albania and Kosovo, as well as  
southern Montenegro, southwestern Serbia, western Macedonia, and the Greek territories known 
in Albanian as “Chameria.”  
 
     During World War II, a “Greater Albania” came into formal existence under Italian fascist 
and Nazi German sponsorship. Together, Mussolini and Hitler agreed that Albania would be 
allowed to annex most of Kosovo, large parts of Western Macedonia (from a line running from 
Lake Ohrid to Prizren), as well as the Montenegrin municipalities of Plav and Gusinje and some 
other Montenegrin territory on Lake Scutari. Albania also asked (unsuccessfully) to be awarded 
the city of Skopje as well. In September 1943, a “Second League of Prizren for the Defense of 
                                                        




Kosovo” was formed to lobby Hitler on behalf of the Kosovo Albanians.92 Traveling secretly 
through Albania and Kosovo at this time, a British Foreign Office official noted  
The question of the future status of Kosovo was one of a burning anxiety in the 
minds of all—even of people living a long way from Kosovo, people of such 
widely differing views as Enver Hoxha, Mustapha Gjinishi, Ymer Disnica. All 
agreed on the importance to Albania of a just settlement of the Kosovo problem—




     Significantly, the small group of Albanians who joined Tito’s partisan movement was just as 
intent on promoting unification between Albania and Kosovo as their collaborationist co-
nationals. In August 1943, in the middle of World War II, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
(CPY) sponsored a conference in the village of Bujan (near Djakovica) which subsequently 
became known as the Bujan Conference. The conference was attended by 49 communist 
representatives from both Albania and Yugoslavia, including 43 Albanians, 3 Serbs, and 3 
Montenegrins. As the conference’s conclusions noted, “Kosovo and the Plain of Dukagjin 
represent a territory largely inhabited by the Albanian people, which still today, as always, wish 
to unite with Albania.”94  
 
     The Axis’ defeat in World War II spelled the end of this attempt at forming a “Greater 
Albania.” Nevertheless, efforts on behalf of such an entity continued throughout the post-WWII 
period. In 1968, the first dramatic reminder of the problems Yugoslavia continued to face 
regarding its national question 
. . . took the form of widespread, apparently well-organised, and sometimes 
violent demonstrations by Albanians in the Kosovo Autonomous Province, 
significantly timed to coincide with neighboring Albania’s own National Day, on 
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November 27, and less than a week after the minority’s problems had had an 
unusually open airing at the 6
th
 Congress of the League of Communists of Serbia. 
Instead of being gratefully satisfied with the considerable increase in equality and 
personal security which they had enjoyed since the taming of the Province’s Serb-
dominated UDBa after July 1966, politicized strata of the rapidly growing 
minority, now nearly 1 million in number, were demanding more of the same and 
the transformation of their region into a seventh Yugoslav republic in which the 
Albanians, as the local majority, would in fact be politically dominant. The 
demonstrations in Kosovo and their echoes in western Macedonia, alarming in 
scale and in the context of historic Greater Albanian irredentism, also witnessed 
the return of the national question to center stage among Yugoslavia’s problems.95  
 
     Large-scale demonstrations in Kosovo in March 1981 again witnessed demands ranging from 
elevating Kosovo’s status from that of an autonomous province of Serbia to that of a fully-
fledged republic in the Yugoslav federation, to demands for outright independence and/or 
unification with Albania. Kosovo’s most famous dissident/political prisoner during this period, 
Adem Demaçi, was a well-known supporter of Albanian separatism and pan-Albanian 
unification, as was Rexhep Qosja, one of Albania’s leading intellectuals. Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, Albanian organizations throughout the region were coordinating their activities and 
planning on eventual unification. Thus, 
. . . documents from Albanian organizations outside Kosovo have shown that the 
unification of all those regions into one state had been prepared for quite some time 
and that such regions would be united with Albania, specifically within the ethnic 
boundaries claimed by the Albanian movement in 1913 . . . After all, the desire for 
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     During the 1980s-1990s, Albanian society in Kosovo developed a complete parallel system of 
education, health care, and local administration, culminating in an outright declaration of 
independence by the “Republic of Kosova” on 2 July 1990. The only state to recognize the 
Republic of Kosova was neighboring Albania, with the Albanian president at the time, Sali 
Berisha, promising to bring down “the Balkan Wall” separating Albania from Kosovo and unify 
the two Albanian entities.
97
 By June 1991, as the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia began, 
radical currents within Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) began calling 
for unification with Albania.
98
 On 26-30 September 1990, Kosovo Albanians organized an 
independence referendum in which some 89 percent of Kosovo’s Albanian voters reportedly cast 
ballots. 99% of those turning out voted in favor of independence.
99
 In 1992, Rugova warned that 
if the international community agreed to the partition of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo 




     Another key territorial component of the greater Albania project is the Preševo Valley, an 
area of southern Serbia adjoining Kosovo composed of three municipalities—Bujanovac, 
Medvedja, and Preševo. Altogether, some 70,000 Albanians live in the three municipalities, with 
90 percent of the population of Preševo municipality itself composed of ethnic Albanians, 54.2 
of Bujanovac municipality, and 30 percent of Medvedja. In March 1992, Albanians in the 
Preševo Valley held a referendum asking voters whether or not they supported gaining autonomy 
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within Serbia, and possible unification with Kosovo. Over 90 percent of the Albanian population 
in the Preševo Valley participated in the referendum, with reportedly more than 99 percent 




     The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s gave new impetus to efforts to create a greater 
Albanian political unit in the southern Balkans. In 1998, the Albanian Academy of Arts and 
Sciences issued a paper noting that “every Albanian, whether on this or that side of the border, 
within or outside the ethnic lands, desires a quick unification of [his] lands into one unique 
Albanian state as the Great Albanian Renaissance men of the last century put down in their 
programs.”102 In the same vein, one of Kosovo’s leading academics at the time, Rexhep Qosja, 
would note that “Albania has never accepted its existing borders and has always tried to remind 
international circles that these borders are unjust, dividing the Albanian land in two.”103 Pan-
Albanian unification was the express goal of the “Kosovo Liberation Army” (KLA) during this 
period, as noted by Jakup Krasniqi, the KLA’s spokesman.104 In 2002, a KLA-splinter group, the 
“Albanian National Army,” and its political wing, the “National Committee for the Liberation 
and Defense of Albanian Lands,” merged with the Tirana-based Party of National Unity to form 
the Albanian National Union Front, whose explicit agenda was the unification of all “Albanian 
lands” in the Balkans.105 Importantly, mainstream Albanian politicians (such as Sali Berisha and 
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Ibrahim Rugova, as noted above) endorsed such views, as further evidenced by the statement of 
Arben Imami, a member of Albania’s then ruling coalition, the Democratic Alliance, who 
announced that unification of Albania and Kosovo was one of his party’s goals.  
 
     Such explicit rhetoric, however, was subsequently tempered by more ambiguous language, as 
it became clear that international officials were not willing to tolerate continued instability in 
southeastern Europe on behalf of the greater Albanian cause. Thus, as Louis Sells (a US 
diplomat with considerable experience in southeastern Europe) pointed out, 
Kosovo Albanians have learned to talk the talk of international diplomacy. For 
now all of the Kosovo-Albanian leaders are prepared to renounce claims to union 
with their brethren in Macedonia and Albania. But how long the Albanians would 
be prepared to adhere to a separate existence is questionable. Albanians 
throughout the Balkans understand that union now is out of the question, but the 
1999 war caused a qualitative change in the relationship among all three elements 
of the Albanian body politic. Albanian political opinion has become more 
nationalistic, and Albanians across the Balkans now enjoy closer ties than at any 




     Albanian-populated parts of Vardar Macedonia are also part of various “Greater Albania” 
scenarios,
107
 and a specialist on Albanian issues in the Balkans has gone so far as to say that “the 
25 percent minority of Albanians living in Macedonia are among the most militant 
nationalists.”108 By the 1990s, the activities of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia were already 
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being coordinated, and demonstrations in Western Macedonia at this time called for 
independence of Albanian-populated areas of Macedonia, and slogans such as “We want Greater 
Albania” were frequently heard at such events.109 In September 1991, Macedonia’s Albanian 
population (variously estimated to account for between one-quarter to one-third of Macedonia’s 
population) boycotted the country’s independence referendum, a boycott which some observers 
have interpreted as suggesting that the Albanian population’s support for the country was 
questionable.
110
 On January 11-12, 1991, the two main ethnic Albanian political parties in 
Macedonia at the time, the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the People’s Democratic 
Party (NDP) organized a referendum in Albanian-populated areas which, according to different 
versions, either called for autonomy for Albanian-populated regions in Macedonia, collectively 
named “Illyria,” or their secession from the republic altogether. Over 90 percent of the Albanian 
electorate in these areas turned out for the referendum, of which 99 percent voted in favor of the 
proposed measures.
111
 By 2005, one public opinion survey conducted in the region showed that 




     Kosovo’s declaration of independence in February 2008 led to an increase in demands for 
autonomy by Albanian groups in both Macedonia and the Preševo Valley. In April 2009, the 
Albanian mayor of the Macedonian town of Gostivar, Rufi Osmani, publicly called for 
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Macedonia to be turned into a bi-national state.
113
 In June 2009, several Albanian politicians in 
Macedonia put forth a proposal to federalize the country.
114
 In August 2009, Albanians in the 
Preševo Valley proposed the formation of a separate political region within Serbia that would be 
composed of the Albanian-majority municipalities of Bujanovac, Medvedje, and Preševo.115 In 
August 2009, Albanian president Sali Berisha gave an interview in which he claimed that “The 
national unity idea is based on the European principles and ideals and needs a lot of efforts . . . 
the Kosovo PM, Hashim Thaci, and I will work towards removing all barriers that keep 
Albanians from feeling like a unity no matter where they live." Among the proposals Berisha put 
forth was the abolition of customs administration between Albania and Kosovo.
116
 On a visit to 
Albania in March 2011, the then president of Kosovo, Behget Pacolli, openly called for a 
unification of the two states.
117
 Popular support for a unification of Albania and Kosovo 
continues to be strong; thus, a February 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor survey in Albania and 
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Microcase Study II: Greater Bosnia 
     A constant in Bosnian Muslim politics for more than a century has been the effort to maintain 
Bosnia & Herzegovina as a distinct and coherent political entity, regardless of the larger political 
entity in which it was based. This was a cornerstone of the policies of Mehmed Spaho’s 
Yugoslav Muslim Organization (JMO) in the 1920s and 30s in interwar Yugoslavia. It was also 
the bottom line for Alija Izetbegović and the SDA in the negotiations over Yugoslavia’s future in 
1990-91, as well as more liberal Bosniacs such as Adil Zulfikarpašić.119  
 
     In some cases, this policy position in Bosnian Muslim politics has been more expansive and 
includes the Sandžak as well. In May 2009, for instance, the reis-ul-ulema of Bosnia’s Islamic 
Community, Mustafa ef. Cerić, told listeners that “there is no force in the world which will 
divide [Sarajevo] from the Sandžak . . . above all our spiritual, cultural, human, brotherly, 
cultural-civilizational, historical, and all other ties.”120 In August 2010, a representative of the 
Sandzak National Council called for the region to again be given the level of autonomy it 
enjoyed from 1943-45 (i.e., during World War II, when Tito’s Partisan Movement did not have 
control over large parts of the country), and justified this called based on the 1991 Sandzak 
referendum results noted above. In response to concerns that this would threaten the territorial 
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integrity of the Serbian state, the representative noted that this would only occur as a result of the 





Microcase Study III: Greater Croatia 
     In the 1980s, the Croatian sociologist Ivan Perić called nationalism in Croatia and throughout 
the former Yugoslavia “permanently extant in social currents.”122 As with the Serbs, the idea of 
an independent state, often coupled with the goal of a “Greater Croatia,” in various 
configurations, is a chronic feature in Croatian political thought.
123
 As a March 1945 pastoral 
letter by the Bishop’s Conference of Croatia stated (even as the Nazi-puppet “Independent State 
of Croatia” was on the verge of collapse), “History is the witness that the Croatian people 
through all its 1,300 years has never ceased to proclaim through plebiscites that it will never 
renounce the right to freedom and independence which every other nation desires.”124 
 
     An early example of ambitions to create a “Greater Croatia” could be seen in 1831, when 
Count Janko Drašković published his Disertacija which called for the unification of Croatia, 
Slavonia, and Dalmatia, as well as the Slovene areas of Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria. 
Drašković also demanded the return of the vojna krajina to his proposed new entity.125 In 
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subsequent years, perhaps the most important goal of Croatian nationalist ideology has been 
incorporating Bosnia & Herzegovina (in whole or in part) into some form of Croatian political 
unit. In 1894, both wings of the Croatian political spectrum, the obzoraši gathered around 
Strossmayer and Rački, and the pravaši of Ante Starčević, agreed on a platform to unite all the 
“Croat lands,” defined as Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Istria, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Medjimurje, 
Rijeka, and, ultimately, Slovene territories as well.
126
 In 1900, the Catholic archbishop of 
Sarajevo, Josip Stadler, was publicly rebuked by Emperor Francis Joseph II for stating that 
Bosnia & Herzegovina should be united to “the Croatian motherland.”127 Towards this end, 
Stadler was in favor of building a Croatian Catholic clericalist movement that would support 
Trialism in the Habsburg Monarchy, and thus unite Bosnia & Herzegovina with Croatia 
proper.
128
 By 1908, Stjepan Radić had similarly begun to support the idea that Bosnia & 




     After the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, in 1921 Radić’s 
Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) called for the creation of a neutral Croatian peasant’s republic 
within Yugoslavia, with Croat-populated areas of Bosnia & Herzegovina joining the Croatian 
republic if so decided by plebiscite. By the 1930s, some HSS leaders were suggesting that parts 
of Vojvodina (e.g., the area bounded by Subotica-Sombor-Bačka Palanka-Ilok) be incorporated 
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into a Croatian entity as well.
130
 After Radić’s assassination in 1926, his successor as leader of 
the HSS, Vladko Maček, adopted a maximalist negotiating position of demanding two-thirds of 
Bosnia & Herzegovina for this project, and a minimalist position of accepting only BiH territory 
west of the Vrbas River.
131
 The Cvetković-Maček sporazum of 1939 formally made much of 
both Bosnia & Herzegovina part of the Croatian banovina in interwar Yugoslavia. Thus, Bosnian 
towns such as Brčko, Derventa, Gradačac, Fojnica, and Travnik were all incorporated into the 
Croatian banovina.  
 
     In 1941, Bosnia & Herzegovina in its entirety, as well as Croat-populated parts of Vojvodina, 
were incorporated into the so-called “Independent State of Croatia,” (Nezavisna Država 
Hrvatska, or NDH) led by an extreme nationalist organization, the Ustaša. As is typical for such 
extreme movements, one of the Ustaša goals was creating an ethnically homogenous territory; 
thus, as the NDH foreign minister Mladen Lorković noted in May 1941, 
. . . the Croatian nation needs to be cleansed from all the elements which are a 
misfortune for that nation, who are alien and foreign in that nation, who melt 
down the healthy strength of that nation, who for decades have pushing that 




   In the immediate aftermath of World War II, members of the Croatian Communist Party such 
as Andrija Hebrang again called for the inclusion of parts of Vojvodina into the Croatian unit of 
Tito’s postwar federation; thus, according to Milovan Djilas’, “The war had hardly ended when 
[Hebrang] began to speak out in his circle, narrow as it was, arguing for the Croatian borders 
                                                        
130 See Djokić, Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia, 51, 96. 
131 See Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, 488. 
132 As cited by Tomislav Dulić, “Ethnic Violence in Occupied Yugoslavia: Mass Killing from Above and Below,” in 
Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay, eds., New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies 




with Serbia as they had existed in Austria-Hungary before 1918 . . . ‘The border of Croatia is 
known,’ thundered Hebrang, unappeased and belligerent. ‘It extends to the town of Zemun, right 
across the Sava from Belgrade’!”133  
 
     In the late 1960s-early 1970s, during the mass popular movement known as the Croatian 
Spring, Croat nationalists again called for parts of Western Herzegovina to be detached from 
Bosnia & Herzegovina and joined with Croatia. During this time, Ustaša units began to form in 
Western Herzegovina and sporadic attacks on government institutions, arms depots, party officials, 
and local Serb villages were carried out. By the late 1970s, the Ustaša organization throughout 
Bosnia & Herzegovina allegedly numbered several thousand men.
134
 Concurrently, the territory of 
the sporazum “was the object of Croatian nationalist demands in 1971 and again in 1992, when 
Hercegovinian Croats proclaimed the “Republic of Herceg-Bosna” and received military backing 
from the regime in Zagreb.”135 Franjo Tudjman (elected president of Croatia in 1990) was at this 
time promoting the Cvetković-Maček sporazum as the ideal solution for the Croat-Serb problem 
with the Serbian writer Dobrica Čosić, and arguing that Croatia’s “natural” borders follow the 




                                                        
133 See Milovan Djilas, Rise and Fall, 99. It bears mentioning here that more than sixty years after these events, the 
HDZ nominated Hebrang’s son to be their party’s presidential candidate in Croatia’s December 2009 presidential 
elections. Hebrang Jr. is considered one of the current HDZ’s most hardline nationalist members.  
134 See Mart Bax, Medjugorje: Religion, Politics, and Violence in Rural Bosnia (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1995), 
105. 
135 Donia and Fine, Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 132. Some Croat nationalists demanded parts of 
Montenegro as well. See Dragović-Soso, Saviours of the Nation, 42. 




     Tito’s death in 1980 sparked an intense debate amongst Croat nationalists as to the prospects 
for the emergence of an independent Croat state, and the conditions under which such a state 
might come about. In an uncannily prophetic analysis by Mate Meštrović published in 1980 (i.e. 
eleven years before the disintegration of Yugoslavia), he laid out the following:  
What kind of changes will occur in Yugoslavia depends first on the internal 
situation and the relation of patriotic forces. Outside factors, such as the Soviet 
Union, Bulgaria, America, Western Europe, will not begin to get significantly 
involved up until internal political quakes and changes do not begin. If it were 
shown in a crisis situation that the existing status quo cannot be maintained any 
longer, Washington would in a very short time change its position regarding the 
maintenance of Yugoslavia’s national and state ‘unity’.”137 
 
     During the most recent conflict in Bosnia in the 1990s, similar ideas were again revived. At 
the founding congress of Tudjman’s Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ) in 1990, for 
instance, Tudjman claimed that the Muslims of Bosnia & Herzegovina were “a constituent part 
of the Croatian national body (korpus).”138 Implicit in Tudjman’s claim that BiH’s Bosniac 
population was Croat, of course, was the belief that the territory of Bosnia & Herzegovina 
belonged to Croatia as well. This was further evident in the formation of the HDZ’s BiH branch, 
which, according to the party’s statutes (Article 4) was a part of a united HDZ organization in 
both Croatia and BiH.  
                                                        
137 See Meštrović, “Mi sami smo temelj—Na nama treba graditi državu,” Hrvatska Revija 3 (1980), 349, as quoted 
by Perić, Suvremeni hrvatski nacionalizam, 57. Emphasis added. The article’s title in translation is “We ourselves 
are the foundation—the state should be built on us.” Perić goes on to point (p. 58) out that the Croat nationalist 
émigrés even at this relatively early date recognized the importance of using Croatian communist dissidents (such as 
Franjo Tudjman) outside of Yugoslavia to show the country’s state of crisis and instability. It should be pointed out 
that Mate Meštrović was a major figure on the Croatian émigré political scene. His father was the famous Croatian 
sculptor, Ivan Meštrović. For a time, he led the Croatian Academy of America, and from 1982-1990 was president 
of the Croatian National Council, an umbrella group of Croatian émigré organizations in the United States. From 
1993-1997, Meštrović served as a deputy in the Croatian parliament. In the 1980s he had helped publish Franjo 
Tudjman’s book, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe, in the United States. 
138 See Cvitković, Hrvatski identitet u Bosni i Hercegovini, 140. The claim that the Muslims of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina were in reality “Croats of the Islamic faith” had of course been an Ustaša thesis that Ante Pavelić 
himself had proposed in the lead article of the first issue of the Ustaša ideological weekly Spremnost. See 




     Attempts to incorporate parts of BiH into Croatia proper were visible even before Croatia 
declared its independence from Yugoslavia on 21 June 1991, according to reports of a meeting 
between Croat leaders from Herzegovina and Central Bosnia in Zagreb on 13-14 June 1991 with 
Croatian president Franjo Tudjman.
139
 The Croat para-state of “The Croat Community Herceg-
Bosna” (hereafter, HZ H-B) was officially proclaimed in the Herzegovinian town of Grude on 18 
December 1991. The minutes of the second session of the presidency of the HZ H-B (held on 23 
December 1991, and attended by members of the presidency of the HDZ BiH and Croat 
representatives in the BiH parliament) noted the following:  
2. The Croat Community Herceg-Bosna once again confirms the will of the entire 
Croat people of Herceg-Bosna, expressed on 18 December 1991 in Grude, 
[which], in bringing the historical decision to create the HZ H-B, represents the 
legal foundation for bringing these territories into the Republic of Croatia. 3. The 
HZ H-B gives full legitimacy to Dr. Franjo Tudjman, as president of the Republic 
of Croatia and president of the HDZ, to represent the interests of the HZ H-B 
before international officials, as well as at inter-party and inter-republican 
negotiations over determining the final borders of the Republic of Croatia. 
 
     Thus, while the Tudjman government did not publicly lay claim to Herceg-Bosna, in reality 
the creation of this entity was a prelude to formal annexation, if and when the international 
community formally recognized the disintegration of BiH.
140
 
                                                        
139 See the translated reprint of a report that ran in Feral Tribune (Split), as published by Bosnia Report, November-
December 1997, available at: http://www.bosnia.org.uk/bosrep/report_format.cfm?articleID=2910&reportid=119 
Accessed on 11 August 2010 at: 3:02pm EST.  
140 This is one of the most important but little known aspects of the Bosnian tragedy. Conventional accounts of 
BiH’s March 1992 independence referendum claim that a majority of BiH’s citizens voted for independence. While 
technically correct, this interpretation obscures more than it reveals. In fact, according to former leaders of the HDZ-
BiH themselves, such as Stejpan Kljuić from the pro-Bosnian faction of the HDZ-BiH, and Jadranko Prlić (Prime 
Minister of Herceg-Bosna, 1992-96; Foreign Minister of BiH, 1996-2001) and Vladimir Šoljić (Herceg-Bosna 
Defense Minister, 1992-95; President of the Federation of BiH, 1997), from the pro-Zagreb, Herzegovinian faction 
of the HDZ-BiH, Croats in BiH were really voting for two things—first, Bosnia & Herzegovina’s secession from 
Yugoslavia as a necessary first step to Herceg-Bosna’s own secession from Bosnia & Herzegovina, and second, to 
help strengthen Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia. (Author’s interview with Jadranko Prlić and Vladimir Šoljić, 
Zagreb, 2003). Before the March 1992 referendum, for instance, the HDZ-Croatia had tried to change the 
formulation of the referendum question, having it ask merely whether citizens supported BiH’s secession from 
Yugoslavia. Franjo Tudjman himself would tell members of the HDZ BiH’s presidency at a meeting in Zagreb in 
December 1991 that “Just as we took advantage of this historical moment to create an independent, internationally-




The Banovina of Croatia, 1939 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
in the maximally-greatest possible borders.” At this same meeting, an HDZ BiH official from central Bosnia, Dario 
Kordić, would note “For six months we have been bloodily developing our idea from June 13-20th [1991] which you 
have expressed to us here . . . the Croat people in the Travnik regional, subregional community, lives with the idea 
of its ultimate annexation to the Croatian state and is ready to achieve this through all means, and the Croatian spirit 
is simmering in the young men.” On these issues, see Ivo Komšić, “Ustavnopravni Položaj Hrvata nakon Daytona—
Kontinuitet Depolitizacije,” in Ivan Markešić, ed., Hrvati u BiH: Ustavni Položaj, Kulturni Razvoj i Nacionalni 
Identitet (Zagreb: Centar za Demociju Miko Tripalo, 2010), 7-21. From 1991-1995, Komšić was a member of BiH 
collective state presidency, and in 1993 had founded the Croatian Peasant’s Party of BiH. For the most serious 
analysis of the constitutional illegality of the March 1992 referendum, see Robert Hayden, Blueprints for a House 
Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 





Banovina of Croatia according to the Cvetković-Maček sporazum of 1939. Note that large parts 






     The Washington Agreement of 1994 formally allowed for a “special parallel relationship” 
between Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia. In the post-Dayton period, efforts to resurrect 
“Herceg-Bosna” or create a third, Croat entity in the country have been a consistent theme in 
Bosnian Croat politics. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Croat public opinion in BiH 




elections, one survey reported that 89% of Croats in BiH believed their future lay more with 




     The casual observer driving through Croat-controlled territory in 1996-97 would have been 
hard-pressed to recognize that they were in fact in Bosnia & Herzegovina. On the roads, cars 
drove with license plates almost identical to those in Croatia proper. In stores, the preferred 
medium of exchange was the Croatian kuna (along with the ubiquitous Deutsche Mark). 
Newsstands sold Croatian publications. Zagreb stations fill local TV screens. People in Ljubuški 
or Široki Brijeg called Zagreb without dialing the country code for Croatia. HDZ political 
gatherings and campaign rallies in places such as Kiseljak or Tomislav Grad began with the 
Croatian national anthem. Residents of those areas voted in Croatian elections and travelled 
abroad with Croatian passports. High-ranking Croat officials in the Bosniac-Croat Federation sat 
in the Croatian parliament. Young lovelies from central Bosnia and western Herzegovina 
competed in the Miss Croatia beauty pageant. On the roadsides were giant billboards of Franjo 
Tudjman promoting the HDZ. Police and military personnel wore the insignia of the “Croatian 
Republic of Herceg-Bosna.” A popular HDZ campaign billboard seen throughout Herceg-Bosna 
during this period read as follows: 
Srušili smo JNA. 
Razbili smo Jugoslaviju. 
Oterali smo četnike. 
I naravno da će te da glasujete za nas--HDZ.142 
 
                                                        
141 Cited in Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 9 August 1996, 7. 
142 The translation reads: "We destroyed the JNA [i.e., the “Yugoslav People’s Army”]. We broke up Yugoslavia. 




     Thus, while in theory Croat-populated areas were parts of the Bosniac-Croat Federation, in 
reality, throughout the post-Dayton period Herceg-Bosna tottered between being the unofficial 
third entity in Bosnia & Herzegovina and de facto annexation by Croatia proper. 
 
     On 19 December 1996, the Croat member of BiH’s collective state presidency, Krešimir 
Zubak, announced that Herceg-Bosna had ceased to exist two days earlier, and that all 
documents, stamps, and stationary with Herceg-Bosna insignia and symbols would be taken out 
of use.
143
 Within a few weeks, however, Croat officials were already alluding to its resurrection 
in another form. On 27 January 1997, for instance, HDZ--B-H President Božo Rajić proposed 
that all Croatian organizations in Bosnia & Herzegovina form a "Croat Community of Herceg-
Bosna" which would reportedly be a form of political and cultural organization for B-H 
Croats.
144
 Rajić would later explain the Croat refusal to disband Herceg-Bosna as a result of the 
fact that the Bosniacs had monopolized Bosnia & Herzegovina’s diplomatic representation 
abroad (and, importantly, at The Hague Tribunal), and the formerly common radio, TV, and 
cultural, scientific, and sports associations. Even more threatening, from the Croat perspective, 
was the formation of the SDA's secret intelligence service, AID. These moves, according to 
Rajić, left the Croats no choice but to form their own organizations.145  
 
                                                        
143 OMRI Daily Digest, 20 December 1996. This was in accord with an agreement reached to have the Bosniacs 
transfer Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina functions and authorities to the Federation. 
144 OMRI Daily Digest, 28 January 1997. Plans for replacing the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna with the 
Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna had been around for several months; for instance, immediately after the 
August 1990 agreement to disband Herceg-Bosna, Ivan Bender had proposed the creation of the "Croatian 
Community of Herceg-Bosna." OMRI Daily Digest, 3 September 1996.  




     In November 2000, in parallel with official state elections in BiH, the HZ-HB held an 
unofficial referendum in which voters were asked whether “Croats should have their own 
political, educational, scientific, cultural and other institutions on the entire territory of BiH.” 
The results of the referendum reportedly showed that of the 70 percent of Croat voters in BiH 
who cast a ballot, 99 percent approved.
146
 Subsequently, the Croat National Assembly held in 
Mostar on 3 March 2001 called for the formation of a Croat third entity in BiH, which many 
observers saw as a resurrection of Herceg Bosna. Even as of 2010, the issue is still being debated 
in Bosnian Croat political circles.  
 
Microcase study IV: “Greater Serbia” 
     The origins of the concept of “Greater Serbia” are frequently attributed to Ilija Garašanin, the 
foreign minister of the Principality of Serbia, who in his 1844 Načertanije (Memorandum) laid 
out a plan in which Serbia would conduct a campaign to re-construct the medieval Serbian 
empire. Even before Garašanin, however, in 1809, the leader of the First Serbian Insurrection, 
Karadjordje (Black George) Petrović had sent a letter to the French vice-consul in Bucharest 
asking for support for Serb efforts against the Ottomans. In passing along his regards to 
Napoleon, Karadjordje wrote, 
The Serbians reassure his Imperial and Royal Majesty that their compatriots, the 
inhabitants of Bosnia and of the duchy of Herzegovina, and those who live in the 
kingdom of Hungary, not excepting the Bulgarians who derive, so to speak, from 
the same branch, will follow their example at the first move which is made.
147
 
                                                        
146 See Florian Bieber, “Croat Self-Government in Bosnia: A Challenge for Dayton?” European Centre for Minority 
Issues Brief #5 (May 2001), 2. 
147 Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 212. Indeed, at Rothenberg points out, many of the Orthodox Grenzer in the 
Croatian vojna krajina were eager to cross the Sava river and join Karadjordje’s rebellion. As one Habsburg report at 
the time noted, “numerous confidential reports indicate a most dangerous disposition among the non-Uniat Greeks.” 
See Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881, 105. This is an important point, because it points to the 
weakness of arguments claiming that the Orthodox population in Bosnia did not have any sense of ethnic identity at 





     Karadjordje’s confidence in the Serb consciousness of the Orthodox populations scattered 
throughout Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Pannonian plains reveals the belief that regardless of 
whose political jurisdiction a group of people fell under, their collective consciousness and sense 
of identity would compel them to join in a Balkan-wide struggle against the Turks. Indeed, at the 
beginning of the 1804 Serb revolt, the Serbs of eastern Herzegovina urged the Montenegrin 
Prince-Bishop Peter I to join in the action.
148
 Almost seven decades later, in the midst of the 
Eastern Crisis of the 1870s, the leaders of the Serb revolt in Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1876 
issued what has become known as the "Unification Proclamation":  
After so much waiting and without hope for any type of help, we resolve that 
from today we forever break with the non-Christian rule of Constantinople, and 
desiring to share our fate with our Serb brothers . . . proclaim that we are uniting 




     During the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Kosovo Serbs sent an appeal to the delegates asking 
that Kosovo be united with Kingdom of Serbia.
150
 In Croatia-Slavonia at this time, the Serb 
Independents (the most important Serb political party in the Habsburg Monarchy at the time) 
sought the unification of all “Serb lands” with Serbia.151 In the closing months of World War I, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
to be Serb, the Orthodox population in Croatia apparently did as well (at least if their willingness to join 
Karadjordje’s insurrection is any indication of their ethnoconfessional identities and loyalties), and yet the Orthodox 
population in Bosnia & Herzegovina allegedly did not. The reference to “non-Uniat Greeks” also reminds us that the 
unwillingness to grant a group its own ethnoconfessional identity is often more a product of the observer’s 
prejudices than of historical reality.    
148 Vladimir Čorović, Bosna i Hercegovina (Banja Luka: Glas Srpski, 1999), 206. 
149 "The Unification Proclamation" of 1876, as quoted by Nebojša Radmanović in Krajiški Vojnik (Banja Luka), 28 
June 1997, 34.  
150 Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 45. 




the Serbs of the Bihać region would again call for unification with Serbia,152 as did Serb 
municipalities in Vojvodina.
153
  In the aftermath of the 1939 Cvetković-Maček sporazum which 
created a separate Croat banovina (composed of Croatia-proper, Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Croat-
populated parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina), “the Serbs began to unite around calls for a Serbian 
banovina, which, they argued, should include Serb-populated areas of the newly established 
autonomous Croatia” and “virtually all Serbs argued that Bosnia should be part of a future 
Serbian banovina.”154  
 
                                                        
152 Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia, 131. Nikola Pašić would claim at this time that “a Serb, no matter 
where he lived, wishes to unite with Serbia, without asking about its internal organization.” As cited by Banac, The 
National Question in Yugoslavia, 166. 
153 Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 35.  
154 Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 222, 235. Emphasis added. As Djokić points out (p. 241), various Serb groups from 
Mostar in Herzegovina to Glina in Croatia proper began to organize efforts to secede from the Croatian banovina at 





A map of territories claimed for “Greater Serbia” in 1941, including large parts of present-day 
Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Available at: 
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3f/Homogena_Srbija.gif 
 
     The historical pattern of Serbs west of the Drina River exploiting instability and state 
disintegration to unify with Serbia proper was again reproduced in the wars of the 1990s. In 
August 1990, a referendum in the Krajina region of Croatia was organized in which the almost 
exclusively Serb population was asked whether they approved of Serb “sovereignty and 
autonomy” within Croatia. Some 99.7% of respondents answered affirmatively, although the 
Zagreb government declared the referendum invalid and illegal. As the situation in Croatia 




Autonomous Oblast (SAO) of Krajina” was declared, and an SAO Western Slavonia and SAO of 
Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem soon followed. On 16 March 1991, residents of the Krajina 
were asked in a new referendum "Are you in favour of the SAO Krajina joining the Republic of 
Serbia and staying in Yugoslavia with Serbia, Montenegro and others who wish to preserve 
Yugoslavia?" to which 99.8% of those participating in the referendum reportedly answered yes. 
With these results in hand, the Assembly of the SAO Krajina issued a declaration proclaiming 
that "the territory of the SAO Krajina is a constitutive part of the unified state territory of the 
Republic of Serbia." On 19 December 1991, the SAO Krajina proclaimed itself the “Republic of 
Serb Krajina,” to which on 26 February 1992, the SAO’s of Western Slavonia and Slavonia, 
Baranja and Western Srem acceded. The Republika Srpska Krajina had an unhappy and short 
existence, however, and essentially ceased to exist in August 1995, when, during the Croatian 
military operation known as Operation Storm, tens of thousands of Serbs fled the region.  
 
 





      The denouement of the Bosnian Serb story was somewhat different. On 24 October 1991, 
Serb deputies in the parliament of Bosnia & Herzegovina proclaimed an “Assembly of the Serb 
People of Bosnia & Herzegovina,” and on 9 January 1992 this body proclaimed the “Republic of 
the Serb People of Bosnia & Herzegovina.” On 12 August 1992, the name “Republika Srpska” 
was officially adopted. Republika Srpska was granted legal recognition in the November 1995 
Dayton Peace Accords, and given the right to have a “special parallel relationship” with Serbia 
proper. Throughout the post-Dayton period, by large majorities Serbs in the Republika Srpska 




                                                        
155 For example, a public opinion survey conducted by Agencija Partner Marketing of Banja Luka in mid-September 
2005 asked 850 participants of legal voting age in a representative sample the following question: “Should 
Republika Srpska secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina and join Serbia if Kosovo is granted independence?” The results 
are as follows: 
Completely agree:  54.1 percent 
Generally agree:   21.6 percent 
Generally do not agree:  8.2 percent 
Do not agree at all:  6.2 percent 
Do not know/refuse to answer: 9.8 percent 
As can be seen from the above, 75.7 percent of RS respondents either agreed to some measure with the proposition 
that the RS should secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina and join Serbia if Kosovo became independent.  
The results of this survey become more ethnically-uniform, however, when one takes into account the fact that 
according to 2005 estimates, 88.4 percent of the RS population is Serb, while 11.6 percent is estimated to be either 
Bosniac or Croat. Thus, were the survey to have been broken down along ethnic lines, it is highly likely that 
“Generally do not agree” or “Do not agree at all responses” would have come mainly from Bosniaks and Croats. 
Conversely, it is safe to assume that over 80 percent of Serb respondents would have answered either “Completely 
agree” or “Generally agree.” 
What is also noteworthy about this survey is that there are fairly consistent attitudes towards this question regardless 
of age. 81 percent of respondents aged 29-45 agreed with the above proposition, 77 percent of respondents 46-59 
agreed, while for older respondents (60 and above; i.e., those with more experience of the former Yugoslavia), 





Republika Srpska (according to the Dayton Peace Accords) 
 
     Public statements by officials in both Serbia proper and the RS reflect similar sentiments. For 
instance, in September 2002, the-then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Vojislav 
Koštunica, claimed that the RS was “a part of the family that is dear to us, near, temporarily split 
off, but always in our heart.”156 In a similar vein, in an interview in 2009, the then prime-minister 
of the RS, Milorad Dodik, noted 
I accept the Dayton agreement and Bosnia as such. But in terms of sentiment, it's 
natural that we Serbs think of Serbia as our homeland, and that we feel Serbia is 
part of us, much more than Bosnia-Herzegovina. We accept Bosnia because we 
must, and because it is part of the agreement we signed. But that agreement says 
nothing about love, and if we're talking about love, it's an intimate feeling and I 
have the right to feel the way I do. In other words, we will continue to support the 
Serbian football team, just as I rooted for Novak Djokovic in the finals in 
                                                        
156 As quoted by Sabrina Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005 




Monaco, and just as I celebrate every victory by [Belgrade's] FC Partizan. No one 
can deny me that right, because it's what I love.
157
   
 
    Finally, one can also point out to efforts of Serbs in the Pannonian plains to achieve as large a 
measure of self-government as possible under the Habsburgs. On November 18, 1849, for 
instance, the Habsburgs created a “Duchy of Serbia and Temeš Banat” which, while not creating 
a separate federal territorial unit, did grant local Serbs a distinct administrative unit with 
significant church and school autonomy. Hungarian resistance to such autonomy led to its 
revocation in 1860, but popular pressure again forced Hungarian authorities to re-establish some 
degree of local self-government for the Vojvodina Serbs in 1868, until such privileges were 
again abolished in 1912.
158
 In late November 1918, Serbian municipalities in both Vojvodina and 




     In concluding the discussion of the chronic nature of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism, it 
is important to place a limitation on the term “chronic.” As George and Bennett have noted, 
“there are no immutable foundational truths in social life. Thus, most social generalizations are 
necessarily contingent and time-bound, or conditioned by ideas and institutions that hold only for 
finite periods . . . “160 Similarly, Maria Todorova has argued that  
. . . legacies are not perennial, let alone primordial. Any reification of their 
characteristics along immobile and unreformable civilisational fault lines cannot 
be a legitimate working hypothesis for historically minded humanists. Thinking in 
                                                        
157 See “Milorad Dodik: One Foot in Bosnia, but his Heart in Serbia,” available at: 
http://www.rferl.org/content/Milorad_Dodik__One_Foot_In_Bosnia_But_His_Heart_In_Serbia/1617635.html 
Accessed on 28 July 2010 at: 4:21pm EST.  
158 See Ana S. Trbovic, “Nation-building under the Austro-Hungarian Sceptre: Croato-Serb Antagonism and 
Cooperation,” Balcanica XXXVII (2006), 202. 
159 Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 35. 




terms of historical legacies, with their simultaneity and overlapping, and with 





    Accepting these reservations, the point here is not to argue that ethnoconfessional nationalism 
in the Balkans has been (and always will be) collective, chronic, and non-economic; however, it 
is to argue that over the past approximately 200 years, these are the traits that characterize it, and 
as of yet there is little sign of significant change in this regard in the foreseeable future.  
 
IV. Ethnoconfessional Nationalism as a Non-Economic Phenomenon 
     The collective and chronic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism, along with the ubiquity of 
nationalism in general, suggests that it is a sentiment or ideology qualitatively different from 
ordinary party politics. Many scholars consider nationalism to be a non-rational phenomenon—a 
phenomenon based more on emotional, psychological, and sentimental loyalties and attachments 
than on decision-making based on economic or material costs and benefits.
162
 Rupert Emerson, 
for instance, claimed that “nationalism, like other profound emotions such as love and hate, is 
more than the sum of the parts which are susceptible of cold and rational analysis.”163 Ivo Banac 
                                                        
161 See Todorova, “Learning Memory, Remembering Identity,” in Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory, Maria 
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has argued that "some of the aspects [of the emotional side of nationhood] are of a sacred or 
privileged character that defy ordinary analysis."
164
 For Clifford Geertz   
. . . congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, 
and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to 
one’s kinsman, one’s neighbor, one’s fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result not 
merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred 
obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute 
import attributed to the very tie itself . . . for virtually every person, in every 
society, at almost all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of 
natural—some would say spiritual—affinity than from social interaction.165 
 
     Importantly, even theorists who see nationalism as an essentially political activity concede 
that as an expression of deeper human emotional needs, it is ultimately non-rational, and, 
consequently, a tremendously difficult, if not impossible, phenomenon for social scientists to 
deal with. Thus, as John Breuilly concedes, 
People do yearn for communal membership, do have a strong sense of us and 
them, of territories and homelands, of belonging to culturally defined and 
bounded worlds which give their lives meaning. Ultimately much of this is beyond 




     Adopting the premise that ethnoconfessional nationalism is a phenomenon defying the use of 
ordinary cost-benefit, material or economic analysis carries with it important implications. The 
most important of these is that it should be wrong to assume that manifestations of 
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ethnoconfessional nationalism can always (or exclusively) be reduced to economistic or 
materialistic motives on the part of cost-benefit maximizing individuals. As Anthony Smith 
argues, the “irreducible ethnopsychological element in nations and nationalism means that 
rational explanations for these phenomenon always miss the point. Economic or political 
explanations in terms of state power and institutions, or individualistic rational choice theories of 
the strategic manipulations of the intelligentsia, must by their very nature fail to ‘reflect the 
emotional depth of national identity’, and the love, hatred and self-sacrifice it inspires.”167 Smith 
also notes that  
. . . we have to concede that, in the last analysis, there remain ‘non-rational’ 
elements of explosive power and tenacity in the structure of nations and the 
outlook and myth of nationalism . . . The conflicts that embitter the geo-politics of 
our planet often betray deeper roots than a clash of economic interests and 
political calculations would suggest, and many of these conflicts, and perhaps the 
most bitter and protracted, stem from just these underlying non-rational 
elements.”168 
 
     Recent Balkan history is replete with evidence that much of the decision-making by both 
elites and the general public is not based on standard “rational” determinations as defined by 
Russell Hardin, who takes “rationality” to mean having “narrowly self-interested intentions.”169 
Importantly, understanding ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans in this way helps to 
explain the second of the fundamental puzzles de Figueredo and Weingast pose about the 
ethnification of politics, i.e., why individuals and groups engage in such conflicts when 
cooperation has much greater economic payoffs than conflict and violence.
170
 Understood as a 
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non-economic phenomenon, therefore, ethnoconfessional nationalism is about much more than 
group struggles for economic resources. In the Yugoslav case, for instance, it is difficult to 
sustain the argument that a desire for economic gain was driving many of the group demands for 
sovereignty and/or independence; as Rodney Hall notes “One might argue that Slovenia was 
sufficiently economically better off than its former Yugoslav partners to rationally seek 
separation from Yugoslavia, but could a Bosnian Serb republic governed from Pale be 
economically viable?”171 Similarly, Stuart J. Kaufman has observed that,  
. . . if the root of Yugoslavia’s problem was economic, no one could have 
considered that a rational solution was a war that would sever economic ties 
between different parts of the country, provoke international economic sanctions 
against some areas while other areas were bombed to rubble, promote massive 
looting, and destroy the rule of law that made normal economic life possible. If 
different regions could not agree on an economic policy, they could have 
amicably split, as the Czech Republic and Slovakia did. All would have been 
better off economically had they done so.
 172
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     While Kaufman misses the many differences between the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak cases, 
he does make an important point when noting that political leaders who were thinking in 
economically rational terms would not have adopted the policies that they did. 
 
     The claim that ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans is a non-economic phenomenon 
can be demonstrated by looking at six historical and contemporary cases in which the cause for 
ethnoconfessional mobilization and action is unclear, or contrary to economically rational 
courses of action. 
 
1) The Croatian Spring: The first example comes with the Croatian national movement of the 
late 1960s-early 1970s, which followed upon a decade in which Croatia experienced rapid 
economic growth.
173
 Yet it was precisely during this most economically successful decade of 
Yugoslavia’s existence that the country experienced the most political and social turmoil: the 
Croatian Spring, demonstrations and riots in Belgrade and Kosovo, the Ranković affair, etc.174 In 
fact, during the Croatian Spring, even communists—whom one would suspect of adhering to the 
view that class distinctions were more important than national distinctions—would claim, as did 
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the then leader of the League of Communists of Croatia, Miko Tripalo, that “national and class 
interests were the same as nation and class had become identical.”175 
 
2) Kosovo Albanian nationalism: Kosovo Albanian dissatisfaction with the Yugoslav state in the 
early 1980s (i.e., before Milošević came to power) provides another example of the non-
economic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism. In the 1980s, for instance, Branko Horvat, 
perhaps postwar Yugoslavia’s most important economist, wrote a book entitled “Kosovsko 
Pitanje” (“The Kosovo Question”) in which he categorically stated that the Kosovo issue could 




     After the late 1960’s, Kosovo for all intents and purposes became an Albanian-governed 
province within Yugoslavia with rights that were essentially equal to those of the other Yugoslav 
republics. Kosovo also enjoyed the benefits of large revenue-transfers from the other 
republics.
177
 Kosovo Albanians were represented at the highest levels of the Yugoslav state and 
party; for instance, in 1984-85, the president of the presidium of the League of Yugoslav 
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Communists was Ali Shukrija, and in 1986-87, the president of Yugoslavia was Sinan Hasani. 
This was at a time, moreover, when Albanians in both neighboring Albania proper and in 
Macedonia were politically and economically much worse off than those in Kosovo. In Albania 
during this period, for instance, the political and cultural repression people faced were such that 
citizens were not allowed to own cars or play tennis (considered a bourgeois sport), and in 1975 
the Hoxha regime decided that people with “inappropriate names or offensive surnames from a 
political, ideological and moral viewpoint [were] obliged to change them.”178  
 
    Moreover, given the Yugoslav state’s overwhelming advantage in terms of military resources 
and international legitimacy, any violent attempt to gain independence could only lead to 
immense losses for the Albanian side. In sum, rational economic explanations cannot 
satisfactorily account for Kosovo Albanian nationalism at this time; by almost any measure, in 
economic terms, Kosovo was better off as a part of Yugoslavia than as an independent entity, yet 





3) Croatian-Slovenian territorial dispute: A third example can be found in the contemporary 
dispute (which in fact goes back to the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991) between Croatia and 
Slovenia over the demarcation of their common land and maritime borders. The land dispute 
essentially concerns whether or not to move the border a few hundred meters in one direction or 
the other. The maritime dispute concerns where to draw the borders in the Bay of Piran. Slovenia 
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insists on drawing the line so that it has access to international waters in the Adriatic Sea; Croatia 
insists on the more standard international practice of allowing states to claim as their maritime 
border a certain number of kilometers from their shoreline. Apart from the legal arguments 
involved in this dispute, however, what is clear is that Croatia’s unwillingness to compromise on 
this issue has cost it several years (at least) in its EU aspiration efforts. From the perspective of 
economic rationality, a more logical position for Croatia to have taken over the past several years 
would have been to compromise with Slovenia for the sake of getting into the EU more quickly, 
especially given the fact that Croatia’s maritime borders already exceed 1,100 kilometers. From 
this perspective, ceding 150 kilometers of its maritime borders (where, moreover, no major 
Croatian ports are located) to Slovenia would still leave Croatia with approximately 900 
kilometers of coastline within its sovereign territory.  
 
4) Serbia-Kosovo: A fourth example of the non-economic nature of Balkan ethnoconfessional 
nationalism can be provided by looking at the ongoing diplomatic dispute over Kosovo’s status. 
There is clearly no economic rationale behind the Serbian government’s efforts to maintain its 
sovereign claims to Kosovo. As was seen in the 1990s, imposing Serbian control over a hostile 
Kosovo Albanian population entailed tremendous costs, in terms blood, treasure, and 
international prestige. One estimate suggests that the Serbian state spent upwards of six billion 
dollars trying to maintain its control over Kosovo after 1989.
180
 In 2009, i.e., one year after 
Kosovo declared independence and was recognized by most EU states, the Serbian government 
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reportedly spent Euro 450 million on Kosovo.
181
 Nevertheless, there is uniform agreement 
amongst politicians whose parties together win approximately 95 percent of the votes in Serbian 
elections that maintaining Serbia’s sovereign claims to Kosovo is one of the state’s central 
political and strategic goals. A 2009 public opinion survey found that 70 percent of respondents 
said that Serbia should not give up its claims to Kosovo, even at the cost of EU membership.
182
    
 
5) Republika Srpska and Bosnian integration: A fifth case in point is the current refusal of 
Serbs in Republika Srpska to accept international demands that they give up a measure of their 
autonomy for the sake of a more centralized, unitary state in Bosnia & Herzegovina. By 
extension, this means that both political leaders and voters in the RS are forfeiting millions of 
dollars in potential EU accession funds for candidate countries. As was seen in the Croatian case, 
however, both politicians and ordinary citizens are willing to sacrifice economic interests for the 
sake of a more intangible good that is considered non-negotiable.   
 
6) The Macedonian name dispute: Finally, the sixth example of the non-economic nature of 
Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism can be found in the current dispute between Greece and 
Macedonia over the name issue. Since 1991, Athens and Skopje have been involved in a tense 
dispute over legitimate rights to the term of “Macedonia.” Greece insists that it alone has the 
right to use the term, and that Skopje’s appropriation of the term implies both a historical 
misappropriation of the legacy of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great, but also that it 
implies that Skopje has territorial pretensions to the Greek province of Macedonia (as evidence, 
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the Greek government has cited Skopje’s earlier use of the White Tower in Thessaloniki on 
Macedonian currency).  
 
     As  with the cases of Croatia and the RS in Bosnia & Herzegovina, from a strictly rational 
economic perspective it would be better for Skopje to compromise with Athens as quickly as 
possible to gain access to pre-accession funding available to EU candidate countries. In terms of 
Macedonian internal politics, this would also be the preferred course, since public opinion 
surveys in the country reveal that the Albanian population in Macedonia is both more willing to 
compromise on the name issue and is becoming increasing impatient with the lack of progress in 
Macedonia’s EU accession hopes since it was accepted as a candidate country in 2005.183 
Nevertheless, the emotional and psychological importance of the name issue, which so directly 
touches upon Macedonians’ identity, has prevented the Macedonian Slav population from 
compromising on this issue, with the result that it has persisted for the better part of two decades.  
 
     What is important to note for each of the above issues is that it is not the behavior of 
politicians that is counter-intuitive from an economic/rational choice standpoint, but that of the 
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general population. Politician’s behavior can be rationalized by their fear of losing elections if 
they choose economically rational courses of action, although on this point it would have to be 
empirically proven that these politicians really were acting out of selfish instrumental reasons 
rather than out of genuine conviction. What is more interesting, however, is the attitude of the 
general population in each of these countries, who clearly have more to gain economically 




     The evidence provided by this analysis of ethnoconfessional nationalism in the Balkans 
suggests that while constructivism’s claim that individual identities are fluid and malleable may 
be correct, this seems true only for relatively limited sections of the population. In fact, 
according to a wide-range of political and social behaviors, on a consistent basis anywhere 
between two-thirds and 90 percent of a given population behave with considerable predictability 
(this claim will be demonstrated empirically in Chapter IV). Of course, there are always 
individuals and groups of individuals who challenge the prevailing group orthodoxy, social 
norms, etc. Thus, we can always find individuals who consider themselves to be first and 
foremost Yugoslavs, or politicians in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, or Serbia who promote 
non-nationalist alternatives. But a review of Balkan history shows that these individuals and 
groups are always a distinct and generally politically irrelevant minority.  
 
     There are a number of reasons for this. First, the Balkans are inhabited by long-settled 




populations, and, consequently, there is a significant difference in attitudes between the two 
types of societies. Theodor Hanf, for instance, argues that,  
As a rule, emigrants tend to be people who are ready to give up (a part of) their 
old cultural identity and take their chances in a new world, which claims to judge 
each individual not by background but by ability and achievement. By contrast, 
those who remain in their native place are part of an existing order, whether they 
like it or not. In most cases, though, they do like it: they want to continue living in 
the way their forefathers lived, in other words, not in a meritocratic, but in an 




     Second, changing one’s ethnoconfessional identity is not as easy or cost-free as 
constructivists, or those who argue that identities are fluid and malleable, often suggest the 
process to be. In fact, switching one’s ethnoconfessional identity, assimilating, or attempting to 
“pass” into a different group, often involves considerable costs; as Caselli and Coleman note, 
changing ethnic group identity may involve considerable loss of ethnicity-specific human capital 
and entail painful psychic costs as well.
185
   
 
     Third, “internationalists,” or individuals willing to give up the ascriptive identities they are 
born with are generally distinct minorities within their own communities. With regard to the 
internationalist outlook of the Yugoslav communists in the interwar period,  
In many respects the young Yugoslav communists of the 1930s, though active in 
arousing the masses, were psychologically outside society. In this sense they were 
not integrated in their own nation. They lived for prolonged periods in close-knit 
groups that became not only their political and ideological universe but also a 
kind of family. For many revolutionaries this ideological-political family was 
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more important than attachment to their nations . . . For them, the idea that one 
day all people could feel an international political loyalty stronger and 
emotionally deeper than the loyalty to one’s nation was based on personal 
experience and not simply on theory. For since all today’s real Communists were 
internationalists, then tomorrow, when everyone became a Communist, everyone 




     Empirical evidence supporting the view that only small minorities of people are willing to 
change their identity can be found in the limited number of people who formally adopted a 
“Yugoslav” identity between 1918 and 1991. Thus, despite the fact that by 1981 Yugoslavia in 
its pre-World War II and post-World War II permutations had existed for some for some 60-plus 
years, less than six percent of the population listed itself as “Yugoslav” in the census.187 (At this 
pace, simple mathematical extrapolation suggests it would have taken some 560 years for 
approximately one half of Yugoslavia’s population to identify themselves as “Yugoslav.”)  
 
     Other exceptions to the rule can also be seen in certain micro-regions, such as the Istrian 
peninsula, where the local political and social culture has not shown the characteristics of 
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ethnoconfessional nationalism evident in other parts of the Balkan peninsula.
188
 Another 
identifiable category of individuals in this regard, according to the sociologist Mitja Velikonja, 
were non-conformist groups and individuals in the former Yugoslavia—youth movements, 
feminists, rock n’ rollers and punk rockers, people in the ecological movement, gays and 
lesbians, pacifists, and children from mixed marriages—who associated with each other more on 
the basis of their interests, activities, music, sexual orientation, etc., rather than on the basis of 
nationality. Even for these groups, however, Velikonja argues that Yugoslavism was not so much 





     Taken in sum, these facts explain why ethnoconfessional nationalism is so successful in the 
Balkans, and why politicians are so easily tempted to play the proverbial “national card.” 
Clearly, any politician’s hopes for coming to power cannot be achieved by ignoring or going 
against the views of two-thirds to 90 percent of their constituency. Thus, while the constructivist 
argument than individual identities may be fluid and malleable is, in a narrow sense, correct, it 
does not seem to apply to substantial majorities of individuals. Similarly, while 
ethnoconfessional groups in the Balkans do not represent uniform, undifferentiated wholes, for 
the purposes of most political and social analysis, they do represent decisive political majorities.     
 
      The above of course has important implications for ongoing debates on whether identities are 
primordial or constructed/instrumental. Primordialists have generally assumed that an 
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individual’s ethnic/national identity is a more or less objective, given attribute, essentially 
impervious to change or willful manipulation, and that it assumes much greater importance than 
any other identity an individual may possess. Edward Shils, for instance, claimed that “the 
attachment to another member of one’s kinship group is not just a function of interaction . . . It is 
because a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood.”190 In the same vein, 
Clifford Geertz has argued that the primordial attachments and individual possesses  
. . . are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and 
of themselves . . . at least in great part by virtues of some unaccountable absolute 
importance attributed to the very tie itself . . . for virtually every person, in every 
society, at all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of 
natural—some would say spiritual—affinity than from social interaction.191 
 
     Until recently, most scholars had rejected the primordialist understanding of identity. To 
some scholars, the term primordial is itself unacceptable. Insofar as it is taken to mean “a priori, 
ineffable, and coercive—which it must if it is to be genuinely primordial—then the evidence 
suggests conclusively that the term is only inappropriately assigned to most of the ethnic 
phenomena of our day . . . [the term is] unscientific and thoroughly unsociological . . . and [as an 
analytical concept] it offers no mechanism for the genesis of its phenomena, nor does it 
recognize or explicate any significant relationship between ethnic attachments and the ongoing 
social experiences of ethnic members.”192 
 
                                                        
190 See Shils, “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties: Some Particular Observations on the Relationships of 
Sociological Research and Theory,” The British Journal of Sociology 8 (1957), 142. 
191 Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 259-260. 
192 See Jack David Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, Reed M. “The Poverty of Primordialism: the Demystification of 
Ethnic Attachments,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 16 (April 1993), 199, 194, 184, respectively. As they go on to 
claim, “primordialism presents us with a picture of underived and socially-unconstructed emotions that are 
unanalysable and overpowering and coercive yet varying. A more unintelligible and unsociological concept would 
be hard to imagine, and furthermore, from a variety of sources—including sociobiology, anthropology, and 





     In contrast to the perceived weaknesses of primordialism, an alternative view emphasizes 
instead identity’s contingent, dynamic, and constructed qualities, and that individuals possess 
multiple identities, any one of which can be instrumentally exploited given a specific social 
context, or the manipulation of a particular causal variable; as one group of scholars put it, 
ethnicity is “an instrumental adaptation to shifting economic and political circumstances.”193 
Seen in this way, ethnic/national identities are not objective qualities, but in fact subjective 
“beliefs, perceptions, understandings, and identifications.”194 Put another way, ethnic identities 
and loyalties grow out of social interaction within a given setting, and are not the result of some 





     But a perceptible shift in scholarly thinking about this topic is again occurring, as specialists 
have begun to argue that ethnic and national identities are more fixed, durable and deeply 
ingrained than simpler constructivist theories suggest.
196
 In this view, once established, ethnic 
identities are much longer-lasting, and much less fluid and malleable, than most constructivists 
allow. Moreover, an individual’s primary, ethnic/national identity, is recognized as being much 
more salient in determining the individual’s perceptions and actions than the instrumentalists’ 
multiple-identities perspective.  
                                                        
193 Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Congnition,” 49. Along these lines, see also the works by 
Brubaker, Chandra, Fearon and Laitin cited above.  
194 See Brubaker, Loveman, and Stamatov, “Ethnicity as Congnition,” 31. 
195 Eller and Coughlan, “The Poverty of Primordialism: the Demystification of Ethnic Attachments,” 195. 
196 Some scholars, for instance, question the supposed “construction” of new ethnicities in Africa, which has 
frequently been used as proof of how easily new forms of identity and new loyalties can be created. As Murat Bayar 
has argued recently, “new ethnic groups did not appear arbitrarily in sub-Saharan Africa; they were constructed on 
the basis of kinship, language, geography and other commonalities.” See Bayar, “Reconsidering Primordialism: An 





    Within the context of these debates, understanding ethnoconfessional nationalism (and the 
identities and loyalties associated with it) as a collective, chronic, and non-economic 
phenomenon places the identity-formation process somewhere along the continuum between 
what has been termed weak and strong primordialism. Thus, the claim has not been made that 
specific ethnic groups have existed since time immemorial, merely that there is no a priori 
reason not to believe that they could have emerged in the Middle Ages, or even earlier. The 
characteristics of ethnoconfessional nationalism articulated above also suggest that ethnic groups 
are, contra constructivist views, “ontologically real groups of people who share ontologically 
real features.”197  
 
     The next chapter will provide an historical narrative and further empirical evidence of the 
claims made above. Part 1 of the next chapter focuses on the on the evolution of group identities 
in the Balkans. Part 2 will then describe the practical, everyday manifestations of the 
ethnoconfessional segmentation of Balkan society that has resulted from this institutional 
structure. The evidence provided throughout Chapter 4 will support the claim that 
ethnoconfessional nationalism is a chronic, collective, and non-economic phenomenon. 
                                                        




 Chapter IV 
The Ethnoconfessional Distintegration of the Western Balkans: 
Historical Narrative & Empirical Evidence 
 
I. Introduction 
     Prior to the 1990s, a casual look at urban life in many parts of the former Yugoslavia could 
lead to the conclusion that ethnoconfessional identity had become a thing of the past. With 
respect to urban Bosnians, for instance, before 1991 it was possible to claim that  
After fifty years of a very secular and secularizing Yugoslav state . . . their ways 
of life are the same, and when one meets a Bosnian, if one does not notice the 
personal name, one may spend considerable time with that Bosnian and then go 
on one’s way, unaware of his ethnic identity.1 
 
     It has also been suggested that this was true of the former Yugoslavia as a whole, and that in 
fact the primary divide in Yugoslav society had been between urban residents and country folk.
2
 
Few observers, however, would make such claims after the conflicts of the 1990s; as Senad 
Slatina has noted,  
Visitors to Bosnia and Herzegovina need not ask whether a local is Serb, Bosniak 
(Muslim Bosnian), or Croat. Such information is easily ascertained by observing a 
person’s choice in cigarettes, beer, or cellular telephones. Ten years after the war 
                                                        
1 Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 9. To a considerable degree, the belief that prewar 
Bosnia constituted some form of neutral, non-ethnic idyll is based on the cult of the komšiluk (from the Turkish 
word for neighborhood) which governed personal relations between individuals regardless of ethnoconfessional 
identity. In the postwar period, this cult has largely been associated with the Bosniac perspective, although, as Paula 
Pickering has noted, “One-sided portrayals of the war and the intrusion of religion into public schools have made a 
mockery of Bošnjak authorities’ so-called commitment to the cult of the neighborhood.” See Pickering, 
Peacebuilding in the Balkans, 42. 
2 Christopher Bennet, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), 63. Some have suggested 
that the wars in the former Yugoslavia were in fact wars of the countryside against the cities. This view, however, is 
only of limited utility, as one did not see rural Croats attacking Croat cities, or rural Bosniacs attacking Bosniac-
majority cities. For critiques of the view that the Yugoslav wars were an urban-rural conflict, see Xavier Bougarel, 
“Yugoslav Wars: The ‘Revenge of the Countryside’ Between Sociological Reality and Nationalist Myth,” East 
European Quarterly XXXIII (June 1999), 157-175; and Marko Živković, “Violent Highlanders and Peaceful 
Lowlanders: Uses and Abuses of Ethno-Geography in the Balkans from Versailles to Dayton,” Replika (Special 









     Importantly, this situation is true not only of war-torn Bosnia. Another of the former 
Yugoslavia’s more multiethnic republics, Macedonia, exhibits many of the same characteristics. 
Thus,  
Macedonia is an exemplar of an ethnically-divided society. Macedonians and 
Albanians are separated by language, religion (Orthodoxy and Islam, 
respectively) employment patterns and traditions. Social networks tend to be 
intra-ethnic (nightclubs, restaurants and shops have clientele exclusively of one or 




     This state-of-affairs in southeastern Europe, however, is not merely the result of the wars of 
the 1990s. In reality, to a large extent it existed even before the 1990s, and is the result of several 
centuries of historical development that has segmented Balkan society along ethnoconfessional 
lines. Long before the breakup of Yugoslavia, ethnoconfessional identity significantly influenced 
(if not determined) one’s behavior and political outlook on a whole range of issues, from voting 
behavior, the choice of one’s spouse, settlement patterns, to the rituals and ceremonies with 
which members of the different ethnoconfessional groups are brought into this world, celebrate 
its milestones, and end their physical existence. Indeed, religious affiliation   
. . . became the source of a host of minor but highly significant differences in 
dress, cuisine, dialect, oral tradition, folk music, housing style, furnishings, and 
many other everyday cultural practices . . . These cultural characteristics and 
practices evolved from religious allegiance but had no religious significance per 
se. They became distinctive markers of group differentiation, a sort of ‘code’ to 
assert one’s allegiance and identity that carried great significance for the 
                                                        
3 See Senad Slatina, “Brand Wars,” at www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2845, accessed on 15 
August 2005. It has even been claimed that the way Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs have traditionally enjoyed their 
coffee reveals ethnic differences: Bosniacs tended to sip coffee with a piece of lokum (Turkish delight) in their 
mouths, Serbs liked to add sugar to the coffee while it was brewing, and Croats preferred to add sugar to their coffee 
when it was brought to the table. See Patrick Moore, “The Demise of Turkish Coffee?” RFE/RL Newsline, 1 April 
1998.   
4 Robert Hislope, “Between a Bad Peace and a Good War: Insights and Lessons from the Almost-War in 




individuals who displayed them, whether or not those individuals held to the 




    These “minor but highly significant” differences played an important role in Yugoslavia’s 
postwar political evolution, even under an ideology that was officially internationalist and 
dedicated to “brotherhood and unity.”6 In what was a long term, secular trend, throughout the 
twentieth century the Yugoslav lands exhibited ever greater disintegration along ethno-regional 
(and, consequently, ethnoconfessional) lines in almost every field of political, social and 
economic life. Whether one looks at education, artistic, cultural and intellectual endeavor, the 
work of dissidents and alternative opposition groups, the media or religion, in the period after 
1945 Yugoslav society disintegrated along ethnoconfessional lines in almost every way 
imaginable. As Susan Woodward has described the totality with which the Yugoslav system 
collapsed in its final years,  
While politicians and parliaments bent on sovereignty or radical change were 
challenging the legitimacy of the federal government and party, all the less visible 
bonds that hold any society together were collapsing—the rules of mutual 
obligation, the checks and balances, the equilibrating mechanisms, the assumption 
of minimal security of one’s person and status.7  
 
     In the vast majority of cases, these bonds collapsed along ethnoconfessional lines. 
Understanding why and how this was the case requires reconsidering the nature of relations 
between ethnoconfessional groups in the Balkans. In recent years, two views have predominated 
in their attempt to explain the nature of these relations: the first, the “ancient ethnic hatreds” 
                                                        
5 Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 83. Emphasis added. 
6 As Samuel Huntington has warned, however, it is a mistake think of religious differences as “minor.” For 
Huntington, “Millenia of human history have shown that religion is not a ‘small difference’ but possibly the most 
profound difference that can exist between people.” See Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order, 254. Ernest Gellner has also stressed the important hold that religion can have on individuals, noting 
that “genetically transmitted or deeply engrained religious-cultural habits are impossible or difficult to drop . . . 
some deeply engrained religious-cultural habits possess a vigor and tenacity which can virtually equal those which 
are rooted in our genetic constitution.” See Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 46, 71. 




view, has stressed that the varying Balkan ethnoconfessional groups have been bitterly and often 
violently at odds with each other for centuries. A more recent view has argued that coexistence 
and tolerance rather than violence have characterized ethnoconfessional relations throughout 
Balkan history.  
 
     As will be argued in this chapter, neither view fully captures the complexity of 
ethnoconfessional relations in the region. As Xavier Bougarel has aptly noted, “the words 
‘tolerance’, ‘hate’, ‘coexistence’, and ‘fear’ are all equally applicable” in the case of Bosnia, and 
much the same could be said of the rest of the Balkan peninsula.
8
 Given these considerations, a 
more accurate understanding of the nature of relations among the various Balkan 
ethnoconfessional groups is one provided by Robert Hayden, who has termed these relations 
“antagonistic tolerance.” Hayden argues that in and of itself, coexistence does not indicate a 
belief in tolerance per se as a positive moral attitude, but rather a simply pragmatic one; 
according to Hayden,  
coexistence may be a matter of competition between members of different groups 
manifesting the negative definition of tolerance as passive noninterference and 
premised on a lack of ability of either group to overcome the other. . . . In such a 
setting, there is much sharing of physical space but also a great deal of social 
segregation, which may not be based on overt hostility most of the time but is still 
based on a principle of separation. . . close examination of shared religious sites in 
India and the Balkans reveals competition between groups and “tolerance” that is 
a pragmatic adaptation to a situation in which repression of the other group’s 
practices may not be possible rather than an active embrace of the Other.
9
 
                                                        
8 See Xavier Bougarel, “Bosnia and Hercegovina—State and Communitarianism,” in D. A. Dyker and Ivan 
Vejvoda, Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth (London: Longman, 1996), 87. 
9 Hayden, “Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive Sharing of Religious Sites in South Asia and the Balkans,” Current 
Anthropology 43 (April 2002), 205-206, 216. The responses of local Muslim elites to the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms 
of the 1930s lend considerable support to Hayden’s thesis. In Bosnia, the Tanzimat reforms were never even enacted 
because Muslim elites considered granting equality to Christians “outrageous.” See Donia and Fine, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 62. The same was true in Kosovo as well, where conservative opposition from 
the ulema and most Ottoman officials served to undermine the Ottoman court’s westernizing efforts; thus, “Muslim 





     As noted in Chapter I, this system of ethnoconfessional separation developed under the 
Ottoman millet system, although some historians believe that the already-existing cleavages in 
medieval Balkan societies forced the Ottomans to adopt such a system of rule in southeastern 
Europe.  
 
II. Inter-ethnoconfessional Relations in the Balkans: Historical Context 
     Appreciating the historical context of inter-ethnoconfessional relations in the Balkans is 
crucial to understanding both developments in the 1990s, and the possibilities for the future 
evolution of these relations given such historical experiences and constraints. In the 1990s, two 
theories purporting to explain Balkan history predominated amongst most observers: the theory 
of “evil leaders” and the “ancient ethnic hatreds” thesis. Those arguing that multiethnic societies 
in the Balkans were impossible, or arguing against foreign military intervention, would 
frequently point to the “ancient” nature of ethnic conflict there; as former British Prime Minister 
John Major said in 1993, “The conflict in Bosnia was a product of impersonal and inevitable 
forces beyond anyone’s control.”10 On the other hand, those arguing in favor of “multiethnic 
societies” claimed that interethnic or interconfessional conflict was the exception to the rule in 
southeastern Europe, and that by eliminating “the nationalists” Bosnia & Herzegovina could 
again become the harmonious society it once was. As one historian has noted, the political stakes 
in this debate are considerable.  
At stake of course is not simply historical understanding for its own sake. Behind 
the ancient-hatreds thesis, there often is, or is seen to be, an argument against 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of things. This eventually led to fanatical outbursts by Muslims against Christians, especially in towns . . . “ 
Duijzengs, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, 95; see also Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 32. 




outside involvement and in favor of ethnic partition. At the other extreme, 
interpretations that dismiss the force of history altogether and focus solely on 
contemporary elites can serve the cause of intervention of one kind or another. 




     At the academic level, many scholars have rejected the “ancient ethnic hatreds” thesis; thus, 
in the case of the former Soviet Union, for instance, David Laitin bluntly states “journalistic tales 
of ancient hatreds erupting as soon as central authority disappeared can be ignored.”12 Such 
views are based on a conscious decision to dismiss the role of historical events on contemporary 
ethnic conflict. Laitin, for instance, does not admit that the legacy of World War II might have 
had anything to do with the violence that occurred in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. 
Instead, according to Laitin, international relations theory and Brubaker’s triadic nexus argument 
suffice to explain the outbreak of violence there; thus, “in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, 
when the national homeland took an inordinate interest in their brethren in the near abroad, it 
gave incentive for the national minorities in these republics to take full advantage of their 
windows of opportunity.”13 
 
     Recent scholarship on whether “ancient ethnic hatreds” have been operative in the Balkans 
has been reflected in differing views of the Ottoman legacy and the division between what 
Srečko Dzaja has called the Turkophile scholars and a Turkophobe school. According to the 
Turkophiles, the Ottomans brought order, religious tolerance, and possibilities for social 
advancement to lower classes after their conquest of Bosnia. Conversion to Islam was voluntary, 
and the Ottomans also bequeathed to Bosnia rich Oriental cultural values. For Turkophobes, on 
                                                        
11 Djordjevic, “Clio amid the Ruins,” in Norman N. Naimark and Holly Case, eds., Yugoslavia and Its Historians: 
Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 4. 
12 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 329. 




the other hand, the Ottoman conquest halted the political and cultural development of the region, 
and, through Islamification, estranged many inhabitants of the Balkans from their native 
identities.
14
 Çaglar Keydar has offered another version of this argument, claiming that one’s 
“political commitments” vis-à-vis the issue of nation-state versus empire often determine one’s 
explanation for the decline and fall of the Ottoman empire; as Keydar notes, “As the dominant 
versions of history written since the end of the Great War have consciously or unwittingly 
adopted the perspective of the nation state, the collapse of the empire has often been viewed as 
the inevitable result of the destiny of the nation.”15 
 
     Although in recent years the view of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans as being benign and 
tolerant is most commonly associated with Bosniac writers and politicians and scholars 
advocating international intervention in the Balkan wars, even many Bosniac historiographies—
when writing for their own domestic, Bosniac audiences—deny the allegedly peaceful and 
harmonious nature of pre-1992 Bosnian and Balkan history. For instance, one Bosnian 
intellectual has claimed that “All of the existing documentation reliably confirms that genocide 
has been committed against Bosniacs in a permanent continuity since 1683.”16 Another leading 
Bosniac intellectual, Rusmir Mahmutčehajić, pushes the persecution of Bosniacs even further 
back in history; according to Mahmutčehajić, the persecution of the Arians in Bosnia, the 
“Bosnian Christians,” and ultimately the Bosnian Muslims (and all the Muslims in southeastern 
Europe) extends back at least into the 12
th
 century. Bosnia, according to Mahmutčehajić, is the 
                                                        
14 Dzaja, Konfesionalnost i Nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine, 82.  
15 Keydar, “The Ottoman Empire,” 30.  
16 Emphasis added. The remarks belong to Smail Čekić, the Director of the Institute for Crimes Against Humanity in 




victim of a “centuries-old tragedy, a victim of satanic forces,” and claims that “The Bosniac 
national community which lives in Bosnia today represents the historically continuous remainder 
of [a community] always exposed to persecution and genocide.”17 A recent book on the Sandzak 
reports that the Muslim population on the territory of the former Yugoslavia has been exposed to 
a “horrible genocide” dating back 300 years.18 Saçir Filandra talks about the “clear religious-
mythic source of the Serbian criminal and genocidal consciousness,”19 while Atif Purivatra has 
claimed that the “basic goal of agrarian reform [in Bosnia in the early 20th century] was 
economic genocide against the Muslims.”20 The main Islamic religious and political leader in the 
Sandzak, Mufti Muamer ef. Zukorlić, argues that the Bosniacs of both Bosnia & Herzegovina 
and the Sandzak have been the victims of “eleven genocides,” with Srebrenica being only the 
latest.
21
 Mustafa Cerić recently claimed that in the past 100 years, the Bosnian Muslims have 
experienced “one hundred Srebrenica’s.”22 Here it bears pointing out that these interpretations of 
Balkan history ostensibly reflect the experience of the ethnoconfessional group that was 
dominant politically, economically and militarily in the region for a number of centuries. 
Recognizing this fact should serve as a useful corrective to the view that the native or local 
                                                        
17 Rusmir Mahmutčehajić, Dobra Bosna (Zagreb: Durieux, 1997), 51, 127. Italics added.  
18 See the introduction by Avdija Avdić to Sandzak: Porobljena Zemlja, authored by Harun Crnovršanin and Nuro 
Sadiković, (Zagreb: Grafomark, 2001), 20. 
19 Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, 52. 
20 Atif Purivatra, Ekonomski genocid nad Bosanskim Muslimanima (Sarajevo: MAG, 1993), 60, as cited by Filandra, 
Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, 65. 
21 See Zukorlić’s statement as reported at: http://srebrenica-genocide.blogspot.com/2010/03/mufti-muamer-ef-
zukorlic-rejects.html Accessed on 14 March 2011 at 1:28pm EST.  
22 See “Izvršitelji genocida su nagradjivani teritorijem,” Dnevni Avaz (Sarajevo), 11 July 2012, available at: 
http://www.dnevniavaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/105461-reisu-l-ulema-ef-ceric-izvrsitelji-genocida-su-




histories of the Christian peoples of southeastern Europe have an excessively negative view of 
the Ottoman era.  
 
     Much of the ancient ethnic hatreds argument ultimately rests on one’s interpretation of the 
Ottoman Empire and its impact on the Balkans. This legacy is contradictory. In some ways, the 




 centuries proved more accepting of religious diversity than 
most Western European states, where, especially after the Protestant Reformation religious 
warfare was common; as Mazower notes, “there was no Muslim analogue to the widespread 
Christian impulse to drive out the infidel and the heretic,”23 and the Ottomans provided “a 
system of rule that, compared with those current elsewhere in Europe, offered an unparalleled 
degree of religious tolerance.”24  
 
     Moreover, until the 20
th
 century, ethnic territorial homogenization of the type carried out in 
Western Europe over the centuries was relatively unknown. As L. S. Stavrianos points out, 
. . . the unique feature of Balkan ethnic evolution is that virtually all the races that 
have actually settled there in the past, as distinguished from those that have 
simply marched through, have been able to preserve their identity to the present. 
The significance of this may be illustrated by imagining a Balkan type of ethnic 
development in England. Had that occurred, we would meet, in a journey through 
England today, Britons speaking Welsh, Romans speaking Latin, Angles and 
Saxons speaking their Germanic dialects, Scandinavians speaking Danish, and 
Normans speaking Old French. Furthermore, religious diversity would match the 
ethnic. Some of these peoples would be Roman Catholic, others Anglican, and 
still others non-conformists of various types. In an English setting, such a 
situation seems fantastic. And yet this preservation of ethnic groups through the 
centuries is precisely what has happened in the Balkans.
25
   
                                                        
23 Mazower, The Balkans, 48. 
24 Mazower, The Balkans, 54. For a similarly favorable assessment of the Ottoman system in comparison to 
contemporary developments in Western Europe, at least during the first two centuries of Ottoman rule in the 
Balkans, see Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, Chapter 6. 
25





      Nevertheless, “coexistence did not mean toleration,”26 and a competing school of thought 
sees more conflict and less coexistence in Balkan history. Cathie Carmichael, for instance, has 
called the Ottoman millet system a form of religious apartheid,
27
 which certainly does not 
conjure up images of a tolerant multiconfessional society. Indeed, upon closer examination the 
issue is more complicated than either school of thought admits. Although many authors have 
claimed that there was no serious evidence of “ancient ethnic hatreds” between Albanians and 
Slavs prior to the twentieth century, the claim is debatable. Outsiders’ accounts of the Balkans in 
the 19
th
 century, for instance, tended to stress the “hatred” between the different 
ethnoconfessional groups, and especially, the “fanaticism” of the Moslem ruling classes there. 
Traveling through these parts at the turn of the 20
th
 century, Mary Edith Durham would note that 
the Albanian “believes that his is the oldest thing in the Balkan peninsula—it was his before the 
coming of the Slav or Turk, and he hates each with a bitter Balkan hatred.”28 Evidence of this 
can be found in the words of one Albanian epic poem:   
As always, Albanian and Slav 
Were at blood since a tragic fate 
Placed fire and gunpowder side by side. 




     Along similar lines, Milovan Djilas, as keen an observer of Balkan history and politics as any, 
would note that “the hatred between the Orthodox and the Moslems in these parts is primeval.”30 
                                                        
26 Mazower, The Balkans, 65. 
27 See Carmichael, “Was Religion Important in the Destruction of Ancient Communities in the Balkans, Anatolia 
and Black Sea Regions, c. 1870-1923?” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 7 (September 2007), 358. 
28 See M. Edith Durham, “High Albania and its Customs in 1908,” The Journal of the Royal Anthropological 
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 40 (July-December 1910), 453. 
29 Gjaku i marrun (Blood avenged), cited by Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 151. 




In Bosnia, Ivo Andrić similarly was an adherent of the view that there was an almost primordial 
hatred between the different ethnoconfessional groups, as expressed in his short story, The 
Woman from Sarajevo:  
Adherents of the three main faiths, they hate each other, from birth to death, 
senselessly and profoundly, carrying that hatred even into the afterlife, which they 
imagine as glory and triumph for themselves, and shame and defeat for their 
infidel neighbor. They are born, grow and die in this hatred, this truly physical 
revulsion for their neighbor of different faith, frequently their whole life passes 
without their having an opportunity to express their hatred in its full force and 
horror; but whenever the established order of things is shaken by some important 
event, and reason and the law are suspended for a few hours or days, then this 
mob, or rather a section of it, finding at last an adequate motive, overflows into 
the town, which is otherwise known for the polished cordiality of its social life 




     Indeed, in contrast to portrayals popular in the 1990s of historically cordial interethnic 
relations among Bosnia & Herzegovina’s peoples, perhaps the most common byword used by 
19
th
 century visitors to the Balkans to describe the attitudes of the Muslim ruling classes in 
Bosnia was “fanatic.” Charles Pertusier, a Frenchmen traveling through Bosnia in 1822, claimed 
that “the Muslim takes his faith to the most extreme form of fanaticism.”32 Leopold von Ranke, 
the great nineteenth century German historian of the Balkans, would claim that “Sarayevo was 
considered the focus of fanaticism” of Bosnia’s Muslim ruling class; quite a different perspective 
from contemporary portrayals of Sarajevo (and Bosnia-Herzegovina by extension) as a 
multicultural paradise.
33
 In northwestern Bosnia, along the military border with Austria-
                                                        
31 See Andrić, “The Woman from Sarajevo,” as quoted by Andrew Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation, 
166. 
32 As quoted by Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History, 106. 
33 Von Ranke, History of Servia and the Servian Revolution, 319. As late as 1871, an attempt to build a bell tower 
for the Serb church in Sarajevo drew such protests amongst conservative Muslims that Russian diplomats raised the 
issue with the Ottoman sultan. A few years later, among the demands of a Muslim revolt against the Habsburg 
occupation of Bosnia in 1878 were the imposition of Islamic canon law (sheriat) law in Bosnia, a ban on bells in 
churches, and the dismissal of all Christian officials in Ottoman service. Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 34, 40. 




Hungary, “the free, warlike, and fanatic Moslem peasantry . . . engaged in frequent plunder raids 
into Austrian territory.
34
 By the mid-nineteenth century, a typical European view of the 
conditions in the Balkans claimed that for the Christian rayah, 
The fanaticism of their Moslem rulers is so strongly opposed to every attempt of 
the Servians and Bulgarians to form educational institutions, and even to acquire 
the elements of Christian knowledge, that it is only by a foreign intervention—not 
the less effectual for being of a peaceful kind—that the means and opportunities 




                                                                                                                                                                                  
notion that non-Muslims suffered grinding oppression under the Ottoman yoke, an idea liberally promulgated by 
Serb and Croat nationalists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, finds no support in historical accounts of life in 
the city under Ottoman rule.” See Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 21 (but compare Donia’s claim with actual 
conditions for non-Muslims during this period, as noted in Chapter I, 30-31). With respect to such interpretations of 
Bosnian history and society, Yeshayahu Jelinek has noted that “Moslems were to argue over and over again that 
tolerance had reigned in the past among the religious groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In point of fact, tolerance of 
the kind described by Moslems was a myth. The Christian population, who had suffered in the past from the status 
of raya (serfs), and were virtually enslaved by the aristocratic Moslem land-owners, found it difficult to believe in 
Moslem toleration.” Jelinek, “Bosnia-Herzegovina at War: Relations Between Moslems and Non-Moslems,” 276.  
34 See Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881, 128. It is important to bear in mind the historical 
legacy of distrust and bitterness such constant raiding and plundering (by both Christians and Muslims) must have 
had on the peoples in these regions, as such repeated actions over years and decades always resulted in livestock 
stolen, homes destroyed, and lives lost. In just one raid in the summer of 1836, for instance, Rothenberg points out 
that over 600 individuals were killed on both sides, Muslim and Christian. Such raids were taking place on an almost 
yearly basis for most of the 1830s. Along these lines, it is also worth noting that, in attempting to put down the first 
Serbian rebellion (1804-1813), the Ottoman authorities mainly used Bosnian Muslim forces (Donia, Sarajevo: A 
Biography, 27). Francine Friedman claims that there were at least 132 military conflicts between Ottoman/Bosnian 
Muslim forces on the one side, and Habsburg armies composed of Croats, Montenegrins, Slovenes, and Serbs on the 
other. The result of both such constant warfare and the unequal socio-economic status of Muslims as landlords and 
Christians (Croats and Serbs) as landbound tenant farmers was, according to Friedman, “The Christian peasants . . . 
hated the local Muslim landlords because of their exploitative practices and because they represented whichever 
empire currently dominated at the local level.” See Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation, 75. In 
terms of the fluidity of borders in the region, it is also important to remember that in the early nineteenth century, 
Bosnian Muslims controlled six nahije (Ottoman administrative districts) on the right bank of the Drina River, i.e., 
in today’s Serbia proper.    
35 See Henry G. Bohn’s preface to the English edition of Leopold von Ranke’s History of Servia and the Servian 
Revolution (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1853), vi. Robert Donia reports that to the foreign consuls in Sarajevo during 
the brief uprising against the Habsburg occupation in 1878, “the movement leaders were religious fanatics, driven to 
irrational behavior by their hatred of non-Muslims.” Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 54. Glenny strikes a somewhat 
different note, admitting that while “By the end of the nineteenth century, chronic poverty, strained social relations, 
arbitrary official cruelty and bitter resentment towards Istanbul flowed through the Ottoman Empire like poisoned 
blood, but no other province could match Bosnia and Herzegovina for the severity of its symptoms” at the same 
time, “nationalism was probably the least important force pushing Bosnia steadily towards centre stage in the Balkan 
drama.” Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 73. Nevertheless, it bears noting that many 
international observers during this period, such as Habsburg foreign minister Gyula Andrássy (admittedly for 
perhaps self-interested reasons) were already at this time claiming that internal divisions within Bosnian society, 
coupled with the ambitions of regional neighbors, made it extremely difficult to survive as an independent entity. 





     The ability of religion to create deep cleavages between groups speaking the same language 
was also obvious at this time. In northern Albania, as the French consul in Skhodra in the mid-
nineteenth century, Hyacinthe Hecquard, reported, 
Oppressed because of their fanaticism, or possibly fanatical because of their 
oppression, the Catholics of Shkodra seem to have been singled out for grievous 
measures. They were forbidden to build a wall around the cemetery. Situated as it 
was outside the city, Muslim hoodlums delighted in enraging the Catholics by 
breaking or overturning the headstones, sometimes even exhuming dead bodies. 
The intimidated Christians did not dare to make complaints, and the government 




    Similar anti-Christian fanaticism was evident in Kosovo at the time as well. Historically, one 
of the earliest manifestations of Albanian nationalism in the Balkans was the League of Prizren, 
founded in 1878, which attracted delegates from Kosovo as well as from northern Albania and 
Macedonia, and whose goal was to unite four Albanian-populated Ottoman administrative units 
encompassing territory in present day Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo into one entity.
37
 
According to the British Consul General in northern Albania at this time, 
Prizren, let me tell you, is the headquarters of the Albanian League, an 
organization of the most fanatical Mussulmen of the country. These men are now 
worked up to a high pitch of religious zeal, and hatred of the Christians. Prizren 





    Further north, such ethnoconfessionally-based xenophobia was also apparent in relations 
betweens Croats and Serbs in Croatia-Slavonia. Although it is commonly claimed that there were 
no serious outbreaks of Croat-Serb violence until the 20
th
 century, deeper historical analysis 
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reveals a relationship that was at the least antagonistic for centuries. The rights and privileges 
granted to the Serb population in the vojna krajina (military frontier) of the Austrian Empire, an 
institution created at the beginning of the 16
th
 century, proved to be an almost perpetual source of 
animosity between the Serbs in this region and Croatia’s nobility and clerical circles. For 
Croatia’s nobility, the vojna krajina represented what they considered to be the administrative 
expropriation of large amounts of territory traditionally considered part of Croatia (and hence 
part of their estates). Exacerbating the problem was the fact that in the effort to protect their 
rights and privileges, the population of the vojna krajina consistently stressed its loyalty to the 
Habsburg throne rather than to the Croatian Sabor. For Croatia’s Catholic authorities, 
meanwhile, the existence of this large Orthodox population constituted the existence of a large 
and in some ways even favored schismatic community of heretics in their midst. Consequently, 
since the 16
th
 century, Croatian clerical authorities repeatedly engaged in various efforts to 
convert the Serbs to Catholicism, or at least to Uniatism. Thus, for centuries, the Serb population 
of these areas was seen as a type of disloyal fifth column to Croat state, political, and religious 
interests—and sometimes even worse.39  
 
     Croats and Serbs in Bosnia & Herzegovina, for their part, clearly nurtured an understanding 
that their relative lack of development was due to their inferior position in the Ottoman system. 
As the Serb journalist Risto Radulović would note in 1913: 
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Nonetheless, there is something unfinished, incomplete, empty . . . We feel all of 
us at every moment in collective and individual life, that for many centuries we 
have been cut off in obscurity from the entire world, because choked under the 
yoke of a nation incapable of culture, a state which had as its basis inequality—
social injustice . . . centuries in which we could take no step forward, while other 
nations free and less encumbered, laboured intensively and advanced in progress . 
. . Entering the wealth of their cultures and creativity of their spirit, we feel like 




          In view of the above, there is clearly considerable evidence that the problems in inter-
ethnoconfessional relations in the Balkans have a much deeper historical context than much 
contemporary scholarship grants. Despite such evidence, however, while it is clear that ethnic 
hatreds did exist to some extent in the region, they cannot in and of themselves be considered 
sufficient conditions for the disintegration of the Yugoslav state, or for the outbreak of 
interethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. The French and the Germans, of 
course, had a long mutual history of conflict, yet (at least since 1945) have been able to 
overcome this history. As Andrew Wachtel has noted,  
Ancient hatreds were undoubtedly present, but they are not sufficient for 
understanding systematic, large-scale violence in the Balkans, or elsewhere for 
that matter. To be sure, there was always a certain amount of tension present 
among the various South Slav groups, but there were few instances of widespread 
violent conflict among them in Yugoslavia’s history or pre-history. Indeed, at 
least as far as Serbs and Croats are concerned (and it is their inability to get along 
that was ultimately fatal), there is little evidence of such hatred before the second 
half of the nineteenth century . . . [and] even in later periods one finds at least as 
much evidence of Serb-Croat cooperation as of animosity . . . The point is that if 
potentials for mutual enmity can be found in almost any country, they have little 




      The fundamental point that interethnic tensions can be found in any society, and that the 
presence of such tensions alone do not explain mass violence in the Balkans, is certainly right.
42
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Large scale forced expulsions and massacres do not occur spontaneously; they result from 
decisions made and orders given by political and military elites. As Mazower notes,  
“Ethnic cleansing”—whether in the Balkans in 1912-1913, in Anatolia in 1921-
1922, or in erstwhile Yugoslavia in 1991-1995—was not, then, the spontaneous 
eruption of primeval hatreds but the deliberate use of organized violence against 
civilians by paramilitary squads and army units; it represented the extreme force 
required by nationalists to break apart a society that was otherwise capable of 




      In sum, while the imagery of “ancient ethnic hatreds” as some strong, irrational force (e.g., 
the “Balkan Ghosts” of Robert Kaplan’s well known and influential book) should be seen as an 
exaggeration, neither can it be rejected outright, or be reduced to economic inequalities in 
Ottoman Balkan societies. The Ottoman Empire, as will be seen in Chapter III, clearly 
discriminated against non-Muslims in a range of political, judicial, religious, cultural, and 
economic ways, leading to repeated insurrections and uprisings on the part of the empire’s 
Christian communities. Underestimating the importance of the transfer of these memories and 
experiences from one Balkan generation to the next significantly distorts one’s understanding of 
Balkan social and political life. This underestimation, in turn, distorts one’s understanding of 
political possibilities in the region, leading to overly optimistic beliefs about the bases on which 
one can construct “multiethnic” polities and societies in the region, as well as to 
underestimations about the resources and time needed to construct such polities and societies. 
 
III. Ethnoconfessional Identities and Divisions in the 19
th
 Century 
     In contrast to the contemporary social science view that identities are fluid and contextual, 
social identities in mixed areas of Bosnia and Croatia by the 19
th
 century seemed anything but. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
group tend to overpredict the potential for such violence. See Fearon and Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic 
Cooperation,” American Political Science Review 90 (December 1996), 715-735. 




There were numerous legal proscriptions in this regard; for instance, it was strictly forbidden, 
under penalty of death, for a Muslim to convert to Christianity under Ottoman law. In Bosnia, 
although there had been a limited number of conversions to Islam in the early periods of 
Ottoman rule, they probably numbered fewer than commonly believed. A census of the Ottoman 
provinces in Europe conducted from 1520-30 suggests that less than ten percent of the 
indigenous Christian population of these regions had converted to Islam, after over eighty years 
of Ottoman rule.
44
 By the 19
th
 century, conversions from one faith to another were 
extraordinarily rare; one estimate suggests that around the turn of the 20
th
 century, in a 
population of over 1,570,000 people there were only twenty-five conversions per year.
45
 Mixed 
marriages were “foreign to Bosnian society as it emerged from the Ottoman Empire, in which 
there was strict communal endogamy.”46 When theater groups began to be founded in Bosnia 
during the Habsburg period, Muslims refused to play non-Muslims,
47
 and Muslim groups also 
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demanded that Muslim supervisors be appointed to supervise Muslim factory workers.
48
 
Different ethnoconfessional groups in Bosnia were even allegedly unable to understand each 
other’s artistic achievements; for instance, Smail Balić has argued that the Christian peasant 
masses in Bosnia were unable to comprehend Bosnian Muslim romantic poetry and ballads 
because of their primitive living conditions.
49
 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, as 
Bosnia’s ethnoconfessional groups slowly began to found literary and cultural publications, 
“Intellectual initiatives developed on independent confessional lines, as if without question.”50 
As late as 1910, the economic division of Bosnian society along ethnoconfessional lines was 
remarkable. As Aydin Babuna notes,  
According to the statistics of 1910, 91.15% of the landowners with kmets 
(tenants), 70.62% of the landowners without kmets and 56.65% of the free 
peasants were Muslim. Only 4.58% of the kmets were Muslim while 73.92% of 
them were Orthodox and 21.49% Catholic. In a society with this social structure 
it was extremely difficult to separate religious rights from economic ones. The 
rights of the landowners meant Muslim rights and the rights of the kmets meant 
Christian rights. Given these circumstances it was not difficult for the Muslim 
landowners to incite the religious feelings of their co-religionists in order to 




      Political reforms in Bosnia during this period paid due respect to ethnoconfessional divisions, 
and followed the ethnoconfessional key; thus, when administrative reforms were adopted in 
                                                        
48 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 107. 
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1865, in the regional council for Bosnia, each of Bosnia’s seven districts was allowed four seats, 
two for Muslims, and two for non-Muslims.
52
 The Habsburg occupation regime of BiH 
continued using the ethnoconfessional key in determining the allocation of governmental 
positions; thus, the Sarajevo City Council formed in August 1878 consisted of six Serb Orthodox 
members, five Muslims, four Jews, and three Croat Catholics. Sarajevo’s city council statute 
adopted in 1882 continued the tradition of appointments to the council based on confession.
53
 
The tradition continued with the formation of the new Bosnian parliament (Sabor) in 1910, in 
which “electoral districts were segregated by confession, and ethnonational quotas were built 
into the parliament’s composition.”54 Students in Bosnia at this time “organized primarily 
according to religious or national affiliations and most frequently separately, for one set of 
events motivated Serb students and other motivated Croat students. There were common 
undertakings, but rarely and with few participants.”55 Indeed, ethnic divisions among the peoples 
of Bosnia & Herzegovina were so firmly drawn by the beginning of the 20
th
 century that even 
financial institutions were divided along ethnoconfessional lines, with the creation of banks such 
as the “Prva muslimanska banka” (i.e., the “First Muslim Bank”) in Brčko, the “Hrvatska 
trgovačka banka i štedionica” (the “Croatian Commercial and Savings Bank”) in Livno, and the 
“Prva srpska štedionica” (the “First Serbian Savings Bank”) in Prijedor.56 According to one 
estimate, by 1908, Muslims had registered some 124 different associations or societies; every 
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54 Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 109. 
55 Mitar Papić, Školstvo u Bosni i Hercegovina za vrijeme austro-ugarske okupacije (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 
1972), as quoted by Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 113. 
56 See Peter Sugar, The Industrialization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1878-1918 (Seattle, WA: University of 




single one of them carried the prefix “muslimanska.”57 In Civil Croatia and the vojna krajina as 
well, financial institutions were often segregated and seen as important resources for 
ethnoconfessional survival; thus,   
These institutions were viewed by their founders as ammunition in a battle to 
maintain the nation . . . a concentrated effort to build a network of loan agencies, 
cooperatives, banks, and educational initiatives directed at the Serbian farmer was 
mounted at the end of the nineteenth century in Croatia, and its inspiration was 





     What was not clear to many of the creators of the original South Slav state in 1918, but would 
become increasingly so after the various peoples of Yugoslavia had entered the new state, was 
that Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims had entered the new entity with firmly 
established identities; thus,  
By the end of the nineteenth century, if not long before, it appeared almost 
inconceivable that a Croat could be anything but Catholic, that a Serb could be 
anything but Orthodox, and the rival claims made upon the Muslims could not 




    In what would have even more ominous implications for the future, by the 1870s (if not 
earlier), Croat-Serb relations had started to deteriorate and serious interethnic animosities were 
already visible just beneath the surface of civil and political life.
60
 Contemporary observers of 
Croat-Serb relations in mid-nineteenth century Croatia-Slavonia did not see the two groups as 
being exceptionally close; the writer Fran Kurelac, for instance, described the ethnic distance 
between the two groups at this time in the following way: “If each [Serb or Croat] threw his own 
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beef into a pot, even the soup would not mix.”61 Many Croats at this time objected to the large 
degree of religious and educational autonomy Serbs in Croatia-Slavonia and the vojna krajina 
enjoyed, as, for instance, guaranteed in Hungarian Law IX of 1868.
62
 The main Croatian political 
party of the period, the Party of Right, or frankovci, refused to allow the use of the word “Serb” 
as either a noun or a qualifier in the Croatian Sabor.
63
 In Zagreb in September 1902, the Serbian 
newspaper Srbobran reprinted an article from a Belgrade journal which had belittled Croat 
history and national character, and argued that eventually all Croats would be assimilated by the 
Serbs. Large-scale riots (involving by some estimates 20,000 people) ensued, with mobs 
attacking Serb homes, businesses and other institutions. The rioting was only quelled after three 
days when martial law was declared.
64
  Such an outpouring of violence based on one newspaper 
article seems difficult to reconcile with the claim that there was a healthy basis to Croat-Serb 
relations. As Stjepan Radić would almost prophetically note in the aftermath of the September 
riots, “everything around us . . . testifies that the battle is leading to extermination, yours and 
ours.”65 Attempts at Croat-Serb collaboration during this period were fragile and short-lived. The 
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Croat-Serb coalition in the Croatia Diet, formed in the autumn of 1910 to coordinate agrarian 





IV: Interwar Yugoslavia  
     On December 1
st
, 1918, the heir to the Serbian throne, Crown Prince Alexander 
Karadjordjević proclaimed the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 
Belgrade. Alexander’s proclamation was the culmination of decades of debates and discussion 
among South Slav intellectual and political elites, primarily Croat and Serb, on the benefits of 
such unification. By the end of World War I, South Slav unification seemed to have become a 
generally popular idea. Many of the South Slavs’ leading intellectuals and cultural luminaries 
supported the idea of Yugoslav unity.
67
 In 1918, the Habsburg commander of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Stefan Sarkotić, estimated that by August 60 percent of the population had been 
“infected with the Yugoslav idea,”68 and Alexander’s proclamation “was greeted by waves of 
celebrations all over the territory of Yugoslavia.”69  
 
     It soon became apparent, however, that support for Yugoslavia’s creation was broad but not 
deep; according to Charles Jelavich, “The immediate euphoria surrounding the formation of the 
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kingdom on December 1, 1918, did not extend through the end of the month,”70 and by the end 
of the 1920s, Yugoslavia was in “an almost perpetual political crisis.”71 As an ideology, 
Yugoslavism did not have widespread acceptance amongst the general populace, for it appealed 
“to idealists, but not to those who had to deal with the realities of the South Slav world . . . South 
Slav unity or Yugoslavism was at its best  . . . a remote vision.”72 Yugoslavism’s “principal 
pool” of active proponents came mostly from Croatia’s “intellectual class”--clergy, officials, 
soldiers, artists and students--which by 1910 numbered only some 16,000 people, barely one 
percent of Croatia-Slavonia’s population at the time. Conversely, Ante Starčević’s Croatian 
nationalist Party of Right drew most of its support from the considerably larger Croatian petite 
bourgeoisie, composed primarily of small-scale retailers and tradesman,
73
 and in many segments 
of Croatian society there were “strong elements of ultranationalism and outright Serbophobia.”74 
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Even those Croats most sympathetic to the Yugoslav idea, such as Cardinal Josip Juraj 
Strossmayer and Franjo Rački, “though prepared to work towards Yugoslav cultural unity and to 
recognize the ‘genetic’ distinctiveness of the Serbs and Slovenes, they nevertheless laid claim to 
Croatia’s historic state right to virtually all of the South Slav territories of the Habsburg 
monarchy, which they wanted federalized.”75  
 
     A similar situation obtained in other parts of the future state. In Bosnia on the eve of World 
War I, even among Yugoslav oriented young Muslims, “the social force of Muslim specificity 
led Muslim groups to operate apart, so that Serbophiles or Croatophiles formed their own student 
groups rather than joining Serb or Croat ones.”76 Significantly, Yugoslavism “did not really 
catch on among Serbs,” either in the Habsburg empire, or in Serbia proper; according to Stevan 
K. Pavlowitch, “The memories and myths of medieval Serbia were too strong among the 
Habsburgs Orthodox South Slavs. In Belgrade, there was little need for the Illyrian-Yugoslav 
vision, and a reluctance to give up a name upheld by Serbia’s rising statehood.”77 When Serbs 
did accept it, it was largely because they saw it as a version of a pan-Serbianism; thus,  
the historical yearning of the diasporic Serbian communities for closer cultural 
and political ties with their ethnic brethren in ‘Serbia proper” . . . support for 
various ‘Pan-Yugoslav’ notions was closely linked to the idea of ‘Pan-
Serbianism’ or interregional Serbian solidarity.78 
 
     Numerous problems plagued the country from the outset. Widespread violence was the most 
immediate; armed protests, in some areas verging on civil war, erupted in many parts of the new 
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state, including Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Sandžak, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia. Politically, the problems of unification and integration were manifested by frequent 
changes of government,
79
 and fierce debate over the new state’s fundamental structure: was it to 
be a centralized kingdom, or a multinational federation?
80
 The debate over this question was 
played out between the different ethnoconfessional groups in the fight over the new country’s 
constitution. The vast majority of Serbs, viewing the new state as the culmination of a century of 
struggle for unification and the liberation of the South Slavs in different empires, and brimming 
with confidence in their successful, independent state and military institutions, viewed the new 
state simply as a geographical extension of the pre-WWI Kingdom of Serbia; as Cohen notes, 
“Obsessed with the idea of liberating subjected Serbs, nearly all segments of the Serbian elite—
including many who flirted with Yugoslavism—had little tolerance for the idea of democratic 
compromise among the South Slavs.”81 Many Habsburg Serbs supported this centralized vision 
for the new state; for instance, the most important Serb politician from Croatia, Svetozar 
Pribičević, supported “a centralized regime that would secure the position of the Croatian and 
Bosnian Serbs.”82  
 
                                                        
79 Charles Jelavich points out that in its first decade of existence, “when political stability was most essential, the 
kingdom had seven prime ministers and twenty-four cabinet reorganizations, an average of one every five months.” 
See Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 99. 
80 The debate had in fact started even during the negotiations between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav 
Committee as World War I was still being fought. Moreover, the individuals comprising the Yugoslav Committee 
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81 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 7. 
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     The other South Slavs, however, envisioned a different kind of state. Both the Croats and the 
Slovenes supported various forms of federation or even confederation. In January 1924, Stjepan 
Radić produced a plan for a south Slav confederation of states called “the Yugoslav Union,” 
symbolically represented by the Karadjordjević dynasty. Within such a confederation, Croatia 
would have its own constitution, parliament, and membership in the League of Nations. Bosnia 
& Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Vojvodina would get similar levels of autonomy.
83
 
The main Croatian proposal put forth for the organization of the state was likened to “the 
American Confederation of 1781-1787.”84 Although the Slovenes, “enthusiastically supported 
the creation of the new state,” their support was due at least in part to threats coming from Italy 
and Austria, and the lack of any regret for the passing of the Habsburg empire.
85
 The main 
Slovene political party of this era, the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS), led by Monsignor Anton 
Korošec, supported a confederal organization of the country.86 The Bosniacs played practically 
no role in the creation of Yugoslavia and “did not feel it to be a satisfactory resolution of their 
interests.”87 Their primary aim throughout the interwar period was to struggle for Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s territorial unity. 
 
                                                        
83 Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 193. Pointing to the 
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another historical parallel, it has also been argued that what Radić really wanted was a position for Croatia similar to 
what Hungary had in the Dual Monarchy. See Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 124. 
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      The complexity of problems such as the country’s organization or what to do about Bosnia-
Herzegovina were such that “even genuine advocates of the Yugoslav idea would find little 
common ground.”88 Two years of political debate over these issues ended in a pyhrric victory for 
the Serbian vision of a centralized state. Due in part to a refusal by Radić’s Croatian Peasant 
Party to participate in the work of the Constituent Assembly for the new constitution, what 
would become known as the Vidovdan Constitution of 1921 resulted in what was considered “a 
framework for centralization. This was to be a state dominated by the monarch, the Belgrade 
ministries, and Serbian political leaders.”89  
 
     Ratification of the Vidovdan Constitution ran predominantly along ethnoconfessional lines: 
the two primary Serb parties in the constituent assembly, the Radicals and the Democrats, cast 
176 votes in favor of the constitution, and they were joined by eleven ethnic Croats and three 
Slovenes. On the other hand, the 158 members of Radic’s Croatian Peasant Party abstained from 
the vote, as did 27 members of the Slovenian People’s Party. Twenty-one delegates from the 
Serbian Agrarian Party voted against the constitution.
90
 The obvious ethnoconfessional 
imbalance in the support for the Vidovdan Constitution and the new state’s structure wound up 
satisfying few of the new kingdom’s constituents and would haunt interwar Yugoslavia 
throughout its brief existence; the smaller South Slav ethnic groups, such as the Montenegrins 
and the Macedonians , and non-Slavic minorities such as the Albanians or the Hungarians, 
“received no constitutional recognition at all, let alone any de facto influence on 
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decisionmaking,”91 and  “the three-nation monopoly officially directing the new state fell far 
short of the pan-Yugoslav ideology embraced by earlier generations of Croatian-Slovenian 
idealists while also managing to offend the several unrecognized ‘tribal’ components of the new 
kingdom.”92 Ivo Banac goes so far as to claim that “the first Yugoslav state failed, not in 1941 
when it disintegrated, but in 1921 with the adoption of the centralist constitution.”93  
 
    An analysis of party voting by ethnicity during the 1920s reveals how strong the tendency was 
towards what Ramet called “the prominence of ethnocentrism in political choice.” Thus, in 
elections to the Skupština in 1923, of 155 parliamentarians who had declared themselves as 
Serbs, 146 voted for the three main Serbian parties. Of the 93 individuals who declared 
themselves as Croats, 68 voted for the Croatian Republican Peasants Party (HRSS), and a further 
17 voted for the Yugoslav Muslim Organization. Of the 22 people who declared themselves as 
Slovenes, 21 voted for the Slovenian People’s Party (SLS). The 1927 parliamentary election 
produced similar results.
94
 With specific regard to the Bosnian Muslims,  
Throughout the era of royal Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Muslims displayed 
remarkable political cohesion by voting in overwhelming numbers for the 
Yugoslav Muslim Organization . . . Although three other Muslim parties sought 
votes in the 1920 election to the Constituent Assembly, together they garnered 
less than 2% of that vote and soon disappeared from the scene. The number of 
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votes for the YMO from one election to another varied by only 20% over seven 
years, a testimony to the solid foundation of Bosnian Muslim identity and the 




     Ultimately, the Vidovdan Constitution could not solve the Kingdom’s problems, and the 
ethnic and political tensions of the 1920s culminated in 1926 when a Montenegrin parliamentary 
deputy shot Radić in the National Assembly. (Radić died of his wounds two months later).96  
 
     Efforts throughout the 1930s to promote Croat-Serb collaboration achieve only very limited 
successes. The United Opposition formed by Maček’s HSS and Serbian parties opposed to the 
dictatorship was in many ways only a formal collaboration; for instance, in the December 1938 
elections the United Opposition did not issue a single joint manifesto.
97
 A final effort to resolve 
the Croatian problem in interwar Yugoslavia resulted in the Cvetković-Macek Sporazum 
(Agreement) of 1939.
98
 Importantly, the Sporazum adopted many of the institutional features that 
had been hallmarks of earlier attempts to deal with the national question. Most prominently, the 
Sporazum created a Banovina of Croatia, carved out of two primarily Croat-populated banovine 
from the 1931 system (the Savska and Primorska), to which were added large parts of western 
Herzegovina and parts of central Bosnia almost to the outskirts of Sarajevo.
99
 The Serbian 
                                                        
95 Donia and Fine, Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 124-25. Emphasis added. 
96 Charles Jelavich would claim that Radić’s assassination “ended whatever hope there may have been to reconcile 
the differences that had emerged between the Serbs and Croats, because now the Croatian electorate turned against 
the very concept of the Yugoslav state.” Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 105. 
97 Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 186. 
98 Cvetković was at the time prime minister of the royal government, Maček was Radić’s successor as leader of the 
Croatian Peasant Party. 
99 The Sporazum would have a significant influence on subsequent Croat ambitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina; as 
Donia and Fine note, “this territory was the object of Croatian nationalist demands in 1971 and again in 1992, when 
Hercegovinian Croats proclaimed the “Republic of Herceg-Bosna” and received military backing from the regime in 




Orthodox Church protested publicly about the creation of the new Banovina Hrvatska and its 
inclusion of a large number of Serbs.
100
 The Croatian banovina was to be largely autonomous, 
having, for instance, its own parliament (the Sabor) with control over all administrative matters 
apart from defense, foreign policy, and international trade. Although the Sporazum brought 
Maček back into the government (accepting a position as vice-premier), “he understood his vice-
premiership primarily as a position from which to fight for Croatian interests and only 
secondarily as one from which to participate in governing Yugoslavia.”101  
 
     The Sporazum also represented the first official recognition that the Yugoslav “tribes” were 
not moving in the direction of some form of “national unity.” As Dejan Jović notes,  
. . . while the idea of national unity foresaw that the differences between the 
individual Yugoslav tribes would weaken and a Yugoslav identity would 
strengthen, in 1939 it became clear that the opposite process was occurring. The 
devolutionary processes in relation to Croatia announced that the decentralizing 
trends were stronger than the centralizing ones. The direction away from 
centralism was exactly the opposite of the direction in which Germany and Italy 






     Despite the fact that the sporazum was conceived of and implemented as an effort to achieve 
a compromise with the Croats, it had the effect of increasing Serb dissatisfaction with political 
arrangements in interwar Yugoslavia and increasing centrifugal tendencies within the country. 
Thus, “Soon after the Cvetković-Maček agreement, the Serbs began to unite around calls for a 
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Serbian banovina, which, they argued, should include Serb-populated areas of the newly 
established autonomous Croatia.”103 Nor did the sporazum seem to increase Croat acceptance of 
Yugoslavia or the Yugoslav ideal either. In January 1940, for instance, eleven new associations 
were formed on the territory of the Croatian banovina, most with “Croatian” as a prefix, and 
none with the word “Yugoslav.” In February 1940, eight new associations were formed, each 
with the prefix “Croatian.”104 
 
     Interestingly, however, because of their ideological blinders, Yugoslav communists at the 
time of the unification seemed unable to recognize the importance of the national question in the 
new state. Thus, the April 1919 Congress of Unification of the various communist organizations 
on the territory of the new state “completely underestimated the importance of the national 
question for Yugoslav politics and for the future of the country, as well as for Communist 
revolutionary action. The majority of delegates did not even seem to be aware that the national 
question existed as a genuine problem . . . “105 Even the officially internationalist communists, 
however, could not ignore the importance of Yugoslavia’s ethnoconfessional problems for long. 
Thus, the CPY’s fourth party congress in December 1934 decided to follow the inescapable logic 
of ethnoconfessional organization and create separate communist party organizations for both 
Croatia and Slovenia (and a separate communist party for Macedonia as soon as there were 
enough cadres; all these institutions, however, remained within the overall organization of the 
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Communist Party of Yugoslavia).
106
 In adopting this organizational division along 
ethnoconfessional lines, the communists were merely following the trend throughout Yugoslav 
society; along with the churches and political parties, many other aspects of social and political 
life, such as the media, were also divided along parochial lines, and few print publications at this 
time were able to claim a pan-Yugoslav audience.
107
 The thinking of bankers showed an 
ethnoconfessional bias as well; for instance, Zagreb’s commercial banks “. . . refused to 
participate in the new kingdom’s central bank in Belgrade . . . Instead, they turned to investment 
banking within Croatia . . . “108 In the end, the first Yugoslavia had made three different attempts 
to form a viable multiethnic state. The first two foundered on the shoals of Yugoslavia’s 
ethnoconfessional cleavage. The third attempt was cut short by World War II.  
 
 
V: The Second Yugoslavia  
 
     Tito’s Yugoslavia (1945-1991) is often seen as the high-water mark of positive interethnic 
relations among the South Slavs. Yet even during this period, and within the (at least formally) 
anti-nationalist, multiethnic, Marxist-internationalist Yugoslav communist movement, the logic 
of Balkan ethnoconfessionalism quickly manifested itself and came to dominate political, social, 
and economic life, just as it had for the interwar kingdom.
109
 As a result, the key feature of 
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Yugoslavia’s post-1945 existence was a long-term, secular trend toward ever-greater de-




     As the winners in the multi-dimensional conflict that Yugoslavia suffered from 1941-45, the 
communists were in the strongest position to propagate their version of why they had won. The 
standard explanation for the victory of Tito’s Partisan movement in Yugoslav communist 
hagiography was its commitment to a federal reorganization of the country, and its positive 
message of “brotherhood and unity.” The attraction of the latter to a population disgusted by and 
tired of fratricidal slaughter should certainly not be underestimated. But just as important was the 
CPY’s recognition of the differences in Yugoslav society as manifested in its commitment to 
federalism, and its willingness to pay at least lip service to the diverse and often contradictory 
aspirations of Yugoslavia’s various ethnoconfessional groups. Susan Woodward, for instance, 
has noted that the “commitment to recognize the separate existence of Yugoslav nations and their 
sovereign rights in a federal system was critical to the communist victory after 1943,” while Ivo 
Banac has expressed a similar opinion in a somewhat different fashion, arguing that the 
Communists were most successful “when they argued for the clear identity of all the constituent 
parts . . . They did not win the war under the banner of Yugoslav unitarism; they won under the 
banner of the national liberation of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and so on.”111 In other 
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words, people did not join the Partisans primarily to fight for “brotherhood and unity” or for a 
united Yugoslavia; they joined to fight for the liberation of their own native regions, or were 
driven into the Partisans out of the necessities of self-defense. Moreover, here it bears noting that 
the Partisan movement itself was not the mass, popular multiethnic movement it is sometimes 
portrayed as being; in fact, for long periods of time and across wide swathes of Yugoslavia, the 
Partisan movement was largely monoethnic.
112
  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Milazzo reached many of the same conclusions in his study of WWII Yugoslavia, noting that “Even the Partisans, so 
often credited, and with considerable justification, for pulling the country together, were an overwhelmingly Serb 
movement until well into 1943, and there is considerable evidence that they often expanded their ranks by appealing 
to national sentiments which had little to do with allegiance to the Yugoslav idea.” See Milazzo, The Chetnik 
Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 186. 
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the occupation garrisons. This proved to be true even in East Sandžak and Montenegro where Moslems were 
exposed to Chetnik atrocities . . . As a result of the hostility of the Croats and Moslems, the support of the Serbs in 
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threatening them with reprisals for outrages against Serbs . . . Occasionally discipline would break down entirely, 
and a Croatian village would be burned and its inhabitants terrorized . . . Serbian units were practically the only 
forces the Croatian party had at its disposal . . . the Slovenian partisans managed—in fact insisted –on staying on 
their own soil . . . the national liberation struggle in Croatia became an almost entirely Serbian affair during the 
course of 1942 . . . It would [b]e a mistake to conclude that those who sided with the Partisans were motivated by 
pro-Yugoslav sentiments . . . among the Serbs, the Croats, and especially the Macedonians, the resistance struggle 
was largely inspired by more narrow regional loyalties.” See Shoup, Yugoslav Communism and the National 
Question, 66-95. Dušan Bilandžić has similarly noted that “For the success of the National-Liberationary War, 
especially in its first phase, the decisive factor were the Serbs . . . the Communist Party of Croatia in 1942 succeeded 
in raising for battle about 7,000 people, the majority Serbs. By the middle of 1942, number had grown to 12,000 
again mainly Serbs.” See Bilandžić, Hrvatska Moderna Povijest (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1999), 129, 141. 
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with allegiance to the Yugoslav idea.” See Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement & the Yugoslav Resistance (Baltimore, 
MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1975), 186. Xavier Bourgarel points out that in order to attract more Muslims 
to the Partisans, separate “Muslim brigades” were created in which the main tenets of Islam were more strictly 
adhered to. See Bougarel, “Bosnian Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea,” 105-06. In Kosovo, according to Jozo 
Tomasevich, “Membership in the prewar Communist Party in the Kosovo region was small and almost exclusively 
limited to Serbian and Montenegrin settlers, with a handful of Albanian intellectuals who had few contacts and no 
real influence. After the former left the region, the Albanian people, largely peasants dominated by reactionary 





     Alongside the CPY’s political goals of creating a federal system and promoting “brotherhood 
and unity” was a commitment to the country’s economic modernization, which was also viewed 
as a crucial element in promoting better interethnic relations. Tito himself claimed that socialism 
would unite not only the South Slavs, but also the non-Slavs of Yugoslavia,
113
 and Yugoslav 
communists in general believed that economic modernization would create a new “Yugoslav 
consciousness” among the country’s diverse ethnic groups,114 which would help transcend 
Yugoslavia’s seemingly chronic national problems.115  
 
     Another point worth noting is that while the dedication of many members of the communist 
leadership to “brotherhood and unity” was undoubtedly genuine, many of these individuals were 
anomalies amongst their own people. As Aleksa Djilas notes,  
In many respects the young Yugoslav communists of the 1930s, though active in 
arousing the masses, were psychologically outside society. In this sense they were 
not integrated in their own nation. They lived for prolonged periods in close-knit 
groups that became not only their political and ideological universe but also a 
kind of family. For many revolutionaries this ideological-political family was 
more important than attachment to their nations . . . For them, the idea that one 
day all people could feel an international political loyalty stronger and 
emotionally deeper than the loyalty to one’s nation was based on personal 
experience and not simply on theory. For since all today’s real Communists were 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of many chieftains. They were easily persuaded to see the Partisan movement as not only a Serbian and Montenegrin 
movement—as indeed it was in that area—but also as Christian and Communist-controlled and thus opposed to the 
political and social interests of Albanian Muslims.” See Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 155.   
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internationalists, then tomorrow, when everyone became a Communist, everyone 




     Very early on, however, the logic of Balkan ethnoconfessionalism began to influence and 
transform Yugoslav Marxism itself. This was apparent even as Tito and the CPY took power.
117
 
Given the horrors of the war, this was perhaps to be expected. The Slovene writer, poet and 
politician Edvard Kocbek, for instance, noted in the early 1950s that “In Belgrade, such a 
bjesomucna hatred of Croats rules, and in Zagreb towards Serbs, that both would at the 
beginning of a war or of civil unrest kill, slaughter and torture each other as never before in 
history.”118 Coming just six years after the horrors of World War II, this was an ominous and 
depressing summation of the chances for interethnic reconciliation in the new state.   
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      The process of reconciling the Titoist system with the reality of ethnoconfessional 
nationalism became evident after Yugoslav Stalinism ended in 1949 and the Yugoslav 
communists began searching for a way to distinguish Yugoslav socialism from the Soviet model. 
The effort began in the 1950s with significant changes to Yugoslavia’s nationalities policy. The 
changes of the period 1948-53 were officially enshrined in the "Fundamental Law" adopted on 13 
January 1953.
119
 The reforms agreed to limited the federal government’s policymaking authorities 
only to those areas exclusively granted to the federation by the constitution (foreign affairs, 
defense, internal affairs, finance, and commodity trade). Execution and administration of 
governmental affairs in all other areas was left to the republics and local organs of government. By 
the end of 1952, Yugoslavia was effectively economically decentralized.
120
 Even during this early 
period in communist rule, the reform debate had already begun to resemble the interregional and 
interethnic conflicts of the interwar period. As Dennison Rusinow noted, less than ten years after 
the communists had come to power, the Yugoslav system had developed into    
. . . an effective pluralism in which consensus was to prove peculiarly evasive, 
primarily because the regional element in the conflict of interests would be 
perceived by most of the participants as an ethnic conflict and thus elevated to a 
transcendent and emotional level which made mutual understanding and 
compromise extraordinarily difficult. Thus it was that the Yugoslav 'national 
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     As a result of this “re-emergence” of the Yugoslav national questions, what was already evident 
by the early 1950s was a process by which over the next three decades power would continually 
devolve from the federal government to ethnoconfessionally-based republics. Moreoever, even at 
this early date the Yugoslav communists themselves were beginning to voice their doubts as to 
the country’s long-term viability. In 1957, Kardelj was already claiming, according to Dobrica 
Čosić, that Yugoslavia “was a temporary historical creation . . . with the development of 
processes of global integration and the overcoming of the imperialist epoch, her peoples will 
enter into new associations and integrations according to their civilizational and spiritual 
affinities . . . “122 
 
     Throughout this period, although much of the rhetoric of reform was obscured in theoretical 
guise as a struggle for "de-etatization," “de-centralization” or “democratization,” the real 
underpinning of support for the reform process was nationalism; thus,   
Although the movement for reform drew its real strength from the revival of 
nationalistic feelings, the reformers were careful to try to disguise this aspect. For 
example, Bakarić, the Croatian Party leader, succeeded in switching the demand of 
the reformers away from 'decentralization', with its nationalistic connotation, 
towards 'de-etatization' . . . But sophisticated managers, economists, or politicians 
knew well that the demand for de-etatisation was directed primarily against the 
power of the federal government, and was implicitly a demand for strengthening the 
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     The devolution of central authority to the republics continued in the 1960s. The 1963 
Constitution reinstated the right to secession “of the peoples of Yugoslavia” (a right that had, as 
noted above, been guaranteed in the original 1946 Constitution but left out of the Fundamental 
Law of 1953).
124
 Although the Yugoslav central leadership had in 1958 officially endorsed an 
attempt to create a supranational Yugoslav identity, this had already been abandoned by the early 
1960s 
125
 The 1963 Constitution also marked the first time Yugoslavia’s Muslims were formally 
recognized as a separate nation.
126
. Decision-making in Yugoslavia underwent numerous 
changes during the 1960s, all in favor of more devolution of power along republican lines and 
assuming more explicitly consociational features. After Ranković’s removal in 1966 the principle 
of proportional representation (i.e., based on the size of the regional party unit) was introduced into 
central party organs, but by 1970, proportional representation had given way to outright parity 
representation for all republican and provincial organizations, thereby giving each regional party 
organization equal representation in central party organs regardless of the size of its population. 
Croats at this time successfully pushed the process one step further by insisting on the principle of 
unanimity in decision-making, effectively giving every republic and province a veto over state and 
party policy.
127
 In keeping with such trends, the regime used “ethnic arithmetic” to determine the 
composition and staffing of key party and government positions.
128
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
continuing disputes over the economic powers of the federation.” Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia, 
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     Other changes during the 1960s similarly showed how political power was shifting to the 
republics. The Eighth LCY Congress, held in December 1964, endorsed changes allowing for 
republican and provincial congresses to be convened before the federal party congress, which 
reduced the all-Yugoslav Party Congress to "a synthesis of the results of the congresses of the 
Leagues of Communists of the republics"—a clear indication that power was shifting to the 
republics and away from central party organs. Nominations to the LCY’s Presidium would be 
made by the republican congresses, and republican representatives would be accountable to the 





     The LCY at this time also adopted a shift in policy away from promoting a common 
Yugoslav identity and in favor of more narrow, ethnically based identities. The most obvious 
evidence of this is the fact that at the Eighth Congress of the LCY in 1964, in the space 
signifying a party member’s ethnic identity, Tito for the first time was listed as a Croat, not as a 
Yugoslav.
130
 Even Yugoslav Marxist theory (which, as the quip went, was “more Groucho than 
Karl”) was giving in to the power of the country’s ethnoconfessional realities; prominent 
Yugoslav communists were arguing, contra the orthodox Marxist standpoint that the proletariat 
has no homeland, that while there was no “Yugoslav” working class, there were in fact “national 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
should be pointed out that they were popular among all the republican politicians, for they enhanced each of their 
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working classes” in Yugoslavia.131  Thus, by the 1960s, ethnoconfessionalism was pervading 
every aspect of political and public life in Yugoslavia; as Dennison Rusinow noted at this time,   
The tendency to subsume all other questions and conflicts to the national one and 
to interpret and simplify every issue in national terms, reminiscent of old 
Yugoslavia and of the Habsburg monarchy before it and always an important sub-
theme in the new Yugoslavia, was again becoming nearly universal. There was 
thus recreated the atmosphere and intensity of emotion which come to surround 
the question of nationality when all discontent and every grievance, every 





    Evidence of how different ethnoconfessional identities influenced one’s views could be found 
in the different reactions members of different ethnoconfessional groups had to the same event. 
Thus, when the longtime head of the Yugoslav secret police, Aleksandr Ranković, was purged in 
1966, “most Serbs and nearly all Croats were inclined to view Rankovic’s fall . . . as a Serbian 
defeat.” In Zagreb, there was an “almost universal tendency to interpret it as primarily a victory 
for Croatian interests,”133 while “In Serbia and among Serbs outside of Serbia . . . the affair was 
viewed as an attack on the Serb nation and its position in Yugoslavia.”134 
 
     An interesting political experiment by the LCY in multicandidate elections at this time showed 
how problematic ethnoconfessional allegiances continued to be, even during an economically 
successful period in Yugoslavia’s history. In Bosnia, as Sabrina Ramet noted,  
Yugoslavia’s brief flirtation with multicandidate elections confirmed the 
prominence of ethnocentrism in political choice. In local elections held in 
Derventa during July and August 1968, for instance, voters overwhelmingly cast 
their ballots along ethnic lines—Serbs supporting Serbs, Croats voting for Croats, 
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and Muslim for Muslims. As might be expected, however, very few (about 3 
percent), when asked about their voting patterns, would admit that ethnicity had 




     The most serious outbreak of nationalism to challenge the Yugoslav communist order in the 
Titoist period was what would become known as “the Croatian Spring” of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. In March 1967, a “Declaration Concerning the Name and Position of the Croatian 
Literary Language,” signed by 144 intellectuals from 19 different Croatian cultural institutions, 
called for a separation of Croatian from Serbian, and making Croatian one of the four literary 
languages of Yugoslavia (in addition to Slovenian, Macedonian, and Serbo-Croatian). 
Interestingly, more than half the signatories were party members.
136
 The “Declaration” was  
a direct repudiation of the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement, which had been signed by 
leading Serbian and Croatian intellectuals in more unificatory days . . . in 
demanding recognition of the Croatian literary language as an independent entity, 
it undermined the only remaining historical connection to the original Yugoslav 
movements of the nineteenth century . . . By opening the door to full linguistic 
separation, the Croatian cultural nationalists thus called all other types of Serb-




     Among the various demands participants in the “Croatian Spring” voiced were calls for the 
creation of separate Croatian territorial defense forces, a separate seat for Croatia at the United 
Nations, and a territorial revision of Yugoslavia’s internal borders in favor of Croatia and at the 
expense of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
138
 Members of Matica Hrvatska, a Croatian 
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cultural organization, claimed that Croats in Bosnia were being denied many basic rights, and 
that Croats in Bosnia were underrepresented in all major political, social, and economic 
institutions. Some extremists called for Croat–populated areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be 
annexed by Croatia.
139
 In a harbinger of what would happen during a subsequent era of national 
homogenization, Serbs in Croatia counter-mobilized and called for a federalization of Croatia, 
increased political, cultural and national rights, and separate representation for Serbs as a 
national group in the Croatian parliament.
140
 Tito himself claimed in a speech in July 1971 that 
“under the cover of ‘national interest’ all hell collects, . . . even to counter-revolution . . . in some 





     One of the most important legacies of the Croatian Spring was that it showed the ability of the 
national issue to unite broad sections of the public around a common, national, goal. As Jasna 
Dragović-Soso notes,  
for the first time since 1945, ‘national homogenisation’ had taken place in one 
republic—bringing together the Party leadership, intellectuals and wider segments 
of society—around the goal of creating a national state. The Croatian experience 
thus set a precedent for what was to take place in Serbia and Slovenia in the latter 
part of the 1980s.
142
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      The process of devolution along ethnoconfessional lines continued into the 1970s, against a 
backdrop of increasing public concern in Yugoslavia about the state of interethnic relations.
143
 
Amendments to the federal constitution adopted in 1971 stripped the federal government of most 
of its remaining powers. Croats generally tended to view them as only the first step toward 
achieving full sovereignty, while in Belgrade many Serbs viewed the new amendments as the first 
step toward the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and began to voice concern about the fate of Serbs 
left outside of inner Serbia. The Croatian weekly Hrvatski tjednik (at the time one of the largest 
circulation publications in Croatia) claimed that the 1971 amendments were “only the first step 
towards a full realization of Croatian ‘national aspirations’.”144 In the end, Tito himself intervened 
to end the “Croatian Spring” in December 1971 by personally demanding the resignation of the 
Croatian party leadership after it had become clear that they had lost control of the situation in 
Croatia.  
 
              Nevertheless, while losing the battle for reform of the Yugoslav system, in many ways the 
protagonists of the Croatian Spring and like-minded allies in other republics eventually won the 
war with the adoption of Yugoslavia’s controversial 1974 Constitution. An unbearably long, 
confusing, and obtuse document, “surpassing in number of articles and equaling in number of 
words the previous record-holder, the Constitution of India,”145 formally endorsed the 
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constitutional amendments of 1971 making the republics sovereign entities, and created a 
confederal relationship between the republics and the federal government.
146
 Among the more 
important features of the 1974 Constitution was the creation of a State Presidency composed of 
nine members, one from each republic and province (plus Tito, who, in his capacity as LCY 
president, served in the state presidency for a term “without mandate,” suggesting that even human 
mortality would not interfere with his position). The earlier decision to require unanimity in 
decision making, thereby giving each federal unit a veto over federal policy, was also officially 
enshrined in the 1974 constitution, “despite the often prolonged and futile character of such 
consultation and agreement seeking procedures.”147  Thus, in both symbolic and practical terms, 
the republics and provinces had achieved de jure and de facto sovereign equality, regardless of the 
size of their populations. The same emphasis on regional parity was reflected in the bicameral 
Federal Assembly.
148
 The 1974 Constitution would subsequently become the subject of 
considerable debate as to whether it provided a mechanism for the country to survive, or whether it 
in fact doomed the country to inevitable disintegration.
149
 Regardless of one’s views on the 
ultimate historical effects of the 1974 Constitution, what is clear is that, in the long tradition of 
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ethnoconfessional corporate self-government, it granted the ethnically--based republics and 
provinces a very significant amount of control over their own internal affairs. As Dennison 
Rusinow noted, by the end of the 1970s,  
The individual republics now have nearly as much control over their economic 
fortunes and cultural identities as the sovereign states in the European Economic 
Community (which means that their control is not unlimited or free of intra-
Yugoslav and wider interdependence!). Their local political leaderships, while 
actually less freely and competitively elected than in the late 1960s, are at least their 
own, internally imposed by co-nationals rather than externally imposed; and those 
who represent the republics in federal institutions are genuinely delegated by and 




     Yugoslav specialists continue to debate whether the impetus for the 1974 constitution was 
economic or nationalist; in other words, were those proposing reforms to Yugoslavia’s 
constitutional, political, and economic system at this time acting out of a desire to democratize 
Yugoslavia’s political system and create a more market-oriented economy, or were they operating 
from more fundamentally nationalist motives? Arguably, the latter should be considered a more 
convincing motive. As noted above (p. 164, footnote 84), individuals with an implicitly nationalist 
agenda at the time had learned the advantages of strategically expressing their preferences; thus, 
knowing that nationalist discontent could not be expressed openly, it was frequently cloaked in the 
guise of more politically-acceptable rhetoric regarding the need for the “de-etatization” of society. 
Thus, as Dennison Rusinow points out, although the Croatian strategy in the late 1960s-early 
1970s for transferring power and authority away from Belgrade and towards the individual 
republics was publicly justified by the need to democratize both the LCY and Yugoslav society, 
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and to remove old communists from power who were preventing political and economic 
modernization,  
Implicitly underlying this line of attack were other ethnic and historical 
considerations. The metaphor for all that was outdated, centralist, and authoritarian 
was “Belgrade.” Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. Serbia, whose notorious ‘Serbian 
bourgeoisie” had ruled and ruthlessly exploited richer, more sophisticated Croatia 
and Slovenia in prewar Yugoslavia, and who had recently attempted a repeat 
performance with Ranković and a Serbian-dominated Party and police bureaucracy. 
Serbian politicians, primitive by education, hardfisted by training, and therefore 
‘neo-Stalinist’ or at least ‘dogmatic Communist’ by definition. Serbian hegemony, 
exploitative and authoritarian, the primary—perhaps the only—reason why Croatia 
was not already as rich and democratic as . . . Denmark? The Croatian strategy had 
from the start two faces: one nationalist, one socialist. As early as 1967, before and 
after the language crisis, the new leadership had become sensitive to the charge that 





     Yugoslavia’s final years yet again revealed the “predominance of ethnocentrism in political 
choice.” By the 1980s, it had become essentially impossible to try to turn the country into a one-
person, one-vote, majoritarian democracy. As Slovenian president Milan Kucan argued, “Can the 
imposition of majority decisionmaking in a multinational community by those who are the most 
numerous be anything else but the violation of the principle of the equality of nations, the negation 
of its sovereignty and therefore the right to autonomous decisionmaking . . . “152 On July 2nd, 1990, 
the Slovene legislature adopted—by a margin of 178-3 (with 2 abstentions)—a “Declaration on the 
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Sovereignty of the State of the Republic of Slovenia.”153 Meanwhile, ethnoconfessional 
homogenization was making similar progress in Serbia. In the December 1990 elections to the 
Serbian parliament, 88 percent of the seats went to three parties (the Socialist Party of Serbia, the 
Serbian Renewal Movement, and the Democratic Party) all of which supported continued Serbian 
control over Kosovo and the redrawing of borders to bring all Serbs into one state if Yugoslavia 
were to disintegrate.
154
 By contrast, the weakness of multiethnic, all-Yugoslav sentiment was 
evident in the poor showing of Ante Marković’s Alliance of Reform Forces; in the four republics 





     As various competing plans to federalize or confederalize the country were brought to the table, 
one’s position predictably fell along ethnoconfessional lines; thus, Slovenes, Croats and Albanians 
strongly supported the confederal option, while Serbs (especially Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-




      By the 1970s, even the architects of communist Yugoslavia had begun to understand the 
magnitude of the problems they were dealing with, and had begun to accept the possibility that 
their efforts had been quixotic. As Eduard Kardelj told a colleague in 1971, “We have up until 
now tried everything possible to maintain Yugoslavia: first it was a unitary state, then it became 
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a federation, and now we are moving towards a confederation. If even that does not succeed, 
then it only remains for us to admit that the Comintern was right when it claimed that Yugoslavia 
was an artificial creation, and that we—Yugoslav communists—had made a mistake.”157 
 
 
VI. The Ethno-Confessional Segmentation of Yugoslav Society—1945-1999 
     In trying to understand the ethno-confessional disintegration of Yugoslavia, it is useful to start 
with some basic facts. In Croatia, 89.6 percent of the population is ethnically Croat, while 87.8 
percent of the population is Roman Catholic. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 48 percent of the 
population is Bosniac, while 40 percent of the population is Muslim; 37.1 percent of the 
population is ethnically Serb, while 31 percent of the population is Orthodox; and 14.3 percent of 
the population is Croat, while 15 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. In Macedonia, 66 
percent of the population is either ethnically Macedonian or Serbian, while 70 percent of the 
population is Orthodox; 29 percent of the population is either Albanian or Turkish, while 29 
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     Clearly, there is an intimate link between religious and ethnic identities in the Balkans, and it 
is symptomatic of the problems the former Yugoslavia confronted that the Islamic, Roman 
Catholic, and Serbian Orthodox religious establishments, in the view of one expert on inter-
religious ties in the former Yugoslavia “never, during the seventy year’s of Yugoslavia’s 
existence, established genuine cooperation.”159 After World War II and its attendant 
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ethnoconfessional conflicts (particularly in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia) the divisions 
between the different religious organizations and their adherents widened. As Perica notes,  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Catholic-Orthodox relations, observed at the 
level of Croat and Serb religious elites, seemed strikingly analogous to the 
Concordat crisis of the 1930s and the prewar mobilization of the churches from 
1937 to 1941. This time, points of conflict included an even larger number of 
concrete issues, plus a propaganda war over the causes of the current crisis and 




     While the divisive nature of religion in the Balkans caused problems from the bottom up, 
communist attempts to manipulate both ethnoconfessional identity and religious organizations 
per se also played a role in furthering ethnic divides. Several features of the regime’s religious 
policies—for instance, recognizing the Muslims in Bosnia & Herzegovina as a separate nation, 
or the creation of an independent Orthodox church organization in Macedonia--had the effect of 
emphasizing “the specifically religious lineaments of national identity, ensuring that, with the 
eruption of conflict in an ethnic framework, it would also have a religious coloring.”161  
 
     By the 1980s, some religious officials were already calling for a breakup of Yugoslavia along 
“civilizational” lines. In October 1987, a Serbian Orthodox Church official (anticipating Samuel 
Huntington by several years), in the official church organ Pravoslavlje, wrote an article claiming 
that Yugoslavia should be partitioned into an “Eastern Orthodox-Byzantine sphere of influence” 
and a “western Roman Catholic sphere of influence” because “the two incompatible worlds 
sharply differ from one another in religion, culture, historical development, ethics, psychology 
and mentality, and therefore previous conflicts that culminated with massacres in the Second 
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World War could be repeated.”162 In 1987, the Serbian Patriarch German had come to the 
conclusion that “Never was I closer to the truth that the Serbian question can only be solved in a 
Serbian state.”163 Attitudes in the Catholic Church were similarly becoming more explicitly 
opposed to the common state; by May 1991, on the eve of Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia, 
an editorial in Glas Koncila claimed “We can say, with a clear conscience, that Yugoslavia, 
every one up to now and also the present one, was a negative experience for the Croats and 
Catholics.”164 Years later, Glas Koncila’s editor, Živko Kustić, would go even further, noting 
that together, the Catholic Church and Franjo Tudjman’s HDZ “destroyed Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslavia had to be destroyed, that was a question of honor. Those who didn’t want to destroy 
Yugoslavia were not honorable people.”165 
 
    Religious divisions, however, were only one aspect of post-1945 Yugoslavia’s disintegration. 
Official governmental educational policy also showed the effects of Yugoslav society’s division 
along ethnoconfessional lines. In the immediate postwar years the individual republics had 
already been granted responsibility over education on their own territory, and after 1948 there 
was no federal level ministry of education.
166
 By the 1960s, Yugoslav educational policy in the 
various republics had turned away from an emphasis on Yugoslavia and “brotherhood and 
unity,” and towards an emphasis on each individual nation and republic, or what would become 
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known as cultural particularism. As Andrew Wachtel notes, “it was the gradual victory of 
cultural particularism that laid the crucial groundwork for the ultimate political collapse of 
Yugoslavia.
167
 After completing an important public opinion survey in the late 1980s, Burg and 
Berbaum concluded that “our findings lend indirect support to the commonly held notion that a 
university education socializes one to Croatian nationalism in Croatia, tends to foster Bosnian 
Muslim ethnic and political identity in Bosnia, and contributes to the promulgation of 
Macedonian national identity in Macedonia.”168  
 
     The visible effect of cultural particularism was that Yugoslav citizens had fewer and fewer 
opportunities to learn about or exchange information with other ethnic groups in the state. In 
Croatia “for all intents and purposes the [educational] program here was one of full-scale, or 
almost full-scale, Croatian nationalism . . . although the language taught was said to be ‘Croatian 
or Serbian,’ no provision in this normative program was made for schools in majority Serb 
districts.” In the Macedonian education plan for 1974, “In the section on the romantic period . . . 
five class hours were supposed to be devoted to Pushkin, Lermontov, and Byron, nine hours to 
Vuk [Karadzić], Zmaj, Njegoš, Mažuranić and Prešeren, and fourteen hours to the almost non-
existent Macedonian romantic tradition.” In Slovenia, “things had gone so far [in the teaching of 
history] that the life of Boris Kidrić received more attention than did that of Tito.” By the 1980s, 
“no federal control or even recommendations in the field of education were to be tolerated . . . 
Given these attitudes toward the central government and the idea of a shared culture it is hard to 
see how Yugoslavia could have survived, even had the most able and compromising political 
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leaders emerged after the death of Tito.”169 In 1976-77, Croatian theaters “did not present a 
single work written by a dramatist from another republic, and only one book was translated into 
Croatian from a language of another Yugoslav nationality.”170 The media in the former 
Yugoslavia also broke up along ethno-regional lines.
171
 Even the editorial boards of major 
journals became increasingly mono-ethnic in the postwar period, with the result being that “when 
the project of creating Yugoslav socialist culture was basically abandoned in the 1960s, splits 
along national lines occurred more quickly and were more extreme than they would have been 




      The fragmentation of the educational system limited the ability of students to learn about 
other parts of what was nominally their own country, or to interact with students from other 
republics. In Zagreb in the 1970s, it was easier to find a foreign language school in which one 
could study German or English rather than a school where one could learn Albanian, 
Macedonian, or Slovenian. Similarly, it was easier at the time to get a fellowship to study in 
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Britain rather than in Skopje. Countrywide, on average less than ten percent of all students left 




     The disintegration and fragmentation of Yugoslavia’s socio-political and economic space was 
also reflected in a similar dynamic occurring amongst alternative political and intellectual elites, 
where concern for the nation (i.e., gaining or enhancing the nation’s autonomy, sovereignty, or 
independence) often was of more importance than the struggle for democracy; in Yugoslavia, as 
Vladimir Gligorov has argued, “Opposition groups [were] more ready to cooperate with the 
Communists of their own nationality than with the opposition of some other nationality.”174 In 
Croatia in the 1960s and 70s, “most dissidents saw the central task as the achievement of 
national sovereignty, while the issue of one-party rule was less important, and they conditioned 
cooperation with Belgrade on the acceptance of Croatia’s right to secede—a goal that was hardly 
conducive to unite dissidents across republics.”175 In 1984, intellectuals from Croatia and 
Slovenia refused to join in efforts initiated by Dobrica Cosić, and supported by the Slovenian 
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intellectual Taras Kermauner and the Croatian Praxist philosopher Rudi Supek to create an all-
Yugoslav “Committee for the Defense of Thought and Freedom,” preferring instead to create 
their own separate, republic organizations.
176
 Even the way the regime dealt with dissidents 
followed an ethnoconfessional logic; thus, in the early 1980s, after Alija Izetbegović and several 
other Muslims were convicted in a Sarajevo court for Muslim fundamentalism, similar trials of 
Croats and Serbs had to follow; thus, “Trials in Bosnia (as, in any case, with everything else in 
that republic) had to follow the national key: the trial of Muslim dissidents meant that soon the 
trials of Serb and Croat dissidents in that republic would follow.”177  
 
     Even the ability of Yugoslavia’s scholars to cooperate with each other began to wane in the 
1960s. By the end of the 1960s “it became increasingly clear that the unity of Yugoslav 
historiography was dependent on regime unity.”178 Pan-Yugoslav efforts to engage in joint 
scholarly endeavors or to write common histories were already collapsing by the 1970s; two such 
efforts, The History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia, and the History of the Communist 
Party/League of Communists of Yugoslavia, came to a halt in the early 1970s and were replaced 
by more particularist projects dedicated to the study of individual republics and/or peoples.
179
 
Croatian dissatisfaction with attempts to publish a joint dictionary of the Serbo-Croatian 
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language led to the project’s demise in the 1960s after the first three volumes came out. Croatian 
linguists at this time began asserting the existence of a “Croatian standard language,” which, as 
Robert Greenberg has noted  
would be a ‘Croat’ language, that is, the language of ethnic Croats, and not the 
language of people residing within the borders of the Socialist Republic of 
Croatia. Croat linguists found it necessary to distance the speech of Croats from 
that of the neighboring ‘non-Croats,’ no matter how similar their dialect is.180 
 
     By the 1970s an academic division of intellectual labor along ethnoconfessional lines was 
also visible; thus, “according to an unwritten rule authors were expected to write about their own 
ethnic groups and publish works in the appropriate ‘ethnic’ journals.” According to this 
“unwritten rule,” Croat scholars would study the dialects of ethnic Croats and publish their 
findings in a Croatian journal, and Serb scholars would study the dialects of ethnic Serbs and 
publish their articles in a Serbian journal.
181
 The intellectual results of such a system were 
predictable; at the Eighth Congress of Yugoslav Historians, a news report at the time noted, it 
was possible “to predict a scholar’s polemical arguments by his national origin.”182  
 
     The history of the Bosnia-Herzegovinian Dialectological Journal, founded in 1975, shows the 
extent to which ethnoconfessional concerns dominated intellectual endeavour. Since Bosnia & 
Herzegovina was officially a multiethnic republic, a journal such as the “Bosnia-Herzegovinian 
Dialectological Journal” could not formally be ethnically-oriented. Very quickly, however, it did 
become so to all intents and purposes:   
the vast majority of dialect studies published in the journal were dedicated to the 
speech of either ethnic Croats or Muslims, and the journal seemed to have 
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provided the impetus for a marked increase in the number of ethnocentric dialect 
studies. A summary of the twenty-one most important ethnocentric studies for 
ethnically mixed regions published from 1970 through 1986 shows that ten were 
written about ethnic Serb dialects, five about Muslim dialects, four about Croat 




          The overwhelming centrality of national issues in Yugoslavia also manifested itself in 
many other areas of social life, perhaps most importantly in marriage patterns. Traditionally, the 
millet system and the various Catholic, Muslim and Orthodox religious organizations 
discouraged interethnic or interconfessional marriage; as Barbara Jelavich has noted, under the 
millet system, “All religious organizations forbade intermarriage. . . . There was little chance of 
conversions from the Muslim community to Christianity, since this action was punishable by 
death. In general, both Christian and Muslim authorities acted to maintain the religious status 
quo.”184  
 
     The traditional social and religious tendency to frown upon interethnic or interconfessional 
marriages continued to have a visible impact in 20
th
 century Yugoslavia. Throughout the post-
1945 period, interethnic marriage rates held steady at 12-13 percent of all marriages; seen a 
different way, 87-88 percent of the population chose as a marriage partner a member of the same 
ethnic group. Nicolai Botev suggests that there were what he has termed three “zones of 
attraction” visible in the former Yugoslavia: people from the “Western” tradition (former Austro-
Hungarian territories, i.e, Croatia and Slovenia) who are predominantly Catholic have a greater 
tendency to intermarry, as do people from the “Balkan tradition” (Orthodox Christians--
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Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Serbs) from formerly Ottoman areas, and people from the 
Middle-Eastern tradition (Bosniacs and Albanians). As Botev notes, “those who marry outside 
their own ethnic group prefer partners from their own cultural tradition.”185  
 
     Even in multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, in 1981 only some 15.3 percent of the marriages 
were interethnic/interconfessional, and the overwhelming majority of these occurred primarily 
between Serbs and Croats; 95.3 percent of Muslim women and 92.9 percent of Muslim men 
married endogamously.
186
 In the midst of Bosnia’s civil war in the 1990s, the leading Islamic 
                                                        
185 See Nicholai Botev, “Seeing Past the Barricades: Interethnic Marriage in Former Yugoslavia, 1962-1989,” in Joel 
M. Halpern and David A. Kideckel, eds., Neighbors at War: Anthropological Perspectives on Yugoslav Ethnicity, 
Culture and History (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 219—233. As Botev 
adds, “ethnic endogamy has been the norm in Yugoslavia, and over the years studied (1962 to 1989) no clear trend 
emerged, either in terms of increasing rates of intermarriage or decreasing social distance between the various ethnic 
groups” (232).  A study by Marie-Paul Canapa done in the 1980s suggests that there were exceptions to the rule of 
“zones of attraction;” for instance, she argues that Bosnian Muslims preferred to marry Croats or Serbs (with whom 
they shared a common language) rather than Kosovo Albanians. See Canapa, “L’islam  et la question des 
nationalités en Yougoslavie,” in Olivier Carré and Paul Dumont (eds.), Radicalismes islamiques (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, Vol. 2, 100-150), as cited by Duijzengs, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, 128. John 
Allcock has reached conclusions similar to Botev’s, arguing that “In the eighties the percentage of mixed marriages 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina (about 12%) was equivalent to that in Yugoslavia as a whole. Given the importance of the 
mixture of populations in Bosnia such a percentage perhaps indicates rather the permanence of communal barriers . . 
. In Bosnia-Herzegovina mixed marriages were essentially a feature of the urban elite and manual workers, and were 
the most frequent between Serbs and Croats.” See Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 376. Certain ethnic groups, 
however, were more likely to marry endogamously than others. Ramet, for instance, claims that this was particularly 
true of smaller ethnic groups in Yugoslavia such as the Italians, Ruthenes, and Bulgarians. See Ramet, Nationalism 
and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 22. Similarly, Tone Bringa points out that “In rural areas of central Bosnia, marriages 
between members of different religious communities were rare, as the social costs in terms of opposition from the 
respective families and the general community were often adjudged too high.” Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian 
Way, 149. According to Islamic law, it is haram (forbidden) for a Muslim woman to marry a non-Muslim man. 
(Bringa, 152). In Kosovo and Macedonia, Hugh Poulton has noted that “the incidence of intermarriage between the 
two largest groups—in both cases predominantly Muslim Albanians and Orthodox Slavs—was almost negligible.” 
Poulton, “Macedonians and Albanians as Yugoslavs,” in Djokić, Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 123. 
186 See Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 42. Some Bosniac historians have begun suggesting that 
the Bosnian Muslims even have few blood ties with Croats or Serbs. Mustafa Imamović, the author of a recent major 
history entitled Historija Bošnjaka, suggests that throughout their history the Bosnian Muslims intermixed very little 
with neighboring Slav populations. According to Imamović, “the Bosnian Slavs, later the Bošnjaks or Bosnian 
Muslims . . . mixed very little with other peoples . . . Bošnjaks rarely mixed blood even with other non-Slavic 
Muslims, despite the strong spiritual ties with the Islamic Orient.” See Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka (Sarajevo: 
Preporod, 1998), 23. This theme has been taken up by Muslim clerics in the Sandzak as well; for instance, the Mufti 
of the Islamic Community in Serbia, Muamer Zukorlić, is urging his followers to claim Illyrian descent rather than 




cleric in Bosnia, Mustafa Cerić, would go so far as to claim that interethnic marriages “are just 
another form of genocide against the Bosnian people.”187As Ramet argues, 
Religion plays an important role in nurturing ethnocentrism, and certain religious 
groups, such as the Muslims, have shown a marked predisposition toward 
ethnocentrism. The dramatically lower incidence of intermarriage between 
members of Yugoslavia’s Muslim community and members of other 





     The pattern of ethnoconfessional marriage endogamy has continued into Bosnia & 
Herzegovina’s postwar period. In the capital of Herzegovina, Mostar, in 1991, some ten percent 
of all marriages were mixed. In 2001, however, out of 176 recorded marriages in the town, not a 
single marriage was between a Bosniac and a Croat. In 2004, 0.7 percent of the marriages in 
Mostar were between Bosniacs and Croats, while in 2008, the figure had risen to 1.6 percent.
189
 
A 1998 USIA public opinion survey also found little evidence of interethnic unions; for instance, 
99% of Bosnian Muslim respondents said that their mother had been Muslim, and 98% said their 
fathers had been Muslims. Among Bosnian Serbs, the respective figures were 95% and 98%, and 
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Bosniac 15,622 14,702 170 350 
Croat 5,957 219 4,981 575 
Serb 9,571 394 522 8,361 
 
 
     Inter-ethnonconfessional marriages were also extremely rare in Macedonia. A study of 
Albanian, Turkish, and Macedonian households in the areas of Tetovo and Gostivar in Western 
Macedonia, published in 1974 by the sociologist Ilija Josifovski, showed that 96 percent of the 
heads of Albanian and Macedonian households, and 84 percent of the heads of Turkish 
households would not let their sons marry women of another nationality.”192 The popular 
opposition to interethnic and inter-confessional marriage in Macedonia as expressed in public 
opinion polls was also apparent practice; for instance, according to figures for selected years 
compiled by Ulf Brunnbauer, between 1952 and 1999 mixed Albanian-Macedonian marriages 
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     Significantly, religion even served as an important divide among the Albanians of Albania 
proper; thus, Duijzengs reports that in the 1980s, only five percent of the marriages in Shkodra 
were interconfessional, i.e., between Catholics and Muslims.
194
 Even family planning in the 
former Yugoslavia could have ethnic/nationalist connotations; in Kosovo, for instance, “Having 
a large number of children, apart from other perceived advantages, was also seen as ensuring for 
Kosovo an Albanian as opposed to a Serbian future.”195      
 
     As throughout much of Balkan history over the past several hundred years, ethnoconfessional 
identity also had a considerable influence on settlement patterns during the post-1945 period. 
Ottoman regulations had traditionally prescribed that people of different religious confessions 
live in separate mahale (quarters or neighborhoods) centered on each ethnoreligious 
community’s house of worship in towns and cities, and “the vast majority” of Balkan villages 
were mono-ethnic, or less frequently, two different groups might live side by side in one 
village.
196
 As the French social geographer Michel Roux has noted,  
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the element of mixture often only applied to the region as a whole: the habitat and 
‘lived spaces’ (espaces vécus) of different ethnic groups were always quite 
separate and segregated, especially at the village level. In most general terms, one 
can see a pattern of juxtaposition in rural areas—ethnically ‘pure’ villages 
forming an absolute majority—whereas mixture is more characteristic of urban 





     Physical proximity, however, did not mean that ethnic or cultural borders between people did 
not exist. In the Bosnian countryside,   
While in the village people of different ethnoreligious backgrounds would live 
side by side and often have close friendships, they would rarely intermarry. In 
some neighborhoods they would not even live side by side and would know little 
about each other. And while some families would have a long tradition of 




         Such ethnoconfessional spatial and symbolic divisions were visible in small towns as well. 
As part of their effort to secure the main strategic lines of communication, the Ottomans settled 
Anatolian Turks along main roads, fortified points or military outposts, and in urban areas.
199
 
Throughout most of the Ottoman period, towns were traditionally inhabited by Muslims and the 
countryside by the Christian peasantry, making urban areas ethnoconfessionally alien to the 
Christian population; thus, “When a Serb, Rumanian, or Bulgarian went into a town in his native 
land he found himself a foreigner.”200 The extent to which what one scholar has called “the cult 
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of Muslim precedence and prestige” existed in urban areas is apparent from the fact that of sixty-
one towns in Bosnia during the Habsburg period, fifty-eight of them had Muslim mayors.
201
 As 
Wayne Vucinich once noted,  
since the city population was predominantly Muslim and the Balkan rural 
population predominantly Christian, the city symbolized the place of the Muslim 
ruler, tax collector, and security agent. Conversely, the village symbolized the 
home of the oppressed and exploited Christian peasant, taxpayer, and food-
producer. The two societal components came to represent a struggle between two 
ways of life, which deepened and expanded as time went on. The protracted 
separation of village from city with hardly any interchange between them led to a 
dichotomy of mores, habits, and customs. The city dweller and the peasant 
differed in many basic aspects of their lives—in their food, dress, song, speech, 
folklore, and world outlook. After the Ottoman Empire expired, the village-city 
conflict continued, even though the city lost its Turkish character. The unbridged 




     This “unbridged chasm” between the Balkans’ different ethnoconfessional groups persisted 
throughout the 20
th
 century; as Ivan Cvitković notes, even before the latest war in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, “suburban, and especially rural settlements were nationally and confessionally 
‘clean.’ Even the old parts of urban areas (in Banja Luka, Tuzla, Sarajevo, Mostar . . . ) were 
nationally and confessionally ‘clean.”203  
 
     Different ethno-confessional groups used different architectural styles to build their homes, so 
even in mixed areas one could often tell the occupant’s ethnoconfessional background by the 
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style of the house.
204
 Muslim houses in Bosnia, for instance, were generally square with a four-
sided roof (similar to the construction of the village mosque), while Catholic houses in central 
Bosnia were mainly rectangular, with the roof sloping down on two sides.
205
 Non-Muslim 
mahalle (neighborhoods) in the cities and towns were immediately identifiable by the absence of 
minarets, and by the fact that the buildings and houses in non-Muslim mahalle were not as tall; 
under Ottoman law, Muslim buildings, both religious and secular, had to be taller than Christian 
ones.
206
 Some towns, such as Kruševo in Macedonia, had traditionally discouraged members of 
“other” ethnoconfessional groups (in the Kruševo case, Muslims) from settling in “their” town, 
even going so far as refusing to patronize businesses opened by Muslims.
207
 By the end of the 
seventeenth century, the traditionally non-denominational trade guilds began to split along 
confessional lines.
208
 Even food preparation revealed ethnoconfessional differences and made 
neighborly visits awkward; in Central Bosnia in the 1980s, for instance, “The food in Catholic 
houses was clearly a major problem for Muslims and was often what made them uncomfortable 
visiting them.”209 One American anthropologist doing field work in Bosnia in the 1960s reported 
that there appeared to be an “invisible boundary” between different ethnoconfessional groups: 
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Moslem gatherings are never attended by Christians and vice versa. Moslems and 
Christians sharing a community observe their own holidays. On one occasion in 
Gornji Vakuf, when a Moslem mevlud and a Catholic celebration fell on the same 
day, the town was evenly divided. The Moslem festivities were held at one end of 
town and the Croatian at the other, with youths of each group strolling the main 




     Such “invisible boundaries” between ethnoconfessional groups would continue after death as 
well. Many cemeteries in Bosnia, for instance, are divided into separate sections for Catholics, 




      Ethnoconfessional identity also played a role in determining such things as, on a micro-level, 
which apartment building one chose to move in to, or, on the macro level, which republic one 
moved to. In the 1974 Josifovski study in Macedonia, for instance, 71% of Albanians, 80% of 
Macedonians, and 73% of the Turks surveyed said they preferred to live in a building in which 
members of their own ethnic group lived.
212
 On an all-Yugoslav level, in the post-1945 period 
(but before the wars of the 1990s had started), the prevailing pattern of ethnic migration was that 
of Serbs from Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo moving to Serbia, Croats from 
Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia moving to Croatia, and Muslims from throughout Yugoslavia 
moving to Bosnia & Herzegovina.
213
 In 1981 alone, five times more Serbs and Croats moved out 
of Bosnia & Herzegovina than moved into it, while for Bosnian Muslims the number of 
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emigrants was equal to the number of immigrants.
214
 Two prominent Yugoslav social scientists, 
Stipe Šuvar and Dušan Bilandzić, both determined that the direction of migration was 
characterized more by the national and religious identities of the migrants than by economic 
considerations.
215
 After 1968, there was also a noticeable movement of Albanians from 
Macedonia, Montenegro, and southern Serbia into Kosovo, as well as Muslims from the Sandzak 
moving into Kosovo as well.
216
 By 1989, Kosovo society was “almost wholly segregated, with 
Albanian and Serbian children attending school in different shifts or in separate rooms.”217 This 
has continued into the present, as Serbs continue to move out of the Sandzak and into Serbia 
proper, Macedonian Slavs move out of Albanian-dominated municipalities in western 
Macedonia, and Croats emigrate from Bosnia & Herzegovina to Croatia.
218
 The various 
republican governments in the former Yugoslavia also played an active role in trying to control 
the movement of people according to ethnoconfessional criteria; Slovenian officials, for instance, 
by the 1980s had decided that they could no longer accept more Bosnians and Albanians 
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     The extent of this ethnoconfessional division of Balkan society has been both pervasive and 
long lasting. As a report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance published 
in 2001 noted in the case of Macedonia, 
. . . each of the main ethnic communities tends to live in a relatively homogeneous 
world of its own. Even where members of different ethnic groups live and even 
work alongside each other, they often have limited contact in daily life. Although 
interaction is increasing, particularly among young people and the educated and 
professional segments of society, many members of the various groups still tend 
to go to different restaurants, different cafes, different stores and even different 
schools. The organizations and associations of civil society too, are in large part 
divided along ethnic lines, as are the political parties . . . Public debate takes place 
within each community rather than between communities, each receiving 
information about events within the community, the country and the region from 




      Such social divisions, of course, had political implications as well. As Yugoslavia entered its 
final days, what is noteworthy is the large degree to which individuals voted along 
ethnoconfessional lines in deciding Yugoslavia’s fate, re-confirming the prominence of 
ethnocentrism in political choice. From Slovenia to Macedonia, overwhelming majorities of the 
titular ethnoconfessional group in each republic or province turned out to vote in various 
sovereignty referenda. From August 9
th—September 2nd, 1990, Serbs in Serb-majority regions in 
Croatia organized a referendum asking whether people supported autonomy for Serb-inhabited 
regions. Of 756,781 people who participated in the referendum, over 99% voted in favor of 
autonomy. On May 12
th
, 1991, the vote was repeated, again with the same result.
221
 In the 
December 23
rd
 1990 Slovenian plebiscite on independence, voters were asked “Should the 
Republic of Slovenia become an autonomous and independent state?” 93.5 percent of eligible 
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voters turned out, and 88.5 percent approved.
222
 On May 19
th
, 1991, Croatian voters were asked 
“Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign and independent state, which 
guarantees cultural autonomy and all civil rights to Serbs and members of other nationalities in 
Croatia, may enter into an alliance with other republics?” 83.6 percent of voters turned out, and 
93 percent approved.
223
 A separate question asking whether Croatia should stay in a federal 
Yugoslavia was rejected by 92 percent of the voters.
224
 On September 8
th
, 1991, Macedonian 
voters were asked whether they approved of Macedonian independence. Turnout was 71.85 
percent of the total electorate, of which 95.09 percent approved. In total, 71 percent voted in 
favor. The referendum, however, was boycotted by both Albanians and Serbs in the republic, 
which means that ethnic Macedonians almost unanimously voted in favor of independence.
225
 In 
September 1991, Kosovo Albanians held a referendum asking voters whether they supported 
making Kosovo an independent republic; organizers claimed that 940,802 people voted out of an 
eligible population of 1,051,357. Of those, over 99 percent reportedly voted in favor of the 
proposal.
226
 In January 1992, Albanians in Macedonia held a referendum on territorial autonomy 
within Macedonia; of the 92 percent of eligible voters who turned out, 74 percent voted in 
favor.
227
 In a referendum held in Bosnia & Herzegovina in February 1992 asking citizens 
whether Bosnia & Herzegovina should become an independent state, 64.4 percent of the 
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electorate turned out to vote, the overwhelming majority of whom were Bosniacs and Croats 
(according to the 1991 Bosnian census, Bosniacs and Croats made up 61 percent of the 
population of Bosnia-Herzegovina). Of these, 99.7 percent voted in favor of independence. The 
vast majority of Bosnia’s Serbs (31 percent of the population) boycotted the referendum.228  
 
      Thus, as Robert Hayden has noted, Bosnia’s 1990 democratic election was essentially an 
ethnic census. Given the chance to vote as Bosnians, the population of Bosnia & Herzegovina 
chose instead to vote, overwhelmingly, as Muslims, Serbs, and Croats.”229 This has been a 
pattern visible throughout Bosnia’s 20th century history (and into the 21st century as well). Thus, 
regardless of the political regime under which elections in Bosnia have been held:  
The results [of the 1990 elections] demonstrate remarkable historical consistency 
with previous Bosnian multiparty elections, whether in 1910 (the Austrian period) 
or in the 1920s (the royal Yugoslav era). In 1990, Bosnians again voted 
overwhelmingly for ethnically based parties, and a single party achieved an 




      Years of bloodshed in the 1990s did little to change the Bosnian population’s predilection for 
nationalist parties. In the 1997 municipal elections, parties with a multiethnic base of support 
won only six percent of the vote statewide (12 percent in the Federation, and 2 percent in the 
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RS). The three leading nationalist parties again captured 67% of the popular vote. Even this level 
of support for multiethnic parties was somewhat misleading, however, for "multiethnic" parties 
such as the Social Democratic Party (SDP) or the Union of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Social 




     Many observers have cautioned that the voting results of these referenda should be analyzed 
cautiously, and that a vote for “sovereignty” or “independence” did not necessarily mean a vote 
to break up Yugoslavia. Woodward, for instance, argues that “A vote in 1990 for a political party 
that emphasized ethnonational identity was not the same thing as a vote for a national state, and 
even a vote for the sovereignty of one’s republic was not necessarily a vote for independence, let 
alone commitment to war, should that be necessary.”232 Similarly, Burg and Shoup caution that 
with reference to the 1990 Bosnian elections, “The victory of the nationalist parties in the 
elections of 1990 was in some sense fraudulent, based on fear rather than on popular support for 
the views of the nationalists themselves . . . Everywhere, a feeling of fear drove persons to vote 
for the nationalist parties, even when they did not necessarily support these parties’ aims.”233 
And Robert Hayden has pointed out that even into 1990 a majority of citizens of the former 
Yugoslavia (57 percent according to one credible poll) were believed to still be in favor of a 
continuation of the country in some form.
234
 Nevertheless, viewed in a historical context, the 
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voting in all of these elections is consistent with long-term historical patterns, and as such should 
not be written off as accidents of history. 
 
VII: Conclusions 
     Robyn M. Dawes has argued that “’the role of the social scientist’ should not be in 
understanding and communicating to people ‘what we are like,’ but rather in analyzing and 
characterizing the influences that are likely to operate in human life and how they may lead on a 
probabilistic basis to change.”235 This chapter has attempted to show that at this particular time in 
southeastern Europe, and for perhaps the past 150 years, the most important indicator of the 
influences likely to operate in an individual’s life is his or her ethnoconfessional identity.  
 
     Moreover, the analysis provided in this chapter provides considerable evidence contradicting 
many premises of social constructivist theory. There are four primary points which should be 
noted here. First, Balkan ethnoconfessional groups can be considered unitary actors in many 
situations, especially those in which ethnic or national interests are exceptionally salient. The 
evidence provided above supports Ramet’s claim that ethnoconfessional group interests in the 
Balkans can be considered “monolithic.” This in turn contradicts many constructivist arguments 
questioning the validity of concepts such as “groupness.” Second, ethnoconfessional identity 
clearly provides a reliable indicator of a wide range of political and social behaviors. Third, the 
Balkan experience shows that ethnic identities are not as fluid and malleable as constructivism 
suggests, and that while individuals may have multiple identities, the salience of certain 
identities—most especially, ethnoconfessional identities—far outweigh the salience of others. In 
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fact, much evidence from southeastern Europe suggests that only some 10-20 percent of a given 
population possess “fluid, malleable” identities in any politically meaningful sense, making them 
in most cases politically irrelevant. Fourth, the Balkan experience also shows that ethnic groups 
or ethnic identities are not endogenous variables dependent upon other political, social, or 
economic processes. As the preceding analysis has shown, for the overwhelming majority of the 
population in the Balkans, ethnic identities have been fairly concrete and consistent over time, 
regardless of political regime, economic conditions, or conditions of war or peace.   
 
     This has many implications. First, it suggests that group rights will figure much more 
prominently in multiethnic political entities in the Balkans than in more monoethnic entities, and 
that traditional liberal democratic emphases on the individual will have to be balanced with such 
group rights. It also suggests that the functioning of political systems in multiethnic political 
systems will be considerably more complicated. As Roucek noted in the 1930s, the multiethnic 
states in the Balkans suffer from a “handicap of heterogeneity,” and evidence from the former 
Yugoslavia, and, more recently, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, amply bears out the 
difficulties that heterogeneous ethnic populations pose for the various states in southeastern 
Europe.  
 
     The evidence provided above also suggests that churches and mosques will likely play a 
much larger role in Balkan political and social life than in other democratic systems. Several 
factors—the legacy of the millet system, the fact that ethnic groups in the region have evolved as 




impact on the Balkans—combine to make the intertwining of church and state a normal feature 
of social and political life for most politicians and average citizens.    
 
     The argument also suggests that it would be wrong to believe that the problem of Balkan 
ethnoconfessional nationalism has ever been “solved.” The effort to create national states in the 
Balkans has been an ongoing process (albeit of greater or lesser intensities) for the past two 
hundred years. During this period, many of the multiethnic entities imposed on the region by 
outsiders have lacked the legitimacy (and, hence, internal stability) a state enjoying true support 
and loyalty from its population possesses. This has made multiethnic states in the Balkans 
inherently fragile and susceptible to disintegration whenever geo-political circumstances permit. 
Given the analysis provided above, as long as the Age of Nationalism lasts, it would be wrong to 
believe that these problems have been “solved.” Even as outsiders have attempted to promote 
multiethnic polities and societies, they have had to succumb to the power of ethnoconfessional 
nationalism in the region. As one scholar notes,  
Institutional change in former Yugoslavia, both domestically and internationally 
generated, has been moving towards the primacy of ethnicity. Some systems have 
been mono-national, other agreements established bi- or tri-national states. Only 
in Macedonia, some aspects of the Ohrid Agreement constitute a move away from 
institutionalized ethnicity. Even here this move away is at the symbolic level (in 
the preamble of the constitution), while the institutions of the state are given 
strong ethnic qualifiers.  
 
     Finally, the collective nature of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism suggests that dealing 
with the problem is much more complex than many “outsiders” realize. As seen above, the 
constructivist and instrumentalist emphasis on elites must be tempered with a greater 
appreciation for the interests and aspirations of the general population. Being a mass-




rooted and complex phenomenon than is commonly assumed, and much less susceptible to the 





Nations Making States 
 
I. On Elites and Institutions 
     A major constructivist research problem is identifying the mechanisms and processes by 
which social construction occurs. One approach has focused on the individuals or activists 
working to affect social change. This involves an interesting puzzle for social scientists, 
however, because activists working to affect change are often at a disadvantage with respect to 
forces supporting the status quo, such as governments, corporations, or other extant institutions.
1
 
Explanations based on elite power or state institutions, on the other hand, suggest that these 
forces have the ability to impose a sense of identity on the great mass of any given population. 
 
    An analysis of how constructivist explanations fare when applied to the various Balkan 
identity-projects and nation-building attempts is of particular interest because it reveals the 
importance of several things frequently overlooked in such accounts: the crucial importance of 
when a constructivist identity-formation or nation-building project is embarked upon; the fact 
that the economic or material incentives which integrating or centralizing institutions offer often 
fail to change either identities or behaviors, and the fact that identity-projects enjoying 
significant resource or material advantages over their ideological competitors frequently fail. 
Moreover, a review of a number of constructivist projects in southeastern Europe also reveals a 
somewhat more disturbing and problematic aspect of constructivism: the fact that constructivist 
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projects—whether those of Habsburg bureaucrats or 21st century liberal internationalists—
require a considerable amount of coercion, and the denial of fundamental political rights and 
civil liberties that supposed domestic patriots or foreign officials usually claim to be acting on 
behalf of.    
 
     In the context of the overall debate about the merits of constructivism, the Balkan experience 
is interesting because it has frequently shown the limits of elite or government power. In 
discussing the difficulties confronting such theories, one scholar has asked whether nations   
[can] . . . be created ab ovo, from an idea shared by five-six, or even fifty or sixty 
dreamers and like-minded individuals? Was the Yugoslav idea really the result of 
semi-sober discussions in Prague beer halls, a few songs about Yugoslavism, and 
a dozen sculptures, even if they were Meštrović’s? On the other hand—and in the 
same vein—was a group of writers gathered at Francuska 7 or those in Republic 
Square (today, Ban Jelačić’s Square) in Zagreb able to destroy the existence of a 
Yugoslav nation, even if they had (and if they could have) such intentions? Did 
the academicians in the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) really 
have such power over the hearts and minds (of many) Serbs (and some others) to 
reorient them away from Yugoslavism and towards Serbianism, and at that in a 
half-finished document (the so-called Memorandum) which the Academy 




     The extent to which elites really are so influential and consequential in identity-formation is 
related to theories focusing on the role of institutions (such as government bureaucracies, school 
systems, religious institutions, or military organizations) in this process. Yet Balkan history is 
replete with examples in which would-be nation-builders work on the assumption that such 
institutions are crucial in determining the “fluid and malleable” identities of their subjects, only 
to learn that their attempts had the opposite of their intended effect. Keith Darden, for instance, 
has recently suggested that the onset of mass schooling—“when a community shifts from an oral 
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to a literate mass culture”—is the point at which ethnic and national loyalties become fixed.3 Yet 
numerous examples from the Balkans suggest a number of problems with this type of 
explanation. First, in 19
th
 century Serbia and in Bosnia & Herzegovina, identities seem to have 
hardened and become fixed even when overwhelming majorities of the population were illiterate 
and unschooled. Second, schooling can also produce the opposite of the effect that Darden 
predicts. One example comes from the efforts of nineteenth century Hellenizers to educate the 
children of Bulgarian chorbadjii (the Bulgarian equivalent of Greek notables or Serbian knezes) 
and transform their identities: 
At some point in the education of these young men, a spark appeared to inflame 
their Bulgarian consciousness. The catalyst might be the reading of Paisius’ 
History; it might be the arrival of a converted fellow student. Once pushed over 
the threshold the young Slav began fervently to apply the lessons so well taught 
by his Greek teachers. He looked for ways to define and to defend his own 
nationality in the face of Greek exaggerations and belittlement of other peoples. 
He searched ancient sources for arguments to use to contradict his teachers. Going 
further, he instigated his fellow Bulgars to form a student society to look after 




     The passage above shows how elite strategies, or those of institutions such as educational 
systems, can have unpredictable and even counter-productive results. Note that the Greeks have 
the advantages of both organization and resources, yet some “spark” within the young Bulgars 
forces them to reject such Hellenization.  
 
     A similar example can be found in Bosnia during the Kállay period, when Habsburg efforts to 
cultivate indigenous Bosnian elites loyal to the monarchy, epitomized by the resources devoted 
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to educating young Bosnians such as Safvet-beg Bašagić, Vladimir Ćorović, or Tugumir 
Alaupović, “showed how the Austrian system could bring forward talented Bosnians into its civil 
service, but could not win their hearts.”5 Amongst Macedonians in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century,   
Virtually all members of the small Macedonian intelligentsia were educated in 
schools operated by the neighboring Balkan nationalist institutions in Macedonia 
or, with their financial support, in Athens, Belgrade, or Sofia. With the exception 
of those of them who were for all practical purposes assimilated into what 
appeared as a superior culture and embraced the nationalist ideology and aims of 
the host-benefactor state, they repudiated assimilation and the outside nationalist 
ideologies and assumed leadership positions in both the Macedonian national and 
revolutionary movements. They rejected all schemes for the annexation or 




    Several factors bear noting here. The first, already made above, is that educational 
indoctrination does not have the effect that constructivist theories based on elite action might 
desire. Instead of educational enrollment turning Macedonians into Greeks, Serbs, or Bulgars, 
the effect was quite the opposite. Second, the above description of the early stages of the 
Macedonian national movement suggests that the fluidity of identities seems limited, and that 
relatively small numbers of people are willing to assimilate to supposedly “superior” cultures. 
Most educated Macedonians at this time appear to have chosen to fight for an independent 
Macedonia. This choice raises an interesting question about human motivations: if identities are 
fluid, individuals are rational interest-maximizers (in the economic sense), and opportunities for 
assimilation exist, why would educated individuals support an underdog movement acting on 
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behalf of an unorganized, backward, illiterate, peasant mass? A surer strategy for personal 
success (and longevity) would be to throw one’s lot in with the ruling powers. Struggling for a 
“free Macedonia” at this time was by any measure a long shot, and even if such a “free 
Macedonia” were achieved—and if one avoided being executed or having their house burned 
down in the process—the material or financial payoffs would be far down the road. Working for 
the ruling elites would certainly seem like a safer strategy, and yet most individuals did not go 
that route.
7
    
 
     Another problem with theories stressing the importance of educational institutions is that they 
overstate how strong and effective such institutions are. As late as 1880, for instance, some 75 
percent of the overall population of Croatia-Slavonia was illiterate.
8
 In these areas, moreover, it 
would be difficult to say that Serb confessional schools were mechanisms for a nationalist 
revival. As late as the 1840s, there was not a single gimnazija or pedagogical school for the 
Serbs in Croatia, Slavonia, or the military frontier, and only 32 Serbian primary schools (mainly 
of a religious character) for a population of over 500,000 people. One historian has claimed that 
the schools at this time “were frequently unable to provide even the most basic knowledge, much 
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less to influence the development and strengthening of national consciousness.”9 Croatia as a 
whole only gained control of its educational system in 1868,
10
 decades after the struggle between 
the Croatian sabor and the Hungarian Diet had begun.  
 
    Even if we do grant the view that educational institutions are crucial in the formation of 
national consciousness, the Balkan experience with regard to the role of educational 
indoctrination in the identity-formation process suggests that the time it would take to do so is 
considerable. In examining the failure of interwar Yugoslavism, one of Serbia’s leading scholars 
of the early 20
th
 century (and a prime minister in Yugoslavia’s World War II government-in-
exile), Slobodan Jovanović, believed that it would have taken one hundred years of peace and 
prosperity for an educational system to instill a sense of common identity amongst Croats, Serbs 
and Slovenes.
11
 Balkan history, unfortunately, rarely gives states such long periods of either 
peace or prosperity.       
 
     Along with schools, religious institutions are also frequently cited as important factors in the 
identity-formation process. Yet a detailed look at the role of churches and church hierarchies at 
this time shows that there were problems with regard to their relationship to the nation-building 
project as well, insofar as the wishes and directives of religious elites did not easily translate into 
successful identity-formation efforts. After the Patriarchate of Peć was abolished in 1766, for 
instance, many of the Orthodox hierarchs in the lands inhabited by people speaking 
                                                        
9 Vasilje Krestić, “Srbi u Hrvatskoj, 1850-1868,” 138. Rothenberg similarly notes that “Orthodox schools in the 
Croatian borders remained poor and had but few pupils.” See Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-
1881, 51.  
10 Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 96. 




“Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian” were Greeks bent on Hellenizing their flocks, not Serb proto-
nationalists.
12
 Between 1778 and 1882, the Habsburg administrators of BiH had taken control of 
both the budges and the personnel appointments in the Orthodox and Catholic churches there, the 





      Nor is the argument that the Orthodox Church in areas populated by Serbs during this period 
enjoyed resource, material, or even intellectual advantages in promoting their own preferred 
                                                        
12 See, for instance, Samardzić, “Srpska pravoslavna crkva u XVI i XVII veku.” As Samardzić points out (p. 60), 
towards the end of the eighteenth century many of the metropolitans of Belgrade were Greeks. Indeed, Barbara 
Jelavich claims that for the Bulgarians, Romanians, and Serbs, the attempt to shake off Greek ecclesiastical rule was 
the first step in the formation of the Balkan national movements. See Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Eighteenth 
and Nineteenth Centuries, 57. Charles Jelavich notes that “In 1766 the Patriarchate of Peć was abolished and the 
authority of the patriarch of Constantinople was extended to cover purely Serbian territories . . . Once in control of 
the new lands and peoples, the patriarch of Constantinople gradually began to replace the Serbian church hierarchy 
with a Greek one. The change was greeted with violent dissatisfaction by the Serbs . . . they could only see that their 
nationality, which had been spared Islamization for centuries, was now being subjected to Hellenization.” See 
Charles Jelavich, “Some Aspect of Serbian Religious Development in the Eighteenth Century,” 149. Along similar 
lines, Mazower has noted that “In nineteenth century Bosnia . . . the Greek Patriarch takes good care that these 
eparchies shall be filled by none but Fanariots, and thus it happens that the . . . Orthodox Christians of Bosnia, who 
form the majority of the population, are subject to ecclesiastics alien in blood, in language, in sympathies, who 
oppress them hand in hand with the Turkish officials and set them, often, an even worse example of moral 
depravity.” See Mazower, The Balkans, 52. Dušan Bataković notes that in Kosovo, between 1830 and 1896, a series 
of “anti-Serbian orientated” Greek bishops had been enthroned. See Bataković, The Kosovo Chronicles, p. 58. See 
also Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 75. On the role of the Fanariots in Bosnia, see 
also Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 9. During this period, education for the Orthodox millet, “. . . was [the] 
responsibility of the local Church leaders. Needless to say, shortage of funds and the frequently low quality of the 
responsible ecclesiastics meant that education was not available in many places; usually only the episcopal centers 
could be counted on to provide schools, and their quality depended on the interest of the given bishop. Since few 
bishops took much interest in education, the few schools that did achieve some standards were rarely able to achieve 
any continuity, usually declining or even closing after the death or departure of the individual bishop who had taken 
an interest in them. And, when the Patriarch of Constantinople regained his control over the Slavic dioceses in 1766, 
he began regularly to appoint Greeks as their bishops. Few of the Greek ecclesiastics whom he appointed knew any 
Slavic language and even fewer had any interest in sponsoring schools taught in the vernacular.” Donia and Fine, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 66. A similar situation obtained in the Habsburg Empire. According to 
Nicholas Miller, “There was a wide disparity in the education, wealth, and general competence of priests in parishes 
of the Orthodox church. Whereas the higher clergy of the church would generally be well-educated, literate, and 
prosperous, the parish clergymen might well be illiterate and poorer than some of his peasant compatriots.” See 
Miller, Between Nation and State, 18.  
13 Donia, Sarajevo: A Tradition Betrayed, 76. As Donia points out, in March 1880 the Habsburg emperor, in an 
agreement with the Patriarch of Constantinople, was given the right to dismiss and appoint the Orthodox 
metropolitans in Tuzla, Mostar, and Sarajevo at will. In an interesting example of how such apparent power can 
occasionally backfire, in 1891 the emperor appointed as Sarajevo metropolitan Sava Kosanović, an individual 




identity-projects very persuasive. Apart from its Greek leadership, the Orthodox Church was also 
a poor institution; because of the exodus of Serbs from Ottoman lands in the late seventeenth 
century “. . . the Serbian patriarchate became increasingly impoverished. The departure of tens of 
thousands of Serbs from Old Serbia—among them the wealthiest—deprived the Serbian church 
of revenues formerly available to it.”14 Many accounts of the time have described the low-
educational level of the Orthodox clerics in these areas, at least in comparison to their Catholic 
colleagues,
15
 while accounts of the higher-ranking Orthodox clergy in the Ottoman Empire saw it 
as is opportunistic and solely motivated by its own interests. By contrast, the lower, secular 
clergy was seen as having the most influence on the development and nurturing of national 




     This is a crucial point. The lower clergy in these areas came from the same social strata as the 
vast majority of the peasant population—they were the same illiterate sons (and daughters, in the 
case of female monastics) of the poor peasants who made up their flocks. Educational training or 
attainment did not distinguish them; most village priests had no formal training, and performed 
their duties only by virtue of rote memorization of religious texts and ceremonies. Consequently, 
whatever ethnic identities and nationalist sentiments the lower clergy had must have come from 
such already existing sentiments in the general population. This in turn reveals the mass-based 
                                                        
14 Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” 293. 
15 Dzaja, Konfesionalnost i Nacionalnost Bosne i Hercegovine, 113; Mazower, The Balkans, 56-57. According to 
Gunther Rothenberg, in the 18th and 19th centuries “The education of the Orthodox clergy was extremely primitive; 
often the priests could neither read nor write. In contrast with the government supported Roman Catholic ‘German’ 
schools, the Orthodox, or ‘national’ schools received no aid and were supported entirely by their own, often poverty-
stricken, communities.” See Rothenberg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881, 87. Rothenberg goes on to 
note (p. 98) that apart from these material disadvantages, limits were also placed on the number of Orthodox men 
who could study for the priesthood, a limit which did not apply to Catholics. 




nature of ethnoconfessional identity in southeastern Europe, and belies the constructivist 
argument that elites and institutions impose identities from above.  
 
      If explanations based on the role of educational and religious institutions in the determination 
and transmission of identity in southeastern Europe are not plausible, this then raises the issue of 
the actual mechanics or logistics of nation-building and identity formation. Eric Hobsbawm, for 
instance, suggests that “Nations and their associated phenomena must . . . . . be analyzed in terms 
of political, technical, administrative, economic and other conditions and requirements.”17 In the 
case of the nation-building processes in southeastern Europe, what were these conditions and 
requirements, and to what extent were they satisfied?  
 
     In the following series of micro-case studies, the plausibility of several aspects of 
constructivist and modernist claims about nation-building and identity formation will be 
analyzed and tested. First, who were these elites ostensibly “building nations” in southeastern 
Europe, and how many of them were there? Second, what means of communication did they 
have to spread their message, and what instruments of state power did they have at their 
disposal? Third, why did some of these efforts succeed while others failed? All three of these 
questions can be summed up in one: how plausible is the elite-led constructivist model of the 
formation and transmission of ethnoconfessional identity in southeastern Europe?  
Micro-Case Study 1: Serbia 
     19
th
 century Serbia provides a good place in which to test many of the premises of the 
constructivist argument regarding the importance of state power on the identity-formation 
                                                        




process, and the role of institutions such as the media or the school system in fostering a specific 
identity. Recent treatments of 19
th
 century Serbian history, for instance, suggest that most 
inhabitants of what is today considered Serbia proper had little or no sense of ethnic identity or 
national awareness, but through a process of diffusion during the course of the 19
th
 century, a 
modernizing elite and state bureaucracy, adopting ideas imported from Western Europe, 
produced an essentially nationalized (and nationalistic) population.  
 
     A detailed analysis of Serbia and the Serbian government at this point in time, however, 
reveals several problems with such a view, and/or the constructivist argument in general. These 
problems mainly revolve around whether the fledgling Serbian state and educational institutions 
really had the capabilities to carry out such a nationalizing project given their actual resources 
and weak capacities. In 1839, for instance, at the end of the reign of Prince Miloš Obrenović, the 
Serbian government consisted of 672 state officials (out of a total population of approximately 
one million), of whom 201 were policemen.
18
 Since most people throughout history have usually 
shied away from contact with the police, that leaves 471 state officials to spread the nationalist 
gospel to one million people (the ratio is approximately 1: 2,123) when they were not busy 
attending to the duties of everyday government administration. Moreover, such institutions as 
Serbia possessed at this time were uniformly weak; Stokes, for instance, has described nineteenth 
century Serbia as possessing “a traditional agricultural economy, an ineffectual church, no 
aristocracy, a minuscule army, and undersized bureaucracy, and a weak royal apparatus.”19   
 
                                                        
18 Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 242. 




     A second category of people frequently seen as evangelists of nationalism were Serbs who 
were educated or had lived in Western European countries. According to this view, these 
individuals spread the “modern” conceptions of ethnic identity and nationalism they had imbibed 
in Western Europe. In this category one could include the Habsburg Serbs as well, and 
particularly those living in the town of Novi Sad, one of the main centers of learning and culture 
for the Serbs in the Habsburg monarchy. Thus, as one version of this theory argues: 
. . . locally born but European-educated elites made attempts to superimpose 
Western European ideas of nation and nation-state—ideas that had grown up 
more or less organically in Western Europe over hundreds of years---onto the 
existing mix of peoples in the region . . . But as a result of geography and history, 
nations of this sort did not exist in the Balkans, so the European-educated elites 
had to create them, through a cultural process of national “awakening.”20 
 
     This view of the identity-formation and nation-building process raises a number of important 
questions about the simple mechanics and logistics of the nation-building process. In the 
eighteenth century, for instance, it has been estimated that only some one hundred Habsburg 
Serbs had been educated in Western Europe.
21
 Allowing for the fact that by 1840 the number of 
“enlightened,” nationally-conscious Serb intellectuals and politicians might have increased ten-
fold, by 1840 there might have been some one thousand such Serbs spreading the nationalist 
gospel. The modernist understanding of Balkan ethnoconfessional identity then suggests that 
these “nationally-conscious” Serbs then imposed or instilled a sense of identity on not just the 
one million inhabitants of Serbia proper, but on the Orthodox population of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina as well.  
                                                        
20 See Andrew Baruch Wachtel, The Balkans in World History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7. Note 
that with respect to Western Europe, Baruch argues that notions of the “nation” and “nation-state” grew up “more or 
less organically . . . over hundreds of years,” but that in the case of the Balkans such ideas were imported and 
imposed. Throughout this dissertation, of course, the argument has been made that identity-building and the 
“creation” of nations in the Balkans has been a similarly organic, long-term process.   





     How they might have done this, however, is an important question. Mass media such as radio, 
television, and the internet obviously did not exist at this time. But it is also doubtful that 
newspapers or books could have fostered or promoted a sense of common identity in the 
nineteenth century, because the vast majority of the Balkans’ population during this period could 
neither read nor write. In 1866, for instance, only 4.2 percent of the Principality of Serbia’s 
population was literate.
22
 Printing presses did not even exist in Serbian-speaking areas in the 
eighteenth century,
23
 and as late as 1897 the Serbian census shows that the literacy rate for males 
in larger towns was not quite 50 percent, while for females urban literacy was only 23 percent. In 
the countryside, where the overwhelming majority of the population lived, the corresponding 
figures were estimated to be 10 percent and 1 percent, respectively.
24
   
 
     It is also doubtful that the Serbian school system could have fostered a strong sense of 
national identity during this period, as it has been argued was the case with Germany. Bismarck, 
for instance, had reputedly said that the German nation had been created by its schoolmasters, 
and in 1807, Fichte’s stress on the importance of a universal educational system for the German 
states was condensed into the saying that “a good education system is worth an army.”25  
                                                        
22 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 20. Along these lines, Mark Mazower notes that “Most people remained 
illiterate, ignorant of books and the new doctrines they contained, inhabitants of a much more circumscribed world.” 
Mazower, The Balkans, 74. 
23 See Stokes, “The Absence of Nationalism in Serbian Politics Before 1840,” 79. 
24 See Gale Stokes, Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in Nineteenth Century Serbia 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), 1. As Stokes further points out (p. 300), all the political groups in 
nineteenth-century Serbia “used their newspapers to make their cases, although these could have little immediate 
impact on the illiterate peasant voter . . . the ordinary Serb was not able to read the newspapers in which such 
[nationalist] arguments appeared.” 





     Serbia’s fledgling educational system at this time, however, does not seem to have been a 
particularly powerful institution for spreading the nationalist gospel. As late as 1810, for 
instance, there were only two elementary schools in the Paşalik of Belgrade (the core of future 
Serbia). In both, the language of instruction was Greek.
26
 A full one-hundred years later, in 1910, 
only 5.8 percent of the Serbian population was attending primary school.
27
 In the 25-year period 
between 1838-1863, Serbia’s highest institution of learning, the Lycée in Belgrade, graduated a 




      Another important question is how the evangelists of nationalism would have gotten around. 
Serbia’s transportation networks were so poor that there were only two carriages in all of Serbia 
in the first half of the nineteenth century,
29
 and the first railway in the country was only built in 
the 1880s.
30
 There was not a single large bridge in Serbia in 1860, nor any commercial river 
vessels, and riparian transport within Serbia’s interior was non-existent. The first telegraph line 
was built in 1855, and Serbia’s postal system did not get a four-wheeled coach until after 1868.31  
 
      Given these demographic, physical and technological realities, the diffusion argument, 
whereby over the course of a few decades Western-influenced elites imposed their own preferred 
                                                        
26 Mazower, The Balkans, 74. 
27 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 426, ft. 22. 
28 Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia (Vol. 1), 345-47. 
29 L.S. Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453, 251. 
30 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 426, ft. 22. 




sense of identity on a population whose identity was otherwise ambiguous, does not seem 
sustainable. It is hard to see how such relatively small numbers of people could, in a relatively 
short amount of time, impose their preferred sense of identity on large peasant masses, spread 
out over large areas, who are moreover traditionally weary of new ideas coming from city folk. 
On the contrary, a more plausible argument in the case of 19
th
 century Serbia would be that these 
elites promoted projects and policies compatible with the beliefs, traditions, and cultural values 
of the vast majority of the given populations they were dealing with. Again, this suggests that the 
causal direction in the identity-formation process proceeds from the level of mass society rather 
than the opposite.   
 
Micro-Case Study 2: Nationalisms in Bosnia & Herzegovina 
     The failure of a 19
th
 century attempt to create a pan-Bosnian identity for Muslims, Croats, and 
Serbs provides another example of the difficulties would-be nation-builders and constructivists 
face. After Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia & Herzegovina in 1878, the province’s Habsburg 
administrators realized that ethnoconfessional divisions within Bosnia created numerous 
obstacles towards the primary strategic goal of the occupation: reducing the dissatisfaction of the 
Habsburg monarchy’s South Slavs, and limiting the threat Serbia posed as a potential Piedmont 
for Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs in the monarchy. Habsburg officials thus embarked on what was 
an explicitly constructivist effort to create and foster a new identity, bošnjaštvo, for Bosnia & 
Herzegovina’s Croats, Muslims, and Serbs.32  
 
                                                        
32 It is worth noting that the Habsburg administrators of Bosnia & Herzegovina embarked on this effort, even though 
similar such campaigns had failed. For example, in the 1860s, an effort by the Bosnian Franciscan Antun Knežević 
to propagate a non-confessional Bosnian identity “found practically no response from the Bosnian population.” See 




     The Habsburg constructivist campaign to promote bošnjaštvo faced serious competition. The 
nature of this competition, however, is a point of debate. Most recent scholarship suggests that 
bošnjaštvo competed with simultaneous identity projects promoted by Croat and Serb 
nationalists seeking to create new identities for BiH’s Catholic and Orthodox populations, 
respectively. An opposing view argues that bošnjaštvo was in competition with the already-
existing identities of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s peoples.  
 
     In essence, this debate stems from disagreement as to the degree to which BiH’s peoples in 
the nineteenth century already had established ethnoconfessional identities. One school of 
thought argues (perhaps most strongly by Noel Malcolm) that differences between social groups 
in BiH at this time were based on economic class (i.e., whether one was a land-holder or not) 
rather than on ethnicity or cultural background.
33
 Thus, according to this view, while the 
Catholic or Orthodox populations of BiH might have had a different identity from the Bosnian 
Muslim population, these different identities had little ethnic or national content, and it was only 
the actions of nationalizing elites from Croatia and Serbia that turned Catholics and Orthodox, 
respectively, into Croats and Serbs.  
 
     With regard to the Bosnian Muslims, there has been considerable debate (both amongst 
Bosnian Muslims themselves, and amongst scholars studying their history) as to their 
ethnogenesis as well. Some Bosniac scholars have argued that the Bosnian Muslims are 
descendants of the original Illyrian population that lived in the Balkans prior to the Slavic 




 centuries who later (and to a very limited extent), intermixed with the 
                                                        




Slavs over the following centuries. Sometimes this argument is combined with the thesis that the 
Bosnian Muslims are descendants of a medieval Bosnian heretical sect, the Bogomils.
34
 Another 
view (not surprisingly, more popular in Croat or Serb historiography, respectively) has argued 
that Bosnia’s Muslims are descendants of Croats or Serbs who converted to Islam after the 15th 




     Considerable debate also remains as to the extent to which the Bosnian Muslims had a 
separate sense of identity to distinguish them from the Catholic or Orthodox populations of BiH, 
or from the Ottomans/Turks in BiH,
36
 and when they developed such a separate identity. In the 
early part of the 20
th
 century, for instance, prominent experts on southeastern Europe such as 
Hugh Seton-Watson claimed that “Bosnia’s Mohammedans do not know whether they are Serbs 
or Croats.”37 Other historians, however, have claimed that a sense of separate Bosnian Muslim 
identity was already visible with Husein-beg Gradaščević’s revolt in 1831-32 against Ottoman 
rule which showed “the existence of a strong Bosnian Muslim identity with its own historical 
                                                        
34 See, for instance, Enver Imamović, Porijeklo i Pripadnost Stanovništva Bosne i Hercegovine (Sarajevo: Bosanski 
Korijeni, 1998), 29-52. See also Mustafa Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka (Sarajevo: Preporod, 1998), 23. 
35 For a useful survey of these debates, see Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Boulder, 
Co: Westview Press, 1996), 7-27. 
36 As to the extent to which Bosnia’s Muslim population had an identity separate from that of the Ottoman Turks, it 
is interesting to note that as late as the Habsburg occupation, Bosnian Muslim clerics were literate mainly only in 
Turkish or Arabic (some two-thousand in the former and several hundred in the latter), showing how weakly 
developed education in the local vernacular was at this time. Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 96. 
37 As quoted by Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 195. Even Alija Izetbegović, for instance, would claim in 1991 that 
“Yes, I was a Serb while I still didn’t know exactly who I was and what I was. I followed my older brothers, who 
chose to be Serbs between the two wars . . . When they asked me afterwards what I was I said that I didn’t know. 
We came out of World War II in a state of great delusion and confusion. We were forced to be Croats during the 
period of the Independent State of Croatia. Probably out of spite for being forcibly Croatized, I immediately 
declared myself as a Serb. But after I thought about it a little, I saw that I was neither a Serb, nor a Croat, but a 
Muslim.” Izetbegović originally made the comments in Svijet (Sarajevo) in 1991. They were reprinted in Svijet, 29 




perspective . . . with relevance for what was to come.”38 Later Bosnian Muslim resistance to the 
Habsburg occupation of BiH in 1878 is seen as a continuation and confirmation of this already 
existing separate sense of Bosnian Muslim identity.
39
 Yet another view claims that the Bosnian 
Muslim’s identity was too firmly fixed by 1900 for it to be subsumed by either Croat or Serb 
national ideologies.
40
 Thus, in pre-1914 Bosnia, the term “muslimanski narod” was already as 
pervasive as the equivalent “srpski narod” or hrvatski narod.”41 
 
      It was in the context of such ambiguities and debates that the Austro-Hungarian minister of 
finance, Benjamin Kállay (1882-1903) made the first explicit and sustained constructivist 
attempt to create a common identity for Bosnia & Herzegovina’s Muslims, Croats and Serbs. 
Kállay saw his mission, and that of the Habsburg Empire, as that of “a great Occidental empire, 
charged with the mission of carrying civilization to Oriental peoples.”42 In keeping with this 
“civilizing mission,” one of the cornerstones of Kállay’s strategy (and of many subsequent 
international interveners as well) was that religious tolerance and equality under the law for 
Bosnia’s ethnoconfessional groups would assimilate them into the Habsburg empire.43 
Anticipating by some one hundred years the constructivist thinking and strategies of 20
th
 century 
international high representatives to promote a common Bosnian identity, Kállay  
                                                        
38 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 5-6. 
39 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 23. 
40 Donia and Fine, Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 112. 
41 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 242. 
42 Donia, Islam Under the Double Eagle, 14. 
43 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 57. Donia, for his part, claims that Kállay “believed that the masses should be 
showered with benefits but deprived of rights,” obviously a belief that for “ordinary people,” economic and material 




felt that the best antidote to popular unrest was a rational, fair and generous 
government. Kállay, along with many other imperial civil servants, believed in the 
Habsburg monarchy’s ‘civilizing mission’ in Bosnia, and for two decades he 
worked to mold Bosnia and Sarajevo into his vision of an enlightened European 
state and society. He aggressively promoted economic development, 
Westernization, cultural modernization, and administrative and legal reform. Such 





     Kállay’s strategy to create a new pan-ethnoconfessional identity included all of the 
fundamental assumptions and tenets of constructivism and modernization theory. He believed 
that economic progress had to precede political reforms; as Okey notes, “in the first instance, his 
mission was an economic one.”45 Another implicit assumption underlying Kállay’s bošnjaštvo 
campaign was the belief that the identities of Bosnia’s peoples were fluid and malleable; for 
instance, Kállay believed that Bosnia’s Muslims would eventually convert to Catholicism rather 
than Orthodoxy if the former was supported as a privileged religion.
46
 In keeping with 
constructivists’ stress on the role of the media, Kállay tried to create a pro-Bosnian press, an 
important example of which was the newspaper Bošnjak launched in 1891 to promote the new 
multiconfessional identity. Within a short time, however, “the paper gradually abandoned 
bošnjaštvo when that concept failed to gain popular support.”47 Kállay’s constructivist efforts 
also included promoting his preferred version of Bosnian history through such things as the 
creation of the Zemaljski (sometimes translated as “Regional”) Museum in Sarajevo, and 
                                                        
44 Robert J. Donia, “Fin-de-Siècle Sarajevo: The Habsburg Transformation of an Ottoman Town,” Austrian History 
Yearbook 33 (2002), 45. 
45 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 59. 
46 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 60.  




“romanticizing [Bosnia’s] cultural traditions.”48 New textbooks for Bosnian schoolchildren were 
written designed to strengthen their “Bosnian self-consciousness,” and it became mandatory to 
use the term “Bosnian language,” while use of the terms “Croatian language” or “Serbian 
language” were prohibited.”49 Other similarly repressive measures included prohibiting the 
creation of ethnoconfessionally “exclusive” organizations or groups, no matter how seemingly 
benign such groups might have been, as seen in the denial of a request to create a “Serb Singing 
Society” in Mostar,50 and a proposed “Croat Singing Society” in Sarajevo had to change its name 
to “Trebević.”51 Even architecture was invoked in the campaign to build a common Bosnian 
identity for Croats, Muslims, and Serbs; thus, a style that became known as “neo-Orientalism” 




     Kállay’s strategy also rested on the belief that identities and loyalties in BiH could be altered 
if the local ethnoconfessional groups could be cutoff from outside influences. Towards this end, 
Croats, Muslims, and Serbs were to be isolated from the “corrupting” influences of Zagreb, 
Constantinople, and Belgrade as much as possible, while his version of an indigenous Bosnian 
identity was promoted.
53
 Plays performed in theaters were altered or banned if censors believed 
                                                        
48 Donia and Fine, Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed, 97. On the importance of museums in forging 
national identities, see Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1980, Revised Edition), 178-
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49 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 67-68. 
50 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 76. 
51 Donia, Sarajevo: A Tradition Betrayed, 83. 
52 See Donia’s description of the work of the famous Viennese architect Josip Vancaš in Sarajevo during this period; 
Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 72. 




they did not promote the official line of Bosnian unity.
54
 Controls over contacts with people from 
neighboring states were put into place; thus, “Visits to Bosnia from neighboring south Slav states 
were very rare and were vigourously controlled, as with a party of Belgrade Gymnasium students 
in 1890, who, through an ‘outwardly quite friendly considerateness’, were to be kept from any 
unobserved contact with Bosnians.”55 Other forms of repression were adopted as well; for 
instance, some 235 Serbs and 42 Muslims suspected of having contacts with Serbia and 
Montenegro had their mail monitored, and the railway authorities were instructed to submit all 
suspicious shipments to the Provincial Government for inspection. “Hostile” newspapers were 




      Despite these efforts, however, Kállay’s twenty-year effort to construct a non-confessional, 
pan-ethnic Bosnian identity ultimately failed, although he did attract some limited support from 
the Bosnian Muslims and some Bosnian Croats. As Saçir Filandra notes,   
Kállay’s form of bošnjaštvo, according to which all inhabitants of Bosnia were 
Bošnjaks regardless of their religious adherence [for the sake of state-political 
goals] violated the real course of organizing life along religious-national lines, so 
that by 1903 the occupational authorities were already abandoning it. . . . That 
attempt to build a united Bosnian political people, completely in keeping with 
western, modern theories of the construction of society and the relationship 
between state and nation, in Bosnia, despite five decades of effort, simply did not 
succeed, neither for the Ottomans, nor for the Dual Monarchy. The particularities 
of Bosnian reality were such that they eluded all rational models and 
schematizations, which in numerous other examples showed and proved 
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     By the end of Habsburg rule in Bosnia, BiH’s Croats and Serbs were definitively looking 
more towards Zagreb and Belgrade, respectively, than they would ever henceforth look towards 
Sarajevo; the Bosnian Croats, for instance, entered the 20
th
 century “as a part of a united 
Croatian national, political, spiritual and cultural collective.”58 Importantly, both clericalist and 
secular tendencies in Bosnian Croat society supported a Trialist solution to the Dual Monarchy’s, 
which envisioned the creation of a third, South Slav unit within the empire, led by Croatia and 
which would have included Bosnia & Herzegovina.
59
   
 
     The failure of bošnjaštvo opens the issue of the identities and loyalties of BiH’s Catholic 
(Croat) and Orthodox (Serb) populations. As noted above, one school of historical thought has 
argued that the Catholic and Orthodox populations in BiH had no sense of national 
consciousness until relatively late in the 19
th
 century. Thus, in the case of the Croats in Bosnia 
“The great bulk of Bosnian Catholics continued to identify themselves as ‘Latins’ and their 
language as ‘Slav’, ‘Bosnian’ or simply ‘ours’.”60 Noel Malcolm has similarly claimed that 
before the late nineteenth century, the Catholic and Orthodox populations of BiH had no sense of 
identity as Croats or Serbs, respectively, and only came to develop such identities under the 
influence of nationalistic elite propaganda coming from Croatia and Serbia.
61
 Predictably, this 
thesis is especially popular with Bosniac writers.
62
  
                                                        
58 Filandra, Bošnjačka politika u XX. stoljeću, 15. 
59 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 166. 
60 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 13. 
61 Malcolm appears a bit confused about his own argument, however, for he also notes that in 1557 the Grand Vizier 
Mehmed Paša Sokolović re-established the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate of Peć. Malcolm claims that Sokolović 
came from a Bosnian Serb family, but by his own account this was some 300 years prior to when Orthodox 
inhabitants of Bosnia should have had a Serb identity or consciousness. Nevertheless, it could be said that this 
perspective is at present the conventional scholarly wisdom on this issue. Mazower, for instance, similarly argues 





    Here it is worth pointing out that an earlier generation of Balkan scholarship took a different 
view of these issues. Peter Sugar, for instance, in his study of the industrialization of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina during the Habsburg period reached significantly different conclusions about the 
nature of identities in Bosnia during this period, and is worth quoting at length. Thus, according 
to Sugar, surveying the local populations according to confessional background 
. . . indicates not only religious differences which were vital in themselves, but 
also delineates self-centered and mutually-antagonistic social groups, cultural 
orientations with their historical causes, and in some cases even social and 
economic status. Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism have indicated more than 
forms of worship in Bosnia-Herzegovina and do even to the present day. 
Historically they represented three different cultures which, like the religions, 
came from three different sources. The Muslims looked to Istanbul and called 
themselves Turks. The Orthodox sympathized with Montenegro and later also 
with Serbia and considered themselves Serbs, while the Catholics looked to 
Hungary, Venice, and later to Austria and Zagreb for leadership and spoke of 
themselves as Croats. Sharp as these dividing lines still are at present, they were 
unimportant if we compare them with the meaning and importance they had under 




     Yet as in the case of Serbia and the “spread” of a Serbian national consciousness within 
Serbia proper analyzed above, it is hard to see how the diffusion and transmission of the 
nationalist idea might have taken place amongst BiH’s non-Muslim populations within the 
overall context of a severely poor and underdeveloped province. Bosnia only received its first 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
reflected their sense of belonging to a community defined by religion, where the linguistic differences between 
Greek and Bulgarian mattered less than their shared belief in Orthodoxy.” See Mazower, The Balkans, 39-40. 
Similarly, John Lampe has argued that “the populations of such medieval polities surely attached more importance, 
at the time, to their religious identity in newly accepted Christian churches than to brief native states.” Lampe, 
Yugoslavia as History, 14.  
62 See, for instance, Aličić, Pokret za autonomiju Bosne od 1831. do 1832. godine, 355-371. In the case of the 
Orthodox population of Bosnia, for instance, Aličić argues that they were mainly Vlach shepherds who converted to 
Orthodoxy in the medieval period, and then adopted a Serb national identity in the nineteenth century.  
63 Emphasis added. It is worth stressing the point that Sugar’s claims about the strength and importance of identities 
and the mutual antagonism of various social groups was made in the early 1960s, i.e., at least a quarter of a century 
before anyone had ever heard of people such as Slobodan Milošević or Radovan Karadžić. See Sugar, The 




printing press in 1866, and it was used to print official publications of the Bosnian regional 
government.
64
 From 1879-1893 there was only one public high school in Bosnia (in Sarajevo), of 
course, for male students only.
65
 Gale Stokes claims that in the 1870s less than one percent of 
Bosnia’s population was literate, and even this small reading public would probably have had a 
hard time acquiring nationalist literature because even in the 1870s there was not a single 
bookstore in Bosnia.
66
 As late as 1910, 88% of Bosnia & Herzegovina’s population was still 
illiterate.
67
 Organizations dedicated to fostering national consciousness had relatively weak 
memberships. In 1909, for instance, the Serb cultural organization Prosvjeta (“Enlightenment”) 
had 5,101 members, the Croat Napredak (“Progress”) had 3,156 in 1912, and the Muslim 
organization Gajret some 2,089 in 1910, for a total BiH population of some 1,900,000 at the 
time.
68
 By the end of the Habsburg occupation, only some 1,779 individuals had completed 
secondary education in BiH and could be considered its intelligentsia.
69
 In 1899-1900, out of a 
total of nineteen secondary school professors in BiH (seventeen of whom were Catholics), there 
was only one native Bosnian (a Muslim teacher of Arabic), while at least half of the lawyers, 
printers, and booksellers in BiH in 1913 were foreigners.
70
 Out of 114 doctors listed in a 
                                                        
64 Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 35. 
65 Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 85. In 1882, Donia points out, a secondary school for women opened in Sarajevo. 
In 1904-05, but pointing to the ethnoconfessional segregation of the time, enrollment in the school was as follows: 
“84 Catholics, 67 were Jews, and 36 were Serbian Orthodox. Not a single Muslim attended, as the life of a Muslim 
girl was largely confined to her parents’ home.” Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 85 (emphasis added).  
66 See Stokes, Politics as Development, 92. 
67 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 184. Okey cites figures showing that the comparable rate of illiteracy in 
Croatia-Slavonia in 1900 was 56 percent, and in Serbia, 77 percent. Okey (p. 222) claims 99.7 percent of Muslim 
women were illiterate in 1910. 
68 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 162. According to these figures, each member of one of these organizations 
would have been responsible for converting some 184 members to the national cause.  
69 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 218. 




provincial yearbook for 1904, only twelve had local sounding names, reflecting the fact that most 
professionals in Bosnia at this time came from other parts of the Habsburg empire.
71
 In 1878 
there were a total of fifty-four Catholic schools in BiH.
72
 A Bosnian Serb literary review, 
Bosanska vila, founded in 1886, had a total of 387 subscribers in Bosnia (157 of whom were in 
Sarajevo).
73
 The first permanent Bosnian Serb school in Sarajevo was only founded in 1850,
74
 
and such Bosnian Serb schools as were founded during this period were not very strong; in 1879, 
the Austrians recorded the existence of 56 Serb schools with some 3,500 students, out of a Serb 
population of 600,000.
75
 Such confessional schools, moreover, were generally poor; at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, “[F]inancially secure Serb schools in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be 
counted on the fingers of one hand.”76 Bureaucratic ordinances frequently hindered the ability of 
Catholic or Orthodox confessional schools to operate in an efficient way; an ordinance passed in 
1892, for instance, demanded that teachers in confessional schools obtain a certificate of political 
reliability, the effect of which was to delay the hiring of new teachers for significant periods. 
This was especially detrimental for BiH’s many one-teacher schools; for instance, the school in 
Glamoć was apparently closed for four years for this reason, while the school in Ljubuški was 
                                                        
71 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 171. 
72 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 15. 
73 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 84. 
74 Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography, 33. 
75 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 12. Writing in the early part of the 20th century, Jovan Cvijić provided figures 
claiming that in 1906 there were 253 state elementary schools (which of course propagated the official pan-
confessional ideology) as opposed to 70 elementary schools supported by local Orthodox church parochial 
organizations and 31 elementary schools supported by Catholic church parochial organizations. See Cvijić, “Дух и 
смисао аустроугарске управе у Босни,” in Cvijić, Сабрана дела, Volume 3 (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, 2000), 174.   






 There were only 71 [Serb] confessional school teachers in BiH in 1881-82, of 
which only 27 were qualified. All of them, moreover, were “wretchedly paid.” More Serb 
schools closed than opened in 1882, and the numbers enrolled in these schools fell by thirteen 
percent in 1882 as compared to the previous year. In comparison, 40 of 59 government teachers 
were considered to be qualified, while enrollment in state schools increased by 28 percent in the 
same period.
78
 Although various members of the Belgrade government during the nineteenth 
century organized networks of agents to promote Serb national consciousness and agitate in 





     There were strict prohibitions on ethnic identifications during this time as well; thus, it was 
mandatory to use the term “Bosnian” for the language one spoke, and historic Serb figures (with 
the exception of Saint Sava) were banned from Serb confessional schools. Serb reading rooms in 
Sarajevo and Livno were also refused permission to operate because of their “national and 
religious exclusiveness.”80 The 1860s and 70s “were a time of mounting government pressure on 
Serb national feeling. Educational and religious leaders were expelled or imprisoned, textbooks 
                                                        
77 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 86. 
78 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 52. In the period between 1881-1890, the number of Serb schools increased 
from 57 to 61. However, during this same period there were significant fluctuations; for instance, thirty-three new 
schools opened, while 29 closed, suggesting that the educational system was both unstable and relatively weak. See 
Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 76. 
79 On the work of such clandestine networks and organizations during this period, which David MacKenzie called 
“small and generally ineffective,” see MacKenzie, “Serbian Nationalist and Military Organizations and the 
Piedmont Idea, 1844-1914,” East European Quarterly 16 (Fall 1982), 323-344. 




confiscated, foreign south Slav newspapers banned and the expressions ‘Bosnian language’ and 
‘Bosnian nation’ enforced at the expense of the suspect term ‘Serb’.”81 
 
     Another interesting question is how receptive the rural peasantry might have been to this 
supposed conversion to the national ideal being spread by the Balkan apostles of nationalism. 
The peasantry is, overall, traditionally considered to be conservative in its thinking and 
suspicious of city people.
82
 In Bosnia in the 1870s, for instance, in rural areas “Christians were, 
overwhelmingly, illiterate peasants who impressed observers by their ‘extreme abjectness of 
mind as the result of long and harsh serfdom’, their ignorance, poverty and fanaticism, their 
‘total engrossment in the problem of daily subsistence’.”83 A local official at this time described 
the Bosnian peasant as “atavistically burdened by great suspicion, overall wants to hear nothing 
of newspapers, and the efforts of Serbo-enthusiasts founder on the passive resistance of the rural 
population.”84 Meanwhile, the elite that was supposedly fostering a Serb national consciousness 
in Bosnia was “small, cautious and moreover divided.”85 
 
                                                        
81 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 7. 
82 Consider, for instance, the experience of Ernest Čimić, a Croatian bureaucrat in interwar Yugoslavia charged with 
keeping tabs on what the peasants were doing in his district. As Čimić reported to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 
Belgrade, “peasants assemble in and outside the villages, but that it cannot be determined what they are discussing . . 
. because it is impossible to induce a single one of them to inform for us for any sum of money or profit. The 
psychology of the masses has a particularly great role in this and from it stems the fear that he [informant] will be 
considered a ‘national traitor,’ so that this is stronger than the desire for profit.” As cited by Biondich, Stjepan 
Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 177. Emphasis in the original.  
83 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 8. 
84 Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 213. 




     As was the case with Serbia discussed above, infrastructural and communications limitations 
also makes the diffusion theory suspect. Mid-nineteenth century Sarajevo, for instance, only had 
two carriages, one for the vizier and the other for the Austrian consul, neither of which was 
probably being used to convey Croat or Serb nationalist missionaries; even if they had, “roads in 
the Western sense of the term did not exist” in Bosnia at this time.86 Bosnia did not receive its 
first printing press until 1866, and railway construction only started in the 1870s.
87
  There were 




    In sum, it is difficult to see how identity-projects such as “Serbianism” or “Croatianism” could 
have succeeded in 19
th
 century Bosnia & Herzegovina given their organizational and resource 
disadvantages in comparison to the Austro-Hungarian state, and in comparison to the sheer 
number of people it was necessary to “convert” to a new form of identity. As in the case of 19th 
century Serbia proper, it is much more plausible to claim that the success of Croat and Serb 
nationalists in 19
th
 century Bosnia & Herzegovina could be attributed to the fact that their 
identity-projects were in tune were the already extant traditions and sentiments of the people they 
were allegedly trying to convert. This in turn suggests the rather limited strategic room for 
maneuver would-be nation-builders face, and, by extension, the limits of constructivism itself.    
 
Micro-Case Study 3: Macedonianism  
     The “construction” and emergence of a Macedonian state provides perhaps the most 
interesting case defying constructivist logic regarding the formation of ethnic groups and 
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national identities. The emergence of the modern Macedonian nationalist movement is often 
traced to the founding of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Movement (IMRO) in 1893 by 
six young intellectuals. For four hundred years prior to this date, the term Macedonia did not 
even exist as a geographical/administrative unit within the Ottoman Empire, as the territory 
comprising most of historic Macedonia throughout this period was divided into several Ottoman 
vilayets.
89
 Many scholars claim that the Slavic inhabitants of this region were an “amorphous” 
mass of Balkan peasants with no strong sense of identity or national consciousness.
 
Perhaps the 
most important exponent of this view of the Slavic inhabitants of the southern Balkans as an 
“amorphous” mass was the great Serbian ethnographer and geographer Jovan Cvijić, who spent 
decades exploring and researching the Balkan peninsula in the late 19
th





According to Jezernik,  
. . . till the beginning of the twentieth century the Slavic people in Macedonia 
developed no clear consciousness of nationality: those who did not belong to their 
local community were strangers . . . many people simply could not understand the 
concept of nationality and ‘I am an Orthodox, I was an Exarchist, but now I am a 
Serb.’ Only when directly asked again whether they were Bulgarians or Serbs, 
might they answer: ‘I was a Bulgarian, now I am a Serb.’91 
                                                        
89 See Nadine Akhund, “Muslim Representation in the Three Ottoman vilayets of Macedonia: Administration and 
Military Power (1878-1908),” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 29 (December 2009), 443-445. “Historic 
Macedonia” refers to the three regions traditionally understood to comprise Macedonia: Pirin Macedonia, in 
Bulgaria; Aegean Macedonia, in Greece; and Vardar Macedonia, in the current Republic of Macedonia. In the 
Ottoman period, this area roughly comprised the vilayets of Selanik (Thessaloniki), Manastir (contemporary Bitolj), 
and Üsküb (Skopje). According to a 1912 estimate of the population of these regions based on language, there were 
an estimated 1,150,000 Slavs, 400,000 Turks, 300,000 Greeks, 200,000 Vlachs, 120,000 Albanians, and 100,000 
Jews living in “historic Macedonia.” Most of the Turks were expelled or fled during the Greek-Turkish population 
exchanges of the 1920s; the vast majority of the Jews were killed during World War II. For a more detailed 
discussion of the population of Macedonia in the 19th and 20th centuries, see Elizabeth Barker, “The Origin of the 
Macedonian Dispute,” and James Pettifer, “The New Macedonian Question,” both in James Pettifer, ed., The New 
Macedonian Question (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). Throughout this chapter, “Macedonia” will refer to 
Vardar Macedonia, i.e., the territory and the Slavic population comprising the current Republic of Macedonia.    
90 For Cvijić’s views on the identity of the population of present-day Macedonia, and his arguments that they were 
more Serb than Bulgarian, see “Из проматрања о етногафији Македоније,” in Cvijić, Сабрана дела, Volume 3 
(Београд: Српска Академија Наука и Уметност, 2000), 153-158. For similar arguments on the origins of the 
Macedonians (from a Serb historian), see Djoko Slijepčević, The Macedonian Question: The Struggle for Southern 
Serbia (Chicago: American Institute for Balkan Affairs, 1958).  





     Well into the 20
th
 century, the Macedonian Slav population had none of the institutions 
constructivism argues are necessary for a successful identity-project: no school system controlled 
by local Macedonians, no state apparatus or governmental bureaucracy, no autonomous church, 
and no independent military organization. By way of contrast, by the mid-19
th
 century the 
already-established Bulgarian, Greek and Serb states all had developed programs attempting to 
claim the population of Macedonia as “theirs.” Yet despite these disadvantages, popular and 
social pressure and support for the creation of an independent Macedonian political entity was so 
strong that in November 1943, Tito’s communist movement recognized the existence of a 
separate Macedonian people and endorsed the creation of a separate Macedonian republic within 
the planned postwar Yugoslav federation.  
 
     Such an outcome, however, was far from certain even just a couple of decades earlier. 
Historically, most things about Macedonia and the Macedonians have been bitterly contested. 
Serbs tended to claim that the Macedonians were “southern Serbs,” Bulgarians that they were 
“western Bulgarians,” and Greeks that they were “Slavophone Greeks.” Historically, Bulgars had 
laid claim to Macedonia based on the fact that much of present-day Macedonia had been part of 
Tsar Samuel’s Bulgarian empire in the 10th and 11th centuries. Serbs, meanwhile, laid claim to 
both the Macedonians as a people and to the territory because Skopje had been the capital of 
Serbian Tsar Dušan’s 14th century Serbian empire, and due to the fact that Serb ethnographers 
found many cultural similarities between the populations of Macedonia and of Serbia proper. 
Linguistically, although the Slavic dialect spoken in the Vardar valley grammatically most 
closely resembles modern Bulgarian, there were enough similarities (especially phonetically) to 




well. Even today, many Bulgarian (and some Serb) scholars deny that Macedonians really 
constitute a separate nation or ethnic group.  
 
    No independent Macedonian institutions existed during the period of Ottoman rule. Although 
an essentially Bulgarian “Archbishopric of Ohrid” existed as an autocephalous church 
organization until 1777, in that year it was abolished and control over the church in Macedonia 
was returned to the Patriarch of Constantinople, who installed Greek hierarchs throughout 
Macedonia. In 1870, the newly-established Exarchate of Bulgaria obtained jurisdictional control 
over many of the dioceses and churches in Vardar Macedonia, as a result of which the 
Bulgarians were able to send many priests and teachers to Macedonia in an effort to Bulgarianize 
the local population.
92
 In terms of governmental administration, the Ottoman state apparatus, 




     Under Russian sponsorship, in March 1878 the Treaty of San Stefano established a greater 
Bulgaria which included Pirin and Vardar Macedonia, as well as large parts of Aegean 
Macedonia. Unwillingness to accept the creation of such a powerful potential Russian client state 
in the Balkans, however, led the great powers to convene the Congress of Berlin in July 1878 to 
create a new Balkan political order. The Congress of Berlin formally recognized the full 
independence of Bulgaria and Serbia (the Hellenic Republic had been recognized as fully 
independent in 1833), and “Turkey in Europe” was essentially limited to Albania and 
                                                        
92 On the religious history of the Orthodox ecclesiastical organization in Macedonia, see Stella Alexander, Church 
and State in Yugoslavia since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Barker, “The Origin of the 
Macedonian Dispute,” 8-9, and Rossos, Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History, 56-57. 
93 On these issues, see Nadine Akhund, “Muslim Representation in the Three Ottoman vilayets of Macedonia: 




Macedonia. Throughout this period, various nationalist/bandit groups, known as komitadji 
(“committee men”) operated in Macedonia, some sponsored by Belgrade, some by Sofia, and 
some by Athens. While ostensibly dedicated to expelling the Turks from Macedonia, the various 
komitadji bands frequently betrayed each other to the Turks when necessary. Indigenous 
Macedonian armed movements, meanwhile, were split between factions that supported Bulgarian 
hopes of annexing Macedonia, an autonomous Macedonian political option, or full 
independence. Indicative of the relative weakness of the elites in these movements is the fact that 
many of them had little fixed sense of their long-term political/strategic goals: often the same 
individual would adopt a pro-Bulgar policy at one point while later adopting a Macedonian-
separatist position.   
 
    The Macedonian national movement traces its origins to the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century, with the first Slav anti-Patriarchist, anti-Greek, and anti-Turkish movements. Decades 
later, the short-lived Ilinden (St. Elijah’s Day) rebellion of 1904 created the “Kruševo Republic” 
and which was quickly defeated by Ottoman forces.
94
 As a result of the First and Second Balkan 
Wars (1912-1913) and World War I, the territory of present-day Macedonia was incorporated 
into the Kingdom of Serbia (and, after 1918, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929). During the interwar period, the inhabitants of 
Macedonia were officially considered “southern Serbs,” and the existence of a separate 
Macedonian identity was officially rejected.  
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    Here again, as in the cases analyzed above, the plausibility of a relatively small, politically 
mobilized group of activists imposing their sense of national identity on a defined group of 
people, at the expense of similar attempts by neighboring states endowed with significantly 
greater resources, does not seem persuasive. The Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian states all claimed 
that the inhabitants of Slavic Macedonia belonged to their respective ethnic groups. Moreover, 
given their advantages as recognized, independent states, each had well-organized and well-
financed campaigns to impose the identity of their choice upon the Slav population of 
Macedonia. In their efforts, they deployed the full panoply of constructivist techniques and 
institutions to try to win the Macedonians over to their side. Thus,   
In order to prove their respective claims they became directly involved in every 
sphere of life in Macedonia. Each sought to establish or control the local 
churches, schools, communal organizations, reading rooms, guilds and so on. 
Until the 1890s they carried on the struggle mainly through extremely well-





      Macedonia, in fact, became the target of “the determined efforts on the part of the three states 
to destroy all signs of Macedonian particularism, patriotism, and nationalism.”96 
 
     In contrast to these organized and government-financed campaigns by neighboring states, the 
local inhabitants of this part of the Balkans had few organizational advantages or resources to 
combat such concerted attempts to transform their identity. Macedonia (along with Kosovo and 
Montenegro) had traditionally been amongst the poorest and most under-developed regions in 
southeastern Europe. For much of the 19
th
 century, Greek bishops in Macedonia forbade use of 
the local language/dialect, insisting that Greek be used in liturgical services. The educational 
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system in Macedonia was extremely poorly developed, even by Balkan standards. In the 19
th
 
century, a rudimentary educational system emerged, primarily devoted to teaching students 
religious fundamentals; secular schools only emerged in Macedonia after 1838. The first two 
“lower secondary” schools in Macedonia were founded in 1857, one by a Serb, the other by a 
Bulgarian. Yet in the 1870s, “schooling in Macedonia went into a permanent decline because of 
the weaker economic situation of Macedonian citizens. At the same time, the activity of the 
neighboring countries, Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia, grew stronger in Macedonia. They opened 
their own schools and through them introduced their national politics into Macedonia.”97 As late 
as the 1940s, sixty-four percent of Macedonia’s population was illiterate,98 and as late as 1948, 
only 2.5 percent of Macedonia’s population went to secondary school. By 1971, this number had 




     Yet despite such disadvantages, a Macedonian nationalist movement consistently gained 
strength and momentum throughout the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. During this period, various 
individuals and groups worked unsuccessfully for the re-establishment of an independent 
Archbishopric of Ohrid, separate from that of the newly established Exarchate of Bulgaria, and 
in 1893,
100
 a revolutionary-terrorist organization, the Vnatreshna Makedono Revolucionerna 
                                                        
97 See Risto Kantardzhiev and Lazo Lazaroski, “Schools and Education,” in Mihailo Apostolski and Haralampié 
Polenakovich, eds., The Socialist Republic of Macedonia (Skopje: Macedonian Review Editions, 1974), 107-108. 
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Organizacija (VMRO) had been created to combat both Turkish control over Macedonia and 
attempts to impose a Bulgarian hegemony over the Macedonians.   
 
     As seen in the previous case-studies, the emergence and ultimate success of the Macedonian 
nation-building process again reveals the weaknesses of constructivist arguments about identity-
formation and the role of elites and institutions. In the case of Macedonia, as in that of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina analyzed earlier, financial and organizational advantages in and of themselves 
clearly were not enough for constructivist identity projects to succeed. In fact, the success of the 
Macedonian nation- and state-building project provides perhaps the best counter-example to 
constructivist views that elites and institutions are crucial, necessary components in identity-
formation and nation-building. In the Macedonian case, what we see is not governments, 
schools, churches, or military organizations creating an ethnic group or a nation, but an ethnic 
group creating its own institutions. The Macedonian case thus shows that identity-formation and 
nation-building are much more complex, deeply-rooted, and long-term processes than many 
constructivists recognize. 
 
Micro-Case Study 4: Alexander’s Integral Yugoslavism 
     On January 6, 1929, King Alexander Karadjordjević dissolved the parliament of the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, proclaimed a royal dictatorship, and, following his contemporary 
Marshal Pilsudski’s dictum that “the state makes the nation,” embarked upon a constructivist 
campaign to forge new political identities and loyalties among his subjects by creating a new, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
28-29. According to the traditions of the Orthodox Church, autocephalous churches are allowed to name and 
consecrate their own hierarchs, and do not need the consent of any other Orthodox church. Church organizations that 
only have autonomy, on the other hand, do require such consent. In this context, autocephaly for the Archbishopric 
of Ohrid meant allowing local bishops to choose their own canonical leader of their own independent church 




“integral” Yugoslav consciousness. John Allcock claims that “this is the period par excellence of 
the building of ‘imagined communities’ and hence the incorporation of people into groups with 
temporally and spatially extended identities wider than those of kinship and locality.”101  
 
     “Integral Yugoslavism” was based on the belief that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were 
members of one ethnic nation who had become separated by centuries of foreign rule.
102
 Before 
World War I, many South Slav and foreign observers, such as R.W. Seton-Watson, believed that 
these “races” would eventually meld into one “race,” in the same way that the Germans and 




     Yet Alexander’s efforts were based on weak foundations. Despite the fact that many 
intellectuals in the South Slav lands adopted “Yugoslavism” in the 19th and 20th centuries, the 
general population on the whole maintained their narrower Croat or Serb national ideologies. 
Thus,  
Yugoslavism was restricted mainly to the intelligentsia, which in the 
underdeveloped and semiliterate lands of the South Slavs included even those 
with only secondary education, since it presupposed an ability for abstract 
thinking about social and political matters, a way of thinking that was impossible 
without at least some systematic secularized education. The Croatian and Serbian 
national ideologies also were initially the creation and concern of the cultural and 
political elites, but in the second half of the nineteenth century they spread much 
faster than Yugoslavism, primarily because they corresponded to a premodern 
sense of identity based on the memories of medieval Croatian and Serbian 
politics. Not only was Yugoslavism from the very beginning primarily the 
                                                        
101 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 265. 
102 For a useful analysis of the various strains of thinking behind Yugoslav ideology during this period, see Pieter 
Troch, “Yugoslavism between the World Wars: Indecisive Nation-Building,” Nationalities Papers 38 (March 2010), 
227-244. 




concern of the educated, but it rarely reached the peasantry. When it did, the 




     In keeping with the new campaign for integral Yugoslavism, in 1929 the ethnoconfessionally 
specific “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” was renamed the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia,” 
and on October 3
rd
, Alexander redrew the internal, historical and/or ethnoconfessional borders of 
Yugoslavia and replaced them with purely administrative borders intended to foster a broader, 
pan-ethnoconfessional Yugoslav consciousness. The new administrative districts, named 
banovine (in the plural; the singular form is “banovina”) “established with intentional disregard 
for the national aspirations of Croats and Serbs,” 105 abolished historical names associated with 
specific ethnic groups, and were largely organized along major river valleys to promote 
economic integration.
106
 Using the names of rivers for the various banovine was also meant to 
have symbolic value, as rivers are seen as geographical features that promote fusion.
107
 The 
constructivist (and de-constructivist) purpose of the new arrangements was clear from the fact 
that many ethnic groups were split into separate banovine: Croats, for instance, found themselves 
in four separate banovinas, which, according to Sabrina Ramet, were intended to break down a 
sense of Croat identity and cultivate instead the development of separate regional identities such 
                                                        
104 Djilas, The Contested Country, p. 16. 
105 Djilas, The Contested Country, 80. The Croats and Serbs were not the only ones to be unhappy with the new 
borders. Bosnia & Herzegovina, for instance, was divided between four different banovinas. See Bougarel, “Bosnian 
Muslims and the Yugoslav Idea,” 103. Importantly, however, King Alexander’s decision to proclaim a dictatorship 
was seen by many political forces as necessary; among those were the Croatian Peasants Party and the Independent 
Democrats. See Djokić, “(Dis)integrating Yugoslavia: King Alexander and Interwar Yugoslavism,” 147. 
106 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History, 165. 




as Istrian, Dalmatian, and Slavonian.
108
 As a government manifesto issued in October 1929 
claimed 
The administrative division [into 9 banovinas] has forever erased historic borders 
. . . This Law [of 3 October 1929] has laid the foundations for the following 




           In 1931, Alexander promulgated a new constitution which was a further attempt to deal 
with Yugoslavia’s ethnoconfessional divisions by administrative diktat. Under the 1931 
constitution, parties or associations organized on a religious, ethnic or regional basis were 
outlawed, and in parliamentary elections held in November 1931, only parties which fielded 
candidates in all constituencies were allowed to compete; however, as a result of the difficulty in 
fielding candidates throughout the country, and since many political organizations decided to 
boycott the elections, the practical result was that the only party on the voter’s lists was the 
government’s “Yugoslav National Party.”110  
 
    A centralized educational system was considered a crucial element in promoting Alexander’s 
integral Yugoslavism and sense of common Yugoslav identity. In a hand-written letter (in the 
Latin script) to the eleventh convention of the Yugoslav Teachers Society in August 1931, King 
Alexander would note 
The Yugoslav teachers, imbued with love for their people and for their difficult 
but exalted calling, are the architects of the national soul, its national conscience 
and culture. In order that they respond completely to the wishes and hopes which 
their king and nation has entrusted to them, the Yugoslav Teachers Society, 
                                                        
108 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 105. Croats, of course, were not the only ethnoconfessional 
group to be divided between different banovinas, for the Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims found themselves in a 
number of different banovinas as well.   
109 “Historički zaključci Ministarskog Savjeta,” Novo doba (Zagreb), 5 June 1930 (emphasis in the original), as cited 
by Djokić, “(Dis)integrating Yugoslavia: King Alexander and Interwar Yugoslavism,” 149. 




uniting all current and future Yugoslav teachers, must be the focus of education, 
the pillar of Yugoslav nationalism and stimulus for all the beautiful aspirations in 




      Despite this rhetoric, however, in reality, the combined difficulties of trying to reconcile 
several different educational systems amidst the overall difficulties of the interwar years,
112
 
meant that Alexander’s attempts to use a centralized, standardized educational system to promote 
a common Yugoslav identity never really got off the ground, and in many ways, Alexander’s 
constructivist attempt to promote a unitary sense of Yugoslav consciousness had the opposite 
effect of that intended. As could be expected, a significant amount of coercion was needed to 
make Alexander’s Yugoslavism work. Civil liberties were suspended, censorship of the press 
was instituted, and many actual or potential opponents of the dictatorship were jailed.
113
 As 
Aleksa Djilas notes, the 1931 Constitution,  
was intended not only to strengthen centralism but also to generate a unitary 
Yugoslav national consciousness. The existence of a Croatian or any other 
national question was simply not admitted; only Yugoslav nationality was 
recognized. The king hoped to solve the national question simply by abolishing it 
. . . The administrative reorganization of Yugoslavia, the suppression of political 
parties that had defended particular national interests, and the reform of the 
educational system in order to promote Yugoslavism were expected to create a 
new Yugoslav nation . . . Instead of dissolving traditional Croatian nationalism, 




    Thus, following upon the earlier failures of bošnjaštvo, the first constructivist attempt to create 
a pan-confessional, Yugoslav identity failed as well; as Slobodan Jovanović put it bluntly in 
                                                        
111 Učitelj 45, no. 1 (1931-32), 3, as cited by Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 106. 
112 For a balanced assessment of the problems confronting the new kingdom in the interwar period, see Joseph 
Rothschild, East-Central Europe Between the Two World Wars (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 
1974), Chapter 5.  
113 Srdjan Trifkovic, “The First Yugoslavia and the Origins of Croatian Separatism,” East European Quarterly 
XXVI (September 1992), 347. 




1939, “the attempt, through the use of state power, to create in the shortest possible time a 
Yugoslav nationalism that would suffocate Serbian and Croatian nationalism—did not 
succeed.”115 Alexander himself was assassinated in 1934 by a Croatian/Macedonian conspiracy 
while on a state visit to France in 1934, and his Yugoslavism did not long outlast him; as Charles 
Jelavich notes, “By the mid-1930s, Yugoslavism as a unifying concept was dead for all practical 
purposes.”116 
 
     Thus, despite Alexander’s efforts, in interwar Yugoslavia, instead of the state making the 
nation, it was the structure of Yugoslav society itself that reinforced the divisions of loyalty and 
identity along regional and ethnoconfessional lines.
117
 Although Serbs were generally considered 
to be those who most strongly identified with the interwar state, this was largely because “they 
perceived it as a Serbian creation, led by the Serbian monarchy, in which the Serbs were finally 
united. But Serbs never became Yugoslavs in the sense of developing a new national 
consciousness, either political or cultural . . . “118 For the other ethnoconfessional groups in 
Yugoslavia this was even more so.  The weak attachment of most Croats to the new Yugoslav 
state was evident in the fact that “Frankovci,” a generic name for a variety of Croatian separatist 
groups in the 1930s (many of whose members were allied to or sympathetic to Ante Pavelić and 
the Ustaša movement) “were the largest student group at the University of Zagreb in 1940.”119 
                                                        
115 See Jovanović, “Jugoslovenska misao u prošlosti i budučnosti,” Sabrana dela volume 11 (Belgrade: Srpska 
književna zadruga, 1991), 575. 
116 Jelavich, “South Slav Education,” 113. 
117 Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia, 287-288. 
118 Djilas, The Contested Country, 59-60. 




The consequences of such widely diverging loyalties and affinities became very obvious during 
the interethnic civil conflict that engulfed Yugoslavia in the midst of World War II.  
 
Conclusions 
     The purpose of this chapter has been to raise some fundamental questions about identity-
formation and nation-building in the Balkans that are usually taken for granted or left unexplored 
by constructivist and modernist accounts of this these issues. The conventional wisdom on these 
matters claims that most individuals in southeastern Europe had no sense of an ethnic or national 
identity until “nationally-conscious” elites and state institutions gave them such identities at 
various points in the nineteenth century through carefully conceived identity-formation and 
nation-building projects. Yet an examination of the track record of such attempts, and analysis of 
the actual logistics and mechanics that would have been involved in making such attempts—
based on the assumptions that the peasant masses have no sense of their own identity in ethnic or 
national terms, that their identities are “fluid and malleable,” and that clever constructivists can 
impose their own preferred sense of identity upon them—reveals the weaknesses and 
shortcomings of such explanations. Explanations based on the role of the media or educational 
institutions in identity-formation and nation-building, for instance, clearly have difficulty 
explaining the success of such efforts among largely illiterate populations. And, as was seen in 
the Macedonian case (and, to a lesser extent, in the case of Croat and Serb nationalisms in 
Bosnia & Herzegovina as well), giving a decisive role to institutions (such as churches, 
militaries, schools, or governmental bureaucracies) in the identity-formation and nation-building 





    The micro-case studies examined in this chapter offer specific lessons in the problems 
confronting would-be nation builders. The first is the crucial importance of timing. Thus, even 
granting the constructivist argument that identities are fluid and malleable, the failure of efforts 
such as bošnjaštvo and “integral Yugoslavism” suggests that they are not always so, and that if 
group identities really can change, they do so only during specific historical windows of 
opportunity. Adrian Hastings and Steven Van Evera, for instance, have suggested that ethnic 
identities solidify once a group’s sacred scriptures are translated into its own indigenous 
language. If accurate, the aforementioned constructivist projects came far too late to have had a 
serious chance of succeeding. This also suggests that similar contemporary projects to create 
pan-ethnoconfessional “Bosnian,” “Kosovar,” or “Macedonian” identities will face the same 
fate. 
 
     A second lesson for would-be nation-builders is both the time and the resources required for 
such efforts, even when “only” confronted with the beliefs and identities of relatively poor, 
uneducated, and unorganized masses of people and small groups of activists. Any comparison of 
the material and resource advantages enjoyed by Bosnia & Herzegovina’s Habsburg 
administrators in their effort to promote bošnjaštvo as an alternative to Croat or Serb 
ethnoconfessional identities would be overwhelmingly in favor of the former, yet bošnjaštvo 
clearly failed while the other ethnoconfessional identities proved long-lasting. Alternatively, the 
success and longevity of these other ethnoconfessional identities shows the limits and constraints 
under which elites, institutions, and resources operate in the identity-formation and nation-
building process when they are not compatible with the attitudes, beliefs, traditions and 




which will examine the implications of this understanding of identity-formation, nation-building, 








And when it is said to them, 'do not make mischief in the land', 
they say, 'we are but peacemakers.'  





      The analysis of Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism provided in this dissertation has 
numerous implications for the management of interethnic relations. The purpose of this chapter 
is to provide a coherent critique of the various possibilities for ethnic conflict management in 
southeastern Europe consistent with the collective, chronic, and non-economic characteristics of 
ethnoconfessional nationalism described in this dissertation.  
 
     Students of nationalism and international policymakers dealing with ethnic conflict have 
differed significantly in their views of the ability of outsiders to improve interethnic relations to 
any great degree in any given setting. Some have consistently proposed extensive interventionist 
policies in trouble-spots around the world.
1
 On the other hand, a more cautious approach to 
dealing with ethnic conflict was once famously offered by former U.S. Secretary of State Warren 
                                                        
1 Groups favoring extensive interventions and state- and nation-building campaigns often have a vested self-interest 
in exaggerating the successes of such efforts; on this, see Gerald Knaus and Marcus Cox, “The ‘Helsinki Moment’ 




Christopher, who claimed that Bosnia was “an intractable ‘problem from hell’ that no one can be 
expected to solve . . . a tribal feud that no outsider could hope to settle.”2 
 
      Upon closer examination, it is clear that the many efforts to resolve ethnic conflict in the 
Balkans, whether theoretical or practical, have fallen short of their goals. This was just as true for 
the Habsburg administrators of Bosnia at the close of the nineteenth century as it is for European 
Union and NATO administrators in the 21
st
 century, perhaps because a common thread in the 
policies of both sets of outsiders has been the belief that “rational” forms of governing these 
regions would ameliorate ethnic tensions.
3
 Worse still, sometimes the policies outsiders’ have 
adopted have simply been counterproductive; in fact, many international attempts to reduce 
communal conflict in war-torn states, relying on liberal-internationalist beliefs in democratic 




     Intellectually, the range of policies available to deal with ethnic conflict are relatively limited; 
one telling example is that in David Laitin’s 363-page (minus appendices) study of identity 
formation in the former Soviet Union, Identity in Formation, a total of two pages are devoted to 
                                                        
2 As cited by Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 307. 
3 With respect to the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia & Herzegovina, for instance, Okey notes that it was based on a 
belief that “basic public works, like communications, irrigation or drainage,” confessional even-handedness, 
equality before the law and a few European-style schools” would produce a satisfied and loyal population. See 
Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 26. 
4 Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism.” Along these lines, for a useful analysis (and 
strong critique) of how the OHR in Bosnia mismanaged police reform there from 2004-2007, see Kristof Bender and 
Gerald Knaus, “The Worst in Class: How the International Protectorate Hurts the European Future of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” Journal of Intervention and State Building 1 (December 2007, Special Supplement), 24-37. The most 
important recent analysis of the dangers inherent in holding elections in divided societies is Jack Snyder’s From 
Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: Norton, 2000). International officials 
often (belatedly) come to this conclusion as well; for instance, former High Representative Paddy Ashdown now 
argues that the biggest failing of the international community in its strategy in the Balkans has been to promote 
democratization without first establishing the rule of law; see Ashdown’s op-ed piece entitled “What I Learned in 




policy recommendations for dealing with ethnic conflict and violence.
5
 Another sobering 
example is provided by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, who claim that there are eight 
distinct methods of ethnic-conflict regulation, which can either eliminate ethnic differences, or 
manage them. Most are neither intellectually nor morally appealing: 1) genocide; 2) forced mass-
population transfers; 3) partition and/or secession; 4) integration and/or assimilation; 5) 
hegemonic control; 6) arbitration (third-party intervention); 7) cantonization and/or 




     Democracy itself is no panacea for resolving ethnically-based conflicts, Belgium, for 
instance, has been called “the most successful ‘failed state’ of all time,” yet relations between the 
Flemish and Walloon population continue to deteriorate.
7
 As Rabushka and Shepsle succinctly 
ask but somewhat dismally answer “is the resolution of intense but conflicting preferences in the 
plural society manageable in a democratic framework. We think not.”8 The political science 
                                                        
5 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 344-45. 
6 See McGarry and O’Leary, “The Macro-Political Regulation of Ethnic Conflict,” in John McGarry and Brendan 
O’Leary, eds., The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London: Routledge, 1993), 4.   
7 See Michael Kimmelman, “With Flemish Nationalism on the Rise, Belgium Teeters on the Edge,” The New York 
Times, 4 August 2008, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/04/arts/04abro.html  
8
 Rabushka and Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies, 217. The rather pessimistic view on the very limited ability of 
outsiders to “solve” ethnic conflicts around the world seems, arguably, to be the scholarly consensus. Donald 
Horowitz has called the problems of ethnic politics and ethnic conflict “intractable,” noting that to study the sources 
and patterns of ethnic conflict is “to emphasize the constraints on policy innovation, for it is to see in advance just 
how intractable a force ethnicity can be. The evidence suggests that serious ethnic conflicts are likely to be resistant 
to sweeping change . . . The whole structure of ethnic politics conspires to make the problem of conflict intractable.” 
Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 564-566. Similarly, Lake and Rothchild note that “Managing ethnic conflicts, 
whether by local elites and governments or concerned members of the international community, is a continuing 
process with no end point or final resolution . . . Ethnic conflict can be contained, but it cannot be entirely resolved.” 
Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict,” International Security 21 
(Fall 1996), 42. Roger Petersen has been similarly pessimistic; in his view, “ethnic violence is very difficult to 
prevent.” See Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence, 267. I. William Zartman similarly notes that “Conflicts as 
deep and complex as ethnic disputes have, of course, no solution. Solutions apply at best to legal divisions among 
consumables, or at least among possessables, that can be used, marked, carted away, or cut up. They do not 
adequately cover human feelings, memories, and relations, particularly when new generations can regenerate the 




literature that has attempted to measure the effectiveness of the various institutions and strategies 
used to deal with ethnic conflict—such as federalism, consociationalism, electoral engineering, 
and democracy itself—often provides either inconclusive or contradictory results.9 Further 
pointing to the relatively small toolbox political scientists have for dealing with ethnic conflict is 





     Policymakers have often similarly expressed frustrations in dealing with ethnoconfessional 
conflict; as one international official described the problems experienced in trying to impose the 
international agenda on Bosnia,  
We’ve played all the cards: the money, the advice, the pressure. We have done 
everything my country has learned to do in two hundred years of meddling in 
other countries. I still wonder if it is enough to achieve what we want.
11
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Zartman, “Putting Humpty-Dumpty Together Again,” 317. All of this of course confirms the chronic nature of the 
phenomenon.   
9 Elkins and Sides provide a good review of the state of the literature on all these issues. On consociationalism, for 
instance, they note that “Evidence of the effects of consensual institutions is inconclusive,” and on the utility of 
federalist solutions, or various electoral engineering efforts, “there is no agreement—either theoretically or 
empirically—that either type of reform actually builds unity within the state.” See Elkins and Sides, “Can 
Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?” American Political Science Review 101 (November 2007), 694. 
10 As Timothy Sisk points out, despite the fact that Horowitz’s support for integrationist mechanisms for reducing 
conflict in deeply-divided societies is considerably at odds with Arend Lijphart’s consociational approach, both 
overlap in several important ways, notably, their support for federalism, proportionality, and ethnic balance. See 
Sisk, Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
Peace, 1996), 40. 
11 Mike O’Connor, “Bosnian Elections Test Western Resolve,” The New York Times, 13 September 1998. Such 
frustration dealing with ethnic conflicts is not uncommon. In very similar language, a recent report on the upsurge of 
violent incidents in Kashmir over the past three years claimed that “they signal the failure of decades of efforts to 
win the assent of Kashmiris using just about any tool available: money, elections and overwhelming force.” See 
Lydia Polgreen, “Indian Forces Face Broader Revolt in Kashmir,” The New York Times, 13 August 2010, A1. 
Contrast this exasperation with the thoughts of one of the protagonists in Ivo Andrić’s novel Bosnian Chronicle, 
Hamdi Bey Teškeredzić, who, upon learning that a French consul was being sent to his central Bosnian town of 
Travnik exclaimed, “We’re on our own ground here, and anyone else who comes is a stranger and won’t be able to 
hold out long. Many people have come here intending to stay, but so far we’ve seen the back of all of them.” Ivo 
Andrić, Bosnian Chronicle (London: Harvill Press, 1992), 3. In Bosnia in 1996, the present author was told the 





     A fundamental point of this dissertation has been ethnoconfessional nationalism’s utter 
complexity, both as a phenomenon to understand and as a phenomenon to deal with. Another 
important point has been how “massive” the problem is, insofar as it is not a function of dealing 
with small groups of elites over a limited period of time, but rather of large collectivities over 
extended historical periods. This position stands in stark contrast to the pro-interventionist 
position, which generally views southeastern Europe’s problems in the 1990s as a-historical and 
a-typical events provoked by malevolent elites, which, consequently, can be dealt with rather 
quickly and easily; hence the reliance on quick fix measures such as replacing elites, writing new 
constitutions, and holding donor’s conferences.12 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Accords, Radovan Karadzić allegedly said “We survived five hundred years under the Turks. We can survive one 
hundred under these guys” (i.e., NATO).  
Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been foiled by the same problem. In discussing local attitudes towards 
the US/NATO presence in Afghanistan, for instance, William Dalyrymple related the following anecdote: “During 
lunch, as my hosts casually pointed out the various places in the village where the British had been massacred in 
1842, I asked them if they saw any parallels between that war and the present situation. ‘It is exactly the same,’ said 
Anwar Khan Jegdalek. ‘Both times the foreigners have come for their own interests, not for ours. They say, ‘We are 
your friends, we want democracy, we want to help.’ But they are lying. Whoever comes to Afghanistan, even now, 
they will face the fate of Burnes, Macnaghten and Dr. Brydon,’ said Mohammad Khan, our host in the village and 
the owner of the orchard where we were sitting. The names of the fighters of 1842, long forgotten in their home 
country, were still known here.” See Dalyrymple, “Why the Taliban is Winning in Afghanistan,” The New Stateman, 
22 June 2010.   
12 This has been a failure of U.S. and/or international policy in many parts of the world; as Joseph Rudolph has 
noted, “in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia, international workers speak optimistically of nation-
building as though such projects had not repeatedly failed in the past in both the Third World and multinational 
communist states.” See Rudolph, Politics and Ethnicity, 209. Critics of U.S. policy in the Middle-East have also 
noted that American policy in Lebanon and Iraq failed because U.S. policymakers did not understood that liberal 
approaches to dealing with interethnic conflicts stressing the rights of the individual rather than collective or 
communal group interests were incompatible with local political cultures. As Vali Nasr has argued, “When the U.S. 
government toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003, it thought regime change would help bring democracy to Iraq and 
then to the rest of the region. The Bush administration thought of politics as the relationship between individuals and 
the state, and so it failed to recognize that people in the Middle East see politics also as the balance of power among 
communities. Rather than viewing the fall of Saddam as an occasion to create a liberal democracy, therefore, many 
Iraqis viewed it as an opportunity to redress injustices in the distribution of power among the country’s major 
communities.” See Vali Nasr, “When the Shiites Rise,” Foreign Affairs 85 (July/August 2006), 58. U.S. Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates has indirectly acknowledged Nasr’s critique, noting after a trip to Baghdad in 2007 that “In 
some ways we probably all underestimated the depth of the mistrust and how difficult it would be for these guys 
[Sunni, Shia, and Kurds] to come together on legislation, which, let's face it, is not some kind of secondary thing." 





      Compounding the difficulty in dealing with ethnoconfessional nationalism lies in the fact that 
“nationalists,” “anti-nationalists,” and “outsiders” all have to deal with numerous and complex 
historical, political, and social constraints in trying to influence the development of Balkan 
societies. These constraints significantly limit political options, and again reveal the large role 
that autonomous popular demands and expectations play in determining the outcome of 
nationalist conflicts. As Anthony Smith notes with respect to the problems facing “nationalists,” 
but which also apply to “anti-nationalists” or “outsiders,” 
. . . nationalists can sometimes use the ‘ethnic past’ for their own ends, but not in 
the long run: they soon find themselves locked into its framework and sequences, 
and the assumptions that underlie the interpretations of successive generations . . . 
Our understandings of past cultures set limits to the degree to which they can be 
transformed; the richer and better documented that past and those cultures, and 
the greater knowledge and understanding of them, the more complex and more 
difficult the task will be . . . To achieve success, the nationalist presumption must 
be able to sustain itself in the face of historical enquiry and criticism, either 
because there is some well attested documentation of early ethnic origins or 





      Thus, the longer the historical record of a particular “ethnic past” the more difficult it is to 
transform the intellectual framework and social milieu which influence the behavior of its 
members.
14
 In the Balkan case, the already entrenched national identities of most of the region’s 
peoples, together with the longevity of the ethnic conflicts in the region, suggests little cause for 
optimism on this score. Here it is important to note, however, that the difficulties in creating (or 
imposing) multiethnic, multicultural societies in the Balkans are not due to some atavistic, 
irrational streak amongst the Balkan peoples themselves, as the more strident versions of the 
                                                        
13 Smith, Nationalism and Modernity, 43, 46. 




“ancient ethnic hatreds” school would suggest. Rather, the problem stems from the inherent 
contradictions in liberal democratic theory between individual and group rights, and the 
difficulty in resolving these issues in an environment of geo-political instability, institutional 
weakness, systemic breakdown, and war. Many of these problems are present throughout much 
of the world, which is why a study of the successes and failures of international intervention in 
southeastern Europe can serve an important purpose for future efforts in other regions.  
 
     Another intellectual problem facing scholars and policymakers dealing with nation- and state-
building in the Balkans is the fact that the supposed western European “solutions” to “national 
questions” and interethnic relations currently being imposed upon the region are expected to 
succeed in states and among nations that have not experienced the same social, political, and 
economic development as western European states. This expectation is based on the assumption 
that there is one “proper” course of socio-political development, and that other states and nations 
can accelerate their own development by simply adopting the institutional forms and 
mechanisms that emerged over hundreds of years in other cultural environments and other 
political and historical circumstances. Both of these assumptions remain unproven. Gale Stokes 
categorically denies that it is even possible, noting that  
 . . . our current policy of imposing multiculturalism and tolerance on Bosnia and 
Kosovo cannot work. Democracy and the attributes that go with it cannot be 
imposed—they must be chosen. The Balkan peoples will be able to develop the 
confidence needed to choose to enter into the multifaceted system of buffering 
mechanisms and negotiating modes that constitutes today’s security system in 




    If Stokes is right, then to become stable democracies, the Balkan states will have to follow the 
same developmental course that the western European states have followed, which means they 
                                                        




will have to become more ethnically homogeneous. Timothy Garton Ash has come to similar 
conclusions, noting that  
. . . we in Western Europe have long since been molded into nation-states, in a 
process that lasted from the Middle Ages to the early twentieth-century . . . It’s 
precisely on this basis of clear separation into nation-states that we have been 
getting together in the European Union, as well as becoming more ethnically 




    In a later essay, Ash developed this point further: 
 
. . . this separating out into small states or sub-state units with clear ethnic 
majorities, driven though it has been by manipulative and often cynical post-
communist nationalism, nonetheless has powerful precedents and counterparts in 
the rest of Europe. Elsewhere in Europe, too, people generally prefer to be ruled 
by those they consider somehow ‘of their own kind.’ Only once thus constituted, 
in some version of a nation-state, are they prepared (up to a point) to come 
together in larger regional and all-European units. A realistic liberal 
internationalism for the twenty-first century needs to take on board the insights of 




     If correct, the assumption that the Balkan states will have to follow, at least to some degree, 
the western European historical experience of forming more or less ethnically-homogenous 
nation-states again suggests that the essence of the phenomenon is not a matter of malevolent 
elites (i.e., human agency) but of certain universal realities of politics and society in the modern 
era. The phenomenon is thereby inherently more complex, and hence more difficult to deal with.  
 
     One other point bears noting here as well: the international efforts in Bosnia & Herzegovina 
and Kosovo probably qualify as the most ambitious constructivist state-building projects ever 
attempted, under the most favorable circumstances and enjoying the greatest allocation of 
resources ever given to such projects, and it is doubtful that we will ever see international 
                                                        
16 See Ash, “Cry, the Dismembered Country,” 32 




experiments of this relative magnitude again.
18
 Moreover, the international community’s 
interventions in southeastern Europe are qualitatively different from other interventions around 
the world. Whereas historically most internationally-mediated agreements between warring 
factions have focused on negotiating cease-fires or demarcating borders between warring parties, 
the recent Balkan interventions have been far more ambitious insofar as they have involved long-
term efforts in writing constitutions, designing governmental institutions, trying to codify 
relations between different ethnic groups, aiding refugee returns, and creating institutions to 
protect human and civil rights. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the international organizations 
implementing these have taken on executive, legislative, and judicial functions, and international 
personnel staff various governmental institutions and agencies in these countries (for instance, in 
the case of Bosnia, the Constitutional Court and the Central Bank).
19
 In this sense, the 
                                                        
18 Coming up with a precise figure for how much the US, the EU, NATO, the United Nations, and the various other 
international organizations and agencies active in the Balkans over the past fifteen years have spent is practically 
impossible to determine, but somewhere in the neighborhood of $200 billion seems roughly accurate. The following 
is a sample of some of the estimates that have been put forth. Between 1992-2000, one Bosnian magazine estimated 
that the international community had spent in between $50-90 billion in Bosnia & Herzegovina alone. See Jasna 
Hasović, “Pola budžeta za plate službenika,” Dani (Sarajevo), 8 September 2000. Determining a precise amount is 
impossible because different agencies use different methodologies for calculating their expenses. Hasović and others 
estimated that over half of this amount had been spent on the salaries of foreign “experts” themselves. Elizabeth 
Pond cites figures showing that the U.S. spent $22 billion in southeastern Europe between 1992-2003, while the 
E.U. spent €33 billion in the region between 2001-2005 alone. Aid to Bosnia per capita in 1996-97 exceeded aid 
given to postwar Germany or Japan in their first two postwar years. See Pond, Endgame in the Balkans, 278. One 
estimate of the cost of the Kosovo war to NATO itself was $40 billion. See Michael R. Sesit, "Cost of Kosovo War 
Could Hit $40 Billion, Biggest Economic Impact Could Turn Out to be End of Peace Dividend," The Wall Street 
Journal, 29 June 1999, A11 By way of comparison, Misha Glenny has estimated that the annual budget for the U.N. 
Mission in Kosovo amounted to less than one-half of one day’s bombing. See Glenny, "The Muddle in Kosovo," 
The Wall Street Journal, 23 February 2000. Iain King and Whit Mason have determined that NATO countries 
devoted 25 times more troops and 50 times more money to the effort in Kosovo than to the effort in Afghanistan. 
See King and Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo, 21. Walter Mayr has claimed that the 
U.N. has spent $33 billion (U.S.) in Kosovo since 1999, or approximately 1,750 Euro per capita—160 times more 
than the U.N. spent on the entire developing world per capita. See Mayr, “Elefanten vor dem Wasserloch,” Der 
Spiegel (Hamburg), 21 April 2008, available at: 
http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/dokument/12/30/dokument.html?titel=Elefanten+vor+dem+Wasserloch&id=566703
21&top=SPIEGEL&suchbegriff=walter+mayr+kosovo&quellen=&vl=0 Accessed on 16 July 2008 at 4:09pm EST. 
One estimate suggests the EU spent more than €300 million on reconstruction and state-building programs in 
Macedonia between 2001-2008. See Chivvis, “The Making of Macedonia,” Survival 50 (April-May 2008), 154. 
19 See Bieber, “Institutionalizing Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia: Domestic vs. Internationally Driven Processes of 




international effort in Bosnia (and, to lesser extents, in Kosovo and Macedonia as well) 
constitute “crucial cases” for the study of constructivist nation-building projects. It is hard to 
imagine, for instance, that would-be state-builders will ever have the powers granted to the 
Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, which, as one analysis noted, reflects “an 
extraordinary political reality in contemporary Europe: the unlimited authority of an international 
mission to overrule all of the democratic institutions of a sovereign member state of the United 
Nations.”20 The authors go on to point out that 
. . . outsiders actually set [the reform agenda], impose it, and punish with 
sanctions those who refuse to implement it. At the center of this system is the 
OHR, which can interpret its own mandate and so has essentially unlimited legal 
powers. It can dismiss presidents, prime ministers, judges, and mayors without 
having to submit its decisions for review by any independent appeals body. It can 
veto candidates for ministerial positions without needing publicly to present any 
evidence for its stance. It can impose legislation and create new institutions 
without having to estimate the cost to the Bosnian taxpayer. In fact, the OHR is 
not accountable to any elected institution at all . . . Bosnia is a country where 
expatriates make major decisions, where key appointments must receive foreign 
                                                        
20 See Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, “Travails of the European Raj: Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
Journal of Democracy 14 (July 2003), 60. Transparency International has gone even further in its critique of the 
High Representative’s powers, suggesting that many of the OHR’s actions would be construed as criminal in other 
countries. Thus, “the High Representative has demonstrated that he can bring charges against any individual in BiH 
without presenting sufficient (or any) evidence and that the entire process of ‘democratic’ elections comes close to 
being a farce. Dispossessing legal entities of their funds without a proper public investigation and a trial would be 
classified as theft in any Western democracy.” National Integrity Systems Country Study Report Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Berlin: Transparency International, 2004), 24. Lest one think that these are just the musings of 
professional naysayers, on this score it is worth quoting Matthew T. Parish, head of the OHR Legal Department 
from 2005-2007. Parish has described the “gross lack of due process” in the High Representative’s exercise of his 
“unlimited legal powers,” noting that “The right to amend legislation, and to dismiss public officials, could be 
exercised without any prior reference to any affected party. Bosnia’s democratically elected parliaments did not 
have to be consulted. Where officials were removed, they did not have to be given any notice, or an opportunity to 
respond to the evidence against them. Indeed, the evidence did not even have to exist. There was no possibility of 
appeal or review of a decision, even if one lost one’s job or otherwise suffered direct and individual harm as a 
result.” See Parish, “The Demise of the Dayton Protectorate,” Journal of Intervention and State Building 1 
(December 2007, Special Supplement), 15. Here it is worth noting that the post-Dayton international effort in BiH is 
largely following a blueprint already designed by the Habsburg administrators of Bosnia in the late 19th-early 20th 
centuries. As Robin Okey has noted, “democracy was incompatible with the mystique on which the cultural mission 
in Bosnia was founded, which derived ultimately from Habsburg traditions of enlightened despotism: the rule of 
impartial, dispassionate bureaucrats who appropriated to themselves the sphere of modern administration.” Okey, 
moreover, points out that then, just as now, it is a mistake to believe that resistance to outsiders’ initiatives 
automatically constitutes a rejection of democracy per se; as he notes, “western values have always been more 
acceptable than foreign rule.” See Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 249, 253. All of these points reflect the 









      It is worth noting that a constructivist identity- and state-building project could hardly hope 
to be endowed with more power than has been granted to the OHR, yet even here such wide-
ranging powers have achieved only limited success.
22
 The international experience in Kosovo 
serves as a similar case in point, where, it has been argued, 
The most generously supported and ambitious nation-building exercise in recent 
history (if not ever) is now a humbling reminder of humanity’s limitations. 
Kosovo has exposed the weaknesses of all the most powerful global international 
institutions, including the United Nations, NATO and the European Union . . .The 
fact remains that the world seems to have tried its best and has failed to achieve a 





    All things considered, it is understandable why many students of ethnic and national problems 
consider them relatively intractable. Even as original a thinker as Ernest Gellner, for instance, 
admitted that the solutions he could propose for dealing with nationalism were relatively 
“banal;” all Gellner could recommend was  
. . . a preference for stability, an avoidance of destabilization without strong cause 
and without provision for an orderly passage to a successor regime; affluence; 
centralization of major order-maintaining functions and a cantonisation of social 
ones; cultural pluralism, de-fetishsation of land. These recommendations may be 
                                                        
21 Knaus and Martin, “Travails of the European Raj,” 61-62. As Robert Hayden similarly notes, “it is surely an odd 
democracy in which the unelected representative of foreign powers can ignore the elected representatives of the 
people of the country . . . Ironically, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, supposedly embodying the will 
of the international community, now runs the country much in the same way that the League of Communist of 
Yugoslavia did, promulgating laws by fiat, dismissing elected officials for political and moral unsuitability, and 
controlling the press.” Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided, 137, 174.  
22 There are three specific reasons for this. First, the consequences of political interventions have proven difficult to 
predict, and local politicians have frequently responded to political initiatives and constitutional changes in ways 
that both defy the spirit of these initiatives and outsmart their designers. Second, implementing such initiatives has 
far too often required substantial violations of democratic norms and principles, which consequently means that 
these initiatives have less legitimacy in the eyes of local politicians and populations. Third, the ability of the 
international community to accurately assess local problems, develop policies to deal with them, and then find the 
energy and the resources to implement such policies has been lacking. 
23 See Iain King and Whit Mason, Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell 









     A proper appreciation for the complexities of ethnoconfessional nationalism makes Gellner’s 
advice seem more wise than banal. As a 2004 report by the International Commission on the 
Balkans noted, more than a decade of ambitious attempts to solve the problems of southeastern 
Europe through constitutional engineering, ambiguous political arrangements, and economic 
development, have come up short: 
In the past decade, the international community has regarded the Balkans 
primarily as a post-conflict region. This has led to a raft of provisional solutions 
to constitutional problems and to policies based on what might be termed 
‘constructive ambiguity,’ embodied in documents like the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 or the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro. At the 
same time the international community has been working on the assumption that 
economic development would reduce the pressing need to solve the open status 




     While plagued by a raft of false assumptions and failed policy initiatives, however, the 
international community has also achieved some successes worth noting in the Balkans. In both 
Bosnia and Kosovo, basic institutional infrastructures have been created, several rounds of 
elections have been successfully held, a considerable amount of infrastructure and public 
services have been rebuilt and restored, and, most importantly, since the end of the Kosovo war 
in 1999, a return to large-scale violence has been prevented.
26
 In Macedonia, the relatively rapid 
international diplomatic reaction to conflict between Albanians and Macedonian Slavs prevented 
an all-out war. These successes suggest the importance of examining what has and has not 
worked in the region, and then determining the reasons for these different outcomes. The three 
                                                        
24 Gellner, Nationalism, 108. 
25 The Balkans in Europe’s Future, 13. 
26 On the successes of international efforts in the Balkans, see Knaus and Cox, “The ‘Helsinki Moment’ in 




theses on ethnoconfessional nationalism proposed here predict that international intervention and 
assistance will have a higher likelihood of success in certain functional areas that are logically 
related to the rationalist, liberal-internationalist worldview, and a lower likelihood of success in 
other functional areas more logically related to culturally-based understandings of interethnic 
conflict and the problem of nationalism in general. The purpose of this chapter is to outline 
exactly how these two approaches play out.  
 
    Developing a proper understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism, and developing the right 
institutions to manage ethnic-conflict in the region, is not simply an academic exercise; as Nina 
Casperson notes “the right choice of approach can make the difference between continued 
warfare and gradual development of peace and stability.”27 Arguably, this was the case in Bosnia 
& Herzegovina in 1993-95, when several opportunities to end the war were vetoed by U.S. 
policymakers.
28
 Moreover, developing an accurate understanding of the phenomenon one is 
                                                        
27 Caspersen, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? A Comparison of Conflict-Regulation Strategies in Postwar 
Bosnia,” 569. Along similar lines, Sherrill Stroschein has argued that in the case of Bosnia “The stakes in such 
decisions [i.e., the choice of institutional design] are high. Forcing groups to cooperate in unitary structures may 
alienate them from the democratic process, as they might find their demands better represented through protests or 
violence rather than through parliament. At the same time, institutions that codify ethnic or linguistic cleavages may 
reduce the possibility of group cooperation and exchange in the political process.” See Stroschein, “What Belgium 
Can Teach Bosnia: The Uses of Autonomy in ‘Divided House’ States.” Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues 
in Europe 3 (2003), 1. 
28 Throughout this period, the Clinton Administration insisted that the political solution to the war must include the 
creation of a unitary, centralized Bosnian state. Both the Europeans and the Russians, however, were willing to 
accept a political solution which would create a more decentralized, federalized, or cantonized Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
On how flawed U.S. policies prolonged the war in Bosnia, see the essay by the former deputy supreme commander 
of NATO, General Charles G. Boyd, “Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth About Bosnia,” Foreign Affairs 
(September/October 1995); see also General Sir Michael Rose’s memoir of this period, Fighting for Peace (London: 
Harvill, 1998), 239-241 (General Rose was the commander of the UN Protection Force, UNPROFOR, in Bosnia in 
1994. Both men make clear that had the Clinton Administration supported agreements acceptable to the Europeans 
and the Russians, there is a strong likelihood that the Bosnian war could have been over as early as 1993. The 
Clinton Administration eventually did accept such positions, but only after such tragedies as Srebrenica and the 
cleansing of the Krajina Serbs. For the turnaround in U.S. policy in the summer of 1995 which made Dayton 
possible, see Carl Bildt, “Holbrooke’s History,” Survival 40 (Autumn 1998). On the US role in bringing about the 
failure of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in 1993, one of its authors, Lord David Owen, noted that the Clinton 
Administration “were not ready to stand up to the Bosnian Serb leaders with the backing of the FRY, the Serbian 




dealing with is important for would-be interveners themselves. As current problems in Iraq make 
clear, intellectual over-confidence and ill-conceived plans for dealing with complex historical 
and social problems lead to massive losses of blood and treasure, and destabilize entire regions 
of the world in the process.  
 
I. Ethnoconfessional Nationalism and Political Interventions 
     Given the collective, chronic, and non-economic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism, 
ambitious attempts to substantially restructure interethnic relations and reorient individual 
loyalties and identities will not work—at least not within the life-span of most of the proponents 
of such policies.
29
 In a similar way, the time needed to develop a proper understanding of the 
Balkans generally exceeds the limited time academic specialists can devote to the topic, or that 
international policymakers have to spend on the region before being seconded to their next 
post.
30
 There is little reason to believe that either of these problems will go away, which suggests 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
show within a few years the folly of government’s decisions, but by August 1995 it was painfully apparent how 
damaging the US decision to ditch the VOPP in May 1993 had been. The Bosnian Muslims had now been ethnically 
cleansed from Zepa and Srebrenica and the Croatian Serbs from the Krajina. There was no longer any talk, or hope, 
of reversing ethnic cleansing.” See Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace & Jovanovic, 1995), 184. On 
Owen’s views of the US prolonging the war, see p. 365.  
29 As John Lewis Gaddis has noted, in fields such as astronomy, geology, or paleontology, the time required to see 
the results of experiments often exceeds the lifespan of the researchers involved. See Gaddis, “History, Theory, and 
Common Ground,” International Security 22 (Summer 1997), 75-85. 
30 As one critique has noted, the international effort in the Balkans has been “hampered by a rapid turnover of often 
unqualified personnel, lacking relevant experience, including sometimes in senior positions.” See Bosnia’s 
November Elections: Dayton Stumbles (Sarajevo/Brussels: International Crisis Group Report No. 104), 18 
December 2000, 17. Peter Maass has argued that United Nations field offices, “though staffed by some well-
qualified individuals, infrequently rise above mediocrity.” “Trying to Rebuild Iraq, While Watching Their Backs,” 
The New York Times, 11 May 2003, (Week in Review), 3. Sumantra Bose has described many of the international 
officials working in the Balkans as “so many adventure seekers, missionary zealots on civilizing field expeditions 
and careerists from comparatively dull and boring post-industrial Western societies.” Bose, Bosnia after Dayton, 12. 
Jacques Klein, the head of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia, once noted that “There are more people (in 
Sarajevo) who know nothing about this place than in any other capital where I’ve ever served.” See Klein’s 
comments as quoted by Robert Wright, Irena Guzelova, and Jonathan Birchall, “Bosnia-Herzegovina: Fear proves to 





that more conservative projects would better match the resources, expertise and commitment the 
international community has to devote to the Balkans.    
 
     But a deeper problem in dealing with Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is structural. 
Given the fact that foreign governments have few vital interests at stake in the Balkans, few 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
     Another aspect of the personnel problem is that international policy towards the region is being relegated to 
increasingly lower ranking bureaucrats. As one European diplomat noted in February 2003, “The problem is that the 
Balkans are now in the hands of middle-ranking bureaucrats who aren’t decision makers and don’t cut it 
analytically.” As quoted by Daniel Simpson, “Croatia Waiting for a European Balkans Plan,” The New York Times, 
23 February 2003, 6. Morton Abramowitz and Heather Hurlburt have made a similar observation, noting that 
“Responsibility for Balkan decision-making at the State Department has drifted down from “7th floor” special 
envoys and political figures to the “6th and 5th floor” mid-level career officials and out to the embassies 
themselves—a reduction not necessarily in competence, but certainly in high-level attention.” See Abramowitz and 
Hurlburt, “Can the EU Hack the Balkans? A Proving Ground for Brussels,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 
2002).  
     Finally, Richard Holbrooke has suggested that part of the reason why the Bush Administration ignored the 
Balkans during its first term in office had to do with partisan politics; according to Holbrooke, “the new Bush team 
hated anything it had inherited from Bill Clinton—even (perhaps especially) his greatest successes—and made no 
effort to advance policy in Kosovo until 2005 and ignored Bosnia.” See Holbrooke, “Back to the Brink in the 
Balkans,” The Washington Post, 25 November 2007, B07. 
     In addition to the structural difficulties inherent in seconding personnel to crisis areas (and the often mediocre 
quality of many of them), a further critique is that the background and training of many of these individuals makes 
them insensitive to complexity of ethnoconfessional conflicts. As Peter L. Berger has noted,  
There exists an international subculture of people with Western-type higher education, especially 
in the humanities and the social sciences, which is indeed secularized by any measure. This 
subculture is the principal ‘carrier’ of progressive, Enlightenment beliefs and values. While the 
people in this subculture are relatively thin on the ground, they are very influential, as they control 
the institutions that provide the ‘official’ definitions of reality (notably the educational system, the 
media of mass communication, and the higher reaches of the legal system). They are remarkably 
similar all over the world today as they have been for a long time (though, as we have seen, there 
are also defectors from this subculture, especially in the Muslim countries) (See Berger, 
“Secularism in Retreat,” The National Interest, Winter 1996/97, 8).  
Along very similar lines, Samuel Huntington has described the existence of a “Davos Culture” 
. . . shared almost exclusively by people who hold university degrees in the physical sciences, 
social sciences, business, or law, work with words or numbers, are reasonably fluent in English, 
are employed by governments, corporations, and academic institutions with extensive 
international involvements, and travel frequently outside their home country. They generally share 
beliefs in individualism, market economies, and political democracy . . . Davos people control 
virtually all international institutions, many of the world's governments, and the bulk of the 
world's economic and military capabilities. (Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 57-58). 




governments or individuals are willing to make the sustained effort needed to accomplish serious 
work in the region. Even during major crises such as the Bosnian war, Western powers were 
faced with what Woodward has aptly called “the dilemma of moral pressure without strategic 
significance.”31 As one report put it, “With no real stake in these territories, international 
representatives insist on quick results to complex problems; they dabble in social engineering but 
are not held accountable when their policies go wrong.”32 Worse still, such interventionism can 
be counterproductive; as international actors who lack the political stamina to enforce an 
agreement for the long-term, or have weak interests in a particular region, often produce 




     Despite these strictures, scholars and policymakers have promoted various stratagems for 
regulating interethnic relations in the Balkans, making the region in many ways an ideal 
                                                        
31 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 289. Woodward also notes (see page 298) that in September and October of 1992, 
both then-President George H. W. Bush and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, claimed in 
separate interviews that they could see no major US strategic interest in the Balkans. This, of course, has been a 
consistent problem in European approaches to the Balkans. Bismarck had famously said that the Balkans were not 
worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier, and even earlier, Napoleon had chastised one of his commanders in 
the Balkans for getting involved in the incessant border raids between Ottoman-controlled Bosnia and French-
controlled Krajina, telling him that “French blood is too precious to be shed for such trifles.” As quoted in Gunther 
E. Rothenburg, The Military Border in Croatia, 1740-1881: A Study of an Imperial Institution (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1966), 113. Similarly, during World War II, when discussing the relative merits of supporting 
either Tito’ communist movement or General Draža Mihailović’s Yugoslav Army in the Homeland, Winston 
Churchill asked his personal emissary to Tito, General Fitzroy Maclean, “Do you intend to make Jugoslavia your 
home after the war?” to which Maclean replied “No, Sir,” whereupon Churchill said, “Neither do I. And that being 
so, the less you and I worry about the form of Government they set up, the better. That is for them to decide.” See 
Maclean, Eastern Approaches (London: Jonathan Cape, 1949), 402-403.  
32 See The Balkans in Europe’s Future (International Commission on the Balkans), 11. Michael Ignatieff has 
described this problem in the following terms: “The activists, experts, and bureaucrats who do the work of 
promoting democracy talk sometimes as if democracy were just a piece of technology, like a water pump, that needs 
only the right installation to work in foreign climes.” See Ignatieff, “Who Are Americans to Think That Freedom Is 
Theirs to Spread?”, The New York Times Magazine, 26 June 2005. 
33 As Lake and Rothchild note “Countries with weak interests in the conflict . . . will tend to lack or will be 
perceived as lacking the political stamina to enforce any new ethnic contract in the future . . . Weak commitments 
produce ambiguous policies that may, in the end, exacerbate rather than resolve conflicts . . . An external guarantee 




laboratory for testing their efficacy. In reviewing these efforts, however, the conflicting political 
goals that outsiders and locals have often result in conflicting preferences about the types of 
constitutional and political solutions needed for ethnic conflict management.
34
 In Bosnia, for 
instance, both consociational and integrative techniques are in evidence, often operating at cross 
purposes, and making it difficult to accurately determine their efficacy.  
 
     Among the most ambitious ethnic conflict management strategies implemented in 
southeastern Europe have been political and constitutional reforms aimed at transforming the 
very nature of interethnic relations in a given state, or to change the nature of individual 
loyalties. Figuring most prominently among these are the creation of federal systems intended to 
decentralize decision-making authority to lower-level, ethnically based units; the adoption of 
consociational governing practices; and the adoption of electoral mechanisms designed to keep 
ethnic extremists out of power. More mundane tactics, such as simply replacing uncooperative 
politicians, have also been used. Several of these techniques, which according to their scope and 
ambition are labeled higher-order and lower-order political interventions, will be examined 
below. In various forms, each of these ethnic conflict management strategies have been used by a 
succession of political regimes in the lands of the former Yugoslavia since at least the Habsburg 
era—during Benjamin Kállay’s governorship of Bosnia, during interwar Yugoslavia’s brief 
period of democracy and royal dictatorship, in communist Yugoslavia, and, currently, in the 
international protectorates in Bosnia and Kosovo. None have proven exceptionally successful. In 
                                                        
34 On the part of outsiders, for instance, the primary political goal has been to achieve “stability,” often meaning 
simply avoiding the bloodshed and violence that would put the Balkans back in the newspaper headlines. Such goals 
generally result in a more pragmatic willingness to compromise important aspects of the political reform agenda to 
the locals’ desire to push a stronger “national” agenda. On the other hand, there has also been a moral component to 
the political goals expressed by outsiders in the region; this would include such things as insisting that war criminals 
be apprehended, that ethnic cleansing be reversed, that refugees and displaced persons be allowed to return to their 




fact, the history of these efforts shows that despite the various systems’ preferences in promoting 
either a class-based consciousness among citizens or liberal-individualistic “rational” identities 
based on non-ascriptive identities, none succeeded in developing new forms of political loyalty 
more powerful than the “non-rational” identities at the core of ethnoconfessional nationalism. 
These failures can be ascribed to what Joseph Rothschild once called the “intellectually facile 
and politically unsound” belief that “ethnicity can be compartmentalized and prevented from 
contaminating those ‘essential’ areas of modern economic and political life that require ‘rational’ 
universalistic behavior and values.” As Rothschild noted,  
The compartmentalization scenario appears to misunderstand the meaning and the 
role of culture in social life. Culture cannot be so readily split and isolated from 
the daily decisions, contacts, values, experiences, and patterns that people 
confront in their economic, professional, and political lives. The suggested 
compartmentalization of culture and of behavior into separate ‘ethnic’ and 
putatively “rational-universalistic” sectors postulates an oversimplified and 
unrealistic world in which a supposedly autonomous ethnic culture is detached 
from the critical dilemmas, opportunities, promotions, demotions, satisfactions, 
and distresses of career or market, and of public affairs. But in the fabric and 





     The following sections outline the main ethnic-conflict management techniques that have 
been used in the Balkans, and assess the successes and failures of each in light of the 
understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism proposed in this dissertation. 
 
 
1) Higher-order political interventions  
     The most ambitious ethnic conflict management strategies used in the Balkans over the past 
several decades have involved political and constitutional engineering projects which attempt to 
                                                        




transform interethnic relations by redistributing power amongst different ethnic groups, or that 
place them within an institutional framework which awards moderation and cooperation rather 
than extremism and conflict. The implicit assumptions behind such strategies is that a fairer 
distribution of power and public goods and the institutionalization of transparent rules governing 
interethnic relations will reshape the loyalties and identities of individuals within a state, and 




     The three most prominent forms of higher-order political intervention are federalism, 
consociational powersharing, and integrative power-sharing arrangements.  The latter two 
(consociationalism and integrative power-sharing arrangements) are based on differing 
assumptions about the nature of individual identity, and, consequently, the basis upon which 
polities should be built. Consociationalism assumes that individual identities are relatively stable, 
and that the essential unit within a polity is the ethnic group.
37
 The premise of integrative models 
is that identities are fluid and malleable, and, consequently, that a state should opt towards 
developing political institutions that bring individuals towards a hypothetical, non-ethnic, central 
position.  The following pages will examine each of these institutional arrangements in detail, 
and test the track record each arrangement has had in the Balkans over the past several decades.  
 
                                                        
36 Whether the hopes behind such assumptions are historically justified is questionable. During the Habsburg period, 
Benjamin Kállay’s efforts “posited collaboration of conservatives and moderates with the authorities [that] proved 
disappointingly elusive . . . Through its confidential informers, its dealings with ‘moderates’, its journalistic ventures 
and its financial incentives, it aimed to isolate ‘radicals’ and cajole a sufficient body of opinion toward the 
government position.” See Okey, Taming Balkan Nationalism, 126, 132. 
37 Fearon and Laitin, for instance, argue that “analyses of consociation border on primordialism as they assume 




     Federalism has long been considered one of the most important mechanisms for distributing 
power equitably within ethnically-divided polities. As a form of indirect rule, federalism seeks to 
decentralize as much power and authority as is practicable to lower-level, territorially or 
ethnically based units so as to make the central government less of a focal point for ethnic 
grievances. According to federalist logic, devolving educational, cultural, and judicial powers to 
territorial sub-units reduces ethnic conflict, while ensuring that certain state functions, such as 
those needed to assure the functioning of a common market, fiscal and monetary responsibilities, 
and defense and security, remain with the central state. Increasing minority group rights is 




     The scholarly literature on federalism’s utility for combating nationalism is mixed; Elkins and 
Sides, for instance, note that “there is no agreement—either theoretically or empirically—that 
either [federalism or proportional representation] actually builds unity within the state . . . [and] 
there is no definitive evidence that either proportional electoral systems or federalism remedy 
divisions in plural societies.”39 Michael Hechter is more enthusiastic about such efforts, claiming 
that federalism and other forms of indirect rule reduce demands for sovereignty, and hence the 
potential for interethnic conflict. Jack Snyder, on the other hand, is more critical, arguing that 
federalism “has a terrible track record . . . [federalism] tends to heighten and politicize ethnic 
consciousness, creating a self-conscious intelligentsia and the organizational structures of an 
                                                        
38 Thus, “Effective management of ethnic conflicts by local elites and governments and by external states and 
organizations must reassure minority groups of their physical and cultural safety.” See Lake and Rothchild, 
“Containing Fear,” 56. 




ethnic state-in-waiting.”40 Similarly, David Laitin suggests that increasing minority rights may 
only provoke the emergence of new nationalisms because the recognition of minority rights 
“might give incentives for cultural entrepreneurs to create new minorities!”41 Thus, according to 
this more skeptical perspective, ethnofederal systems may be more prone to disintegration along 
ethnic lines because they endow ethnic groups with the governmental and administrative 
capacity to become independent states, given the right geo-political circumstances.
42
 Moreover, 
the implicit assumption that a fair and logical decentralization of authority will strengthen an 
individual’s loyalty to the central government, and thereby encourage them to identify with it,  





    Implicit in all of these arguments is the assumption that institutions are the causal variable in 
determining individual identities; in other words, that different institutional forms and structures 
create different individual identities and loyalties. The Balkan historical experience with 
federalism, however, suggests something quite different—that causation runs in the opposite 
direction—i.e., that the strength of individual and group identities determine the institutional 
form of the state. As discussed in detail in Chapter IV, in ethnically divided polities such as the 
former Habsburg Empire, the former Yugoslavia, or contemporary Bosnia & Herzegovina or 
                                                        
40 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 327. Yugoslav history has tended to bear out Snyder’s concerns. In the interwar 
period, for instance, one Yugoslav prime minister from the period warned “One thing is certain, a federation would 
mean weakness, and very likely the disintegration of the country.” As quoted by Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 174. 
41 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 344. For a similarly negative view of federalism as a means of resolving ethnic 
conflict, see Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Conflict, 269. As an aphorism common in the former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s went, “Why should I be a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?”  
42 Motyl, Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality, chapters 6-7. See also Bunce, Subversive Institutions, 45-52.  




Macedonia, where ethnoconfessional groups have achieved high levels of identity and self-
awareness, it in fact proves very difficult to avoid creating a federal system. Throughout the 
histories of both the First and the Second Yugoslavia’s, for example, attempts at greater 
centralization inevitably led to so much popular opposition that they were abandoned, especially 
since neither state had the institutional capacity to maintain the high levels of coercion that 
would have been needed to impose such a centralized regime.
44
 Again, the experiences of 
contemporary Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia are similar.  
 
     Second, the Yugoslav experience also suggests that in the long run a federal system is 
unlikely to satisfy ethnoconfessional group demands for complete self-government. Given the 
right opportunity, it is highly likely that these groups will ultimately opt for independence. As 
seen in Chapter IV, the former Yugoslavia exhibited a pattern in which each round of 
federalization was followed by demands for an even greater devolution of central powers and 
responsibilities by Yugoslavia’s ethnoconfessional groups. In this case, arguably, the difference 
between calls for greater regionalization and outright independence were only the result of what 
Hudson Meadwell called a “strategic expression of preferences;” thus, “entrepreneurs [took up] 
regionalism or independence as circumstances warrant[ed].”45 Given the right circumstances, 
                                                        
44 This point can perhaps be most strongly made by citing the experience of General Draža Mihailović’s “Yugoslav 
Army in the Fatherland” movement during World War II.  Mihailović’s movement, more commonly known at the 
Chetnik movement, was originally founded by scattered groups of Serb officers who had refused to surrender after 
the capitulation of the Yugoslav state in April 1941. The officers’ movement was explicitly royalist and “Greater 
Serbian” in orientation, whose preferred vision of a post-World War II Yugoslavia was a centralized, unitary state. 
Even Mihailović and his fellow officers, however, had to eventually compromise with the reality of multiethnic 
Yugoslavia, and in January 1944 issued a new political platform calling for a federal Yugoslavia. On these notes, see 
Matteo J. Millazo, The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav Resistance (Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1975). 
45 Hudson Meadwell, “A Rational Choice Approach to Political Regionalism,” Comparative Politics 23 (July 1991), 
402. Importantly, Belgium’s post-1945 evolution showed a similar escalatory dynamic, with each round of 




then, demands for more regional autonomy can quickly become demands for outright 
independence. Recent public opinion polls from Bosnia & Herzegovina suggest just such a 
possibility were Bosnia’s strategic environment to change. In sum, then, the Balkan experience 
with federalism suggests that it has been both dangerous for state polities, but also unavoidable.  
 
     Consociational powersharing is the second form of higher-order political intervention used 
to manage interethnic relations promoted in the Balkans.  Most commonly associated with the 
work of Arend Lijphart, consociationalism is a theoretical approach to ethnic conflict-regulation 
and mediation stressing the importance of equal recognition of different ethnic groups 
(regardless of size) and large measures of cultural autonomy. The four main principles of 
consociationalism include: 1) executive power sharing by a “grand coalition” representing all of 
the major ethnic groups of a given state; 2) segmental autonomy, which can take the form of 
territorial federalism, or of autonomy for segments defined in some other way; 3) proportional 
representation in government institutions; and 4) a minority veto on governmental policy deemed 
to be of vital national importance to a specific ethnic group.
46
 The success of consociational 
powersharing schemes is generally believed to be based on there being a limited number of 
ethnic groups in a given state; that none of them enjoy overwhelming predominance; and that the 
ethnic groups will have relatively little interaction with each other. Instead, decision-making 
should remain the preserve of, and dependent upon, the good will of ethnic-group leaders. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
ethnic groups; see, for instance, Florian Bieber, “Consociationalism—Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in 
Bosnia? The Case of Belgium as a Possible Example,” South-East Europe Review 2 (October 1999), 81. 
46 See Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21 (January 1969), 207-225; and Lijphart, 




intent of all of these rules is to give ethnic groups a large measure of self-government.
 




     Enthusiasm for consociationalism has waxed and waned over the past several decades, as 
experiences from Lebanon to the former Yugoslavia have revealed its many flaws. In the former 
Yugoslavia and its various successor states, different manifestations of consociational 
agreements have included the constitutional amendments to the Yugoslav constitution in the 
1960s; the 1974 Yugoslav constitution; the Washington Agreement on the Bosniac-Croat 
Federation of April 1994; Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Accords; the Ohrid Accords of August 
2001; the State Union Agreement for Serbia-Montenegro of February 2003; and several aspects 
of the Constitutional Framework for Kosovo.  
 
     As we saw with the case of federalism, consociationalism’s record on dealing with complex 
ethnic and socioeconomic problems is mixed. Markus Crepaz, for instance, has argued that an 
analysis of 162 elections in eighteen different countries shows that consociational constitutional 
structures have favorable impacts on a state’s macroeconomic performance, and, when a larger 
number of parties are included in government (hence increasing popular perceptions of 
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that it avoids popular participation, it relies on elite bargaining carried out in secret, and it promotes group as 
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     Yet whether such relative effectiveness ultimately translates into public support for such 
systems is questionable. As seen in Chapter IV, there were significant problems associated with 
consociational powersharing mechanisms in the former Yugoslavia, and many of these same 
problems have also been evident in the consociational features built into political institutions in 
Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia. As consociationalism’s critics note, it tends to make all 
politics ethnic politics.
49
 Moreover, once political conflicts become understood as matters of vital 
national interests, they become increasingly intractable. Unfortunately, consociational 
institutions, in and of themselves, do not provide any built-in mechanism for promoting inter-
group cooperation.
50
 Post-Dayton Bosnia provides ample proof of this; for instance, one Bosnian 
thinktank has estimated that at the current pace at which Bosnia’s various governmental bodies 
are working, it will take them fifty years to pass the various laws and regulations required for 
BiH to implement its Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU.
51
  
                                                        
49 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 330-31. In the former Yugoslavia, this was very evident by the 1960s, as 
Dennison Rusinow noted: The tendency to subsume all other questions and conflicts to the national one and to 
interpret and simplify every issue in national terms, reminiscent of old Yugoslavia and of the Habsburg monarchy 
before it and always an important sub-theme in the new Yugoslavia, was again becoming nearly universal. There 
was thus recreated the atmosphere and intensity of emotion which come to surround the question of nationality when 
all discontent and every grievance, every perception of injustice, oppression or relative deprivation, is projected as a 
national issue.” See Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment, 272-73. Emphasis added. 
50 Hechter, Containing Nationalism, 138. 
51 See “Bosnian Governments’Utterly Ineffective’,” available at http://balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/11068/ 
Accessed on 17 June 2008 at 9:58am EST. At a conference at the University of Graz in February 2011, the current 
international High Representative in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Valentin Inzko, was seated next to the present author. 
When I mentioned this estimate during part of the public discussions, Inzko turned to me and whispered “850 
years.” Another frequently heard criticism of the consociational system Dayton put into place is that it created an 
expensive governmental bureaucracy. Thus, High Representative Miroslav Lajcak in May 2008 criticized the fact 
that Bosnia had “Two entities [for] three constituent peoples; five presidents, four vice-presidents, 13 prime 
ministers, 14 parliaments, 147 ministers and 700 members of parliament, all of who serve a population of just under 
four million people.” As quoted by Edward R. Joseph and R. Bruce Hitchner, “Making Bosnia Work: Why EU 
Accession is Not Enough” (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2008), 2. Yet a detailed 
comparative analysis of Bosnia’s system with that of other European countries completed by the European Stability 
Initiative (ESI) showed that Bosnia’s governmental apparatus employs only 5 percent of the country’s population, as 
opposed to 5.3 percent in Croatia, and 8.1 percent for the Czech Republic. The overall average in Central Europe 
and the former Soviet Union is 6.9. As the ESI report concludes, “There is no reason to believe that federalism itself 
makes the Bosnian state too expensive.” See “Making Federalism Work—A Radical Proposal for Practical Reform” 





     The former Yugoslavia’s consociational system also proved susceptible to another weakness 
identified by consociationalism’s critics, such as the fact that such systems are dependent upon 
the dedication of elites to the preservation of the state.
52
 In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the 
passing of the World War II “partisan generation” of leaders—Tito, Kardelj, Ranković, Bakarić 
(and several thousand lower level officials in all the various republics)—from the 1960s-1980s 
removed a group of leaders from the scene who had been personally dedicated to at least some 
form of Yugoslavia, and their replacement by a younger generation of elites whose formative 
experiences made them more oriented towards their native republics. At the same time, the 
pronounced goal of their efforts—to create a system whose legitimacy was accepted by all the 
country’s ethnic groups, clearly failed. Here the Yugoslav case is consistent with the finding that 
there appears to be no evidence that consociational systems, or distributing power more widely 





     Similarly, actual or potential changes in the ethnoconfessional or communal balance of power 
also make consociational powersharing systems inherently fragile.
54
 In the case of the former 
Yugoslavia in the 1980s, the debate over whether socialist Yugoslavia should move towards a 
majoritarian, “one person, one vote” system (which many people in Slovenia or Croatia thought 
would have favored the Serbs and/or Serbia) was one of the precipitant causes of the crisis that 
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led to country’s disintegration. In the early 1990s, for instance, as Slobodan Milošević was 
attempting to reform the Yugoslav federation along the lines of “one person, one vote,” 
Slovenian president Milan Kučan argued, “Can the imposition of majority decisionmaking in a 
multinational community by those who are the most numerous be anything else but the violation of 
the principle of the equality of nations, the negation of its sovereignty and therefore the right to 
autonomous decisionmaking . . . “55 The same has been true for Bosnia-Herzegovina, both in 
1990-92 when the breakdown of the consociational mechanisms protecting the major ethnic 
groups’ constitutional rights was one of the primary factors that provoked the Bosnian civil war 
in April 1992,
56
 as well as in the post-Dayton period, where some of the most serious political 
crises have erupted after attempts to modify guarantees of political equality among the various 
ethnoconfessional groups. Most recently, many of the problems Bosnia & Herzegovina has 
experienced over the past 18+ months is directly a result of attempts, under the guise of promoting 
majoritarian democracy and more “efficient” government (the same things Milošević claimed he 
wanted to achieve in the late 1980s), to overturn the essence of Dayton by reducing or eliminating 
many of the Dayton constitution’s consociational features.57 Similarly, both the Lebanese civil 
                                                        
55 As quoted by Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 
1993), 62.  
56 This point is somewhat debateable. Steven Burg, for instance, has argued that while the Bosnian political system 
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war in the 1970s and the Iraqi civil war that erupted after 2003 were both in part a result of 
shifting demographics and the changes in the balance of power that this entailed. In the Lebanese 
case, systemic crisis and breakdown erupted when the Christian Maronite community was unable 
to come to some accommodation with growing Sunni and Shia’ Muslim communities as to how 
to reform the powersharing system given the former community’s decreasing numbers and the 
latter communties’ increasing number. Similarly, in the Iraqi case, the eruption of civil war after 
2003 was to some degree a result of the inability of the Sunni Muslim community, which though 
numerically weaker had been politically dominant during the Saddam period, to accommodate 
the Shia’ Muslim community’s demands for a greater share of power in post-Saddam Iraq. 
 
      Another criticism related to the inherent fragility of consociational systems is a function of 
their effectiveness. Lake and Rothchild, for instance, claim that consociational arrangements 
“with ethnic balances of power constantly evolving . .  . are necessarily transitional ones.”58 Such 
structural instability clearly has implications for governmental effectiveness, as the Balkan 
experience bears out. For instance, after Nikola Gruevski’s VMRO-DPMNE party came to 
power in Macedonia’s July 2006 parliamentary elections and chose to form a coalition 
government with Arben Xhaferi and Menduh Thaci’s Democratic Party of Albanians rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Bosniac member of the Bosnian state presidency, Haris Silajdžić, who “has preferred to campaign quixotically for 
abolition of the entities that make up Bosnia—the Federation and Republika Srpska—rather than support more 
realistic changes that can be approved in Parliament.” See Serwer’s “Testimony before the Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe: Hearing on Human Rights, Democracy and Integration in South-Central Europe,” 15 
June 2006, available at: http://www.usip.org/congress/testimony/2006/0615_serwer.html Along similar lines, As 
Srdjan Dizdarević, the president of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Sarajevo has argued, “ the relationship 
of Haris Silajdžić to Bosnia & Herzegovina reminds me of what Slobodan Milošević was doing abusing the idea of 
Yugoslavism . . . the way in which [Silajdžić] interprets the idea of bosnianism, or the idea of Bosnia & Herzegovina, is 
the way in which Milošević forced everyone away from him. In the same way, Haris Silajdžić is now forcing the 
Republika Srpska, Serbs, Croats and all unsuitable Bosniacs from this country.” See Vildana Selimbegović, “Haris 
Silajdžić je prvi zlotvor BiH,” Dani (Sarajevo), 28 September 2007, 13. 




Ali Ahmeti’s Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), Ahmeti’s party boycotted parliament for 
much of 2006 and 2007, making it impossible for several months to pass legislation required for 
EU accession. 
 
     The governmental paralysis visible in Bosnia & Herzegovina and in Macedonia in recent 
years, however, is only a replay of the problems the former Yugoslavia faced in the 1960s and 
1970s. The vetoes inherent in a political system in which different federal units had such widely 
varying interests resulted in a situation in which any policies adopted generally came in the form 
of the least-effective, lowest-common denominator agreements possible. The post-1995 Bosnian 
experience with consociationalism has been similar. Passage of legislation in Bosnia’s 
consociational institutions, such as the State Parliament, was exceedingly slow in the first four 
years after Dayton; from 1996-2000, only twenty-five laws were passed by this body.
59
 The 
pattern has repeated itself in Macedonia. Article 78 of the original Macedonian Constitution 
provided for the creation of a “Council for Interethnic Relations” which was to be composed of 
two members of each of Macedonia’s recognized ethnic groups (Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, 
Vlachs and Romanies) as well as two members representing the other nationalities in Macedonia. 
The speaker of the National Assembly served as president of the council. The work of this body, 
however, has been disappointing; as one observer noted, ‘the results of the council’s work in the 
first decade of independence have proved to be negligible or nonexistent.”60  
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     Another weakness of consociational powersharing mechanisms is their reliance on elites. An 
important premise of consociationalism is that elites have monopoly (or at least near monopoly) 
control over their respective groups, which gives them more freedom to negotiate across ethnic 
lines. In the Balkans over the past 15 years, however, with the exception of a few brief periods,
61
 
no national or subnational set of political leaders have enjoyed such power. As a result, ruling 
elites in southeastern Europe have generally been exposed to the threat of ethnic-outbidding by 
more nationalist segments of their own populations. In such a situation, as Horowitz points out, 
“where some group leaders opt for cooperation with other groups, we have seen that intragroup 
competition tends to arise, and it is usually based on the argument that group interests have been 
sold out . . . intraethnic competition . . . [challenges] interethnic arrangements as a sacrifice of 
vital group interests.”62 This, for instance, proved to be the case in 1990 when a more moderate 
Croatian leadership centered in the League of Communists of Slovenia led by Ivica Račan was 
outmaneuvered by Franjo Tudjman’s HDZ; it was also apparent in the challenges more extreme 
nationalists such as Vojislav Šešelj and his Serbian Radical Party posed to Slobodan Milošević at 
various points in the 1990s. Conversely, of course, if elite control of their respective segments of 
the population is too strong, this obviously has serious implications for democratization within 
the state and its subunits.  
 
    A problem related to consociationalism’s reliance on elites stems from the fact that by 
necessity the system depends upon the actual commitment of elites to the multinational states in 
which they find themselves. Ian Lustick, for instance, notes that “at the core of all consociational 
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approaches is an image of an elite cartel whose members share an overarching commitment to 
the survival of the arena within which their groups compete, and who seek to negotiate among 
themselves and enforce, within their groups, the terms of mutually acceptable compromises.”63 
But the history of all the consociational experiments in the Balkans over the past several decades 
(former Yugoslavia;
64
 post-Dayton BiH; post-1999 Kosovo; the State Union of Serbia-
Montenegro; and post-Ohrid Macedonia) shows that such commitment is often questionable or 
tentative. The “grand coalition” of nationalist parties that came to power in Bosnia in 1990 
quickly fell apart, and in the post-Dayton period, as one scholar has noted, elite support for 
Dayton’s implementation “was in most cases primarily motivated by their attempt to avoid 
penalization by international organizations rather than by support for the actual agreement.”65 In 
the absence of such commitment, moreover, the centrifugal forces operating in consociational 
systems make them extremely prone to disintegration. Consequently, without firm international 
guarantees and support for the integrity and survival of such states, their constituent parts are 
likely to go their own ways.  
 
     Yet despite all of the theoretical drawbacks of federalist and consociational solutions to ethnic 
conflict outlined above, and despite the Yugoslav experience with them, international efforts to 
mediate ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia have often reproduced many of their features. 
As one report summed up the experience of all of these efforts,     
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After the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, constitutions were written for several states 
and other entities in the region. But five years after the wars ended, the 
governments created by those constitutions remain weak, unpopular, and as yet 
unable to persuade either their people or the international community that they are 




     This reveals the fact that the problem in dealing with Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism is 
mainly due to the lack of viable alternative strategies, which in turn reminds us of the importance 
of the “same stubborn facts” of political and social life in East Central Europe that political 
leaders and policymakers so often are constrained by. Nevertheless, an important implication of 
this dissertation and its emphasis on the collective nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism is that 
adopting consociational practices is extremely difficult to avoid. As was argued in Chapter’s III 
and IV, ethnoconfessional groups in southeastern Europe understand themselves and generally 
behave as unitary political actors which deserve equal and sovereign rights and recognitions. 
This has been a feature of Balkan political culture for hundreds of years, thanks to both the 
Ottoman millet system and the Habsburg Empire’s mechanisms for ethno-corporate self-
governance. Attempts to impose political institutions or processes based on majoritarian 
principles in southeastern Europe, though frequently recommended by interventionist 
organizations,
67
 hence lead to tremendous social dissatisfaction, complaints about unfairness and 
inequality, and conflict.  Thus, despite consociationalism’s overall deficiencies and poor track 
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67 The International Crisis Group has been a frequent critic of Dayton’s consociational features; in one report, for 
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record, “there may be no alternative to consociationalism” in southeastern Europe’s deeply 
divided societies.”68  
 
     Integrative institutions provide a third form of higher-order political intervention used to 
manage interethnic relations. In Bosnia, for instance, such integrative institutions would include 
the Constitutional Court, the Central Bank, the Human Rights Chamber and Commission, and 
the Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees. Although membership in all of these 
bodies is based on ethnic parity representation (together with representatives of the international 
community), decisionmaking within these institutions is by simple majority and there are no 




      Another integrative practice has been the adoption of preferential electoral systems (also 
known at alternative vote systems) designed to encourage moderation and move both political 
candidates and individual citizens towards a hypothetically “ethnically-neutral” position on the 
political spectrum. In a preferential voting system, citizens are allowed to vote for a number of 
candidates for office in the rank order in which they prefer specific candidates. Theoretically, 
those candidates getting the most overall votes should be the most moderate and have the most 
overall appeal. The intent behind such voting systems is to allow political candidates to draw 
support from voters of any ethnic affiliation.
70
 Some scholars have argued that it is even possible 
for politicians of one ethnic group to “pass” as members of another ethnic group. This approach 
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quite clearly draws its theoretical inspiration from constructivism: if individuals have fluid and 
malleable identities this should allow political parties to “pass” various candidates as members of 
the ethnic group specific groups of voters favor. Kanchan Chandra, for instance, argues that  
If voters prefer elites and parties that represent their “own” category, then one 
way in which political entrepreneurs can manipulate electoral outcomes is to pass 
as members of the voter’s “own” category. The many ambiguities that shroud the 
origin and markers of ethnic categories make such “passing” possible.71  
 
      The Balkan experience, however, provides no evidence of such “passing” by political 
entrepreneurs. From a more general perspective, however, it is clear that most political-
engineering efforts to manipulate voter thinking and behavior through integrative mechanisms 
have failed. Instead, what the available evidence suggests is that both political parties and voters 
are generally able to see through such integrative efforts and react according to the logic of 
Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism, not according to constructivist logic. Thus, when 
international officials tried to manipulate Mostar’s electoral system to the detriment of the 
nationalist parties “the SDA and the HDZ . . . figured out the logic behind the design of the 
electoral system and [r]efined their tactics in response . . . the experience of Mostar illustrates the 
limits of electoral engineering designed to encourage cross-national politics.”72  A similar 
attempt by the OSCE to impose a draft electoral law in the election of delegates to the BiH 
House of Peoples in 2000 created a crisis with the HDZ which opposed the measures, as a result 
                                                        
71 Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 288. 
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of which “the HDZ were able to use [the crisis] to consolidate their electoral base. Therefore, the 
attempt to impose an integrative solution backfired.”73 In elections in the RS in that year,  
a system of alternative voting was applied in the November 2000 election for the 
Republika Srpska’s presidential and vice-presidential offices. The intent of this 
change was to improve chances for electing moderate candidates by allowing 
voters to rank their preferences, rather than simply casting one vote per office. 
However, this system could not erase the strong preferences for the nationalist 




    In sum, as Bose notes, “realities on the ground in Mostar (indeed, in Bosnia as a whole) tend 
to be at variance with neat formulas and formal arrangements”75 for re-aligning voter preferences 
in deeply-divided societies. The experience of many integrative efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
as Casperson notes, suggests that  
the imposition of an unpopular integrative structure may make it even more 
difficult to create a self-sustaining peace . . . in the Bosnian case, the 
consociational model has been more effective in promoting stability, despite the 
international presence which makes the need for local acceptance less pressing. 
The greater effectiveness of the consociational model has been due to the deep 
divisions in the population, the dominance of self-determination claims in the 
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 Casperson, “Good Fences Make Good Neighbors?” 585. Other scholars have also concluded that consociational 
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Prerequisite or Hurdle for Democratisation in Bosnia? The Case of Belgium as a Possible Example.” South-East 




     There is, however, some evidence that with the passage of time integrative mechanisms and 
institutions may be more accepted and ultimately successful. Thus, while in early post-conflict 
periods consociationalism may provide more appropriate institutional mechanisms for 
maintaining inter-ethnic peace, with longer periods of peace and stability, popular resistance to 
closer forms of interethnic cooperation can weaken (but not disappear altogether). There is also 
some evidence to suggest that over time people become less hostile to integrative institutions and 
policies—at least up to a point. As one recent analysis of post-Dayton Bosnia has noted,  
. . . if Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeds further in the gradual transformation 
process of its institutions, this could be an indication that what might initially 
seem excessively consociationalist is, in fact, necessary to assure communities 
and their political representatives that they can engage in political processes with 
their erstwhile enemies on the battlefield without fear of losing politically what 
they did not lose militarily . . . there is nothing absolutely permanent about even 
as rigid a consociational design as the one adopted by the Dayton constitution. 
Coupled with strong international involvement and security guarantees, and 
complemented by strong individual human and minority rights provisions, 
consociational designs have proven their immense value as transformative 
institutional designs, which, rather than permanently entrenching adversarial 
ethnic identities, instead generate the space and time necessary to enable the 
parties to move beyond some of the initially necessary rigidity of institutions 
aimed at protecting weaker parties in conflict settlements. Internationalized state 
building can thus serve the stabilization of states emerging from conflict well if it 
draws on a well balanced approach of consociational techniques, moderated by 
integrative policies, tempered by a wider regional outlook and sustained by 




    The above discussion on the role that time plays in reducing ethnic tensions and hostility 
towards integrative institutions brings up a related issue—the timing and sequencing of elections; 
in essence, the pace of democratization itself.  
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    If elections provide only symbolic representation for ethnic minorities without allowing them 
to meaningfully protect their communal/group interests, then elections and the democratic 
process itself can be perceived as just a smokescreen allowing ethnic majorities to legitimize and 
dominate ethnic minorities. Hence, in multiethnic states elections have to be complemented by a 





     For instance, a number of scholars and policy analysts have argued that one of the failures of 
international efforts in Bosnia & Herzegovina can be attributed to the fact that elections were 
held too soon after the war ended, thereby allowing nationalists to cement ethnic divisions in the 
country.
79
 Others have argued that the governmental level at which elections are held is also 
crucial for pre-conflict multiethnic federal states. According to this view, by first holding 
elections at a state-wide level, federal politicians and institutions can gain greater legitimacy in 




     Evidence from southeastern Europe suggests that here are problems with both arguments. Pre-
1990 Bosnian history, for instance, shows that Bosnia’s population has always voted along 
ethnic lines, so there is no historical evidence to support the argument that in postwar Bosnia 
waiting several more years to hold elections would have significantly changed the Bosnian 
population’s historical pattern of voting along strictly ethnoconfessional lines (see Chapter IV). 
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Monica, CA.: Rand, 2003), 107-108. See also Snyder, Paris.  
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In Bosnia’s 1990 elections (held 45 years after the last previous bout of interethnic conflict in 
Bosnia) eighty-four percent of the electorate voted for the three main ethnic parties. Debates over 
the timing of elections, or the sequencing of democratization, meanwhile, center on whether 





     To summarize: as predicted by an understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism that sees it 
as a collective, chronic, and non-economic phenomenon, political and constitutional engineering 
projects aimed at quickly transforming individual identities and loyalties have not succeeded in 
the region. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia continue to be defined by sharp and 
even growing divisions along ethnoconfessional lines, despite more than a decade of effort on 
the part of tens of thousands of outsiders spending billions of dollars, and enjoying countless 
organizational and financial advantages. Such lack of success suggests that the phenomenon 
being dealt with is much more massive and deeply-rooted than is generally assumed.  
 
2) Lower-order political interventions 
     Together with the political and constitutional engineering strategies outlined above, the 
international effort in the Balkans over the past decade has also included less ambitious efforts as 
well. Two of these—the effort to create “multinational” administrations and governmental 
bureaucracies, and the effort to purge “un-cooperative” elected officials from office—deserve 
                                                        
81 See Carothers, “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy,” The Journal of Democracy 18 (January 2007), 12-27. Carothers does 
concede, however, that “Where a state has completely collapsed or failed under the lash of civil conflict or other 
accumulated calamities, moving rapidly toward open political competition and elections makes no sense. The state 
will need to have at lease minimal functional capacity as well as something resembling a monopoly of force before 
such a country can pull itself onto the path of sustainable, pluralistic development.” It is not clear how Carothers 




detailed examination. Considerable time, political capital, and resources have been devoted to 
both of these efforts, which have included some or all of the following: directly or indirectly 
endorsing so-called “moderate” parties; holding frequent elections to get “uncooperative” 
officials out of office (or more “cooperative” officials into office); banning parties or individuals 
from office because of their programs; and enforcing electoral rules which would be considered 




     Both of these strategies and efforts contradict a fundamental assumption of the understanding 
of ethnoconfessional nationalism outlined in this dissertation: that is, that it is a collective 
phenomenon. As predicted by an understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism that sees it as a 
collective phenomenon, efforts to create “multiethnic coalitions” or to replace “uncooperative” 
individuals will be of little or no utility, because such “multiethnic coalitions” or “cooperative” 
individuals intending to create a liberal democratic system based on individual rather than group 
rights will be politically irrelevant and/or will have no serious popular support. Moreover, even 
when “multiethnic coalitions” are formed, they will be so only in form, not in function.83   
 
     These strategies and efforts also deserve examination because they are directly related to 
consociational theories stressing the importance of elites. As noted above, cooperative elites are 
seen as the crucial element in such systems; according to Eric Nordlinger, the role of conflict 
group leaders is “critical” because “In each case of conflict regulation it was the conflict group 
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83 This applies equally both to when the parties in the coalition are considered “nationalist” (i.e., the SDA-SDS-HDZ 
coalition that has ruled Bosnia-Herzegovina for much of the post-Dayton period, or the VMRO-DPMNE—PDP 
coalition ruling in Macedonia), or to when the coalition partners are allegedly “civic-oriented” or non-nationalist (as 




leaders who took the initiative in working out the various conflict-regulating mechanisms, who 
put them into operation, and who did so at least partly with the goal in mind of arriving at a 
conflict-regulating outcome.”84 Thus, what needs examining is whether such critically-important 
elites can be imposed on a society by outsiders, and whether (for these elites to play their 
assigned roles seriously) they have to have genuine support from their domestic constituencies.  
 
     This point is important because international officials have expended enormous amounts of 
time and energy on such efforts. For instance, former Bosnia High Representative Wolfgang 
Petritsch claimed in one of his farewell interviews that he could divide his tenure (August 1999-
May 2002) into two parts. During the first one and a half years, Petritsch removed over 70 
publicly elected officials from office and passed many laws aimed at curbing the power of 
nationalist parties. The second half of his tenure, according to Petritsch, was marked by efforts to 
“establish a partnership with the new political forces that had come to power,” largely as a result 
of political maneuvering by the OHR. Six months after Petritsch left his position, however, the 
“new political forces” he had spent so much time installing in office lost power, which leads to 
the question of the utility of Petritsch’s three-years of work.85  
 
     An example from 2000 provides a neat illustration of this point. Following Bosnia’s 
November elections that year, the OHR was intent on keeping the HDZ out of power because it 
had become increasingly critical of international efforts to centralize power within the Bosniac-
Croat federation. Thus, the OHR played midwife to a coalition government which excluded 
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Occasional Papers No. 29: 1972), 10. 
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members of the HDZ, but included Croat politicians from a number of smaller groups. As a 
result, the Federation government formed after Bosnia’s November 2000 parliamentary 
elections, composed of parties in the so-called “Alliance for Change” did not include members of 
the HDZ, which won 93 percent of the Croat vote in the elections, but did include Croats 
belonging to politically insignificant political parties and HDZ breakaway groups.
86
 The failures 
of the “Alliance for Change” also set the stage for a quick return to power of the main nationalist 
parties in the Federation; as one Bosnian journalist described the entire experience: “The short 
and brutal life of the Alliance for Change seems not only to have damaged the parties involved 
but the concept of multi-ethnic government in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole—and may have 
provided the nationalist parties with a head start in this crucial electoral race.”87 Moreover, even 
within the supposedly non-nationalist “Alliance for Change,” accusations quickly started flying 
that Croat members of the coalition were taking control of the Federation’s finances.88 
 
     Another widely-questioned tactic that the international community has adopted in its efforts 
to promote political reform and interethnic reconciliation in Bosnia & Herzegovina has been 
removing publicly-elected officials from office if they are deemed to be obstructing the peace 
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87 Senad Slatina, “Bosnia: Ethnic Divide Widens as Elections Loom,” IWPR Balkan Crisis Report No. 357, 9 
August 2002. In a further indication of how futile such efforts are, in November 2002 the Social-Democratic Party 
of Bosnia & Herzegovina, largely cobbled together by international officials during the mandate of former High 
Representative Carlos Westendorp, split into its two traditional competing factions. 
88 See, for instance, Azhar Kalamujić, “Alijansa pokrice za hrvatski finansijski lobi?”, Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 11 
January 2002; Azhar Kalamujić, “Hrvatske firme utajile milione KM poreza,” Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 16 January 
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process (a logical consequence of the constructivist stress on elites). Between 1998 and 2005, for 
instance, various high representatives removed 119 people from office. In one day alone, on 30 
June 2004, High Representative Paddy Ashdown removed fifty-eight people from public office. 





     Moreover, instead of producing more “acceptable” Bosnian politicians, what has been seen 
instead is that there is an endless supply of individuals willing to “obstruct” the DPA, and by 
trying to find “people we can work with” the international community has in the process 
undermined domestic institutions and delegitimized the electoral process.
90
 Outsiders, moreover, 
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(January-March 2004), 59. Similarly, a comparative analysis of international efforts in the Balkans, East Timor, 
Afghanistan and Iraq has noted that “Creating space for political action and expression is within the remit of 
international administration, while determining the ideological character of politics are more treacherous waters. 
Distinctions between ‘hardliners’ and ‘moderates’ have proven over time to be unreliable as political tactics on 
behalf of external and local actors change. Likewise, banning parties that do not sit well with Western sensibilities 
but reflect indigenous dispositions has not proven to be effective, and can contribute to the cause of extremists by 
alienating disaffected youth. Despite Western charges of barbarism, radical movements are a product of the political 
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“Liberal Trusteeship: The Convergence of Interest and Ideology in International Administration,” in Tony Brems 
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have also had a poor track record in picking partners with whom to work in the region, so there 
has been little reason to believe that installing new individuals in power will produce a 
qualitative improvement in the peace process, or mark a significant advance in interethnic 
relations.
91
 As Sumantra Bose argues,  
Bosnia’s future as a democratic country depends on institutions and 
institutionalization, not on particular individuals or political factions . . . 
Individuals and cliques who are given to believe that they are the chosen favorites 
of powerful Western countries and international agencies tend to rapidly develop 




     David Laitin has suggested another strategy for reducing ethnic conflict in multiethnic states 
which he calls the “most favored lord” option: in essence, developing affirmative action 
programs for ethnic minority elites. The purpose of such programs is to increase social mobility 
and possibilities for economic gain for these elites within the larger, multiethnic setting, thereby 
reducing their potential grievances against the state while increasing their incentives for 
cooperation. Thus, the dangers of ethnic outbidding would be reduced “as aspirants for wealth 
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and power in the region would be reluctant to lose the possibility for higher rewards at the 
political center.”93  
 
     Although such arguments are intuitively appealing, the degree to which such stratagems 
succeed in reducing ethnic conflict is questionable, for several reasons. The first is their 
assumption that nationalism is both a function of economics (i.e., frustrated job-seekers) and an 
elite phenomenon in general, neither of which (as was argued in Chapter’s II, III, and IV), are 
borne out by the Balkan experience. Second, such policies have already been repeatedly tried in 
southeastern Europe, and have repeatedly failed. During Benjamin Kállay’s reign in Bosnia, for 
instance, Austro-Hungarian policies put great emphasis on installing confessional leaders whom 
they themselves had vetted and approved of, as opposed to the then current practice of 
confessional leaders being chosen by religious organizations headquartered outside of Bosnia. 
Through agreements with the Patriarch of Constantinople in 1880 and with the Vatican in 1881, 
the Austro-Hungarian administration succeeded in gaining control over the appointments of 
leaders for both the Serbian Orthodox and the Roman Catholic churches, respectively, and over 
their budgets as well.
94
 The purpose of the entire effort was to foster the growth of local elites 
that would promote a sense of indigenous Bosnian identity, yet their efforts came to naught, at 
least among the Serb population of Bosnia, since (as pointed out in Chapter’s IV and V), despite 
the appointment of such leaders, Serb popular opinion in Bosnia continued to overwhelmingly 
favor unification with Serbia at this time.  
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     A more recent example can be taken from the experiences of Tito’s Yugoslavia. Post-1945 
Yugoslavia adopted amongst the most comprehensive policies for ethnic affirmative action 
imaginable, yet these policies nevertheless failed to instill the loyalty to the central state that the 
architects of such policies envisioned. As politicians and government officials in the former 
Yugoslavia correctly understood, the center of legitimate power in such deeply divided societies 
is often their home or native region.
95
 This pattern has continued to be apparent in both post-
Dayton Bosnia, and in Serbia-Montenegro between 1997-2006. All of this suggests that Darden 
was accurate in predicting that many constructivist attempts to re-orient ethnic and national 
loyalties are doomed to failure. As he notes, 
Efforts to conscript, to re-educate, or to economically develop a community 
should meet either with resistance or with no effect on the loyalties of the 
communities in question. Once in place, the national loyalties can be 
accommodated or emboldened, or any outward manifestation of them can be 
violently repressed, but they cannot be substituted or switched and authentic 




     Thus, given the reality that outsiders or the local hegemon are highly unlikely to shift the 
locus of popularly-legitimate political power within such deeply divided societies from the ethnic 
groups to the central government, it is doubtful that a most-favored lord approach would 
succeed.  
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         In sum, ethnic conflict regulation strategies based upon punishing or rewarding individuals 
using extra-institutional means often end up by simply diminishing the legitimacy of such efforts 
in the minds of many domestic politicians and its citizens. As David Chandler has noted,  
The manipulation of pliant political elites, isolated from any electoral base in 
society, may make it easy for international legislators to impose good governance 
decrees but can only institutionalize societal divisions rather than overcoming 
them. Politicians who have little representational legitimacy are unlikely to be 
able to build bridges within society and lack the capacity to resolve conflicts. The 
weak position of the new elites highlights the artificial nature of this 
internationally enforced process, in which decisions arrived at are dependent upon 
international supervision. This increases insecurity on all sides, as there is little 
local control or ownership of the political process, necessary for the settlement to 




      The ability of international officials to dismiss democratically-elected officials from office 
and the power to impose pieces of legislations, laws, decrees, etc., have also created a secondary 
negative dynamic. Instead of Bosniacs, Croats, Kosovar Albanians, Macedonians, and Serbs 
believing that their most important goal should be to gain the political support of their neighbors 
for specific reforms, the large role of the international community has forced them to conclude 
that the best way to protect or further their political interests is by getting an outside actor on 
their side, be it the High Representative, the Special Representative, or the local U.S. 
ambassador. Thus, the nature of the political game in the post-conflict international protectorates 
prevents local ethnoconfessional groups from developing the habits of mutual cooperation, 
compromise, and trust needed for effective politics. As a European Stability Initiative (ESI) 
report on Bosnia-Herzegovina argued, 
One reason why there has been so little real constitutional debate in Bosnia in 
recent years has been the assumption among many that in the end the shape of the 
country –and all decisive issues over distribution of power and resources—will be 
decided upon by foreigners. Better to wait and see, defend what one has and 
advance maximalist positions than to explore how through negotiations and 
                                                        




compromise the highly imperfect system bequeathed by years of violent conflict 




     International Successes: Successful outside interventions into interethnic conflicts in the 
Balkans have usually involved problems of a more technical and less political or cultural nature. 
The implementation of the two major peace agreements in the Balkans, the Dayton Peace 
Accords (DPA) and UNSCR 1244, provides important examples of the functional fields in which 
outsiders can successfully intervene in ethnic conflicts. For instance, military implementation of 
both agreements was incredibly successful by almost any measure. Armed forces were 
withdrawn from confrontation lines, de-armed, and demobilized largely according to schedule. 
Similarly, regional arms reduction efforts fostered by the OSCE and other organizations have 
also been impressively successful.
99
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to bring security and development to the province. A multi-ethnic Kosovo does not exist except in the bureaucratic 
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     Conversely, the struggle to adopt a unified Bosnian passport, currency, and license plates 
reveals both the problems and the benefits that surround efforts by international officials to 
promote reform in ethnically-divided societies. During negotiations over the design of a new 
Bosnian passport in 1998-99, large amounts of time were spent on disagreements over whether 
“Republika Srpska” should appear in three millimeters on the cover of the BiH passport. After a 
particularly difficult period of negotiations, former Deputy High Representative Jacques Klein 
claimed “Never in the history of diplomacy was so much time and effort expended by so many 
diplomats over such trivia.”100 In effect, enormous amounts of outsiders’ limited time and energy 
was expended on matters of symbolism that ultimately had very little effect on the quality of life 
of most Bosnian citizens, while at the same time the polemics accompanying the dispute 
increased political tensions in Bosnia considerably.  
 
     On the other hand, the effort to create a common currency and license plates in Bosnia, which 
were necessary for citizens to enjoy freedom of movement throughout the country and for Bosnia 
to function as a common economic zone, have widely been hailed as amongst the most 
successful things the international community has accomplished in Bosnia. Public opinion 
supports this view; for instance, a recent survey showed that the BiH Central Bank is the 
institution Bosnian citizens have the most trust in.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
the greatest indictment of Europe’s willingness and ability to defend its proclaimed values . . . Most Kosovo 
Albanian politicians have done nothing to oppose this public mood which flies in the face of everything that Europe 
believes in . . . Over the past few years UNMIK has been actively involved in a policy of reverse discrimination in 
Kosovo.The Balkans in Europe’s Future, 7, 19. 





     As the above analysis suggests, strategies favoring ambitious, long-term, expensive and 
intensive international efforts in the Balkans are doubly questionable: on the one hand, the costs 
of such interventions are unlikely to be acceptable to electorates back home, and on the other 
hand, the degree to which outsiders have the political skills needed to deal with these problems is 
questionable. The Bosnian and Kosovo cases will in all likelihood prove to be the most powerful 
international state- and nation-building projects in recent times, yet their futures are not 
promising. Thus, it is doubtful that outsiders have the political will, the resources, or the 
knowledge to make such constructivist efforts successful. The essence of politics—gauging the 
public’s mood, communicating with citizens in an idiom they understand, and determining the 
right moment for political action—is something local politicians have an inherent advantage over 
outsiders in, and technocratic, scientific-rational approaches to the problems of 
ethnoconfessional nationalism will not be able to pull at the emotional and sentimental loyalties 
of people the way local politicians and cultural elites are able to.   
 
II. Ethnoconfessional Nationalism and Social Interventions 
     A major theoretical implication of this understanding of Balkan ethnoconfessional 
nationalism is that managing it requires concentrating on the popular, mass base of the 
phenomenon. An alternative strategy for affecting political change and improving interethnic 
relations that does not suffer from the drawbacks of involvement in high-level political and 
constitutional engineering is working from the bottom up to manage ethnoconfessional 
nationalism or at least to make it more “benign.” Examples of such work would include 
initiatives such as the numerous programs sponsored by the international community in 




rights, the UNMiBH’s work training police recruits, projects sponsored by NGO’s to train 
journalists, future parliamentarians, judicial officials, etc. As part of a coherent, coordinated plan, 
such social engagement can become  
a set of catalytic activities meant ‘to show the way.’ . . . to demonstrate to 
different institutions in the host country how to draw on duly approved 
international standards and experience gained in their implementation by 
countries on their way to civil society. [In Macedonia] many of these endeavors 
promoted indirect peacebuilding through support for the revival and development 
of a network of civic, professional and other nongovernmental organizations all of 




     I will focus on three types of “catalytic activities” that have been used in the Balkans to 
examine the strengths and weaknesses of each approach: education reform, media reform, and 
NGO work in general, and to test how effective this aspect of managing ethnoconfessional 
nationalism actually is.  
 
1) Educational reforms: The educational systems in southeastern Europe have long been seen as 
institutions that inculcate nationalist sentiment and emotions by distorting or providing an 
extremely subjective version of an ethnic group’s history, casting neighbors in an unremittingly 
negative light while casting one’s own people in a similarly positive one.102  Consequently, 
education reform and increasing educational attainment levels in general are often seen as 
important tools for combating ethnic intolerance and preventing the dissemination of 
controversial and dubious accounts of historical relations between ethnic groups. Throughout 
southeastern Europe, public opinion surveys have consistently found that higher levels of 
educational achievement indicate a lower tendency to vote for the most extreme nationalist 
                                                        
101 Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention, 109. 
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parties. In Croatia, higher educational attainment has been found to be a significant factor in 
reducing levels of intolerance amongst the Croatian population.
103
 A study of Serb voting 
behavior in Serbia proper, Montenegro, and in the RS found that the most extreme nationalist 
political movement, the Serbian Radical Party, generally drew its support from the least educated 
and lowest paid segments of society.
104
 A study of Federation citizens on the eve of the 
September 1997 elections found that 67% of the respondents falling into the category of “urban, 
highly-educated” were favorably disposed to opposition parties as opposed to the ruling 
nationalist parties. At the same time, individuals with only an elementary education were more 




     Apart from the benefits to promoting ethnic tolerance at the individual level that appear to 
derive from increased educational attainment, education system reform itself is also considered a 
key part of managing nationalist tensions. In post-1999 Kosovo, for instance, UNMIK’s failures 
can in part be attributed to its failure to fully exploit “the levers of soft power” such as control 
over the education system or the media.
106
 Yet the Bosnian experience has shown how difficult it 
is for outsiders to carry out educational reform when locals themselves cannot agree on their own 
history. For instance, an attempt sponsored by several international NGO’s to promote 
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interethnic reconciliation by developing common textbooks for use in Bosniac, Croat, and Serb 
schools was abandoned after much agonizing effort to come up with a common history text. 
Significantly, however, attempts by the OHR to design a common curriculum for the teaching of 
general subjects such as math and science were more successful.
107
 In Kosovo, apart from 
rebuilding schools, UNMIK paid little attention to education, with the result being that “no 
systematic effort to prevent inter-ethnic hatred fermenting in the education system, or distorted 
versions of history” was made. Instead, Kosovo’s school system was allowed to become “an 
enormous patronage network” for Kosovo’s political bosses, and “instead of harnessing 
education as a vehicle for progressive change, UNMIK’s priority was simply to get the schools 
back to work.”108  
 
    In Macedonia, implementing educational reform has encountered similar difficulties. 
Especially since the Albanian-Macedonian conflict of 2000-2001, the Macedonian school system 
has become increasingly ethnically segregated; in some cases, students attend entirely different 
school buildings, in others, they share the same school building but attend courses in different 
shifts. At Zef Ljus Marku High School in Skopje, for instance, Macedonian students attend 
classes in the morning, while Albanian students go to school in the afternoon. Sometimes it is the 
parents that demand such segregation, in other cases it is the students themselves. In 2001, in 
Kumanovo, Macedonia’s third largest city, 1,700 Albanian refused to attend classes with 
Macedonian students. At Kiril Pejcinovic high school in Tetovo, Albanian students study only 
the history of Albania, not that of Macedonia itself. A former Macedonian Education and 
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Science Minister, Aziz Polozani, has noted that teachers themselves, and especially those 
teaching history, language and social sciences, often believe that “they must fight for the ideals 
of their nationality.” As one account has described the problem of school segregation in 
Macedonia: 
When the students do run into each other, the encounters often end in fights. But 
the problems don’t end with students. There is even a divide among the teachers: 
the Macedonian instructors meet in one school office, while the Albanian ones 
meet in another . . . “According to what [my daughter] tells me, students are 
separating by themselves, we cannot do anything,” says a Macedonian mother 
from an area near Skopje. “In the future, the segregation among students will 
increase more.”109 
 
         As these experiences suggest, the very nature of the educational process—the attempt to 
teach children and adolescents important elements of a society’s or an ethnic group’s history, 
tradition, culture, etc.—is readily politicized and easily becomes a part of the ethnoconfessional 
struggle in multiethnic societies. The Yugoslav experience, moreover, shows that in a 
multiethnic, multiconfessional setting, struggles over different versions of history and the proper 
curricula in general will be more or less chronic problems (on these issues in post-1945 
Yugoslavia, see Chapter IV).    
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2) Media reforms: Considerable effort has also been expended on media reform in the Balkans, 
based on the belief that more objective, professional media can reduce ethnic conflict. As was 
pointed out in Chapter II, however, the record suggests that there are limits as to how much the 
media effects voter behavior. In Bosnia, numerous attempts to shut down “nationalist” media 
outlets have had little success in encouraging people to vote across ethnic lines. In 1997-98, for 
instance, the international community undertook a number of actions designed to weaken the 
strength of the SDS: five transmitters broadcasting SRT’s main evening news program were 
occupied, an international “technical administrator” was assigned to oversee SRT’s broadcasts, 
and SDS directors from 16 radio and television stations around the RS were dismissed. 
Nevertheless, while these actions did seem to influence voter behavior to some extent (insofar as 
there was a noticeable increase in the votes RS opposition parties gained), it was not enough to 
change the ethnoconfessional pattern of RS voter behavior in the September 1998 Bosnian 
general elections; in effect, while improving the media environment may encourage people to 
voter for a wider variety of parties within their ethnoconfessional group, it has not up until now 





     In Kosovo, media reform efforts have been disappointing. Despite the fact that UNMIK had 
appointed an international “Temporary Media Commissioner” to monitor and supervise 
Kosovo’s media institutions after 1999, such international watchdogs were unable to control 
local journalists. For instance, after ethnic unrest in March 2004 resulted in twenty deaths, the 
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destruction of approximately 30 churches and monasteries, and the expulsion of 4000 people 
from their homes, one analysis of the media reaction in Kosovo noted, “Kosovo’s media, above 
all its foreign-funded public broadcaster, played a leading role in whipping up enthusiasm for 
this pogrom.” Even after such incidents, international efforts to reform Kosovo’s media made 
little progress.
111
 Given these realities, efforts either to control the flow of information or to 
substantively change popular beliefs through media regulation are unlikely to be successful; as 
Roger Petersen notes, “discourse follows large structural changes at least as much as it shapes 
it,” and elite actions are not major determinants of this process.112 
 
3) Promoting civil society: Promoting the work of NGO’s has also been a major feature of 
international efforts to manage interethnic conflict in southeastern Europe. In sum, the actual 
experience of NGO’s operating in southeastern Europe suggests that there are limits to what they 
can achieve. Paula Pickering, for instance, has found that many people in Bosnia believe that 
NGO’s exist either for the benefit of the individuals working in the NGO’s themselves, or to 
promote the agenda of outsiders.
113
 The track record of faith-based NGO’s, likewise, has not 
been exceptionally successful. Vjekoslav Perica, for instance, has noted that “According to one 
account, the religious peace-building operation in the Balkans expanded into the most massive 
such operation in the history of humanitarian work and peacemaking . . . [however] the 
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impressive quantity but low quality of this ‘religious statecraft’ (i.e., little if any real effect in 
eliminating the cause of the conflict) is one of its most remarkable characteristics.”114 
 
      In sum, reforming educational systems, the media, judicial systems, polices forces, etc., are 
clearly large-scale projects requiring long-term political commitment. In the short-term (i.e., over 
a period of 10-15 years) such efforts appear to have negligible impact in terms of moderating 
individual ethnoconfessional loyalties or voter behavior. At the same time, their contributions to 
Balkan stability and development are undeniable, and the available evidence suggest that while 
such efforts will not make breakdown the strong attachments individuals feel towards their 
specific ethnoconfessional identities, it may be possible, as Van Evera suggests, to make ethnic 





III. Nationalism and Economic Interventions  
    One of the primary components of the understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism 
outlined in this dissertation has been that improvements in the material and economic standards 
of life for the inhabitants of southeastern Europe do not eliminate ethnic problems in the region. 
As was argued in Chapter II, social science has not established any direct correlation between the 
emergence of nationalism and economic conditions; as Donald Horowitz has argued, “The 
psychological sources of ethnic conflict do not readily lend themselves to modification by the 
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manipulation of material benefits that is so often the stuff of modern policymaking.”116 
Nevertheless, it is clearly wrong to claim that economic conditions have no impact on interethnic 
relations. The question thus becomes what kinds of economic policies improve interethnic 
relations, or, conversely, worsen them?  
 
     First, it should be pointed out that economic policies cannot be promoted independently of the 
political process, and attempting to promote economic reform after interethnic conflict poses 
exceptional difficulties. A fatal flaw in many post-conflict peace building efforts has been the 
presumption of the existence of stable governments and working financial and legal institutions 
which can properly implement economic reforms and absorb international aid.
117
 Yet this is 
rarely the case in ethnically-divided, post-conflict states, since developing common markets for 
capital and labor in divided societies will generally conflict with the nationalist political goals 
over which ethnic groups went to war over in the first place. Moreover, an implicit assumption of 
contemporary peace-building operations is that the natural goal of developing states should be 
the creation of a market economy which is assumed to bring with it peace and prosperity. Such a 
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     The neo-liberal economic agenda currently promoted by many international agencies has also 
been attacked for unwittingly increasing the power of the very political forces that these agencies 
are supposedly struggling against. In Bosnia & Herzegovina, according to Michael Pugh,  
Not only did the international agencies underwrite the nationalist’s grip on power 
(through ethnically stratified elections in Bosnia), but the economic priorities of 
the post-conflict “protectorates” presented opportunities for the winners to reap 
further riches . . . Through its emphasis on privatization, advocates of the neo-
liberal agenda in Bosnia have enriched an elite of war entrepreneurs, their 
political protectors, and the forces of law and order tasked with controlling 
criminal activity (police, customs, tax officials, and special forces). By the late 
1990s, nationalist elites were gaining control of socially owned assets . . . Rather 
than building up state competence, the economic de-regulation and privatization 




     All things considered, promoting economic reform in ethnically-divided post-conflict 
societies is clearly a difficult task. It is precisely here, however, that the understanding of 
ethnoconfessional nationalism presented in this dissertation suggests that prudent, selective 
intervention in the political process can be justified, as opposed to interventions into areas of 
purely symbolic importance (such as the issue of the passports described above). A side-benefit 
of job-creation, for instance, appears to be that it reduces ethnic intolerance. One study of public 
opinion in Croatia, for example, found “a strong positive relationship between unemployment 
status and ethnic intolerance.”120 Another recent study has found that the most positive 
interethnic contacts in post-1999 Bosnia appear to be made at the workplace, rather than in 
schools or among neighbors; thus,  
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Mixed workplaces may provide opportunities for repeated interethnic interaction 
among colleagues of equal status, allow for norms of professionalism, and enable 
people to form relations of varied intimacy with colleagues of another 
background. These characteristics and much-needed salaries make the mixed 




     While on the one hand this suggests that (at least for now) there are limits to the degree of 
familiarity people want to have with individuals across the ethnoconfessional divide, it also 
suggests that the professional requirements of the workplace makes it the best setting for 
improving interethnic relations.  
 
     David Laitin has suggested that a system of revenue transfers from the center to autonomous 
regions can also help reduce ethnic tensions; thus,   
the center could negotiate with its autonomous regions a system of transfer 
payments that increased per capita with the size of the group. Such a policy would 
give leaders of protected minority groups an incentive to reward leaders of 




     While this idea is intuitively appealing, the Balkan experience does not provide substantial 
evidence that such policies work. In the period leading up to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, for 
example, substantial financial rewards to the various republics to keep the country together failed 
to deter them from the nationalist goals.
123
 A similar example was the refusal of Republika 
Srpska leaders in 1996 to attend a donor’s conference for Bosnia as part of a united Bosnia & 
Herzegovina delegation, despite the fact that refusing to agree to such terms resulted in several 
hundreds of millions of dollars of aid being denied to the RS. In Bosnia’s September 1998 
elections, “strong international backing for reformist candidates—including pledges of additional 
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financial assistance—seems to have contributed to their defeat, as some voters resented the 
intervention of the international community.”124 Such mistakes were made yet again in Bosnia’s 
October 2002 elections, when an implicit threat by the U.S. ambassador to Bosnia only two 
weeks before the elections that a victory of nationalist parties in the RS would lead to a cutoff of 
U.S. aid to that entity backfired.
125
 Despite the warnings, the nationalist parties nevertheless won, 
again suggesting that Laitin’s argument that financial incentives can reduce or moderate 
nationalist aspirations seems weak. Still later, RS politicians from 2006-2007 repeatedly made it 
clear that “the carrot of EU membership is an incentive for Serb cooperation, but not a decisive 
one. In both words and deeds, Serb leaders have made it clear that ‘when the choice is made 
between Brussels and Republika Srpska, we choose Republika Srpska’.”126 As Daniele Conversi 
notes, such examples suggest that “To put economic issues at the center of the analysis means to 
miss the primary point, namely, that ethnic movements are indeed ethnic and not economic.”127 
 
     Moreover, the results of such political conditionality are often at odds with other goals a 
peace-building or ethnic-reconciliation process may have. For instance, the severe political 
conditionality imposed on the RS in 1996-97 delayed its economic recovery for several years, 
                                                        
124 Caplan, “International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 59.  
125 Thus, on 22 October 2002, only two weeks before Bosnia’s general elections, the U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Clifford Bond, told the Banja Luka daily Nezavisne novine that only moderate parties would be 
considered partners for the U.S. government—the obvious implication being that a victory by nationalist parties 
would lead to a cutoff in U.S. aid. Nevertheless, in the subsequent elections, the SDS again was confirmed as the 
most popular political party in the RS. See the report by Dragan Stanimirović and Anes Alić, “Forming Bosnia’s 
Future,” 23 October 2002, Transitions OnLine, available at http://balkanreport.tol.cz 
126 Edward R. Joseph and R. Bruce Hitchner, “Making Bosnia Work: Why EU Accession is Not Enough” 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2008), 4.  
127 See Conversi, “Conceptualizing Nationalism: An introduction to Walker Connor’s work,” in Ethnonationalism in 
the Contemporary World: Walker Connor and the study of nationalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 




hampering the return of refugees and displaced persons to that half of Bosnia because jobs, 
housing, and social benefits in the RS were lower than those in the Federation. Thus, as Cousens 
and Cater note, “although imposing political conditionality on Republika Srpska was apparently 
intended to induce Dayton compliance, it has actually had the unintended consequence of 
undermining the international community’s initial strategy of promoting political moderation 
through facilitating demographic shifts toward multiethnicity.”128 
 
    On the other hand, the Yugoslav experience shows that certain economic policies can and do 
intensify the nationalist dynamic. Thus, the international economic sanctions regime imposed 
upon Serbia in the 1990s had the opposite effect of what it had intended: instead of forcing the 
Milošević regime to end the war in Bosnia (which the regime in any case had very little ability to 
resolve unilaterally), the sanctions regime led to a collapse of the Serbian economy, provided 
Milošević with a ready-made external excuse for the country’s economic problems, thereby 
homogenizing public opinion, and forced citizens to resort for help to the very bases of ethnic 
nationalism itself—family and community. Similarly, many neo-liberal economic reform 
measures international financial institutions impose on post-conflict states can increase 
communal tensions. Thus, austerity measures that cut public spending on social services such as 
education or poverty-reduction programs, or on programs to reintegrate ex-soldiers into a 
peacetime economy can lead to a rise in violence and insecurity, and thereby again reinforce 
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individual’s reliance on what Woodward has called “the informal networks and social 
obligations that define ethnicity—family, cousins, godparents—or crime.”129  
 
      The implications of the evidence cited above suggests that outsiders should focus their efforts 
on economic issues that are important to people regardless of their ethnicity.
130
 Such a strategy 
makes even more sense since the skill sets of so many of the outsiders working to affect change 
in southeastern Europe lie precisely in dealing with technological issues such as infrastructure 
reconstruction and renewal, technological modernization, negotiating international trade treaties, 
and economic reform programs in general. In postwar Bosnia, for instance (as noted above), the 
most unambiguous successes of the international effort there have been precisely on these sorts 
of issues—establishing a stable currency and common license plates to promote freedom of 
movement. Nevertheless, even such politically-neutral interventions should not be mistaken to be 
a panacea that can “solve” ethnoconfessional conflicts. As was pointed out in Chapter II, the 
very forces of economic modernization such policies promote can intensify ethnic conflict rather 
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IV. Temporal Horizons 
“Better to let them do it imperfectly than to do it perfectly yourself,  





     As has been argued in this dissertation, one of the key characteristics of ethnoconfessional 
nationalism is that it is a chronic phenomenon. As seen from numerous examples around the 
world—for example, Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland, Kashmir, to name but a few—ethnic 
conflicts tend to be long-lasting. Another characteristic of intrastate conflicts (of which 
ethnoconfessional conflicts are typically a subset) is that they are usually very difficult to resolve 
through negotiations. Roy Licklider, for instance, has found that of 57 civil wars fought between 
1945 and 1993 he examined, only fourteen were resolved through negotiations.
132
 In the Balkan 
case specifically, Florian Bieber has found that over half of the fourteen cases of international 




     Unfortunately, patience has not been one of the hallmarks of international efforts in the 
Balkans. Quite often more time has been spent on debates over deadlines and exit strategies than 
on getting the job done, while expectations of what should be done and what should be achieved 
within given time frames have been driven by the length of an international official’s 
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secondment, or by the cycles of the American electoral process.
134
 Moreover, public debates over 
pull-outs often encourage protagonists in an ethnic conflict to just wait the foreigners out.
135
 The 
problem with such short temporal timeframes for international intervention in ethnoconfessional 
conflicts is that it creates considerable uncertainty about the future amongst the protagonists, 
and, ultimately, fear that security arrangements arrived at today can be reversed tomorrow. As 
Lake and Rothchild note,  
In a way not sufficiently appreciated by current policy makers in Washington and 
elsewhere, external guarantees work only when the local parties to the conflict 
believe that the outside powers are resolved to enforce the ethnic contract in a fair 
manner into the indefinite future. The behavior of the external powers is not the 
crucial factor. Rather, a more fundamental question is whether the warring parties 
or potential combatants believe the external powers will be there to protect them 
tomorrow, and in the days and years after that. Absent a belief in the fair-





     A second problem with the relatively short nature of the temporal timeframes with which 
many outsiders view ethnoconfessional conflicts is that they reflect unrealistic expectations 
about the rate at which war-torn and divided societies are supposed to reform themselves and act 
more “European” or “Western.” As Roland Paris has noted,  
Not only are [war-shattered states] expected to become democracies and market 
economies in the space of a few years—effectively completing a transformation 
that took several centuries in the oldest European states—but they must carry out 
this monumental task in the fragile political circumstances of states that are just in 
the process of emerging from civil war.
137
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     What is clear from the analysis provided in this dissertation, however, is that even if we grant 
the possibility that constructivist nation- and state-building efforts can succeed, the process is 
both incredibly complex and very time-and resource-consuming. Even in the small town of 
Mostar, as Sumantra Bose notes, “Seven years of international presence and engagement have 
certainly not undone or substantially reversed” Mostar’s partition, leading Bose to conclude that 
“A gradual, incremental approach may eventually yield better dividends in the longer term even 
if unsatisfying in the short run.”138  
 
    Given the limited success of ethnic-reconciliation efforts in even small towns like Mostar, it is 
clear that interethnic peacekeeping, reconciliation and powersharing efforts on larger scales will 
take commensurately longer. Paris, for instance, has suggested that the time-frame for 
peacebuilding operations be extended from the current 1-3 years to a more realistic 7-9 years,
139
 
yet even this seems optimistic. Robert Putnam’s study of democratic institution building in Italy 
concluded that “Where institution building (and not mere constitution writing) is concerned, time 
is measured in decades,”140 and the most prominent Serbian historian of the early 20th century, 
Slobodan Jovanović, claimed it would take one hundred years of peace and prosperity for the 
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    Liberal democracies, however, generally have little willingness to commit to longer-term 
international engagements. As Kimberly Marten has argued,  
There is unlikely ever to be sufficient political will in the current international 
system by any liberal democratic state or coalition to put together a coherent, 
long-term operation whose purpose is to direct political developments abroad. 
This fact should matter to the international community, because it implies that the 
lack of forceful will when dealing with peace operations and governorship of 





     The conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that Gellner was most probably right when 
he expressed a “preference for stability” in dealing with ethnic conflicts, and that diplomatic 
intervention in a potential crisis in its early stages is crucial. As Lake and Rothchild argue, early 
assistance to “failing” states is preferable to allowing violence to breakout and then having to 
confront the logic and dynamics of war.
143
 Once violence breaks out and “the potentially 
uncontrollable psychological mechanism” of nationalism takes over, it becomes much more 
difficult for would-be interveners to control the situation.
144
  After severe ethnoconfessional 
conflict, the Balkan experience has shown that people have little desire to rebuild their societies 
as they had been, even despite massive international interventions.   
  
V. “When All Else Fails”: Partition as a Solution to Ethnoconfessional Conflict 
     Given the relative intractability of ethnoconfessional conflict, some scholars have suggested 
that the only stable solution to these problems is to make state borders congruent with ethnic 
borders. Steven Van Evera, for instance, has suggested that one way of reducing ethnic conflict 
                                                        
142 See Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004), 147-148. 
143 Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 74. 




is to increase the proportion of nations having their own states; in effect, to redraw numerous 
state borders and partition a number of existing states. Robert Hayden has gone a step further, 
arguing that the forced reestablishment of a multiethnic state after war may in fact hinder that 
state’s democratic development down the line; according to Hayden,  
If a multiethnic (or multinational or multireligious) polity has been disrupted . . . 
the morally satisfying position of mandating restoration of the status quo ante to 
the greatest extent possible may be detrimental to the establishment of democracy, 
accountability, and prosperity in the newly consolidated territories. Recall the 
greater stability and prosperity after 1989 of those East European states that were 






      The arguments made by Van Evera and Hayden are based both on European historical 
experience and on the need to resolve the security dilemma that emerges when different ethnic 
groups are intermixed on the same territory. Gale Stokes, for instance, has argued that  
. . . the historical fact is that the homogenization of national entities has proceeded 
in Europe not through tolerance and civility but through rampant violence and 
copious bloodshed. Only after the violence created more or less ethnically 
homogenous entities did the Europeans develop a method of interacting with a 
significant level of tolerance. If Europe’s experience is any guide, a genuine, 
voluntary, multiethnic solution can arise in the Balkans only when the remapping 
process is complete there. Only when the peoples of the region feel that they are 
included in the state system as authentic, autonomous units enclosing most of 
their own peoples and excluding most others will they be able to develop the 
confidence necessary to reach accommodation with their neighbors . . . We need 
to take a realistic, fresh look at the only long-term solution to the endemic unrest 
of the past decade in the former Yugoslavia—creating compact, ethnically 




     In sum, given the fact that so many historical and structural factors seem to be operating in 
favor of the nation-state, and, as pointed out above, there are limited options available for 
combating ethnoconfessional nationalism, the few remaining multiethnic states in the Balkans 
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(Bosnia & Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro) would appear to face a difficult future. As 
Timothy Garton Ash once noted, “what we are proposing to do in our Balkan quasi protectorates 
is not just to freeze war. It is also to freeze history.”147 
 
     On the other hand, many scholars argue against considering partition a valid, viable, and 
morally acceptable solution to ethnic conflict. Laitin, for instance, calls the policy of rewarding 
nations with states “liberal ethnic cleansing.”148 Donald Horowitz claims that such moves only 
increase the chance that other nationalist/secessionist conflicts will erupt within the newer, 
smaller political units; thus, according to Horowitz’s law of infinite regress, “As the importance 
of a given political unit increases, so does the importance of the highest available level of 
identification immediately beneath the level of that unit, for that is the level at which judgements 
of likeness are made and contrasts take hold.”149 Laitin has come to a similar conclusion, arguing 
that “Changing boundaries (e.g. by giving territorial autonomy to a successful nationalism) will 
unleash national differentiation politics at a lower level.”150  
 
     Bosnia & Herzegovina’s post-1992 experience provides a useful example of the validity of 
these arguments, but also of the real world limits as to how much theoretical insights can prevent 
ethnic conflict. As Horowitz predicts, the recognition of Bosnian independence in 1992 made 
Croat and Serb identities in such an independent state even more politically salient than they had 
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been in Bosnia while it was a part of the Yugoslav federation. Certainly, by March-April 1992 it 
was clear that recognizing Bosnian independence would lead to civil war; despite this, the 
Bosniac political agenda at this time remained creating an independent Bosnia which they, as the 
numerically largest ethnic group, could dominate, while the Bosnian Serb political agenda was to 
prevent such a development at all costs. Here, then, we have a depressing example in which our 
theoretical understanding of certain problems could not ultimately prevent real world power 
struggles amongst political movements with diametrically opposed programs.  
 
     Regardless of these debates, what is undeniable is that an “unmixing of peoples” in the 
Balkans has been going on for the past 200 years and has continued in entities such as Bosnia 
and Kosovo even as they have become international protectorates. The Ottoman withdrawal from 
Europe between 1821 and 1923 is estimated to have been accompanied by the deaths of some 
five and a half million Muslims, and more than five million were forcibly expelled or fled from 
southeastern Europe.
151
 Other ethnoconfessional groups have experienced similar demographic 
and territorial changes. To understand the scale and magnitude of these ethnic demographic 
movements, it is worth quoting Stavrianos at length; thus, the population shifts that began with 
the Balkan Wars 
. . . first occurred in 1912, when about 100,000 Turks fled before the successful 
armies of the Balkan League. Then with the second Balkan War and the 
Bucharest Treaty that concluded it, other mass migrations occurred, involving 
approximately 50,000 Turks, 60,000 Bulgarians, and 70,000 Greeks. During 1914 
the population movements continued as many people found themselves on the 
wrong side of the newly created frontiers. About 115,000 Moslems left Greece, 
another 135,000 left the other Balkan countries, and 115,000 Greeks departed 
from Turkish Eastern Thrace. During World War I the migratory movements 
ceased, though the Bulgarians expelled about 36,000 Greeks from Eastern 
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Macedonia in 1916 when they occupied that region. With the end of the war the 
migrations resumed, the largest being the voluntary exchange of Greek and 
Bulgarian minorities provided for under the Neuilly Treaty, and the compulsory 
exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities required by the agreement reached at 
Lausanne. It is estimated that 53,000 Bulgarians emigrated from Greece and 
30,000 Greeks left Bulgaria. The Greco-Turkish exchange was of an altogether 
different magnitude, involving some 400,000 Turks and 1,300,000 Greeks . . . 
According to an ethnographic map of the League of Nations Refugees’ Settlement 
Commission, whereas in 1912 the population of the portion of Macedonia now 
belonging to Greece was 42.6 percent Greek, 39.4 percent Moslem, 9.9 percent 
Bulgarian, and 8.1 percent miscellaneous (including Saloniki Jews), by 1926 it 
had become 88.8 percent Greek, 0.1 percent Moslem, 5.1 percent Bulgarian, and 6 




     World War II continued these population movements. In 1941, there were 500,000 ethnic 
Germans on the territory of Yugoslavia; by the late 1940s their numbers had fallen to 55,000. 
Throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, for every one Croat or Serb who moved to Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, three to seven would leave, while at the same time, the number of Muslims moving 
to or from Bosnia-Herzegovina was relatively equal. Much the same was true for Croatia and 
Serbia as well, with Croats and Serbs from throughout the former Yugoslavia moving to their 
“home” republics in far larger numbers than those moving out of them.153 Anecdotal evidence 
from Bosnia suggests that despite superficially encouraging numbers, most so-called minority 
returns (i.e., those in which the returnee is not a member of the local ethnic majority) are old 
people returning to die on their own land, not young people going back to start their lives anew, 
or people reclaiming their property with the intent of selling it as quickly as possible and 
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returning to areas in which they are part of the ethnic majority.
154
 Sarajevo has for all intents and 
purposes become a monoethnic Bosniac city; one study completed in 2002 found that of 7,349 
employees who work for the cantonal, city, and municipal governments, only 202 (i.e., 2.7 
percent) are Croats.
155
 In 2005, for the first time in its history, there was not a single Serb on the 
Sarajevo City Council.
156
 Between 1996 and 2003, half the population of the predominantly 
Bosniac city of Goražde left the strategically and economically isolated enclave.157 Croatia’s 
ethnic composition changed dramatically in the 1990s; from 1989 to 1996, the Croat percentage 
of the population increased from 74.1 percent to 92.2 percent. During the same time period, 
approximately 280,000 Serbs emigrated, fled, or were forcibly expelled from Croatia.
158
 Among 
Croatian Serb refugees in Serbia, a poll conducted in 2001 showed that 65 percent of those 
surveyed did not intend to return to their homes, and that only 6-7 percent were actively planning 
their return.
159
 The net outflow of Serbs from Croatia continued into 2007; in that year, for 
instance, an estimated 1,400 Serbs moved from Serbia to Croatia, while 3,800 Serbs left Croatia 
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 According to a report released in 2007, 80 percent of high school graduates in 
Banja Luka have never been to Sarajevo.
161
 In the central Bosnian town of Bugojno, of the 
16,500 Croats and 9,000 Serbs who lived there before 1992, only 4,500 Croats and 300 Serbs, 
respectively, had returned as of January 2008. Many of the returnees are older people.
162
 In 
Serbia’s Sandzak region, recent political moves suggest the town of Novi Pazar might be 
heading towards an ethnically divided territorial-administrative structure, with separate police 
stations, schools, and health centers.
163
 As in many other aspects of social and political life in 
southeastern Europe, then, ethnoconfessional identity plays a large role even in influencing 
where individuals choose to live.  
 
VI: International Deteminants of the Success of Ethnoconfessional Movements 
     An important issue that remains to be examined is under what circumstances do Balkan 
ethnoconfessional nationalisms become successful? “Success” here is defined as the 
ethnoconfessional movement actually achieving international recognition and becoming a fully-
fledged member of the international community, or, to paraphrase Gellner, achieving the goal of 
the nation having its own state. It is here that the issue moves from the world of ethnic politics 
into the realm of international politics. 
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     Traditionally, the international recognition of fledgling states has been governed by the 
Montevideo Convention of 1933, which declared that the criteria for statehood should be based 
on an entity having: 1) a stable population; 2) a defined territory; 3) a functioning government; 
and 4) that the aspiring government has the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
164
 
For most of the subsequent six decades, the international community more or less adhered to 
these criteria. Beginning with the breakup of Yugoslavia, however, a less realist and more 
idealist norm about the use of international recognition, began to be promoted. Abandoning the 
heretofore concrete, tangible, realist criteria pertaining to international recognition (i.e., control 
of territory and people), certain segments in the international policymaking community began to 
espouse a doctrine in which recognition would be used as a conflict-prevention tool, or to 
endorse one party or faction in an internal civil conflict.  
 
     The latter emphasis was most clearly seen in the international recognitions of Bosnia & 
Herzegovina and Croatia, and more recently, a similar logic can be seen in the international 
recognition of the anti-Qaddafi movement in Libya and the anti-Assad movement in Syria. In the 
Yugoslav case, at the moment of international recognition for Croatia (15 January 1992) and 
Bosnia & Herzegovina (6 April 1992) neither state enjoyed criteria 1 and 2 of the Montevideo 
Convention. In both cases, indigenous Serb ethnoconfessional movements morphed into 
territorial rebellions that gained control of approximately 30 percent of Croatian territory, and 
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probably over 70 percent of Bosnian territory by the end of 1992,
165
 so in neither Bosnia nor 
Croatia did the two newly-recognized governments have control over either the territory or the 
populations. Nevertheless, various governments and lobbies in Europe and the United States 
argued that pre-emptive recognitions of these specific ethnoconfessional movements was a way 
to limit or contain the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Conversely, the Bosnian and Croatian 
self-declared para-states of “Republika Srpska” and “Republika Srpska Krajina” which did on 
the face of it fulfill Montevideo Convention criteria, did not gain recognition.
166
 Other similar, 
albeit more minor and somewhat comical scenarios played out in other parts of the former 
Yugoslavia, for instance, with the declaration of the “Republic of Illyrida” in Albanian-populated 
western Macedonia in 1992.  
 
     A somewhat different dynamic played out from 1988-2008 with respect to the battle for 
international sovereignty over Kosovo. Although in terms of international law and international 
recognition the Republic of Serbia was the sovereign power in Kosovo during this time,
167
 the 
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local Albanian self-determination/insurgent movement, represented by Ibrahim Rugova’s more 
pacifist Democratic League of Kosovo (PDK) and Hashim Thaci’s Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA), over the course of these two decades gradually gained more supporters among some 
members of the international community. With the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo 
in 1999 and the ensuing NATO occupation of the province, a hybrid situation emerged in 
Kosovo in which official international sovereignty over Kosovo remained with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (in 2003, the Republic of Serbia became the official successor state to 
the FRY), but NATO in fact had control of the territory and population of Kosovo (the first two 
Montevideo Convention criteria), which from 1999-2008 it gradually turned over to Albanian 
institutions.  
 
    Thus, the Yugoslav case over the two decades from 1988-2008 shows significant variation in 
the success of ethnonational movements in terms of gaining their own states. The first pattern, 
exhibited by the cases of Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia, show that ethnonationalist 
movements that did not satisfy Montevideo Convention criteria were nevertheless successful in 
achieving international recognition and statehood. The second pattern, as exemplified by the 
Serb para-states in Bosnia and Croatia, show that entities that did meet Montevideo Convention 
criteria nevertheless were not successful in achieving international recognition and statehood. 
Finally, the case of Kosovo shows that a local ethnoconfessional movement that controlled 
neither territory, nor a defined population, nor was internationally recognized as the sovereign 
power within the province did ultimately achieve a limited degree of international recognition 
and acceptance.
168
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    In comparing the above cases, what becomes clear is that the determining factor in making 
some of these ethnoconfessional movements successful and others just nationalist pipe-dreams 
has been the degree of international support these movements have received. This confirms the 
observation that it is the great powers that to a large extent create new states, or “reward” 
ethnoconfessional movements. Thus, as Motyl has noted, “only other states are new-state 
makers. Great power gatherings at Vienna, Berlin, Versailles, Teheran, and Yalta testify to the 
accuracy of this observation . . . the capacity of local entrepreneurs to transform incipient states 
into actual states . . . was a function of factors largely beyond their control.”169 In other words, it 
was neither the military strength or the domestic popularity of the various Balkan 
ethnoconfessional movements that ultimately determined whether or not they successfully gained 
international recognition, it was the support these various movements received from what is 
conveniently called the “international community.” This of course only holds true for to explain 
the outcomes from 1988 to 2011. If, as this dissertation has argued, Balkan ethnoconfessional 
nationalism is indeed a chronic phenomenon, ethnoconfessional struggles in places such as 
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia may only be lying dormant, awaiting their next opportunity to 
take the stage.  
 
     When “the next opportunity to take the stage” occurs is again largely a function of 
international or European geo-politics. The Balkan pattern for approximately 220 years has been 
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that ethnoconfessional rebellions, upheavals, and insurgencies are generally timed to wider 
breakdowns in the European geo-political order. Thus, the “First Serbian Rebellion” in 1804 was 
at least in part a result of the breakdown of the European order initiated by the French 
Revolution in 1789 and the subsequent struggle for power between France and Russia, and, to a 
tertiary degree, the effects of this struggle on the Ottoman Empire. The Congress of Vienna in 
1815, the Congress of Berlin in 1877, the Versailles Treaty in 1919, the Yalta and Potsdam 
agreements in 1944 and 1945, respectively, and the end of the Cold War in 1989-1992 all played 
determining roles in deciding upon which ethnoconfessional movement would be “successful” in 
the Balkans and which ones would not.
170
 The regularity of this pattern—i.e., the fact that the 
geo-political order in Europe changes with some regularity every two to three generations—begs 
a somewhat tantalizing question, especially from the perspective of the crisis in Europe in 
2011—namely, if large-scale change in Europe occurs every 40-60 years, and if the last such 
large-scale change in the European geo-political order last occurred some twenty years ago, and 
if Europe’s current leaders fail to come to grips with what is considered the most serious threat to 
the EU’s unity in its history, are we then, are we then on the cusp of a new reshuffling of the 
geopolitical deck in southeastern Europe? Hopefully not, because the history of such geo-
political upheaval has shown that it is always accompanied by tremendous bloodshed and 
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     A common bias amongst U.S. and Western European intellectual and political elites is that 
Europe and America represent the “ideal” model of socio-political and economic development, 
and that with the fall of communism we have reached the “end of history” in which liberal 
democratic, market economies become the logical (and moral) endpoint of human social 
development.  
 
     In reality, it is by no means clear that political and social solutions achieved in the West over 
the past two hundred years can be reproduced at this point in time in the Balkans, or anywhere 
else in the world. As Arnold Toynbee warned, we should beware the “parochialism and 
impertinence” of those in the West who believe that there is “only one river of civilization, our 
own, and that all others are either tributary to it or lost in the desert sands.”171 Moreover, the 
assumption that Balkan societies should evolve along the same lines as those in the West 
assumes that “the West” has successfully resolved its own national, ethnic, and racial 
problems—something hard to accept if we look at the continuing problems of the Basque region, 
Belgium, Corsica, Northern Ireland, French cities, or racial tensions in the U.S.  
 
     This philosophical skepticism regarding western teleological assumptions about the “end of 
history” and the supposedly inevitable triumph of western liberal democracy is matched with a 
similarly skeptical attitude about the theoretical premises upon which constructivist nation-
building projects are built, a realistic appreciation for their costs, and skepticism regarding the 
willingness of outsiders to shoulder the political and financial burden of such projects over the 
                                                        




long-haul in areas of the world that are not strategically vital to their interests.  As has been 
argued above, the international nation- and state building projects in Bosnia and Kosovo are 
likely to have been the most massive and ambitious in history, but both nevertheless failed in 
several significant ways. Thus, the chances for success of less well-funded future efforts are 
questionable. 
 
    Another important issue in this regard is whether and when it is politically or morally right for 
outsiders to intervene in situations which are the result, as has been argued throughout this 
dissertation, of long-term historical, political and social processes. Roger Petersen raises many 
important points when he notes, 
. . . if there are social processes with their own progressions and dynamics, then 
we must ask whether it is wise, or possible, to intervene to change or deflect the 
course of that progression. The discussion of “prevention” assumes that humans 
can create political institutions that can positively shape the course of social 
interactions. Creating institutions that are divorced from “broad social processes” 




     The understanding of ethnoconfessional nationalism presented in this dissertation—that it is 
collective, chronic, and non-economic—has considerable implications for the choice of policies 
appropriate for dealing with the problem. The collective nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism 
suggests that policies designed to deal with elites will be superficial and only deal with the 
symptoms of the problem, not with its root causes. A serious effort to deal with the problem must 
be focused on transforming the political culture of southeastern Europe as a whole, which is 
obviously a long-term project, and will, ultimately, depend primarily upon the willingness of the 
peoples of southeastern Europe to change their attitudes and beliefs about the nature of political 
and social relations within their respective states. In other words, such a transformation cannot be 
                                                        




imposed; it will have to be a voluntary decision by the general population to adopt a new 
framework for governing their societies. The chronic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism 
means that we should be skeptical of the belief that multiethnic, multicultural political units in 
southeastern Europe will, in the long-term, be stable or successful, unless the fundamental 
premise upon which the contemporary international political order is based—the nation-state—is 
superceded. Thus, until this change occurs, these states will remain especially prone to conflict 
and disintegration during times of geo-political upheaval. As has been repeatedly evident over 
the past two-hundred years, breakdowns in the European order have given the various Balkan 
ethnoconfessional groups opportunities to attempt to realize their national projects. 
Consequently, we should beware the temptation to think that ethnoconfessional problems in the 
region have been “solved.”  
 
     Finally, the non-economic nature of ethnoconfessional nationalism suggests that economic 
strategies intended to combat the phenomenon will be of only limited utility. The various Balkan 
ethnoconfessional groups have quite often sacrificed economic goals for national ones. While 
international donor’s conferences and World Bank loans are good things in and of themselves, 
the belief that financial or material gain will ultimately prove more seductive to the various 
ethnoconfessional groups in the Balkans than their nation-building projects has often shown 
itself to be futile. 
 
      Ultimately, this analysis suggests a modest, conservative approach to dealing with Balkan 






 Probably the most that can be done is to avoid policies that exacerbate 
the problem, and attempt to manage Balkan ethnoconfessional nationalism in a manner 
consistent with a realistic understanding of the phenomenon, and the time and resources 
available to would-be interveners. Even this, however, would be a significant step forward, 
because there is still a tremendous difference between aggravating a bad situation, or making a 
bad situation marginally better. 
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1910 Bosnian Sabor (Parliament) Elections 
 
During the last years of the Habsburg occupation of Bosnia & Herzegovina, the first democratic 
elections for a newly-formed provincial parliament were held, subsequent to Bosnia’s formal 




A number of parties formed and competed in the elections for the 61-seat parliament. Each 
ethnoconfessional group in Bosnia was allotted a certain number of seats according to its 
proportion of BiH’s total population. Thus, sixteen seats were reserved for Catholics (Croats), 24 
for the Muslims, and 31 for the Orthodox (Serbs). The Srpska narodna organizacija (Serb 
National Organization) won all thirty-one seats reserved for Serbs. The Croat seats were divided 
between the clericalist Hrvatska katolička udruga (Croatian Catholic Association, or HKU) and 
the more secular Hrvatska narodna zajednica (Croatian National Union, HNZ), which gained . 
All of the seats reserved for Muslims were taken by the Muslimanksa narodna organizacija 
(MNO).  The non-ethnoconfessional, Social Democratic Party, won zero seats.   
 
1921 Ratification Vote of the Vidovdan Constitution 
 
On 28 November 1920, the post-World War I “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes” held its 
first national elections for skupština (parliament). One of the most urgent tasks of the new 
parliament was to adopt a constitution for the country. As such, the 1921 vote in the skupština 
provides a clear example of how ethnic groups and the political parties/movements based on 
them vote in predictable blocs.  
 
The fundamental issue facing the new kingdom was whether to have a unitary, centralized state 
(modeled on the French system), as preferred by Serbia and Serbs in general, or to have a 
decentralized, federal system, which was the preference of most non-Serb ethnic groups. When it 
became clear that the non-Serb parties did not have the power to prevent the Serb factions from 
passing their preferred version through the skupština, most of them boycotted the legislature. 
Nevertheless, the constitution was passed, despite the boycott by several ethnically-based parties, 
on 28
th









                                                        
1 Sources: Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 70-
75; and Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Bosnia-Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia 









November 1920 Skupština Elections2: Total Seats   
 
Party    Number of Votes Percentage, Total Vote  Seats 
 
Serbian Radical   284,575    17.7  
 89 
Serbian Democrat  319,448    19.9   94 




Croatian Peasant  230,590    14.3   50 
Slovene Populist & 
Croatian Clerical  111,274    7.0   27 
Bosniac Muslim (JMO)  110,895    6.9  
 24 
Džemijet (Albanian Muslim) 30,029    1.9   8 
Communist   198,736    12.4   58 
Social Democrat  46,792    2.9   10 
Croatian bourgeois (four lists) 81,728    5.1   14 
Other (nine lists)  41,865    2.5   6 
 
Total    1,607,535   100.00   419 
 
 
The voting for the Vidovdan Constitution, and the boycotts that accompanied it, broke down 
along the following lines: 
 
Party    For   Against  
 Absent/Abstain 
 
Serbian Radicals  89 
Serbian Democrats  94 
                                                        
2 Source: Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars (Seattle, WA: University of 
Washington Press, 1974), 215. Please note: determining how many votes each party received by the ethnicity of 
each voter is difficult to ascertain because only adult males were eligible to vote, and I have not found the statistical 
data allowing the required calculations. Note also that other sources provide slightly different numbers for both the 
November 1920 parliamentary elections and for the voting for the Vidovan Constitution. See, most importantly, 
Charles A. Beard and George Radin, The Balkan Pivot: Yugoslavia, A Study in Government and Administration 
(New York: Macmillan, 1929), 39-56; Dejan Djokic, Elusive Compromise: A History of Interwar Yugoslavia 
(London: Hurst & Co., 2007), 43-53; John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 120-125.  




JMO    23 
Slovene Agrarians  6 
Serb Agrarians      21 
Social Democrats     7 
Communists         58   
Slovene Populists        27 
Croatian Peasants        50 
Džemijet (Albanian Muslim) 11 
 
As seen in the above, the Serb-dominated Radicals and Democrats overwhelmingly voted in 
favor of the Vidovdan Constitution (albeit, as John Lampe points out, eleven of the Democrats’ 
votes came from Croat, Slovene, Macedonian, and Montenegrin members of the party). The 
Bosnian Muslim JMO and the Kosovo Albanian Džemijet party also voted in favor of the 
Vidovdan Constitution in return for guarantees that Muslim landlords in Bosnia and Kosovo 
would be given compensation in the anticipated land-reform process. Not knowing the ethnic 
composition of the Yugoslav communists at this time makes it difficult to give precise figures 
about how individual representatives voted for the constitution when broken down by ethnicity, 
but in approximate terms it seems reasonable to assume that about 80 percent of the Slovenes 
and 90 percent of the Croats did not support passage of the Vidovdan Constitution, while over 75 
percent of the Serbs did.  
 
1974 Josifovski Study on Ethnic Distance in Macedonia 
 
In 1974, the Macedonian sociologist Ilija Josifovski published the results of his study of ethnic 
distance in the Macedonian town of Polog.
4
 Josifovski asked his informants a wide range of 
questions, the most interesting of which were the following: 
 
If you had to move to the city, would you prefer to live in a building with members of?  
 
   Your Own Nationality Any Other Nationality 
 
Albanians   70.5%    30%  
Macedonians   80.1%    19.9% 
Turks    69.5%    30.5% 
 
What is the ethnicity of your three closest friends?  
 
   All three my own nationality One of my nationality, two of another 
 
Albanians   88.5%    3.9% 
Macedonians   87.8%    7.7% 
Turks    89.5%    0.0 
 
                                                        
4 Ilija Josifovski, Makedonskoto, albanskoto i turskoto nasenlenie na selo vo Polog: Sociološka studija (Skopje: 




Would you allow your son to marry a woman of another ethnic group?  
 
    No    Yes 
 
Albanians   95.6%    4.4% 
Macedonians   95.5%    4.5% 
Turks    83.8%    16.2% 
 
August-September 1990 Krajina Serb Referendum on Autonomy 
 
From August 9
th—September 2nd, 1990, Serbs in Serb-majority regions in Croatia organized a 
referendum asking whether people supported autonomy for Serb-inhabited regions. Of 756,781 
people who participated in the referendum, over 99% voted in favor of autonomy. On May 12
th
, 




1990 Bosnia & Herzegovina Elections 
 
Bosnia & Herzegovina held its first multiparty elections after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 
November 1990. Following a pattern established for over a century in Bosnia, voters almost 
uniformly voted along ethnoconfessional lines for their own nationalist parties. To illustrate this 
point, it is worth comparing the ethnic structure of Bosnia’s population with the voting results for 
the three main nationalist parties.  
 
Bosnia & Herzegovina     November 1990 Election Results 
Ethnic Structure of Population, 1981   by Nationalist Party 
 
Bosniacs 43.7     SDA  37.80 
Croats  17.5     HDZ  14.70 
Serbs  31.3     SDS  26.50 
 
Another of other parties competed in the elections as well; should they be included, it would 
show that the voting along ethnoconfessional lines was even greater than the above results 
suggest. Thus, for instance, the political party led by prominent Bosniac businessman and 
intellectual Adil Zulfikarpašić, the Muslimanska Bošnjačka Organizacija (MBO) gained a 
further 0.80 percent of the Bosniac vote, while primarily Serb parties such as Vuk Drašković’s 
Srpski Pokret Obnove (Serbian Renewal Movement) or Vojislav Koštunica’s Demokratska 
Stranka Srbije (Democratic Party of Serbia) similarly gained 0.80 percent of the Serb vote.  
Civic, non-ethnic parties in the 1990 Bosnian elections were represented by the 
reformed/renamed Savez Komunista—Socijal Demokratska Partija (SK SDP, League of 
Communists—Social Democratic Party), which gained 6 percent of the total vote, and the reform 
party of Yugoslav federal prime minister Ante Marković (himself a Bosnian Croat) which gained 
                                                        









December 1990 Slovenian Plebiscite on Independence 
 
In the December 23
rd
 1990 Slovenian plebiscite on independence, voters were asked “Should the 
Republic of Slovenia become an autonomous and independent state?” 93.5 percent of eligible 




May 1991 Croatian Referendum on Independence 
 
On May 19
th, 1991, Croatian voters were asked “Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia as a 
sovereign and independent state, which guarantees cultural autonomy and all civil rights to Serbs 
and members of other nationalities in Croatia, may enter into an alliance with other republics?” 
83.6 percent of voters turned out, and 93 percent approved.
8
 A separate question asking whether 




September 1991 Macedonian Referendum on Independence 
 
On 8 September 1991, Macedonia held a referendum in which voters were asked the following 
question: “Do you agree to a sovereign or an independent State of Macedonia, with the right to 
join a future union of sovereign states of Yugoslavia?”  
 
Turnout for the referendum was 71.85 percent of the eligible electorate of 1,495,626 registered 
voters. Of these, 95.09 percent supported the measure. The referendum, however, was boycotted 
by both the Albanian and Serb communities in Macedonia, who represented 23 and 2.3 percent, 
respectively, of Macedonia’s population at the time. Taken in sum, this suggests that ethnically 
Macedonian eligible voters in the referendum voted almost unanimously in favor of 
independence. 
 
In the aftermath of the referendum, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov gave a speech noting 
that the voting results expressed “the centuries-long strivings of the Macedonian people.”10   
 
                                                        
6 Sources: Srđan Bogosavljević, “Bosna i Hercegovina u ogledalu statistike,” and Vladimir Goati, “Politički život 
Bosne i Hercegovine, 1989-1992,” in Srđan Bogosavljević, Vladimir Goati, et. al. Bosna i Hercegovina izmedju rata 
i mira (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1992), 34, 56, respectively. 
7 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 139. 
8 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 143. 
9 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 212. Cohen also points out that a vote organized by Krajina Serbs one week earlier on 
whether the Krajina should unite with Serbia was approved by a reputed 99.8 percent of the population.  
10 Sources: Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 1995), 466, ftn. 92; and Henryk J. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and 








In November 1991, an opinion poll of 900 students throughout Bosnia & Herzegovina was 
carried out asking respondents whether they thought BiH could survive as an independent 
country. Responses in the main were along ethnic lines, with 71% of Croatian students 
responding in the affirmative, 61% of Bosniac students, while only 6% of Serb students 
answered affirmatively.  
 




Between 26-30 September 1991, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim 
Rugova, organized a referendum asking whether or not Kosovo should become independent, 
both from Serbia, and from the Yugoslav federation. Chronologically, the referendum was being 
held in the same time period as similar referenda were taking place in republics throughout the 
former Yugoslavia. Since Kosovo was officially a province of Serbia, however, Serbian 
authorities declared the referendum to be illegal, unconstitutional, and invalid.  
 
Nevertheless, Rugova and the LDK proceeded. According to most reports, the referendum 
succeeded by an overwhelming margin. Out of 914,802 votes counted (representing 87 percent 
of Kosovo’s electorate at the time) 99.87 percent reportedly voted in favor of independence. 164 






October 1991 Sandžak Referendum on Political and Territorial Autonomy13 
 
The Sandžak is a mountainous area straddling the border of Serbia and Montenegro with a 
predominantly Muslim/Bosniac population. Traditionally, the Sandžak is considered to include 
eleven municipalities: six on the Serbian side (Nova Varoš, Novi Pazar, Priboj, Prijepolje, 
Sjenica, and Tutin), and five on the Montenegrin side (Bijelo Polje, Ivangrad, Plav, Plevlje, and 
Rožaje). According to the last official Yugoslav census completed in 1991, the population of 
these eleven municipalities was approximately 440,789, of which 52 percent (229,160) were 
Muslims/Bosniacs. 
 
                                                        
11 See Vladimir Goati, “Politički život Bosne i Hercegovine 1989-1992,” in Bogosavljević, et. al., Bosna i 
Hercegovina između rata i mira (Belgrade: Institut Društvenih Nauka, 1992), 61. 
12 Sources: Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 82; Besnik Pula, “The 
Emergence of the Kosovo ‘Parallel State,’ 1988-1992,” Nationalities Papers 32 (December 2004), 807; Peter R. 
Prifti, Confrontation in Kosova: The Albanian-Serb Struggle, 1969-1999 (New York: Eastern European 
Monographs, 1999), 204; Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1998), 251. 
13 Source: Milan Andrejevich, “The Sandžak: A Perspective of Serb-Muslim Relations” in Hugh Poulton and Suha 




On October 25-27 1991, Muslim/Bosniac political organizations in the Sandžak region, a 
mountainous areas straddling both sides of the border between Serbia and Montenegro, 
organized a referendum which asked voters whether they supported the region’s “full political 
and territorial autonomy” and its “right to [integration with] one of the sovereign republics” of 
the former Yugoslavia, which in this instance implied Bosnia-Herzegovina. The organizations 
supporting the referendum included the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Muslim 
Association, local branches of the Reform Forces of Plav and Bijelo Polje, and the Association 
of Sandžak Writers. The Serbian government declared that the referendum was illegal, 
unconstitutional and invalid; nevertheless, the organizers of the effort went forward with it.  
 
The published results of the referendum claim that 70.2 percent of eligible voters in the Sandžak 
region (185,437 out of 264,156) participated in the referendum, of which it was claimed that 98.9 
percent (183,301) voted in favor of autonomy. 
 
It is impossible to verify the accuracy of the results; however, even if the official results of the 
referendum are artificially inflated, there seems to be little doubt that a substantial majority of 
Muslims in the Sandžak did in fact vote in favor of it.  
 
January 1992 Albanian Referendum on “Illyria” 
 
On January 11-12, 1991, the two main ethnic Albanian political parties in Macedonia at the time, 
the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the People’s Democratic Party (NDP) organized a 
referendum in Albanian-populated areas of Macedonia which, according to different versions, 
either called for autonomy for Albanian-populated regions in Macedonia, collectively named 
“Illyria,” or their secession from the republic altogether. According to one report, over 90 
percent of the Albanian electorate in these areas turned out for the referendum, of which 99 
percent voted in favor of the proposed measures.
14
   
 
March 1992 Preševo Valley Referendum on Unification with Kosovo 
 
The Preševo Valley, in an area of southern Serbia adjoining Kosovo, is composed of three 
municipalities—Bujanovac, Medvedja, and Preševo. Altogether, some 70,000 Albanians live in 
the three muncipalities, with 90 percent of the population of Preševo municipality itself 
composed of ethnic Albanians, 54.2 of Bujanovac municipality, and 30 percent of Medvedja.  
 
In March 1992, Albanians in the Preševo Valley held a referendum asking voters whether or not 
they supported gaining autonomy within Serbia, and possible unification with Kosovo. Over 90 
percent of the Albanian population in the Preševo Valley participated in the referendum, with 




                                                        
14
 Sources: Hugh Poulton, Who are the Macedonians? (Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, 1995), 136; 
Henryk J. Sokalski, An Ounce of Prevention: Macedonia and the UN Experience in Preventive Diplomacy 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 41; and Zvezdan Georgijevski, “Rule of Fear,” 
Reporter (Banja Luka), 20 March 2001. 







April 1998 USIA Public Opinion Surveys in Bosnia & Herzegovina 
 
In April 1998, the United State Information Agency (USIA) published the findings of a detailed 
survey of public opinion in Bosnia & Herzegovina approximately two years after the end of 
hostilities. Questions posed to survey participants ranged from queries on the state of the 
economy, to survey participants views of international affairs, to the state of interethnic relations 
and trust in public institutions. A representative review of sample questions returns the following 
answers:  
 
Table 6, February 1998: How much confidence do you have in SFOR/IFOR? Bosnian Serbs, 
26%; Bosnian Croats, 28%; Bosnian Muslims, 82% 
 
Table 10, February 1998: How much confidence do you have in the High Representative? 
Bosnians Serbs, 22%; Bosnian Croats, 27%; Bosnian Muslims, 78% 
 
Table 22: February 1998: What is your opinion of the provision that Bosnia & Herzegovina will 
remain a single state? Bosnian Serbs, 18%; Bosnian Croats, 36%; Bosnian Muslims, 97% 
 
Table 24, February 1998: Some people say that it is inevitable that the country will be 
partitioned into three ethnic communities. Others say that we will ultimately be able to live 
together peacefully. Which view is closer to your own? Three ethnic communites: Bosnian Serbs, 
85%; Bosnian Croats, 78%; Bosnian Muslims, 5%. Will be able to live together: Bosnian Serbs, 
5%; Bosnian Croats, 15%; Bosnian Muslims, 90%.  
 
Table 25, February 1998: Do you favor or oppose the existence of the Bosnian Serb Republic? 
Bosnian Serbs, 98% strongly or somewhat favor; Bosnian Croats, 47% strongly or somewhat 
favor; Bosnian Muslims, 11% strongly or somewhat favor.  
 
Table 59, February 1998: Nationality-mixed marriages are generally not a good thing: Bosnian 
Serbs, 70% agree; Bosnian Croats, 80 percent agree, Bosnian Muslims, 44% agree. 
 
Table 121, February 1998: Do you think that Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat students 
should be taught from the same curriculum or different curricula? Same curricula: Bosnian 
Croats, 15%; Bosnian Muslims, 94%. Different curricula: Bosnian Croats, 78%; Bosnian 
Muslims, 3%.  
 
Table 145, February 1998: How much confidence do you have in TVBiH television news 





                                                        
16 Source: Public Opinion in Bosnia Hercegovina Volume V: Two Years After Dayton. Washington, DC: United 










    In April 2002, the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Podgorica, Montenegro 
(CEDEM) carried out a public opinion poll throughout Montenegro in the aftermath of the 
signing of the March 2002 Belgrade Agreement, which had established the State Union of 
Serbia-Montenegro. Individuals surveyed were asked a number of question regarding their 
support for the Belgrade Agreement, and overall attitudes about the political situation in 
Montenegro. 
 
    Amongst the most interesting findings are the following:  
 
 When asked whether or not they supported the Belgrade Agreement, overall, 61.6 percent 
of respondents answered “Yes,” 23.0 percent answered “No,” and 15.4 percent were 
“Uncertain.” When broken down by ethnic group, however, the responses were 
significantly different. Thus, 57.6 percent of Montenegrins expressed support for the 
Belgrade Agreement, 77.1 percent of Serbs, 39.2 percent of Muslims, and 15.4 percent of 
Albanians.  
 When asked whether or not they would vote in favor of a referendum on independence 
for Montenegro rather than on the Belgrade Agreement, 57.8 percent of Montenegrins, 
86.5 percent of Muslims, and 96.2 percent of Albanians voted “Yes.” Serbs were the only 
ethnic group to vote “No” on this question, with 79.0 percent being opposed.  
 When asked to express their confidence in leading institutions in Montenegro, the 
Serbian Orthodox Church emerged as the public institution in which Montenegrin 
citizens had the highest levels of confidence, surpassing in this regard the President of 
Montenegro, the government, the Yugoslav Army, police, judiciary, etc. However, there 
were significant differences in the responses to this question according to ethnic group. 
Thus, while 75.9 percent of Serbs expressed “Great” and “Medium” confidence in the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, while 47.4 percent of Montenegrins, 66.1 percent of 
Albanians, and 54.7 percent of Muslims expressed “Very Little Confidence” or “No 
Confidence” in it. 
 When asked to express their confidence in the president of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (at the time, Vojislav Kostunica), 59.8 percent of Serbs expressed “Medium 
Confidence” or “Great Confidence” in the federal president, while 87.5 percent of Croats 
expressed “Little Confidence” or “No Confidence”, 85.1 percent of Muslims, 64.7 
percent of Montenegrins, and 61.5 percent of Albanians.  
 Interestingly, the poll also noted the following: “In this research it is characteristic for 
Albanians that in their attitude towards institutions, especially towards federal 
institutions, besides the negative attitude expressed in the text, a considerable percent of 
them declared themselves neutral. No subject of Albanian nationality with positive 
attitude towards some of the federal institutions has been registered.” 
 When asked whether or not they supported cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the “Yes” and “No” responses according to 
                                                        




ethnic group were as follows: Montenegrins, 47.5 percent/35 percent; Serbs, 10.4 
percent/76.5 percent; Muslims 89.2 percent/1.4 percent; Albanians, 84.6 percent/3.9 
percent   
 
 
November 2000 Herceg-Bosna Referendum in BiH 
     
      On November 11
th
, 2000, the Croatian National Congress (HNS), an umbrella organization 
comprising several smaller Croat political parties in BiH, together with the main Croat political 
organization, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), held a referendum asking citizens to 
approve a “Declaration on the Rights and Position of the Croat People,” to be organized 
concurrently with BiH’s parliamentary elections. Voters were asked to say whether or not they 
approved measures calling for “full political and cultural equality” for Croats in BiH, to include 
the establishment of independent Croat political, scientific, educational, and information 
institutions in BiH. Although the wording itself was not completely explicit, most observes 
interpreted the referendum as asking Bosnian Croat voters whether or not they supported the 
formation of a third, specifically Croat, entity in Bosnia. Of the 303,367 Croats registered to vote 
in BiH, 216.191 (71.02 percent) participated in the referendum, of which 213,994 (98.96 
percent) voted in favor of the declaration. 1,252 (0.57 percent) voted against. Importantly, even 









     On October 23, 2004, Kosovo held its second parliamentary elections after an international 
protectorate had been established in the disputed Serbian province in June 1999. The elections 
were held in the aftermath of large-scale violence against Serbs and other ethnic groups in 
Kosovo had erupted in March 2004. Given concerns over freedom of movement, Kosovo Serbs 
overwhelmingly chose to boycott the elections. Kosovo’s Central Election Commission and the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported that 99 percent of Serbs 
registered to vote in Kosovo refused to vote in the parliamentary elections. Other sources 
reported that out of 96,000 Serbs registered to vote in Kosovo, only 300 cast ballots.  
 
     Overall, Kosovo’s Central Election Commission and the OSCE reported that 53.08 percent of 
Kosovo’s registered voters cast ballots in the parliamentary elections (670,000 out of 1,412,000 
total).  
 
                                                        
18 Sources: “Deklaracija o pravima i položaju hrvatskog naroda dobila plebiscitarnu podršku, za referendum-95 
posto,” Slobodna Dalmacija, 13 November 2000, available at: 
http://arhiv.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20001113/novosti.htm, accessed on 26 July 2007; “U Mostaru objavljeni konačni 
rezultati plebiscitarnog referenduma o deklaraciji. Hrvatski narodni sabor ovlašten za nove korake,” Slobodna 
Dalmacija, 14 November 2000, available at: http://arhiv.slobodnadalmacija.hr/20001114/novosti1.htm#bih, 
accessed on 26 July 2007; Bose, Bosnia After Dayton, 29. 
19 Source: Danas (Belgrade), 25 October 2004, available at http://www.danas.co.yu/20041025/frontpage1.html. 





Bosnia-Herzegovina Public Opinion Survey, July 2005 
 
     A public opinion survey conducted by Agencija Partner Marketing of Banja Luka at the 
beginning of July 2005 asked 1,200 citizens across Bosnia-Herzegovina of legal voting age the 
following question: “Should Croats get their own entity in BiH?” Respondents were broken 
down according to ethnicity. The results were as follows: 
 
Among Croat respondents: 
 
Completely agree:  42 percent 
Agree in general:  29 percent 
Generally do not agree:  15 percent 
Do not agree at all:  11 percent 
Do not know/refuse to answer: 3 percent 
 
Among Serb respondents: 
 
Completely agree:  20 percent 
Agree in general:  23 percent 
Generally do not agree:  22 percent 
Do not agree at all:  29 percent 
Do not know/refuse to answer: 5 percent 
 
Among Bosniak respondents, responses were even more uniformly opposed, with 91 percent of 
Bosniaks answering “Generally do not agree” (17 percent), or “Do not agree at all” (74 percent).   
  
 
September 2005 Republika Srpska--Bosnia-Herzegovina Public Opinion Survey 
 
     A public opinion survey conducted by Agencija Partner Marketing of Banja Luka in mid-
September 2005 asked 850 participants of legal voting age in a representative sample the 
following question: “Should Republika Srpska secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina and join Serbia 
if Kosovo is granted independence?” The results are as follows: 
 
Completely agree:  54.1 percent 
Generally agree:  21.6 percent 
Generally do not agree:  8.2 percent 
Do not agree at all:  6.2 percent 
Do not know/refuse to answer: 9.8 percent 
 
As can be seen from the above, 75.7 percent of RS respondents either agreed to some measure 
with the proposition that the RS should secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina and join Serbia if 





The results of this survey become more ethnically-uniform, however, when one takes into 
account the fact that according to 2005 estimates, 88.4 percent of the RS population is Serb, 
while 11.6 percent is estimated to be either Bosniac or Croat. Thus, were the survey to have been 
broken down along ethnic lines, it is highly likely that “Generally do not agree” or “Do not agree 
at all responses” would have come mainly from Bosniaks and Croats. Conversely, it is safe to 
assume that over 80 percent of Serb respondents would have answered either “Completely 
agree” or “Generally agree.” 
 
What is also noteworthy about this survey is that there are fairly consistent attitudes towards this 
question regardless of age. 81 percent of respondents aged 29-45 agreed with the above 
proposition, 77 percent of respondents 46-59 agreed, while for older respondents (60 and above; 





May 2006 Montenegrin Independence Referendum 
 
     On 21 May 2006, Montenegrin citizens were asked to vote on the following question: “Do 
you want the Republic of Montenegro to be an independent state with full international and legal 
personality?” 
 
     According to official results, 55.49 of valid votes cast in the referendum approved of the vote, 
while 44.11 percent of the valid votes disapproved.  
 
     A breakdown of the Montenegrin independence referendum by municipality (see below) 
shows that voting was largely along ethnoconfessional lines. Municipalities shaded in blue 
(mainly bordering Serbia and/or Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina), voted against the 









     However, looking at the referendum results and comparing them to the ethnoconfessional 
demographics of each municipality reveals the degree to which ethnoconfessional groups vote as 
unitary actors. For instance, in Cetinje, the old royal capital of Montenegro, 93 % of the 
population according to the 2003 Montenegrin census is Montenegrin, and 2.62% is Serb. 
86.38% of voters in Cetinje municipality voted in favor of independence.  
 
     Referendum results were similar in municipalities with large Albanian, Bosniak, or Muslim 
populations. For instance, in Rožaje municipality, the ethnoconfessional breakdown of the 
population is as follows: Bosniaks, 82.09%; Muslims, 6.65%; Albanians, 4.44%; Serbs, 3.98%; 
Montenegrins, 1.94%. Thus, Bosniaks, Muslims, and Albanians constituted roughly 94% of 
Rožaje municipality’s population. 91.33% of Rožaje municipality voted in favor of 
independence.  
 
     In Plav municipality, the ethnocofessional breakdown of the population is as follows: 49.32% 
Bosniak; 5.71% Muslim; 19.70% Albanian, 5.54% Montenegrin; and 18.93% Serb. In total, 80% 
of Plav municipality’s population consists of Bosniaks, Muslims, Albanians, and Montenegrins; 
78.92% of Plav municipality’s population voted in favor of independence.  
 
     In Herceg Novi municipality, 52.88% of the population declared themselves to be Serbs in the 




themselves as Croats, and 8.60% were nationally undeclared. 61% of Herceg Novi’s population 
voted against independence.  
 
     In sum, as a March 2007 NDI study on Montenegro noted, “the defining division in 
Montenegro continues to be one’s ethnic identification, which has been the case since NDI began 
to conduct opinion research in Montenegro since 2001.”20 
 
 
February 2007 Serbian Parliament Vote on Ahtisaari Plan 
 
     On 14 February 2007, the 250 seat Serbian parliament debated a resolution entitled 
“Resolution following UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari’s "Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement" and continuation of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo-
Metohija.” The resolution rejected the UNSG’s Special Envoy for Kosovo plan to give Kosovo 
conditional independence from Kosovo. Part of the Resolution is as follows: 
 
“The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia therefore rejects all articles in 
the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy's Proposal which breach the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia as an internationally 
recognised state. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia warns that this 
questions the possibility of coming to a compromise solution reached through 
agreement which would represent the basic goal of talks on Kosovo-Metohija's 
future status.” 
 
     The resolution passed the parliament with 225 representatives voting in favor (out of 240 
present), and 15 against. The coalition in favor of the resolution included all of the major 
political parties in the country—DSS, DS, G17, SRS, SPS. Those voting against were members 










     The April-June Early Warning Report Kosovo was based on an opinion poll conducted during 
the first half of 2007, based on face-to-face interviews with 1,250 respondents: 851 Kosovo 
                                                        
20 See National Democratic Institute for International Affairs Montenegro Key Findings Baseline Poll—February 
2007 (March 9, 2007), available at: http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2128_mn_focusgroups_030907.pdf 
(accessed on 2 July 2007).  
21 Sources:  “Resolution following UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari’s "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement" and continuation of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo-Metohija,” available at 
http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/specijal.php?id=31679 (accessed on 26 June 2007); “Већина за нову резолуцију 
о Космету,” Politika (Belgrade), 15 February 2007, available at: 
http://www.politika.co.yu/detaljno_arhiva.php?nid=19859&y=2007&m=2&d=15 (accessed on 26 June 2007). 




Albanians, 206 Kosovo Serbs, and 193 respondents from other nationalities (Bosnians, Gorani, 
Turks, Ashkali, Roma, and Egyptians).  
 
Respondees were asked a variety of questions, including the following:  
 
What is your preferred option for Kosovo’s future status? 96 percent of Kosovo Albanians 
surveyed indicated independence was the best option; 77 percent of Kosovo Serbs said 
autonomous status within Serbia was the best option. 
 
Is the Ahtisaari Plan fair? 97 percent of Kosovo Serbs answered negatively; 65 percent of 
Kosovo Albanians, and 69 percent of “Others” answered positively. 
 
Do you agree with the establishment of special zones around cultural monuments? 65 percent of 
Kosovo Albanians disagreed with such a move; 71 percent of Serbs agreed or strongly agreed.  
 
Do you agree that Kosovo Serb municipalities should have the right to special relations with 
each other and with Serbia? 67 percent of Kosovo Albanians overwhelmingly disagree, and 26 
percent strongly disagree with this proposal; 54 percent of Kosovo Serbs agree with the proposal, 
and 31 percent strongly agree.  
 
Are you satisfied with the performance of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC)? 89 percent of 
Kosovo Albanians responded positively, while only 5 percent of Kosovo Serb respondents did.  
 
 




     A public opinion poll conducted by the GPO polling organization in Greece in June 2007, and 
published in the To Proto Thema (Athens) weekly newspaper on 10 June 2007, asked Greek 
citizens the following question: “Should the Greek government veto FYROM’s accession to 
NATO using the name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia?” 
 
     82.3 percent of the respondents replied "yes" and "probably yes," while 16.8 percent replied 
"no" and "probably no,” 2.3 percent didn't reply. 
 
     Seven in 10 respondents rejected any name that included the term "Macedonia" in FYROM's 
name, with 67.9 percent calling on the government to insist to the end on a name that does not 
contain "Macedonia", while 61.3 percent were in favor of a referendum on the name issue. 
 
86.1 percent of the respondents considered the FYROM name issue to be of great importance to 
Greece. 
 
                                                        
23 Sources: http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=19&article=20901; 
accessed on 10 July 2007; http://www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2007/07/06/afx3888877.html; accessed 





February 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor survey on “Greater Albania” 
 
    In February 2010, the Gallup Balkan Monitor organized a public opinion survey in Albania, 
Kosovo, and Macedonia asking respondents “Would you personally support the formation of 
Greater Albania?” In Albania, out of a sample of 1000 individuals, 70.5 percent responded 
positively. In Kosovo (n=931) 74.2 responded affirmatively. In Macedonia (n=1008) 13.6 




    Since the survey’s methodology was not published, it is unclear why a significantly lower 
percentage of people responded to the question positively. One explanation may be that the 
survey was conducted amongst both Albanians and Macedonians, in which case it would be 
predictable that Macedonians would answer negatively.  
 
July 2010 Public Opinion Survey on Macedonian Name Issue 
 
     In July 2010, a public opinion survey conducted amongst 1110 respondents in the Republic of 
Macedonia asked them whether they considered the name dispute with Greece to be more 
important than membership in NATO and the EU. Among ethnic Macedonian respondents, 
82.1% said that maintaining the country’s constitutional name (i.e., “The Republic of 
Macedonia”) was more important than NATO and EU membership. Among ethnic Albanian 
respondents, on the other hand, 77.8% said that NATO and EU membership was the more 




July 2010 Gallup Balkan Monitor survey on Kosovo Independence 
 
     In July 2010, a Gallup Balkan Monitor survey published the views of respondents throughout 
southeastern Europe regarding how they viewed Kosovo’s February 2008 Declaration of 
Independence and its consequences. Among the more interesting responses were the following: 
“Do you feel secure in independent Kosovo?” Albanians, 92%; Serbs, 7%. When asking citizens 
of Serbia proper whether they believed that Serbia should recognize Kosovo for the sake of EU 
membership, 70% replied negatively.
26
 
                                                        
24 The survey results are available at: http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/index.php/dashboard Accessed on 1 July 2010 
at: 3:28pm EST. 
25 See Sinisa Jakov Marusic, “Macedonians Opt for Name Over EU, NATO,” available at: 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/29413/ Accessed on 14 July 2010 at 11:45pm EST.  
26 Source: “Focus On: Kosovo’s Independence,” Gallup Balkan Monitor (July 2010), available at: 
http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/Gallup_Balkan_Monitor-Focus_On_Kosovo_Independence.pdf Accessed on 11 
August 2010 at: 11:16am EST.  
